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Abstract 
This dissertation argues that Eastern Orthodox theology is a framework for multidimensional 
social change or improvement and can  inform, and be informed by the multi-disciplinary social 
science field of development studies. This claim will be examined by analyzing the Trinitarian 
theology of the Orthodox theologian Dumitru Staniloae in relation to the writings of Nobel 
Economist Amartya Sen and his ‘capability approach’.  
 
 
The argument begins by justifying EO’s interaction with development studies based on her 
anthropological optimism.  Critical is that supernatural revelation stands very close to and builds 
on natural revelation.  A Trinitarian theological anthropology then provides a rationale for, and 
integration of, three key concepts in the social sciences:   agency, solidarity, and structures.   
This analytical framework is then used to assess the challenges of post-Communist contexts, 
where most Orthodox live.   The Communist downfall, it is argued, involved a failure to 
incorporate each of these dimensions in human development.   This analysis then serves to test 
the adequacy of, and reveal weaknesses in, Amartya Sen’s freedom-focused social evaluation 
framework known as the capability approach. 
 
The dissertation proceeds with examining Orthodox salvation as movement from Being, to Well-
being, to Eternal-being where Well-being is, notably, the exercise of agency to develop the 
potentials given in Being.  Agency is not individualistic, but is structured into the virtues of 
solidarity and incorporates the related notion of phronesis (practical reason).  The virtue tradition 
is then postulated as a promising link between theology and development studies.  The virtue 
tradition is analyzed in its classical background, modern human development, as well as both 
Protestantism and Catholicism to facilitate a comparison with Eastern Orthodoxy.  This analysis 
shows that Orthodoxy offers a theological framework for human development in that she gives 
priority of practical reason to contemplation, makes virtually no separation between grace and 
nature, and provides a relevant method for synergizing salvation history with action on behalf of 
human development. 
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1. INTRODUCTION:  EASTERN ORTHODOXY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
This study arose out of almost fifteen years of reflection on practice in a post-communist 
Eastern Orthodox country.   In 1999, my wife and I moved to an impoverished coal-mining 
region of Romania to engage in youth development through experiential education.  
Romania had some of the worst experiences of Communism and the coal mining region we 
moved to is storied in terms of its underdevelopment and corruption.   The early years of 
our time meant learning the hard way the real meaning of the expression “in Romania, 
everything is possible” and the wisdom of “Be wise as serpents...”   Long years in court 
cases against what I thought were trusted friends; deep levels of deception and trickery 
including IRS (Garda Financiara) impersonations and constant disinformation schemes; 
such experiences were a painful baptism into the realities of corruption.   Such experiences 
also meant coming to terms with the learned-helplessness, interpersonal suspicion, fear, 
and lack of civic engagement engendered by Communism.   Within this challenging 
context, we created a replicable process through which youth can become agents of 
positive change, learning to work together to identify and rectify community burdens.   
It was also within this context that I began to read Dumitru Staniloae and discerned that 
EO contains, even if it may not seem apparent, a powerful theology of transformative 
praxis, a theology that this thesis aims to disclose.   At the end of this study, this “learn by 
doing” approach to youth development will be revisited as an effective way to address 
many of the challenges left by Communism.  
 
*           *          *          * 
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Eastern Orthodox theology is often considered a barrier to progress and indifferent to 
concepts such as human rights.   This thesis will show that not only is this not the case, but 
her theology constitutes a powerful framework for human development.  This will be 
demonstrated through a wide ranging conversation primarily between Dumitru Staniloae, 
representing Eastern Orthodoxy, and Nobel Economist Amartya Sen and his “capability 
approach” to human development.1  This study has far ranging implications between East 
and West, between religious faith and modernity.    
Readers familiar with Eastern Orthodox contexts are perhaps already uneasy.   Eastern 
Orthodoxy (hereafter EO) and human development?  EO and social action?  Yes, at least in 
terms of a theological framework that brings these concepts into the very heart of 
salvation, even if it is recognized EO fails (like others) to fully achieve her own ideals.   
Catholic theologian Catherine Lacugna noted the problem, but also the potential: 
It is ironic that while Orthodox ethics may have the ontology and soteriology more 
appropriate to this ... ethicists in the West are the ones who have actually advanced the 
critique of personhood in its social and political dimensions (LaCugna 1991, p. 285).  
It is important to note at the outset that this thesis is neither defending nor condemning 
social practice in societies where EO is the dominant religion.  This is not to say that some 
features, such as the closeness of the Church and State and the focus on monastic 
spirituality, are unproblematic.
2
    Rather the aim here is to explore the adequacy of EO’s 
conceptual tools to make sense of, motivate, and bring Christian faith into closer 
                                                          
1
 Human Development (HD) is a term used in many fields, not just the academic discipline of Development 
Studies (DS).  As will be seen especially in chapter four, Sen’s Capability Approach (CA) is a specific way 
of conceptualizing human development (HD) within the broader academic field of DS, with the complication 
that HD is often used as a synonym for Sen’s CA.    
2
 Many Orthodox argue similar criticisms as these (Nissiotis 1962).   
 3 
integration with human development concerns.  EO can make a fundamental contribution 
here because theological dogma (salvation itself) and social ethics (human development 
being an expression of this) are not separate domains as has been the case in Western 
theology (LaCugna 1991, p. 287; Abrams 2009).
3
   
However, some will press further:  why the stark gap between theory and practice in EO 
countries?    There are several answers.  Empirical studies have shown that the dominant 
influence in most Orthodox cultures is in fact not religion, but rather the corrupting effects 
of Marxist inspired Communism (Howard 2003, p. 16; Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005).
4
    
Furthermore, EO cultures are relatively new to the challenges and pressures of modernity.  
As Rowan Williams argues, apart from a brief burst by Russia in the later 19th century, 
there was little theological vitality “in any other historically Orthodox society–partly for 
the simple reason that no other such society had enjoyed real cultural independence for 
centuries” (Williams 2005, p. 572), or around 500 years to be more precise (Harakas 1983, 
p. 16).     Even Greece is barely beginning to develop an intellectual ethos of its own after 
an extended period of Ottoman occupation, evident in thinkers such as Christos Yannaras 
(Yannaras 2002; 2007).    The long-range social potential of EO, developing its own 
vitality within democratic contexts and under its own leadership, is much too early to tell.   
These caveats noted, the argument concerning EO’s relevance for human development 
proceeds, allowing for the fact that EO cultures are often considered “backward” (Pollis 
1993; Harrison 2006), but also that such assessments can be based on biased perceptions of 
the Orthodox world (Wolff 2001).    
                                                          
3
 Lacugna notes:  “The vision of ethics as theosis [salvation] directly links ethics to soteriology and theology, 
whereas, Harakas [an EO ethicist] rightly points out, ethics and dogmatic theology are quite distinct 
disciplines in Western theology” (LaCugna 1991, p. 287). 
4
 More specifically, East Germany, or Poland, for example, has similarly low rates of civil society 
participation as the rest of post-communist Europe (Howard 2003, p. 18). 
 4 
Recognizing the uphill nature of the battle, perhaps the best way to address scepticism 
about EO and development is to lay out the argument of this thesis, chapter by chapter.  
After this, sources, audiences, and methodology will be considered.  
Following this introduction, chapter two justifies this “dia-logue” between EO and 
development studies (DS).  Chapter two articulates the methodology of the thesis 
(presented also briefly below), showing that a dialogue can legitimately be established 
between such apparently disparate domains as EO theology and DS.  Here, the most 
fundamental point is that EO holds a rather optimistic view of the human condition and 
views her own theological reflection as taking place in close continuity, both being 
enhanced by, but also enhancing, general human wisdom.
5
 Protestant theologian Jurgen 
Moltmann notes that “Orthodox theology has preserved a creation wisdom which was 
pushed aside and lost in the West” (Moltmann 1993, p. xv).  But perhaps surprisingly, it is 
Orthodoxy’s view of the Trinity that can establish the strongest links between EO theology 
and DS.  The Trinity in EO (but especially clear in Staniloae) expresses an anthropology 
involving three distinct dimensions—person, communion, and shared nature.  It will be 
argued that these correspond with, affirm, and synthesize three fundamental “values” in the 
human sciences:  agency, solidarity, and structures—and that human development cannot 
be adequately conceptualized without affirming all three of these simultaneously.
6
   This 
Trinitarian analysis (which will be extended throughout the thesis) shows how theology 
can dialogue with but also contribute to the social sciences—even on its own terms.  Then, 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, some Orthodox thinkers argue that what faith provides is not any new content, but “the necessary 
motivation for the doing of the good” that is already generally recognized (Harakas 1983, p. 8).   
6
 If this connection between the Trinity and the social sciences seems like a stretch for those unfamiliar with 
Orthodoxy, consider that leading ethicist Stanley Harakas insists:  “The affirmation that the Triune God is the 
supreme good does not exclude, but in fact includes aspects of all other understandings of the good 
developed by ethicists throughout history” (Harakas 1983, p. 33).  He notes that this involves “in-born ethical 
capabilities”, the role of law, evolution, perfection, pleasure, all as partial perceptions of the good. 
 
 5 
in order to establish the dialogue from the side of DS, DS is shown to be concerned with 
“change for the better”, which mirrors definitions of salvation within EO and coheres 
closely with the Second Great Commandment.  The chapter finishes by arguing that, in 
order for meaningful dialogue to be possible, DS must gain critical distance from the 
notion that Western philosophical liberalism is the only basis for human development.    
Chapter three places this dialogue between EO and DS in a wider context, both 
conceptually and geographically.  First, there is an orientation to the discourse, or lack 
thereof, between Christian faith and the social sciences.  Important here is Liberation 
Theology’s adoption of Marxist theory in Latin America, with which this project is an 
analogue.  However, for EO geographical contexts, Marxist theory is untenable because it 
proved utterly tragic in practice.   Marxism failed, it will be argued, precisely because it 
did not respect the Trinitarian picture of the human condition, which is to say it did not 
recognize the simultaneous importance of agency (person), solidarity (communion), and 
structures (nature’s norms).  A misguided and unnatural “structuralism” destroyed both 
personal agency and interpersonal communion.   An approach to development relevant for 
Orthodox contexts must come to terms with the effects of this disastrous global social 
science experiment. 
Chapter four then analyzes Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) with this post-
Communist situation in mind.   Sen’s approach emphasizes “development as freedom” 
which is a necessary corrective to the agency-denying structuralism of Communism.  
However, as will be demonstrated, this focus on agency is insufficient by itself.  Humans 
must also be conceptualized as communal beings, and not only this but also sharing in a 
common nature that serves as a basis of moral obligation to humanity as such.   Making 
explicit these additional dimensions provides a more satisfying and coherent 
anthropological basis for Sen’s capability approach.   Despite these problems with Sen’s 
 6 
liberal/individualistic foundations, the capability approach still offers many helpful insights 
and can aid in conceptualizing an EO theology of human development.   
Chapter Five then shifts to the dogma of the Incarnation and explores its relevance in the 
light of human development concerns.  Theosis (deification) is multidimensional “change 
for the better”, which is identical to the definition of DS.  Theosis as movement from 
“image into likeness” (or potentiality to actuality) reveals that deification and 
“humanification” are two sides of the same coin.   Maximus the Confessor reframes this 
Hebraic idiom into a movement from Being, to Well-being, to Eternal-being where Well-
being is the actualization of nature’s/Being’s potentials through the exercise of agency.  
Important here is that Orthodoxy views creational structures in a dynamic way; genuine 
progress or development is possible.   
Chapter six introduces the question of whether virtue ethics can serve as a bridge between 
religious faith and development studies, a question that will remain until the end of the 
study.   To systematically address this question, chapter six analyzes virtues first on the 
secular side.  It begins with the classical background, especially Aristotle’s formulation, 
and then examines the virtues in modern day human development.  It is argued that Sen’s 
individual freedoms can be more reliably linked to human development by employing the 
virtue theory that he dropped from his mentor Adam Smith.  Other virtue approaches are 
then examined such as Martha Nussbaum’s and Positive Psychology which provides a 
more complete picture. 
Chapter seven then discusses the virtues in Western theology as a basis for comparison 
with EO.   Protestantism tended to repudiate the virtues in favour of a Divine Command 
theory and clues for the troubled conceptual relationship between faith and human 
development are sought here.  Stanley Hauerwas is examined as a promising Protestant 
 7 
entry, but his insistence that Christian virtues are absolutely distinctive undermines taking 
into account creational wisdom, or nature’s norms.   The Catholic affirmation of the virtues 
is then analyzed especially in terms of the natural-supernatural distinction and the 
privileging of contemplation over practical reason as in neo-scholasticism.  This chapter 
also examines Jacques Maritain’s role in human development, the changes that occurred at 
Vatican II, and several social encyclicals bearing on development.     
Chapter eight, with this background in mind, investigates meta-ethical issues relating to 
Orthodox virtues.  First, it is shown that Staniloae presents Orthodoxy as a “phronetic” 
science of human development, linking Orthodox salvation directly with practical 
reasoning which it places prior to contemplation.
7
   It is also shown that Orthodoxy has 
never split the virtues into natural and supernatural which brings grace in closer alignment 
with the development of natural powers.   Lastly, the practical reasoning approach of 
Orthodoxy is compared with that in development studies, noting that Orthodoxy is not 
content to develop a universal list of desirable human functions, or identify injustices to be 
remedied, but advocates a therapeutic program for getting humans back on track for human 
development.    
Chapter nine examines briefly the Orthodox list of virtues, showing how close these are to 
the concerns and vocabulary of human development.   The pinnacle of the virtues, “love” 
is then examined in detail, arguing that it is both deeply communitarian and cosmopolitan.   
The doctrine of synergy is then introduced as the capstone of Orthodoxy, whereby 
salvation is not mere belief, but re-incarnating Christ’s philanthropia in the world today.  
Synergy provides a theological framework that gives priority to God’s initiative in 
salvation history, but links these great actions of God directly with practical reason 
                                                          
7
 Phronesis, often translated prudence, wisdom, or practical reason, is a meta-virtue in that it includes all the 
other practical virtues.   
 8 
(phronesis) understood as problem-solving on behalf of human development.   Chapter ten 
concludes with a view towards clarifying the contribution to the various literatures, and 
returns to the question of youth development.   
Looking again briefly at the thesis from the vantage point of these two dogmas, Trinity and 
Incarnation, can further clarify the argument.  The first part of the thesis (chapters 2-4) 
establishes a Trinitarian theory of personhood which is used to analyze claims about the 
nature of human development within Marxism, Sen’s approach, but also (later in the 
thesis) theological models such as Hauerwas and Maritain.   Social theories (both secular 
and theological) imply both a “metaphysics” and a “model of man” which complement one 
another (Hollis 1980, p. 3).  Social science theories, but also theology, have tended to see 
the person as individual agent, or as communal, or as structured (internally or externally), 
with various emphases given to these.  The aim throughout this thesis, but especially in the 
first three chapters, is to show why each of these separated from the other is incomplete 
and that human development presupposes, even on secular terms, all three.   
The second and other major structuring feature is the Incarnation, comprehending the rest 
of the thesis (chapters five through nine).   Here, the virtues are pivotal because the virtues 
are not only the climax of EO theosis, but are emerging as a bridge between religious faith 
and development studies.  This motivates a comparative analysis which aims to illuminate: 
a) the potentials and problems inherited from the classical conceptions and primarily 
Aristotle; b) how the virtues can enhance modern development debates; and c) the 
distinctiveness of EO vis-a-vis Protestantism and Catholicism.  A corollary with this virtue 
approach is practical reason (phronesis) which is also explored as a bridge between EO and 
human development.  Maximus affirms that “the Logos of God is revealed in practical 
things”, or “rational, intelligent, thought through act”, and Clement of Alexandria argued, 
“The life of Christians is a sort of system of rational acts” (Harakas 1983, p. 239).   
 9 
Admittedly, this action orientation may not sound like modern Orthodoxy, but it is a 
fundamental part of the tradition meriting restatement in light of modern human 
development concerns.  Indeed, EO ethicist Stanley Harakas notes: 
In our day, in Orthodox theology, we are presently under the powerful influence of liturgy and 
mystical experience in Theology which tend to weaken the role of ethical concerns and interest 
in ethical living within the larger concept of what it means to be an Orthodox Christian.  For 
Orthodoxy, this is erroneous (Harakas 1983, p. 4). 
Beyond reasserting the ethical basis of EO in light of human development, the need for and 
timeliness of this research emerges from three further factors.  First, there is a resurgence 
of scholarly interest in religion in the human sciences given the decline of the 
secularization hypothesis (Greeley 2003; Habermas and Ratzinger 2005; Martin 2005; 
Taylor 2007).  Religion is returning from its long academic exile (Petito and Hatzopoulos 
2003; Thomas 2005).   Second, the dialogue between Christian faith and the human 
sciences was shaped without input from EO, and often was dominated by Protestant 
conceptions (Casanova 1994) where humanism was often regarded as a rebellion against 
God (Gillespie 2008, p. 292).  Third, there is very little literature on EO and the human 
sciences, much less DS.   This study contends that, despite this paucity, EO can integrate 
Christian faith and humanistic development concerns, and perhaps better than has been the 
case until now.   If this seems a fantastic claim, recall simply the pivotal fact that in the 
West, dogma and social ethics (of which human development is an example) have been 
distinct domains, whereas in Orthodoxy they are interwoven.      
It is important to note here what this study is not.  It does not claim to be a comprehensive 
investigation of EO.  Nicholas Cabasilas, in a classic text, wrote: 
Two things, then, commend us to God, and in them lies all the salvation of men.  The first is 
that we be initiated into the most sacred Mysteries, the second, that we train the will for virtue 
(Cabasilas 1974, p. 110). 
 10 
This study does not explore the Mysteries and neither does it deal adequately with their 
ecclesial context (Staniloae 2012; 2012).   It does not attempt a balanced approach to all 
Orthodox doctrines and emphases.   Nor does it make any claim, and this is critical to 
avoid misinterpretation, to be a comprehensive “study of Staniloae”.  Rather, the aim of 
this study is to trigger dialogue with the social sciences and development studies, and 
especially to highlight the role of practical reason (phronesis) at the heart of Orthodoxy.   
The leading intuition here is that EO can contribute to DS, but also that DS can contribute 
to theology, and it is in the very nature of Orthodox theology for this type of dialogue and 
mutual enrichment to occur. 
This conversation between EO and DS, filtered through Dumitru Staniloae and Amartya 
Sen, should, however, be seen in its intended and more “ambitious” light.  It is taking 
perhaps the best recent representatives of two traditions, EO and Enlightenment humanistic 
concerns, and analyzing their underlying values and vision of personhood.  The decision to 
have these two in dialogue has thus provided the principal factor in the selection of 
sources.  Furthermore, this research is in the spirit of Staniloae, considered among the 
greatest EO theologians of the 20
th
 century.  As one of his disciples argued, Staniloae 
“provided a broad basis for pursuing an intellectual dialogue with modern society, 
especially in the area of the humanities” (Staniloae 2000, p. xiii).8     It is thus hoped that 
any imbalances or omissions in this study will be seen in the light of attempting to do 
justice to these “activism” aspects. 
A further word should be said about sources.  There is sparse literature linking EO and 
development beyond a few short essays, and often in connection with the World Council of 
Churches (Nissiotis 1971; Tsetsis 1983).  There is recent work on the Orthodox view of 
                                                          
8
 Kallistos Ware argues that Staniloae’s theology “show[s] how every dogma corresponds to a deep need and 
longing of the human heart, and how it has practical consequences for society” (Staniloae 1994, p. xiv).    
 11 
peacemaking (Asfaw, Chehadeh et al. 2012) as well as a call for Orthodox to develop their 
own distinctive “political theology” (Kalaitzidis 2012) as well as important entries into the 
field of ecology (Sherrard 1987) and the natural sciences (Nesteruk 1993).
9
  There are a 
few articles on key issues such as human rights (Harakas 1982; Pollis 1993; Guroian 
1998).
10
  Elizabeth Prodromou and others have written important essays on Orthodoxy and 
democracy (Prodromou 1996; Papanikolaou 2003; Prodromou 2005) and there is an edited 
volume on the role that EO will play for civil society and modernization in Russia (Marsh 
2004).   There are almost no academic theses on EO and the social sciences in English.
11
   
There are series of collected essays bringing Orthodox thought to the public (Papanikolaou 
and Prodromou 2008), but tend to be classics recycled from thinkers like Staniloae or 
Berdyaev (Witte and Alexander 2007).   Notably however, Archbishop Anastasias of 
Albania has written profoundly about Orthodoxy and development (Anastasios 2003) 
which will be mentioned in due course.   Stanley Harakas has collected important, but 
dated social concern statements (Harakas 1979; Harakas 1983; Harakas 1989) and works 
overlapping with human development, as has Paul Evdokimov (Evdokimov 2001).  This 
thesis has not sought to incorporate the modern Russians such as Bukharev, Soloviev, and 
Bulgakov due to the complexity of their thought (Valliere 2000; Payne and Marsh 2009).    
The primary texts for EO are those of Dumitru Staniloae, with support from many other 
modern and ancient Orthodox thinkers.   Some of Staniloae’s untranslated works have been 
employed where they bear on the argument; fortunately, his five volume Dogmatics was 
recently completed in English (Staniloae 2011; 2012; 2012).  His magisterial Orthodox 
                                                          
9
 One noted Muslim scholar noted that Orthodoxy “has formulated some of the most profound religious 
responses to the environmental crisis in recent years” (Nasr 1996, p. 201). 
10
 Perhaps contrary to expectations, Orthodox thinkers do not agree among themselves.   Some declaim 
human rights as “inhuman” (Yannaras 2002), while most defend them.  It is often the philosophical basis for 
rights, and the dissociation from responsibilities, that is more frequently questioned, not rights themselves.  
11
 A conversation with Bishop Kallistos Ware of Oxford in June of 2011 revealed knowledge of only one 
PhD thesis in the UK.  The one mentioned was an investigation of the primarily monastic text, Philokalia in 
relation to well-being (Kadloubovsky and Palmer 1992; Cook 2010).   
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Spirituality (written after the Dogmatics) and several other major works exist in English 
including his newly translated work on the Holy Trinity (Staniloae 2012).    There is a 
growing secondary literature on Staniloae that is extremely important as an entry into his 
thought (Bielawski 1997; Louth 1997; Rogobete 1997; Ica-Jr. 2000; Miller 2000; Bartos 
2002; Rogobete 2002; Turcescu 2002; Manastireanu 2005; Neamtu 2006; Bordeianu 
2011).  Maximus the Confessor (580-662) is also frequently referenced as he is absolutely 
central to Orthodoxy—and is also a saint in the West.   One important source has been the 
liturgical readings of the church calendar which include the lives of the saints.   
In relation to the capabilities approach, there is an immense literature.  This study employs 
most of the major texts of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (the number two in the CA) 
and secondary literature where appropriate.  There is an emerging literature on faith and 
development, and occasionally in relation to the capabilities approach that is important 
(Villa-Vicencio 1999-2000; Narayan 2000; Belshaw, Calderisi et al. 2001; Janis and Evans 
2004; Skerker 2004; Thomas 2004; Alkire 2006; Marshall and Saanen 2007; Sagovsky 
2008; Deneulin and Bano 2009; Deneulin and Rakodi 2011; James 2011).   In terms of the 
CA applied to post-communist contexts, there is very little literature linking the two 
(UNDP 2006).   
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this research, it is important to make clear the 
audience(s) this thesis is addressed to.  This is a complex issue for reasons which can only 
become fully clear throughout the thesis, but the following comments can help.    The first, 
and primary audience is theological.   This thesis is an appreciative inquiry into DS 
through EO theological categories.  A fundamental contention is that the insights of DS 
(i.e. poverty reduction) should play a greater part in all theological reflection because 
fidelity to the Second Great commandment demands this—more on this below.  But there 
is the additional claim that EO merits attention precisely because it can conceptualize this 
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relationship between theology and human development perhaps better than has previously 
been the case in the West.  The extensive comparison of virtues in Western theology with 
EO is the basis for suggesting this judgement. 
There is however a secondary audience which is the “secular” field of DS.   Many of the 
arguments aim to bring DS into a closer relationship with theology.  This should not be 
viewed as an alien intrusion as DS is concerned with, for instance, questions of agency and 
thus sources of human motivation in geographical contexts where secular intuitions are not 
dominant.
12
  An indirect claim made in this thesis is that, from a purely disciplinary point 
of view, religious understandings of human development should be included within DS, 
and have not been (Sumner 2006; Deneulin and Bano 2009).   But there are also deeper 
arguments that concern the overlap, both historically and conceptually, between the moral 
concerns of DS and Christian theology.
13
  To illustrate this from a historical perspective, 
many instances are cited of the religious contribution to human development such as the 
non-secular emergence of human rights.  In terms of the conceptual overlap, there are 
arguments for a more fruitful dialogue with a) theology in general, but also b) EO in 
particular.  The contribution that religious faith can make to DS involves not just the 
motivational aspects that religion can bring in (this is indeed important),
14
 but more 
substantial questions about the very nature of human development itself.  Therefore, in 
order to speak to the secular DS audience, a “phenomenological” (Taylor 1993, p. 212) 
methodology is employed whereby the actual practices and values operative in human 
development are examined, which, it will be argued, demand more than Amartya Sen’s 
                                                          
12 If “a requirement on practical reasons [is] that they be capable of motivating us” (Korsgaard 1986, p. 11), 
then religious faith provides both the reasons and the motivation for action in many contexts.  
13
 It is beyond the scope of this study, but historically, DS emerges out of the Renaissance, “humanistic” side 
of Modernity.  Byzantine Orthodoxy influenced this side more so than the Reformation side.  It is well 
known among historians that the influx of Orthodox Greek scholars (e.g. Manuel Chrysoloras) and tradesmen 
(many of whom had a superior classical education than many literati in the West) spurred the Renaissance 
(Harris 2006).   
14
 Staniloae: “if we do not feel this imperative of the good acutely, we have no power to bring about our 
growth in the good” (Staniloae 2000, p. 182).  
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Enlightenment focus on individual freedoms.  EO’s picture of the human condition can 
arguably offer a more satisfying basis for human development, even on strictly social 
scientific terms.  This thesis thus aims at two principal audiences:  theological and 
development studies.   This is a direct result of the meta-aspiration woven throughout and 
is that an awareness of the EO approach to theology, being different in key points than the 
Western,
15
 can catalyze a rapprochement between faith and humanistic development 
concerns.   
A brief attempt will now be made to formally state the theological method involved, 
although this will be picked up in the next chapter.  Theological method is a contested 
domain and is often concerned with establishing the “authority” or the “starting point” for 
inquiry:  whether revelation, or the Church, or human experience or some hierarchy among 
these (Clinton 1995).   Concerns for establishing lines of authority are, however, marginal 
in EO and a “from below” approach is used simultaneously with “from above”.  This is, 
again, “because creation plays a much more important role in Eastern than in Western 
theology” (Manastireanu 2005, p. 147).   But even if one starts “from below”, one must 
still ask, “where below”, or more specifically, “with which academic fields”?  One of the 
tasks of theological method is, in fact, clarifying the “relation to the disciplines which seem 
to stand nearest to it” (Macquarrie 1977, p. 33).  This thesis argues that DS is the discipline 
that should be related to Christian theology precisely because of its practical nature 
(discussed in chapter two) and close relationship with the second great commandment.  
Christ’s response to the teacher of the law who saw the importance of the second 
commandment applies to DS as a field of study:  “You are not far from the kingdom of 
                                                          
15
 A Protestant theologian notes:  “Eastern anthropology differs from the West on nearly every point” 
(Maddox 1990, p. 34). The following is from a noted Catholic theologian:  "In conclusion, on nearly every 
significant doctrinal point—theology of grace, theological anthropology, epistemological principles—the 
differences between East and West are decisive and probably irreconcilable” (LaCugna 1991, p. 198).   This 
is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but an instructive one.    EO, according to Kallistos Ware, stands much 
closer to Catholicism than Protestantism (Ware 1997).    
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God” (Mark 12:34).  The methodology is thus close to what is known as “correlation”, but 
unlike Paul Tillich’s approach the correlation here is less with philosophical questions 
concerning Being (Tillich 1951; 1957) and more with practical rationality in the pursuit of 
well-being.   Correlation means dialogue and thus DS has its wisdom and questions with 
which to address theology; mutatis muatandi theology has its wisdom and questions for 
DS.   And if the “vindication of any particular method can only be found in the kind of 
theology to which it conduces” (Macquarrie 1977, p. 34), then the aim is simply to put 
people and especially the most vulnerable and their burdens back at the centre of 
theological reflection.  The aim is a theological method that takes the Second 
Commandment as seriously as the first.  
In concluding this introduction, it merits mention that this thesis is the very first to offer a 
detailed analysis of EO in relation to DS.   This is important for while development 
discourse is often performed in the secure middle-range of the secular octave, most of the 
world still experiences life in the fuller ranges that stretch both higher up into 
Transcendence, and delve deeper into creation as mystery.  Thus, to say that 'The Glory of 
God is humanity fully alive” may just mean every person experiencing well-being in every 
dimension.   A greater understanding of the values shared between religious faith and 
development can allow moving beyond mere tactical cooperation on targeted issues 
towards deeper synergies and more effective strategies.  Such harmonized action may be 
the only real hope human development has in becoming a reality.      
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2. JUSTIFYING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EO AND DS (METHODOLOGY) 
A dialogue between Eastern Orthodoxy and development studies might seem odd to some, 
if not impossible to others.  This chapter explores why a dialogue of this nature is not only 
methodologically possible, but theologically appropriate.  This chapter will first delineate 
Orthodoxy’s approach to natural theology and show that EO has always been comfortable 
engaging, and even requires the method of correlation (or dialogue) with wisdom from “the 
outside”.  The account will then show how the Trinity can bridge with human development 
in that it generates a theological anthropology involving three clear dimensions—persons, 
communion, and shared nature—which can be brought into dialogue with the social 
sciences/DS.   It will then be hypothesized that these three dimensions correspond with and 
integrate three values operative, but in an inchoate fashion, in the human sciences:  agency, 
solidarity, and structures—a correspondence which will be strengthened in further 
chapters.  The argument will then examine the nature of DS and its concerns for 
multidimensional “change for the better”, and show that this mirrors in a very precise way 
EO definitions of salvation.  Finally, in order for dialogue to be possible from the secular 
side, a vigorous critique of the notion that Western liberalism is the unique basis for human 
development is offered.  This chapter, while wide ranging in subject matter, is principally 
methodological:  it aims to legitimate the dialogue between EO and DS to be developed in 
further chapters. 
2.1 EO Natural Theology 
Natural theology or law
1
 recognizes an “overlap”, a “between” (dia) of the “truth” (logos) 
understood by a religious tradition and that of general human experience.   This is another 
                                                          
1
 As mentioned, Orthodoxy does not separate theology and ethics as does much Western theology (Guroian 
1981).  Thus these two terms, natural theology and natural law, can largely be used interchangeably because 
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way of expressing the notion that “grace” and “nature” overlap, a common expression in 
regard to EO.   Natural theology (or law) allows the claim of “truth” (however defined) to 
be at least in principle available to everyone as a source of knowledge or inspiration not 
from “special” revelation per se.  In the past, natural theology largely consisted of rational 
proofs for the existence of God as in Paley’s Watchmaker and the cosmological, 
ontological, and teleological arguments, considered to have been dismantled by Immanuel 
Kant.   Recently, there has been a turn to probabilistic reasoning (Swinburne 1979; 1996) 
but faith under this type of natural theology is still justified through discursive or evidential 
reasoning processes.   There is however another turn and that is towards the human subject.   
This approach is what John Macquarrie (writing from a Western viewpoint) called “new 
style” natural theology (Macquarrie 1977) that takes human experience as the primary 
datum (Macquarrie 1975).
2
  The EO approach to natural theology emphasized here is 
similar:  it includes rational claims but goes beyond them by emphasizing participation in 
communion and human development through love.   Staniloae confirms this approach, 
which, however, is not new within EO:    
We experience God through our fellow humans and in the love we have for them, or we 
test our experience of him by means of the fully responsible love we have for them ... we 
recognize Him as a source of supreme personal love who gives us strength to rise higher 
and higher in our love for one another (Staniloae 2000, p. 199). 
Natural theology is thus more related to the human experience of responsible love, and 
through this one experiences or “knows” God.   An even remotely adequate explication of 
EO natural theology is impossible without demonstrating that Orthodoxy views truth as 
emerging through virtuous action, how this action unlocks nature’s potentials, and that 
constant reflection upon the beneficial consequences of this serves as the basis for wisdom.   
This complex understanding is indeed hard to pin down in formal rules, and is undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the Trinity (theology) is also the “law” or norm of existence.  This will become fully clear below.  For a 
fuller discussion of Staniloae and natural law, see (Rogobete 1997). 
2
 As Catholic theologian Jacques Maritain puts it, “natural law dwells as an ideal order in the very being of 
all existing men” (Maritain 1951, p. 89).   
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why Orthodoxy is sometimes considered to have no conception of natural law (MacQuarrie 
1967, p. 243).  This, however, is simply a misunderstanding.  Orthodoxy has a strong sense 
of nature’s norms, but these are more dynamic and interface with human action.   These 
themes will be continuously clarified throughout this thesis. 
For now however, the aim is much more modest:  it is to justify the interdisciplinary nature 
of this research project by showing the openness of EO towards knowledge from outside 
the presuppositions of faith.  It is not yet trying to show the appropriateness or special 
relation of Orthodoxy to development studies but rather to show that EO has historically 
placed theological wisdom in a line of continuity, and not discontinuity, with “natural”, 
nontheological, or philosophical knowledge.   
Characteristic of the approach of the early Fathers, philosophy was the love of wisdom 
(sophia), and no matter where it was found, was nothing other than the discovery of God.   
So strong was the appropriation of classical learning by early Christians that Gregory of 
Nazianzus complained against the pagan emperor Julian who sought to break up the 
“alliance between Christianity and Classical Culture and to reclaim that culture for 
paganism” (Pelikan 1993, p. 11).   Socrates and Heraclitus were viewed as “Christians 
before Christ” by Justin Martyr (Stevenson 1987, p. 61); Stoicism was viewed largely 
positively; Plato’s teaching on the immortality of the soul was viewed as divine.  The 
Jewish Messiah, “Jesus the Christ” was understood as the Logos, the ordering and 
governing principle of creation, and this wisdom was not possessed exclusively by 
Christians.   
This tradition of being open to nontheological knowledge is prior to, but can be seen 
perhaps most clearly in, the Cappadocian Fathers who have a normative status in EO.  
Basil the Great (330-379) notes: 
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We … must first, if the glory of the good is to abide with us indelible for all time, be instructed 
by these outside means, and then we shall understand the sacred and mystical teachings (in 
Pelikan 1993, p. 27). 
Notice the remarkable word “first”.   This gives a certain priority to philosophy (“these 
outside means”) over, or at least temporally prior to, theology.  Gregory of Nyssa 
identified “two ways of joining man to God:  true doctrine and clear reasoning, both of 
which came from God and each of which needed the other to be complete” (Pelikan 1993, 
p. 187).   Basil argued that there was a “natural rationality implanted in us, telling us to 
identify ourselves with the good and to avoid everything harmful” and “Paul teaches us 
nothing new, but only tightens the links of nature” (Pelikan 1993, p. 31).  To bring this line 
of reasoning up to the present, Staniloae opens his Dogmatics with these lines: 
The Orthodox Church makes no separation between natural and supernatural revelation.  
Natural revelation is known and understood fully in the light of supernatural revelation, or we 
might say that natural revelation is given and maintained by God continuously through his own 
divine act which is above nature (Staniloae 1994, p. 1). 
This places revelation and human experience, theology and philosophy, in close 
proximity.
3
  Later it will be shown how supernatural revelation helps natural revelation be 
understood more fully, but the emphasis here is on how faith can, and even must be, 
informed by the “common apprehensions of humanity”.   More concretely, some Greek 
(especially the philosophic and less the mythic/religious) notions were treated as natural 
                                                          
3
 The EO view of common grace (or natural theology) is a beginning (even if dim) participation in genuinely 
religious truth.  This is to be distinguished from many Protestant theologies that view common grace, and this 
includes “humans in their social relations”, merely as a way that sin is restrained (Berkouwer 1962, p. 179).  
This strong distinction between common and supernatural grace is necessary because, “Belief in common 
grace could be used as an excuse for softening the antithesis between a Christian world-and-life view and a 
non-Christian one” (Hoekema 1986, p. 199).   EO is less concerned with maintaining this antithesis, and sees 
a deep continuity between common and salvific grace, in other words “humans in their social relations” and 
salvation itself in virtue of the Trinity.   This will be developed later in this chapter.  
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theology and in turn served as presuppositions for Christian apologetics, ideas such as 
human immortality, divine transcendence, and cosmic teleology (Pelikan 1993, p. 185).
4
  
Not all ideas from Greek philosophy (representing the best of human reasoning) were 
accepted, and some ideas once accepted were only later rejected, such as the Greek view of 
the radical superiority of soul over body.  Unfortunate perhaps is Gregory Nazianzus’s 
statement that “everyone with a spark of sense” is obliged to acknowledge “the flesh as 
less precious than the soul” (Pelikan 1993, p. 198).   There is recognition of the lingering 
influence of negative Greek ideas concerning material existence (e.g. Plato’s “the body is a 
tomb”) on early Christian thought (Meyendorff 1979).    
While some notions of Greek philosophy were accepted, others were immediately rejected 
and it is important to understand why.  For example, the Greek notion of tyche (that life is 
governed fundamentally by chance or luck) was condemned as an error “inconsistent with 
common sense”.  Any philosophy that leads to doctrines of either tyche or ananke (the 
view that life is governed by an implacable necessity or determinism) was rejected.   This 
is because these views diluted human agency and moral responsibility (Pelikan 1993, p. 
314).  Tyche, the idea that the events of life are outside one’s control, is transformed 
through early Christianity into telos, the “longing after future prospects and reaching 
forward to the remaining possibilities” (Pelikan 1993, p. 153).   Ananke, a sense of 
fatalism, is transformed into eleutheria or freedom, the belief that one can change and be 
also an agent of change.   Centuries later the comic poet Dante Alighieri alludes to this 
Greek fatalism when Beatrice explains that people are actually not led about by the 
movement of the planets—as Plato’s cosmology suggested.     
                                                          
4
 Of course not all of the ancients were so optimistic.  Tertullian, famous for the “What has Athens to do with 
Jerusalem?” question, argues that it was fitting that Thales, while looking up to the stars for guidance, fell 
into a well (Cochrane 1944, p. 244).   Tertullian’s scepticism was, however, more the exception than the rule.   
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All of this is to say that there was a positive, but critical relationship with Greek 
philosophical wisdom.  Both philosophical and theological doctrines, like trees, are to be 
judged by their fruit, and their fruit is nothing other than their contribution to arête or the 
moral virtues.  But arête, itself a classical concept meaning human excellence, was also in 
need of critical reinterpretation before it could be serviceable.  Arête, from the same root as 
“aristos” or aristocrat, was used to denote specifically male nobility or excellence.   
Ordinary men have no arête (Jaeger 1939-44) just as ordinary men (and even less, women) 
have little access to the leisure that is required for the life of reflective contemplation—
man’s highest telos.   This aristocratic understanding of arête (and the related denial of the 
common person to participate in a life of reason and virtue) was democratized, as it were, 
under the influence of Christianity
5—albeit admittedly this dynamic has never reached its 
full potential and there have been setbacks.
6
     As Augustine noted, truth and wisdom 
become “common goods” under Christianity, available in principle to all (Keys 2006, p. 
67).  Jesus is the true light “that gives light to everyone coming into the world” (John 1:9).7   
This ancient achievement is of profound significance for widening the circle of human 
access to reason and virtue beyond the Classical conceptions that included only aristocratic 
males.   This laid the moral and anthropological foundations for modern conceptions of 
                                                          
5
 Alexis de Tocqueville expressed this in an unmatched way when he writes:   
The deepest and most eclectic minds in Rome and Greece were unable to reach this most general 
and yet most simple of generalizations, that men were alike and that all of them had equal rights to 
freedom at birth.  They expended great effort to prove that slavery was a feature of nature which 
would always exist.   Furthermore, everything goes to show that those ancients who were slaves 
before becoming free, several of whom have bequeathed to us fine writings, themselves regarded 
slavery in the same light.  All the great writers of antiquity belonged to the noble elite of teachers or 
at least they saw this noble elite come into being uncontested before their very eyes.  Their minds, 
although broadened in several directions, were limited in this one and Jesus Christ had to come into 
the world to reveal that all members of the human race were similar and equal by nature 
(Tocqueville 2003, p. 505).   
 
6
 The influential Church Father Chrysostom believed that Adam’s sovereignty over creation included woman 
(Kelly 1978, p. 348). 
7
 Justin Martyr employs this hermeneutical perspective (that Christ extends the “logos” or access to the life of 
virtue to all) on John 1:9 in a section “The Light that Lighteth Every Man” where his influential discussion of 
“Spermatikos Logos” (Generative Reason) is discussed (Stevenson 1987, p. 62).   
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universal human dignity.  It is surely not incidental that this happened under the influence 
of a religious doctrine that placed the Samaritan parable at the centre of its ethic.   
The main point here is that EO (and Christianity in general), from its foundations, views 
philosophy or human experience positively.   And there is the even stronger claim that 
human experience and reason are necessary to inform faith.   Faith must be exercised in a 
critical, but positive, dialogue with human reason and experience for it to be authentic.  
Lest one think that this approach ceased with the Cappadocian Fathers who borrowed from 
Classical learning, Staniloae argued that modern thought has given new insights into the 
understanding of the person and relations not given by the Fathers (Staniloae 1994, p. 
xvii). This is a remarkable admission given the normative status of the early fathers in EO.  
This openness to modern insights is what Fr. Georges Florovsky called a “neopatristic 
synthesis”, a term which Kallistos Ware applies to Staniloae (Staniloae 1994, p. ix).   This 
“neopatristic” approach not only looks back to the Fathers, but discerns God’s presence 
and activity through human agency, reflection, communion, and nature itself in every 
epoch (Valliere 2000).   Staniloae was himself known to interface with existentialism 
(Rogobete 1997) and particularly Heidegger (Staniloae 2003, p. 116), depth psychology, 
the action philosophy of Maurice Blondel (Blondel 1984), and other frameworks.  Not all 
Orthodox embrace this openness; some believe that faithfulness to the Tradition consists in 
repetition of past formulae (Vrame 2008).  But it can be argued that this “fundamentalism” 
violates the very spirit of Orthodox Tradition understood as critical engagement with “the 
common apprehensions of humanity”.  The early Fathers demonstrated this critical 
engagement par excellence and this is precisely why they are paradigmatic.   
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Staniloae furthers the theme of the continuity between natural and revealed theology, 
registering Maximus the Confessor’s view:8  
That is why Saint Maximus the Confessor does not posit an essential distinction between natural 
revelation and the supernatural or biblical one.  According to him, this latter is only the 
embodying of the former in historical persons and actions (Staniloae 1994, p. 1). 
This mention of action deserves comment in light of a class of criticisms concerning EO’s 
allegedly “otherworldly” nature (MacQuarrie 1967, p. 243).  EO is accused of being more 
concerned with abstract ontology than history or the Christian narrative.   EO is accused of 
being “neoPlatonic” and captured by Greek philosophical categories of general “being” 
and not of “doing”, and especially of giving insufficient attention to God’s salvific acts in 
history.  Adolf von Harnack famously argued that the Orthodox view of salvation was 
more influenced by Gnosticism than the Gospels (Russell 2004, p. 3).  The respected 
mission scholar David Bosch ends his commentary on EO asserting that “The apocalyptic 
gospel ... was replaced by a timeless gospel ... [leading to an] almost exclusively 
otherworldly salvation” (Bosch 1992, p. 213).   
Orthodoxy’s alleged capitulation to Greek “timeless” categories is a misdiagnosis, but 
clarifying this accusation can helpfully illuminate Orthodoxy’s intentions.   If Orthodoxy 
displays a sometimes unattractive otherworldliness, it is not because of its translation of 
Biblical “apocalyptic” concepts into “Greek” timeless philosophical terms.  This is not to 
say that EO has not been sometimes apathetic, or neglects social concerns;
9
 but other 
                                                          
8
 Maximus is quoted generously in this thesis, but often from Staniloae’s usage of him.  According to 
Kallistos Ware, St. Maximus has had on Staniloae “an influence greater than that of any other patristic 
author” (Staniloae 1994, p. xiii).  One merit of referencing Maximus is that he is considered a Saint in both 
East and West, thus his ideas, and the ideas in this study, can have a wider reach. 
9
 Though the focus here is on the ontological aspects, Staniloae and EO employ Biblical eschatological 
terminology.  The issue that Bosch and others insufficiently grasp is that it is not primarily whether one 
employs a Biblical eschatology or a philosophical vocabulary per se, but the uses to which doctrines/ideas 
are put.  Staniloae argues “No path towards eschatological perfection exists which bypasses life on earth and 
the struggles which accompany that life” and the whole point of all EO dogmas is to show “the value of 
human life on earth” (Staniloae 1980, p. 207).  Here doctrines of eschatology, in fact all doctrines, are linked 
with human well-being.   Dietrich Bonhoeffer was close to this when, in the preface to his doctoral 
 25 
Christian traditions suffer similar neglects—and most did not have to live through 
Communism.   Rather EO articulated its “philosophical approach” to relate salvation 
history to a philosophy of practical activity, and not to the “timeless” truths of Greek 
philosophy.   In fact, EO intentionally placed practical reason (the sphere of action and 
change) prior to contemplative reason (the sphere of the unchanging)—thus reversing the 
priority of much Greek philosophy to bring it closer to the Biblical notion of love.   Instead 
of a “timeless” understanding of Christian truth, EO’s “philosophical” focus can be 
understood as an attempt to translate past salvation history into a present day philosophy of 
action that is directly relevant for human development.    
For Orthodoxy, Christianity is essentially “doing what He does” (Hopko 1976, p. 11) or 
the imitation  (Russell 2004, p. 13)
10
 of the incarnate life of Christ who is the eternal Logos 
“in action”.11  Salvation requires not just belief in Christ’s salvific actions on behalf of 
humanity in the past, but making present past divine actions in the world today.   In other 
words, salvation or theosis involves human action today that imitates past Divine-human 
action which is termed philanthropia, or love of humankind.   And the purpose of this past 
action made present is to liberate the person from anti-humanistic egoism, and bring about 
human well-being or “life to the full” (John 10:10). 
If we act in the likeness of the God who is loving towards all, we act like men come to the 
highest point of their own realization, for our hearts are full of the most fervent love of all, 
God’s love (Staniloae 1994, p. 227). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
dissertation, he wrote that the more he researched, “the more clearly has emerged the social intention of all 
the basic Christian concepts" (Bonhoeffer 2009, p. 21). 
10
 The term “imitation of Christ” can be misleading.  To avoid the idea of imitating an external standard only 
by human effort, Staniloae emphasized participation in the life of Christ.  This will be clarified more fully in 
chapter nine. 
11
 Thus Jesus as Logos overcame the impassable gulf in Classical thought between “being” and “becoming” 
(Cochrane 1944, p. 259).     
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All of these themes will be expanded upon in later chapters.   This chapter is concerned 
merely to elucidate Orthodoxy’s understanding of natural theology as a basis for dialogue 
with non-theological wisdom.  And this natural theology is concerned less with abstract 
truths and more concerned with the “truth” of compassion and action on behalf of human 
development.  As will be seen, this is an especially important bridge, or correlation, with 
development studies. 
Thus Bosch was not correct about Orthodoxy’s concern for “timeless” truths, but his 
criticism was helpful in that it provided the opportunity to clear up a recurrent 
misunderstanding.  Orthodox theology is indeed “mystical”, and does employ 
“philosophy”, but this is out of a desire to explore philanthropic praxis as a link between 
natural and supernatural theology.   This view of “truth” gives rise to a different kind of 
natural theology, one that is less “scholastic” and more broadly about the human condition.  
This understanding is a signature strength of EO and will be the focus of later chapters 
when linked to the virtue tradition and practical reason.   At this point however, 
Orthodoxy’s view of natural law and its relation to action can receive further illumination 
by exploring the relationship of God’s rationality to his personhood.  
2.2 God as Supreme Reason and Person 
Staniloae asserts that God is the Creator and ground of universal “reasons”, that these 
reasons or “logoi” permeate all of creation (including material existence), and that 
humanity can in greater and lesser degrees perceive these.  These reasons find their 
fulfilment in the ontological category of “person”.  Staniloae writes: 
God is beyond discursive reason, but He isn’t devoid of reason—He is the Supreme Reason 
(Logos), the Reason from which the reasons (logoi) of all things and the reason in our souls 
proceed (Staniloae 2003, p. 220). 
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Staniloae’s natural theology can make better sense if several simultaneous dimensions are 
kept in mind.  The first is that God and reality are rational, and God is thus said to be the 
Reason for the “reasons” which lie within things, but especially persons, which correspond 
in some way to God.  Creation’s “logoi” are that which makes things what they are, both in 
their particular, their relational, and their shared or universal qualities.  These “logoi” are 
mediated by the Logos (who in Himself cannot be conceived apart from “relation” due to 
the Trinity), but permeate all of creation including the material realm.   This presence of 
the logoi (or norms of existence) within creation explains the correspondence of internal 
reasons with those in external reality—a fact which has fascinated cosmologists throughout 
the ages (Greene 2000, p. 365).   The Orthodox express this correspondence of interior 
reality with exterior by calling humanity a “Micro-cosmos”, a term borrowed from the 
Stoics.   This means that a miniature cosmos exists in every human and every element in 
the universe—mineral, biological, animal and spiritual—and is recapitulated in the human.  
These levels of Being and norms within creation are concentrated in humanity in which 
they are both constituted, but also transcended, in freedom.    Further, this notion of logos 
explains the ability of humans to both discover and create shared meanings through 
science, language, and symbols.   But the main point is that God is rational and creation 
partakes of that rationality, humanity expresses this as well, and this serves as a powerful 
basis for natural law.  Staniloae paraphrases Maximus the Confessor: 
Everything that God has done and everything that happens and is carried out according to His 
will, in other words what follows the true line of the development of creation, in totality or 
every fact in part, is rational, says Maximus (Staniloae 2003, p. 209). 
Thus all of creation participates in this Divine reason.   But it is important to note that this 
rationality is not “mechanical”, static, or a timeless Newtonian vision, but is rather 
dynamic, process oriented and open-ended—and amenable to human intervention 
(Staniloae 2000).   Humans have their role in both perceiving these logoi as given 
structures, but also in unlocking and even enhancing the various potentials or logoi of 
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existence.  These points will be developed later, but Staniloae notes, “The human person, 
too, has his own part in creating himself; he is not created by God only” (Staniloae 2000, p. 
44). 
This points to the second aspect of Staniloae’s natural theology (and a point emphasized 
continuously by him) and is the importance of not conceptualizing the summum bonum of 
existence as an impersonal rational principle.   The good of existence is not an abstract 
principle such as “beauty” or “justice” or “creativity” in a separate realm of existence 
beyond this world as in Platonism.   Truths or values or principles are always 
“enhypostasized” or “personalized”; they can never be understood to exist apart from the 
ontological category of personality in all her particularity.  Goodness or justice or 
compassion is not something that exists outside of and in a purer form than that found in 
concrete human persons acting in concrete contexts.   As important as reason is, “there can 
be no transcending of the person” (Staniloae 1994, p. 28).  While rationality is vigorously 
affirmed, rationality serves the realm of the personal, the highest category of existence and 
thus the highest expression of natural theology, and there rationality’s fulfilment or telos is 
achieved.
12
  As will be seen in chapter seven, EO’s approach is similar, but not identical to 
a position known as “personalism” associated with, among others, Jacques Maritain and 
Emmanuel Mounier.   
“The Holy Spirit must be a Person in order to make us grow as persons ourselves…” 
(Staniloae 1980, p. 75).  This “personalism” protects the dignity and freedom of concrete 
human persons by affirming that the Divine Archetype towards which persons and history 
moves is not an impersonal force or principle (and therefore inferior and incapable of 
freedom), but in some way is “similar” and appropriate for humans, which is to say 
                                                          
12
 See (Rogobete 1997) for an extended exposition of God as “Supreme Personal Reality” in Staniloae. 
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personal.  This will be investigated more fully in chapter three, but this principle was 
systematically violated in the case of Marxist inspired Communism:  persons were 
subordinated to a “species rationality” and an impersonal historical process (“dialectical 
materialism”) viewed as the ultimate arche (principle) of existence.   Stalin’s morbid, “you 
can’t have an omelet [social utopia] without breaking some eggs” [persons] expressed the 
tragic repudiation of the moral category of the person as the summit of existence.   This 
category of the person safeguards the dignity of “individuals” in a mode analogous to the 
concerns of human rights.   
But a third aspect of Staniloae’s natural theology must be added.  Personalism is not quite 
enough as persons are not separate entities, but exist through and are constituted by 
concrete relationships. Thus another principle is required, and that is person-in-community.  
Human “autonomy” is a myth; or better stated, autonomy is itself a social construct 
requiring a “communal” plausibility structure (Berger and Luckmann 1989) to make sense 
of these claims.   Humans are in many ways conditioned by and dependent on others and 
this is not to be seen as a failure, but rather this interdependence is freedom’s precondition 
and fulfilment.  Within this realm, humans experience a longing for greater and richer 
forms of community, and this includes the realm of ethical obligation. 
The principal point here is that the domain of natural theology in EO is related to human 
experience and is multidimensional: in the shared “logoi” that constitute the human 
essence or “nature”, in the freedom of persons and their irreducibility to nature, and in 
communion.  EO in its approach to natural theology does not focus primarily on rational 
proofs, or evidence in creation external to the human person (though these can be 
included), but seeks clues within the totality of human experience, and especially 
communion, sentiments such as that of human dignity, and the related sense of ethical 
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obligation.  It is in this manner that natural and supernatural revelation stand in an 
especially close relation in EO. 
However, this positive view of human experience does not mean that theology cannot a) 
provide a more secure support for generally recognized claims, or b) add significantly to 
these views about the “nature of nature”.   For example, concerning a),  “human rights” 
depends on the sense of sacredness, the inviolable dignity of the human person and can be 
hard pressed to account for this value with secular reason alone (Perry 1989; Ignatieff 
2000).   Or, as another author put it, “what a secular-rational approach cannot accomplish 
is the most important thing: to give a reason for the absoluteness and universality of ethical 
obligation” (Dallmayr 2003, p. 424).   Supernatural revelation can provide the absolute 
reasons in support of the forms of human reasoning that are found within the realm of 
natural revelation, but in a more diluted fashion.  But concerning b): supernatural 
revelation can help natural revelation or human reason with fresh insights as well, as will 
be demonstrated in the doctrine of the Trinity. 
2.3   Recovering “nature” in the Trinity and bridging with the social sciences 
The Trinity as a “model” or structure for humanity has exploded in the theological 
literature over the last few decades and has been spurred in large part by interaction with 
the Eastern, “social”, view of the Trinity (Parker 1980; Moltmann 1981; Boff 1988; 1988; 
LaCugna 1991; Gunton 1993; 1993; Peters 1993; Thompson 1994; Gruchy 1995; Daniel F. 
Stramara 1998; Rahner 1998; Volf 1998; 1998; Purcell 1999; Fiddes 2000; Kilby 2000; 
Heim 2001; Powell 2003; Karkkainen 2004; Polkinghorne 2004; Turcescu 2005; Zizioulas 
2006; Awad 2007; Jenson 2007; Beeley 2008).   This literature is proceeding apace and 
there is no need to spend much time interacting with it.   However, a few contributions are 
required for present purposes.  First, some Trinitarian concepts and the associated 
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terminology are necessary to make sense of subsequent stages of the argument, for the 
Trinity is the foundation of all EO theology.  Second, it is important to show how the 
Trinity itself serves as a basis for natural theology as Staniloae often employs a “from 
below” approach precisely in terms of this doctrine (Manastireanu 2005, p. 143).   Third, 
important imbalances in pictures of the Trinity must be pointed out that are a result of the 
rush to embrace “relationality” over the category of “substantial” (Cunningham 1998, p. 
26).  These errors include how Staniloae is understood by some of his interpreters, but also 
are reflected in the wider literature on the Trinity. 
Before addressing the question of the Trinity in relation to humanity, it should be noted 
that for EO the Trinity is reflected in the paradoxical unity and diversity that structures all 
of existence, and not only humanity:  “The creation wrought by the Trinity must also be 
touched by the effects of this unity in diversity” (Staniloae 1994, p. 68).   In ancient 
philosophy, this unity and diversity (how the sensible particulars participated in the 
universal forms) was an aporia, or condition of puzzlement, that Plato addressed in the 
Parmenides (Plato 1969).   Staniloae argues that the Trinity is the mystery that makes all 
things intelligible, the mystery of unity and diversity (Staniloae 2005) that structures all of 
reality.   If these vestigial trinitatis (vestiges of the Trinity) appear in non-human nature 
and are universally recognized (at least in principle), the same is true but on a more 
profound level for the community of human beings.     
While the Trinity as a basis for theological anthropology was not clearly articulated in the 
Church Fathers, it became so over time.
13
   Staniloae assumes it even while he sounds 
apophatic warnings about humanity being but a “dim” model of the Divine image.  The 
Trinity is the ground of humanity’s participation in, and aspirations toward, more profound 
experiences of communion.  “Now these relations between human beings reflect in an 
                                                          
13
 This was from a personal conversation with Bishop Kallistos Ware of Oxford in June, 2010. 
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obscure fashion the perfect relations which exist between the Persons of the Trinity” 
(Staniloae 1980, p. 36).   The Trinity thus structures the content of natural law in that the 
community of human beings, being both unitary and diverse, are created in the image of a 
Tri-Unity.  But the Trinity of course is an ideal order towards which humanity aspires:  “In 
God there is a community of persons among whom love is manifest” (Staniloae 1994, p. 
240) and as John Meyendorff notes about Staniloae, this becomes a basis not only for 
ecclesiology, but anthropology. 
But what are the key features of this analogy between humans, modelled even if in a dim 
way, upon the Trinity?   Often, Trinitarian anthropology is framed in terms of keeping a 
“balance” between two categories—the category of person and communion.   For instance, 
a Romanian interpreter of Staniloae, Ion Ica, writes:  
The key to Fr. Staniloae’s creative vision explaining his thought as well as his meditative 
style is the generous theme of ‘person and communion’ in their relational and dialogical 
unity as a ‘coincidentia oppositorum’ structure which provides an open, generous synthetic 
and balanced approach, avoiding the schematic overbidding of partial contrastive aspects 
(in Rogobete 1997, p. 29) (Ica-Jr. 2000). 
This is very well put, but Ica fails to include a critical dimension, that of shared nature,
14
 
in Staniloae’s consistently framed Trinitarian anthropology—and this is the dimension 
which guides humanity towards the universal human community and thus mitigates the 
dangers of “communitarian-ism”.15   This appears to be a common oversight not only in 
characterizing the features of Staniloae’s theological anthropology, but Trinitarian 
discussions in general.  Shared nature is elided.
16
   
                                                          
14
 Staniloae did summarize his theology at times as a theology of “person and communion” (Rogobete 1997), 
but this study argues that shared nature is necessary to give a proper picture of human development.   
15
 Communitarian thinking will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
16
 Colin Gunton’s approach bears these traits, perhaps because he is influenced by Zizioulas (see footnote 
after next) who downplays nature (Gunton 1993, p. 214).   An extensive literature review found no discussion 
of the moral implications, and usually not even an acknowledgement, of “nature”, as an important category in 
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Staniloae’s Trinitarian “formula”, is not just the category of person and the category of 
communion, but consistently includes a third category of nature.  His “formula”, and the 
proper EO Trinitarian one, involves three dimensions:  persons in communion within the 
medium of a shared nature.  The significance of this point for the entirety of this study can 
hardly be overestimated therefore several instances of Staniloae’s three-part formula will 
be offered.   Staniloae writes “hypostasis [person] cannot be understood emptied of nature, 
nor separated from relationship” (Staniloae 1994, p. 100); “There is a unity of human 
nature that needs to be made manifest in the unity (or better harmony) of human wills” 
(Staniloae 1994, p. 253).  Or more simply “The person without communion is not person, 
while communion is conditioned by a common nature” (Staniloae 1994, p. 70).  And 
finally, to seal this important point:  “With respect to both knowledge and responsibility, 
human nature achieves endless progress within the infinitely varied relations that obtain 
among the many hypostases [persons] of the one nature” (Staniloae 2000, p. 97).17 
The omission of shared nature in Trinitarian discussions is critical for a theology of human 
development because it explicitly serves as a powerful basis for universal or cosmopolitan 
ethical obligation.   Shared nature also signals core human functions, or what Staniloae 
calls “the development of human powers ... or the full realization of human nature” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 363).
18
   This three-part Trinitarian framework arises not as an 
invention from Staniloae, but from the classical definition of the Trinity itself, where there 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the Trinity.   Miroslav Volf mentions it in passing, but he chooses to focus only on person and communion 
(Volf 1998).   
17
 And thus even when Staniloae does not mention all three, he will sometimes mention just one in relation to 
nature as when he writes:  “more or less close relations can certainly be established among all men on the 
basis of their common origin, and these relations rest ultimately on the basis of a common  nature” (Staniloae 
1980, p. 35).    
18
 Turcescu argues (against John Zizioulas) that it is a mistake to think that the early fathers downplayed 
shared nature over person (Turcescu 2002; Zizioulas 2002; Papanikolaou 2004; Zizioulas 2006; Awad 2007; 
Bates 2010).    This debate is highly technical and cannot be assessed here, but it is fairly clear where 
Staniloae would lie given that shared human essence (nature) plays in his formulations.  This study will 
provide many arguments for why nature should be more firmly included in conceptions of the person both for 
theology and the social sciences.  This recognition however need not repudiate the fact that the category of 
person indeed has some priority over nature, as it indeed does in Orthodoxy (Meyendorff 1979, p. 184). 
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are not two, but three key dimensions:
 
person (hypostasis), communion (koinonia), and 
shared nature (ousia).
19
  The Holy Trinity is “itself the structure of perfect communion” 
(Staniloae 1994, p. 67) and is based on these three elements and each category is 
constituted by the other.    A theological anthropology claiming to be based on the Trinity, 
and not keeping all three of these in view, will ultimately be defective.  And while all three 
have to be kept in view, the current trend in theology is to embrace relationality 
(koinonia),
20
 and to neglect shared nature, and this, it will be argued at the end of this 
chapter, legitimates a view inimical to human development called “communitarianism”.   
One author writing on the Trinity notes: “Modern atheism was thus born of a wholesale 
neglect of the concrete narratives of the Christian faith” (Cunningham 1998, p. 25).   This 
is only part of the story as another is when theology’s leading questions are not formulated 
in relation to the general experience of humankind and their pressing problems. 
The closeness of supernatural and natural revelation in EO means that Trinity and creation, 
or these common apprehensions of humanity, can be more firmly linked.  This can be 
further illustrated in that Trinitarian theological anthropology can readily be translated into 
philosophical or social scientific terms.  Subsequent chapters in this study will endeavour 
to show that EO Trinitarian categories mirror, but also enhance and harmonize, 
fundamental concepts found in the social sciences.   To this end, three terms will be 
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 Patristic and Staniloae scholar Lucian Turcescu brings together the details that were already in place in the 
Cappadocian Trinitarian conceptions: 
Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Petrum points to some factors that are essential for the understanding of the 
concept of divine persons: (1) The relation of the divine persons to the divine ousia is similar to the 
relation between the individual and the universal; (2) a divine person is understood as a unique 
collection of properties; (3) the divine persons are relational entities; (4) the main differences among 
the divine persons are that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is the only begotten of the Father, and 
the Holy Spirit proceeds forth from the Father; and (5) the divine persons are in a permanent and 
perfect communion with one another.   This last factor makes them be living persons and not merely 
unique collections of properties.  I should also add that, in contrast to a widespread, misinformed 
opinion of the twentieth century, the Cappadocians did not state a priority of the persons over the 
substance, but kept the two together in worshipping God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as in 
Basil's Ep. 236.6. (Turcescu 2005, p. 60). 
20
 “If we had had to name a single issue on which recent Trinitarian theologians have achieved the greatest 
degree of consensus, we might well point to their collective enthusiasm for the category of ‘relationality’” 
over a “metaphysics of substance” (Cunningham 1998, p. 25). 
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analyzed:  agency, solidarity, and structures.   These are three of the most fundamental and 
debated concepts in the social sciences.   For now, the key terms of EO Trinitarian 
anthropology will simply be aligned with these terms:  
Person  =  Agency 
  Communion  =  Solidarity 
      Nature  =  Structures
21
 
There is not a complete isomorphism, but the parallel is remarkable.   Almost nowhere in 
theology or the social sciences are these three—agency, solidarity, and structures—
combined in the way that Staniloae’s EO Trinitarian anthropology holds in mind and 
values simultaneously all three dimensions.  Some theorists emphasize agency and 
solidarity as foundational values (Bhattacharyya 1995), while most have emphasize the 
agency-structure debate (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1979; Hays 1994; Imbroscio 1999; 
Deneulin 2008).
22
  It is important to note that the rest of this thesis will build on this tri-
dimensional approach, testing its validity and extending its implications.
23
   The hypothesis 
to be explored is that all three of these categories are required for conceptualizing the 
human person in the light of human development concerns, and a position called 
“communitarian cosmopolitanism” will be developed in chapter nine to reflect this.  For 
now it is suggested that the Trinity as transcribed into philosophical anthropology is not an 
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 This parallel merits a brief explanation.  Nature and structures are both external (in the sense of 
environmental factors) but also internal to the human agent.  This thesis will focus almost entirely on the 
structures internal to the agent, those “capabilities”, dimensions or functions that are universal and require 
activation for human well-being.  Nussbaum’s “list” of valuable human functions/dimensions, outlined in 
Chapter 5 under “Being”, is a concrete example of this.  
22
 One brief exception from DS is Des Gasper, writing about the poverty of most social theories, asserts that 
“a range of personal, social, and species ‘programmes’ are at work” (Gasper 2004, p. 147).  He does not 
develop this point however. 
23
 Both secular approaches such as Amartya Sen’s will be queried, but perhaps more importantly, theological 
approaches will be analyzed especially in terms of the tendency to ignore shared human nature.   
Understanding the sweeping nature of the Trinitarian analysis throughout the entirety of this thesis can help 
the reader discern the reasons for the later critiques of Hauerwas, Barth, as well as the inclusion of thinkers 
such as Ricoeur.   
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imaginative construct which runs “foul of the facts and of actual life” (Aristotle 2004, p. 
276) but rather gathers the disparate dimensions of human moral experience, recombines 
them, and illuminates them in fresh ways.  As Basil said, revelation “only tightens the links 
of nature”.    
At this juncture, it must be noted that this close relationship of revelation and human 
experience is possible because of EO’s anthropological optimism. Staniloae writes: 
We look upon the man of today with this kind of confidence … [because neither has man] 
become, by reason of the fall, such a totally corrupt human nature that his every thought 
and action and his whole being are completely sinful (Staniloae 1980, p. 216).
24
 
EO rejects the doctrine of original sin (preferring the term ancestral
25
) and the “juridical” 
view of salvation built upon this; Staniloae actually calls it heresy (Staniloae 2000, p. 187).   
Related to this is EO’s rejection of the “common” grace and “saving” grace distinction 
whereby noble human endeavours are excluded from the economy of salvation.
26
  For 
Staniloae, “Noble aspirations … were implanted in our being” and while these aspirations 
are frustrated, humans are “not reconciled with this “minus,” this negative experience of 
what it actually is” (Staniloae 2000, p. 186).  There is a break between God and creation, 
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 To confirm this point, another citation of Staniloae is offered: 
Obviously, neither the good, nor the light, nor the connection to the source of enduring life have 
disappeared totally from creation's existence.  The light has continued to shine in the darkness; the 
good continues to claim its rights before the conscience of men.  Nor has the good given up the fight 
against evil.  Goodness, friendship, noble aspirations, the hope for the immortality of the person—
all these have remained like the rays of a sun that can never be totally covered over by the fleeting 
and ultimately rather insubstantial clouds of evil (Staniloae 2000, p. 286).  
25
 Orthodoxy prefers the term “ancestral sin” to differentiate their understanding from Augustinian notions of 
“original sin”.  Orthodoxy believes in a tendency towards sin, but they do not argue for an inherited guilt 
from Adam such that it serves as the grounds for eternal/Divine punishment.   
26
 In Protestant theology, appeal is made to natural law (common grace) for justititia civilis, (just reward for 
labor, just polity, and so on) but this is categorically separated from redemption (Brunner 1939, p. 317; 1945, 
p. 14).   This point is made absolutely clear by Alistair McGrath when talking about salvation as an 
“external” or “alien” righteousness (Luther’s term) that is imputed to the believer.  This is related to the idea 
of “forensic justification”, of being declared righteous, a doctrine that separated the questions of justification 
(salvation proper) and sanctification (Christian growth including social ethics).   McGrath notes that this 
separation was a “complete break with the teaching of the church up to that point”, breaking even with 
Augustine.  McGrath also notes that this position was “taken up by virtually all the major reformers 
subsequently” (McGrath 1993, p. 108).  Salvation is, in this framework, exclusively what God does, it can 
never be anything that human’s do such as development work.   
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but even after the fall, the “good continues to claim its rights before the conscience of 
men” (Staniloae 2000, p. 186).   These claims of the good, especially a longing for greater 
communion and justice in the human community, are part of those desires for wholeness, 
for well-being, that are authentic movements towards salvation in the fullest sense of the 
word. 
It is time now to introduce Orthodoxy’s dialogue partner, “development studies”.   DS 
bears many of these noble aspirations and, as will be seen, is an expression of Trinitarian 
natural theology, and is evidence that authentic aspirations for the good have not entirely 
fallen from humanity’s view. 
2.4 Development Studies:  “Change for the Better” 
Given that EO can be open to and even requires dialogue with wisdom from without, the 
question now is to explain the rationale for choosing development studies (hereafter DS) as 
the dialogue partner.  This section will define the basic character of DS, and briefly point 
out potential points of synergy with EO, many of which will be fleshed out later in this 
thesis.  
DS is a relatively new academic field and is not a branch of the social sciences per se, but 
an inter-disciplinary enterprise, gathering many different inputs from across the social 
sciences.  DS emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of development and rejects 
defining human development or well-being in primarily economic terms.   DS in not value-
neutral but has a “normative point of departure—to improve people’s lives” (Sumner 2006, 
p. 245) and thus an interest in practical intervention and policy relevance.  DS is thus 
explicitly value-laden and seeks to conceptualize and catalyze “change for the better” 
(Slim 1995, p. 143), or “good change” (Chambers 2000, p. xiv).  In terms of the present 
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dialogue, this moral core of DS is important because salvation in EO was defined as 
“change for the better” by the early Fathers.  Salvation was “an approach toward and 
account of life that embraces everything, life in its entirety, in all its dimensions and 
meanings”.   “Change for the good is the core of our Christian heritage” (Anastasios 2003, 
p. 155-56).
27
    
DS thus aims at “human development”,28 but specifically on behalf of the poor. It analyzes 
local and global inequalities, particularly gender inequality, and is interested primarily in 
“less developed countries” including the former Soviet Union (Sumner 2006, p. 645).   DS 
is not homogenous; there are a diversity of views including fundamental debate over the 
role of economic development in bringing about “change for the better”.   DS has many 
analytical orientations:  economic, sociological, anthropological, historical, and 
geographical (Peet and Hartwick 1999, p. 3).
29
  However, in its shared focus on improving 
lives, and especially the poor, DS claims to be less concerned with elaboration of theory 
and more with removing barriers to development, and thus it has a problem-solving 
orientation.
30
   While DS is explicitly normative and brings values front and centre into the 
human sciences, the relevance of universal laws to deal with complex and variable 
situations is questioned.  As has already been mentioned and will be extensively developed 
later, this “practical reasoning” approach is fundamental to DS and an important point of 
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 EO shares the “therapeutic” or healing role that was once central to the human sciences in thinkers like 
Durkheim (Giddens 1986, p. 11), but is now being recovered in DS.    
28
Human Development, as mentioned, is a term used in many fields, not just DS.  As will be seen especially 
in chapter four, Sen’s Capability Approach is a specific way of conceptualizing human development within 
the field of DS, with the complication that HD is often used as a synonym for Sen’s CA within the DS 
literature.    
29
 It can be argued that three of the main intellectual drivers for DS, liberalism (with its focus on the 
individual), Marxism (with its focus on structures), and postmodernism (with its communitarian, relativist 
strain (Escobar 1995)) reflect this very Trinitarian structure. 
30
 An expert on refugee and humanitarian crises writes, “Policy relevant scholarship might suggest 
approaches, but the issues are fundamentally managerial.  ‘There are no disciplines’ … ‘only problems’”, 
meaning that “there is no single answer, no single tool or even formula or combination of tools to deal with a 
particular situation” (Helton 2002, p. 16). 
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overlap with EO.  Theory must emerge through a trial and error process through which 
wisdom is accrued. 
Furthermore, DS is cosmopolitan in its moral horizons, and this can be seen especially in 
contrast to political philosophy.   Political philosophy can ignore questions that 
development studies cannot—namely one’s cosmopolitan obligations (i.e. to humankind).   
If one studies the history of political philosophy from Aristotle to Machiavelli (Machiavelli 
1979), through to Hobbes (Hobbes 2008) and on to Rousseau’s31 preference for 
civil/political religion over Christianity (Rousseau 2004, p. 148), it is clear that loyalties 
toward the polis or nation are paramount and the moral claims of humanity receive short 
shrift (Kant of course being a major exception
32
).  DS inverts this priority of the political 
and presupposes (but rarely provides adequate moral arguments for) universal values—the 
moral dignity of and obligation to each and every person in virtue of their humanity 
(Nussbaum 2000).   This is consistent with the Samaritan perspective of Christianity and 
the moral obligations that “shared nature” provides within the Trinitarian philosophical 
anthropology. 
But there is another role that shared nature plays besides a ground for universal concern 
(the breadth perspective), and this is where the insights of DS can be especially relevant 
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 Rousseau (following Machiavelli) was one of the few who saw clearly the significance of Christianity in 
that it developed a loyalty to humanity and was therefore unreliable for shoring up political identity.   “Jesus 
Christ is Lord” is often enough called a “political statement” in the context of the early church (Laeuchli 
1967, p. 34), but its true significance is better understood as an explosive cosmo-political statement that 
incurred the wrath of the Emperors.   It was a direct and provocative challenge to the absolute loyalty 
required by the Roman Emperor as Lord and the related refusal to take up arms and kill another human as 
one who is also a divine image-bearer.  Thus, “Christ is Lord” was simultaneously loyalty to God, but—and 
this dimension is lacking in most accounts (Cunningham 1998, p. 53)—also a loyalty to humanity in general.    
These stand or fall together just as the two Great Commandments stand or fall together.   It is plausible that 
the failure to recognize the significance and implications of “shared nature” in the Trinity are implicated in 
this.   
32
 But this exception itself is significant for the case being made here.  Kant was clearly (even if one 
ultimately argues he was misguided by abstracting as he did from the concrete human case (Sherman 1997)), 
trying to provide a rational foundation for an ethic he believed was uniquely given in Christian revelation.  In 
the Critique of Practical Reason he writes, “the moral teaching of the Gospel … first brought all good 
conduct of man under the discipline of a duty clearly set before him” (Schneewind 1998, p. 545; Kant 2003).    
The Christian faith is at the heart of Enlightenment humanism, even though this is often denied (Hare 2002).   
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for theology.  DS, besides assuming the breadth perspective, also seeks the depth 
perspective in the sense of discerning the various dimensions or functions that each and 
every human being needs to live well, or experience “well-being”, a comprehensive term 
in the social sciences (Charles 1999; Giri 2000; Deneulin 2006; Jaggar 2006; Deaton 2008; 
Bok 2010).
33
  This includes a minimum uncontroversial set of basic needs (e.g. food, 
shelter, education) and corresponding human functions (e.g. digestion, reasonable comfort, 
literacy).   In the 1990’s, an international consensus was reached on a broad set of eight 
targets, the Millennium Development Goals, which are now well known.   However, 
beyond these basic needs development may include more controversial “comprehensive” 
goods that not everyone would agree upon, including religious dimensions.   This is where 
disagreements will arise such as whether humans are naturally social, or naturally 
religious, what social sources of respect are valid, what are actually needs and what are 
merely wants, and other such questions.  However, genuine advances in human 
development may very well depend on addressing these contested areas of what it means to 
be human.  This is because humans are not just a concatenation of “whats”, a bundle of 
functions and needs strung together, but “persons”, self-aware “who-s” that live in and 
through questions about meaning, the “Why” questions.    
However, for arguments sake, consider the following:  even if all persons agreed on a 
minimum, uncontroversial, set of basic needs/functions, and religious faith had no unique 
contribution in terms of the “what is human development” question, this would not 
diminish the importance of faith in addressing the “why” of human development.  The 
                                                          
33 The following by an esteemed Catholic Trinitarian theologian show how “nature” in EO is linked not with 
an abstract idea, but with concrete human functions.  “Concrete existence” below can be thought of as 
“conspecifics”, meaning specific, concrete dimensions of the human essence that are not abstractions, but 
shared features: 
Those accustomed to Western thought patterns are likely to interpret ousia [nature] as abstract essence.  
For example, human nature indicates what is common to all human beings, but excludes every 
particularity ... In Cappadocian theology, however, ousia expresses concrete existence (LaCugna 1991, p. 
69).  
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Orthodox philosopher Berdyaev noted:  “Bread for myself is a material question. Bread for 
my neighbour is a spiritual one”.     The question that faith brings to the table can be put 
simply:  “Am I my brother’s keeper?  And if so, on what basis?”  This question is at the 
core of EO and all its dogmas.  As the Archbishop of Albania argues: “Offering 
spontaneous, brotherly love to all our “neighbours” for no other reason than the simple fact 
that they are human beings, is acknowledged as Christianity’s quintessential message” 
(Anastasios 2003, p. 44).  Similarly, John Chrysostom, perhaps the most widely respected 
Church Father wrote:  "The most perfect rule of Christianity, its exact definition, its 
highest summit, is this:  to seek what is for the benefit of all" (Ware 1998, p. 39).  The 
promise of EO in relation to DS can be noted in that many lines of Christianity repudiate 
this “humanistic” understanding of the Christian faith.   However, where this spiritual 
intuition (for Christianity, where the second commandment is the key to interpreting the 
first) is at the basis of religious faith, a powerful dialogue with DS is possible.    
The aim of this chapter is primarily methodological and thus to show that a dialogue 
between EO and DS is epistemologically legitimate.   However, one final obstacle needs to 
be cleared and that is freeing DS from an overdependence on Western philosophical 
liberalism.   Read in terms of Staniloae’s Trinitarian theological anthropology, liberalism is 
defective because it conceptualizes the good of humans almost entirely in terms of 
freedom, which is but one fundamentally important dimension alongside both communion 
and shared nature.  However, the next section will also show that liberalism’s nemesis, 
communitarianism, does not fare much better for similar reasons: an overreliance on the 
concept of community.    
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2.5 Transcending Liberalism (and Communitarianism) 
Modern development theory is largely predicated on philosophical liberalism which 
emphasizes freedoms of the individual, the neutrality of the state, equality, reasoned public 
debate, and is secular in nature (Sandel 1982; Neal and Paris 1990; Avineri and de-Shalit 
1992; Gauthier 1992; Gutmann 1992; Kymlicka 1992; Mulhall and Swift 1992; Bell 1993; 
Dees 1993; Walzer 1995; Rawls 2005).   These values are considered recent in origin, 
emerging with the Enlightenment (Witte-Jr 2007).
34
  The story of the rise of liberalism 
goes something like this:  the ‘liberal’ (or Enlightenment) approach emerged out of the 
need to transcend the violent “passions” of religion and to replace these with the calm and 
peaceful ruminations of reason.  This was no mere armchair intellectual project, but 
emerged out of the European Wars of Religion, “conducted with a fervour and brutality 
that were not to be exceeded until our own times” (Gillespie 2008, p. 129).35   
Enlightenment reason (liberalism) believed it could achieve distance from these passionate 
conflicts by abstracting from concrete communities and burdened historical situations by 
grounding political cooperation in reason, freedom, and public discussion.
36
  The basis for 
social values then becomes not “ascriptive identities”37 such as religion, or anything about 
persons empirically, but in the rights of individuals taken abstractly, i.e. apart from the 
particularities of concrete communities, history, or religion.  In other words, when it comes 
to the bases for justice and human cooperation, “people should be regarded as distinct from 
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 Technically the Enlightenment as a historical period only arose in the nineteenth century, but the term is 
used here to refer to that modern cast of thought from at least the mid-seventeenth century with Descartes and 
Hobbes (Gillespie 2008, p. 257).   The central idea is that human reason can provide at least the practical 
basis for truth and illuminate the way towards social improvements. 
35
 According to conservative estimates, these wars claimed 10 percent of the population of England, 15 
percent in France, 30 percent in Germany and more than 50 percent in Bohemia.   European dead in World 
War II surpassed 10 percent of the population only in the USSR and Germany (Gillespie 2008, p. 130).   
36
 Kant in his classic essay, ‘An Answer to the Question:  "What is Enlightenment?"’ writes:  “For 
enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom.  And the freedom in question is the most innocuous 
form of all—freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters” (Kant 1991, p. 55).  As will be seen, 
this parallels almost exactly Amartya Sen’s emphases, on freedom, reason, and public reason. 
37
 An “ascriptive” identity is an identity that one did not choose, such as race, or gender, or being born into a 
religion.  The fear is that people “identify with their own kind” and not on the basis of choice, which is 
thought to be contrary to the aims of democracy and universal human rights (Gutmann 2004, p. 127). 
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their particularity” (Mulhall and Swift 1992, p. 11).  This (Kantian) Enlightenment 
universalism, rooted in a concern for moral equality, has been and continues to be 
championed as the most plausible basis for universal moral concern, human rights, and 
development more broadly (Sen 2000; 2005).   Liberalism, founded on human reason and 
freedom, is indeed a profound moral vision that is supported by contemporary thinkers 
such as Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 1978), John Rawls (Rawls 1971; 1999; 2005), Amartya 
Sen (Sen 1999; Sen 2000; Sen 2002; Sen 2006), Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1997), 
William Kymlicka (Kymlicka 1992; Kymlicka 1995) and many more.   
However, the received wisdom about human rights and other such progressive ideals, that 
they emerged newborn from the womb of the Enlightenment,
38
 is increasingly recognized 
as false (Wagar 1967).  Indeed, one of the principal conceits of modernity is “to see itself 
as radically new and unprecedented” (Gillespie 2008, p. 19).  Take for instance the very 
case of human rights.   Religious freedoms in Europe were not engendered by the growing 
acceptance and implementation of liberal political concepts, but rather through a much 
more complex set of factors including political leaders’ interest based calculations (Gill 
2008).  Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the Reformers not only developed many 
of the leading concepts of rights but were among the first to implement them (Witte-Jr 
2007).    Even prior to the Reformation, the former colonizer turned Dominican Friar, 
Bartolome de las Casa, became a powerful advocate concerning the Spanish conquistadors’ 
atrocities against the Indians.   “Las Casas was the first person in history to speak about 
human rights and the freedom of religion” (Deneulin and Bano 2009, p. 76).   Similarly, 
the “dignity of the individual” was arguably a Christian achievement (Dumont 1982; 
Kolakowski 1990; Stroumsa 1990).   The classical world tended to emphasize the species 
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 The notion that human rights’ origin was in the Enlightenment became widespread largely through the 
popularization of the ideas of Leo Strauss.   Many conservative Protestants took on board this false idea, thus 
creating a wedge between Christianity and rights discourse (Witte-Jr 2007, p. 21). 
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(universal) or the polis over the person.
39
    In a similar vein, modern notions of “progress” 
in the West owe much more to the doctrines of Cardinal John Henry Newman than perhaps 
anyone (Cowen and Shenton 1996, p. 9).  Further examples will be offered throughout this 
thesis to scrutinise the alleged “liberal” (and Classical Greek) origins of the human 
development concerns.    
More recently, the adequacy of liberalism as an account of the “considered convictions” 
about ordering society has come under attack by a group of scholars loosely and uneasily 
labelled communitarian.  Charles Taylor, principal among them, styles Enlightenment 
liberalism as an “ideal of disengagement” that valorises “the ability to act on one’s own, 
without outside interference or subordination to outside authority” (Taylor 1985, p. 5).40  
Taylor’s incisive language represents a whole class of discontentment with liberalism 
(MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1988; Perry 1989; Neal and Paris 1990; Etzioni 
1993; 2004).   Liberalism is profoundly individualistic
41
 and often suspicious of 
“ascriptive” group identities, including religion (Gutmann 2004).  It is widely feared that 
liberalism, with its focus on negative rights and an ethic of non-interference, is generating 
cultures of mutual indifference (Glendon 1991; Tessman 2005, p. 99). 
 “Communitarians” on the other hand, emphasize the primacy of the particular, local 
context, and values and responsibilities rooted less in individual choice and more in one’s 
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 Hans Von Urs Balthasar writes:  “This idea of the balance and reciprocity of universal and particular is 
perhaps the most important in the whole of Maximus' thought.  Here the old Greek suspicion of particularity, 
the exaggerated preference for the universal, is finally overcome”.  He goes on to quote Maximus:  
For if the universals are constituted by the particulars, it is utterly impossible that they could preserve the 
intelligible form of their existence and continuity in themselves if the singular were to disappear ... For 
the parts have their existence in the wholes, and the wholes exist in and are constituted by the parts 
(Balthasar 2003, p. 161-63).   
But important here is that both the whole/species level (shared nature), and the individual (person) have 
“ontological” or moral status.  
40
 The first paragraph of Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” argues that immaturity is self-incurred and is the 
“lack of resolution and courage to use it [reason] without the guidance of another” (Kant 1991, p. 54). 
41
 A more thorough examination of “liberalism” would show that just as there are “multiple modernities” (see 
below), there are “multiple liberalisms”; the libertarianism of a Robert Nozick (Nozick 1968; 1989) is a far 
cry from John Rawls’ “justice as fairness” (Rawls 1971; 1999; 2005) even if both are labelled “liberals.” 
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given communal identity.   Communitarians insist (rightly) that “community is a structured 
precondition of human agency and selfhood” (Mulhall and Swift 1992, p. 122).   The 
liberal position will be critiqued throughout this study, but it is important to note here that 
communitarians have their own difficulties in defining which community or communities, 
and which values within communities are given, or rather, should be given, priority.   
Moral relativism is a real danger with communitarian arguments.  The communitarian 
problem can be expressed thuswise:  if values are based in the local community, on what 
basis can distressing expressions, such as the Taliban, be critiqued?   Liberalism has been 
deeply uncomfortable with this “localism” and thus grounds values primarily in freedom 
and reason.   However, Aristotle himself argued that reason’s (logos) very purpose was to 
recognize those from “one’s own” polis  and differentiate one’s own from members of 
other poleis (Aristotle 1999)—a very communitarian view of reason.     These tensions 
give rise to the so called “liberal-communitarian” debate that is fundamental to political 
philosophy (Sandel 1982; Taylor 1985; Neal and Paris 1990; Gutmann 1992; Kymlicka 
1992; Dees 1993; Humphrey 1993; Cecil and Taitte 1995; Walzer 1995; Fergusson 1998; 
Nussbaum 2000; Taylor 2004; Rawls 2005) but is also critical for  development studies 
(Nussbaum 2000; Sen 2000; Deneulin 2002; Deneulin and Bano 2009).    
 How are persons to be conceptualized?  Are human beings primarily individual, or 
communal, or perhaps better is to ask what should they be?  The liberal-communitarian 
debate can seem intractable with many creative attempts to traverse between the competing 
claims of obligation to one’s community or the freedoms of the individual.  Notable here is 
John Rawls, who arrived at a rather communitarian conclusion while starting from 
decidedly liberal premises (Mulhall and Swift 1992, p. xvii).
42
  Within this “liberal-
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 He does this by critiquing John Locke’s claim of self-ownership (Macpherson 1962; Locke 1980), which 
became over time the justification for almost unlimited accumulation of private property as justified by 
libertarianism (Nozick 1968; 1989).   Rawls, however, argues that because the dispersion of talent is due 
almost entirely to a genetic lottery where some win and some lose apart from any personal merit, people’s 
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communitarian” debate one hears the call to balance between rights versus responsibilities 
(Glendon 1991; Etzioni 1993) or the individual and communal (Avineri and de-Shalit 
1992).  This binary, this thesis-antithesis can, however, be transcended with the inclusion 
of the third category of shared nature, which situates both individual agency, and 
communitarian obligations, within a moral horizon of universal human development.   This 
is the case that will be developed in the next two chapters with Marxism and Sen’s 
capability approach.   However, it is instructive that this parallels similarly oversimplified 
debates about the Trinity as a model for the human community (emphasizing only person 
and communion). 
As mentioned above, liberalism is the dominant underpinning for development studies as 
will be illustrated with Amartya Sen.  However, outside the West, liberalism is 
increasingly viewed as but one paradigm among many for justifying universal claims such 
as human rights (Pollis 2000; Witte-Jr 2007).   Development studies, more so than Western 
political philosophy, must struggle to build on the “latent dynamism” (Goulet 1971) in 
each culture’s values.   There is a profound and recognized need to explore other routes 
beyond liberalism, including religious values, to critically interact with and guide the 
valuational priorities of development studies (Cartier 1975; Gasper 2002; 2004; Rao and 
Walton 2004; Stewart 2005; Deneulin 2006; Gasper 2006; Jones 2008).   
It is important to point out (and here the argument is directed primarily to the DS audience) 
that liberalism is, in fact, a weak basis for the moral project of human development.  
Liberal theorists have developed various and sometimes bizarre thought experiments 
through which the principles of justice can be derived from nothing external to persons, but 
only from individual choice.   This means that individual choice requires very important 
                                                                                                                                                                                
talents therefore become a species of common property.   Individuals thus do not have exclusive rights to the 
fruit of their labours.  
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procedural safeguards.   These safeguards “allow” an individual, or a group of conversing 
individuals, to reason or dialogue “properly” and thus transcend local or personal biases 
that might distort the principles of justice.  However, these procedural conversations are 
highly artificial and involve carefully placed restraints that are utterly implausible.    One 
famous example, pilloried by Michael Walzer, argues that the principles of justice can be 
secured through the device of a “conversation in a spaceship”.43  Such conversations are 
just too abstract and artificial to be useful in the real world.  As Walzer notes, 
“Proceduralist arguments won't help us … precisely because they are not differentiated by 
time and place; they are not properly circumstantial” (Walzer 1997, p. 3).   
These idealized mechanisms for securing the principles of justice include Rawls’ “original 
position” (Rawls 1999), Habermas “ideal speech situation” (Habermas 1986), Sen’s 
“positional objectivity” (Sen 2009, p. 155-173),44  Nagel’s “View from Nowhere” (Nagel 
1986),  Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator”, (Smith 2002), Peter Singer’s “point of view of 
the Universe” (Singer 1995, p. 230) and the list could go on.45  All argue that their 
procedures allow agents to overcome moral arbitrariness and achieve the 
ethical/epistemological ideal of impartiality.
46
  These are instances of “Ideal-Observer(s)” 
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 Michael Walzer is largely responsible for popularizing this epithet, but it was presented as an actual 
procedural mechanism in (Ackerman 1981).  A group of persons on a spaceship arriving at the planet earth 
had to decide before landing the principles of just distribution amongst scarce resources and these in turn 
became the basis for a social contract.  
44
 It is interesting that in this context Amartya Sen makes one of his few references to Jesus.  He cites the 
Samaritan story but then goes on to say that the “main point of the story as told by Jesus is a reasoned 
rejection of the idea of a fixed neighbourhood” (Sen 2009, p. 171).  This is not the main point of the story, 
but the sub-point.  The main point is that care is to be exercised towards all.  Sen’s point here is similar to the 
ancient Stoics, that citizenship does not matter.  But this insight does not readily translate into a positive, 
proactive sense of care. 
45
 Another approach to universalism derived from African philosophy is a unity rooted in humanity’s shared 
biological nature (Wiredu 1996).   This approach is close to Orthodoxy in that it values creation or shared 
human nature as a universal norm, and not merely human choice in the abstract.   
46 It is not viewed as “arbitrary” that these proceduralist accounts, these “conversations in a spaceship”, the 
most developed of which is probably Habermas’ “ideal speech situation”, are openly acknowledged to be 
based on a situation which is factually and sociologically non-existent, and the theorist even denies 
categorically to exist.  “He [Habermas] acknowledges that his expression "the ideal speech situation," is 
misleading if it seems to suggest "a concrete form of life" (Hoy and McCarthy 1994, p. 159).  Habermas is 
the most transparent about the weaknesses of such procedural approaches, acknowledging the need for 
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theories and by their very nature are highly formalized, abstract and artificial.   And here it 
is vital to note that because of this procedure of abstraction, liberalism by its inner logic 
suppresses particularity in favour of abstract universality.  This is a point that can appear 
counterintuitive as liberalism is said to promote freedoms of various sorts, but the very title 
of Amartya Sen’s Reason before Identity (Sen 1999) vividly bears out how cultural 
difference can be suppressed by rationalism.   
Given these weaknesses of liberalism, it can no longer be treated as the single persuasive 
theory that can ground development theory/practice.  Furthermore, while modernization is 
indeed expanding apace, it does not appear to be inextricably linked with Western values 
such as secularism; there are “multiple modernities” (Sachsenmaier, Eisenstadt et al. 2002; 
Taylor 2004).   Neither does globalism seem to be leading to a more cosmopolitan ethic 
and an increased sense of solidarity across national and ethnic boundaries.  A sense of 
anomie may be increasing as the larger spaces of globalization are accelerating a turn 
inward to traditional identity groups—a “regionalization of meaning” may be occurring 
(Laidi 1998).   
Yet, at the same time, traditional identity groups often display a deep concern for 
development values—this is not the exclusive province of liberal theory.  This notion is 
lost on many liberal thinkers in their mis-characterization of “ascriptive” identity groups 
and their relevance or desire for a contribution to the common good.
47
  There seems to be a 
deep human tendency to seek a unified basis for life amid the welter of diversity and 
difference.
48
  Whether through a shared genetic substrate, or through a common genesis in 
a Creator, or through common rationality (Kant), or an awe-inspiring secular authority 
                                                                                                                                                                                
further “background conditions” for his theory.  It is significant that late in his career he began calling on the 
aid of religion if even in a limited sense (Habermas 2010).   
47
 Recall Chrysostom’s earlier defining the very essence of Christianity as caring for the good of all. 
48
 One sees this tension in Aristotle where he discusses the virtues of man as such, or the virtues of man in 
relation to specific poleis (Aristotle 1999).    
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(Hobbes), or natality (Arendt), or death (Heidegger), there is a deep need for grounding 
human unity in meaningful narratives or some shared feature of the human constitution.  
Religious traditions share this tendency and there are various “humanisms” in every 
religion (Nasr 1996).  The point being emphasized here is not that specific traditions regard 
their own idiosyncratic (narrative) world-view as the unique universal truth that everyone 
should submit to, and a unity achieved on this basis.  Rather religious traditions may affirm 
truth as the unity of humanity, truth as working for the common good, truth as emerging in 
humble and uncoerced dialogue with others—and these as religious truths that are 
genuinely internal to human experience because creation is good.  There can be “truth” 
internal to the human condition precisely because all humans participate in a shared logos, 
and for the religious faithful, God is the source of this shared logos.  This is another way of 
describing natural law and some religious traditions place natural revelation and special 
revelation in rather close proximity—as does EO—and  this has the potential to bring faith 
in a close relationship with development concerns. 
Western Enlightenment based liberalism is neither the origin, nor can it correctly be 
viewed as the hegemonic carrier, of these “development” values.    But by no means is 
liberalism entirely bankrupt and there are many noble features, and much to be learned 
from its leading figures like John Rawls and as will be seen, Amartya Sen.
49
  This section 
has merely signalled the limitations of liberalism in order to clear the pathway for a 
genuine dialogue between faith and development.    
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 Recent scholarship has brought to light the religious origins of Rawls’ political philosophy (Rawls 2009).   
Joshua Cohen and Robert Nagel assert:  “Those who have studied Rawls’s work, and even more, those who 
knew him personally, are aware of a deeply religious temperament that informed his life and writings, 
whatever may have been his beliefs” (Cohen and Nagel 2009).   But important is that his beliefs were formed 
in the womb of direct theological influence as he studied theology and planned to enter seminary at an early 
stage in his life.   This point is significant for this thesis because Amartya Sen, who is strictly a-religious, was 
deeply influenced by Rawls religiously influenced political philosophy.   
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With this recognition in place, the diverse findings of this chapter, which have aimed to 
legitimate this dialogue (or “correlation”) between EO and DS, can be restated.  The bases 
for dialogue (from the Greek dialogos: dia meaning “between”, and logos meaning 
“reason”) are many.  These include for EO a positive view of humanity’s shared rationality 
and experience, a less severe view of the Fall, and even in that most idiosyncratic dogmas 
of Christianity, the Trinity as a bridge with human development.  Furthermore, the 
academic field of development studies, concerned as it is with all that goes into “change 
for the better” and especially for the marginalized, profoundly overlaps with EO 
definitions of salvation and the concerns within the second great commandment.  Finally, 
in order to remove an impediment to this dialogue that will be continued in subsequent 
chapters, it was necessary to show that Enlightenment liberalism is not the exclusive 
carrier of human development values. 
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3. THE DIALOGUE IN CONTEXT:  THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
This chapter will place the dialogue between EO and DS in the larger context of the 
already existing relationship between faith and the social sciences.  This is important for 
the social sciences were constructed in relation, often agonically, to religion.   This chapter 
will start with general reflections on theology and the social sciences, but quickly 
transition to a sustained interaction with Marxist thought for two very important but 
different reasons.   First, Marxism is the theoretical background for Liberation Theology 
which is perhaps the most profound interaction between faith and the social sciences.  
Second, many Eastern Orthodox countries face development challenges which are a direct 
result of “Marxist inspired Communism”.1  Analyzing these contextual factors is 
paramount for conceptualizing a theology of development relevant for Orthodox cultures.
   
 
This chapter will examine these challenges in a way that demonstrates the relevance of the 
Trinitarian picture of the human condition for human development.  This chapter paves the 
way to the next where Amartya Sen’s capability approach will be investigated in light of 
these findings.  
3.1 Background Considerations 
The social sciences and theology can conceivably interact in many ways.
2
  John Milbank, 
an important Protestant theorist asserts that “the most important governing assumptions of 
[secular social] theory are bound up with the modification or the rejection of Orthodox 
Christian positions” (Milbank 1990, p. 1).  The veracity of this statement is difficult to 
assess because there is very little consensus within the social sciences over terms like 
                                                          
1
 This phrase is used to prescind from the question of the precise relationship between theoretical Marxism 
and empirical Communist societies.   This will be touched on later, but no definitive resolution is sought. 
2
 For a helpful typology of five different strategies for relating theology and the social sciences, see (Roberts 
2005, p. 373f).   EO theology is not included.   
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agency, solidarity, structure (Giddens 1979; Hays 1994; Imbroscio 1999), and similarly, 
there is little consensus over the meaning and significance of theological terms.  From an 
EO perspective, many Western “Orthodox” Christian positions that Enlightenment thinkers 
attacked have often appeared rather anti-humanist, denying value (grace) in nature, in 
human agency, and expressions of social solidarity.   If “modernity’s” two values can be 
characterized as a regard for  a) human life and b) freedom (Casanova 1994, p. 233), then a 
strong case can be made that Orthodoxy stands at least as close to these as Western 
theology, if not closer.  This section will analyze the strained relationship between 
theology and the human sciences in the West,
3
 but it will also point out some obstacles 
within EO for a theology of human development. 
Many of the Enlightenment criticisms were not against religion per se, but specific 
emphases.  J.S. Mill famously reacted not against Christianity itself, but Calvinism.  Mill 
criticizes:  
this narrow theory of life, and … the pinched and hidebound type of human character 
which it patronizes.   Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus 
cramped and dwarfed are as their Maker designed them to be … But if it be any part of 
religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith 
to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and 
unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach 
made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them (Mill 1991, p. 62).  
The EO understanding developed in this thesis is very close to this form emerging from 
Aristotelian virtue language.
4
   Similarly, David Hume who critiqued religious faith in his 
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 Richard Roberts has written extensively on the “problematic” relation between theology and the social 
sciences.  “[S]uch has been the degree of cultural isolation of theology that the New Testament theologian 
Ernst Käsemann could write of the status of theological thought as a “nature reserve” in European culture. 
This is an apt but alarming image” (Roberts 2005, p. 373). 
4
 If the reader is incredulous at this early stage of the argument, the following is advanced from a standard 
Eastern Orthodox textbook.  Christians are to advance, and notice the Aristotelian language, the “virtues ... 
which literally means those powers and possessions of the mind and the heart which all men should have if 
they are truly human, fulfilling themselves as created in the image and likeness of God” (Hopko 1976, p. 56).  
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Dialogues (Hume 1779 (1990)), was “in rebellion against the dour Scottish 
Presbyterianism of his childhood” (Gay 1966, p. 64).    
Part of the discord between faith and reason is also that recent secular writers have tended 
to downplay or omit references to Christian inspiration that, in fact, were used by the great 
thinkers of the Enlightenment.    Divine references by Kant, Locke and even back to (the 
claim to divine inspiration by) Socrates (Grube 1981), are often dismissed as “ironical”, or 
as irrational hangovers.   Philosopher John Hare writes concerning Kant in particular,  
“This [downplaying of the divine] is an interpretive manoeuvre that twentieth century 
interpreters have also used in order to lessen the significance of Kant’s references to God’s 
role in human morality” (Hare 2002).5 
Modern interpreters “cherry-pick” thinkers such as Kant, pulling ideas piecemeal out of 
their richer context and intent.  Modern philosophy (and social science) which fails to 
recognize its theological roots is increasingly recognized as superficial (Marty 1980; 
Taylor 1989; 2004; Lilla 2007; Taylor 2007; Gillespie 2008) (Kilborne 1992; Wolterstorff 
2010).  But it is also true that the social sciences were built on the hypothesis of the 
universal decline of religion as societies advance (Stark and Bainbridge 1985).  There were 
notable exceptions who challenged the secularization hypothesis such as Tocqueville and 
William James, but they were outliers.      
However, the poor relationship between theology and the social sciences arises from 
deeper sources.  Modern social sciences have often aspired to be “value-free” and achieve 
the epistemic certainty of the natural sciences where necessary and predictable truths 
                                                          
5
 Hare insists that what is true of Kant “is also true of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, and even Hume” 
(Hare 2002, p. 2). 
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obtain with lawful regularity, regardless of context, history, or meaning (Toulmin 1990).
6
   
The social sciences have indulged in what Bent Flyvbjerg calls “physics envy” (Flyvbjerg 
2001), which has meant considerable abstraction and discounting of factors not fitting into 
scientific models—the “rational choice” theories of economics are but one case in point 
(Sen 1977; Petracca 1991).    This has meant that the social sciences have typically given 
short shrift to action, internal questions of meaning, moral values (Levitt and Dubner 
2005), history, and contextual considerations in preference for timeless truths, 
oversimplified motivations, in an attempt to model what “necessarily must be the case”.7  
This epistemological ambition has (many argue) proven disastrous for the social sciences 
and unlike the natural sciences, in the social sciences there has been no real progression or 
accumulation of knowledge.   In the social sciences, there is almost no methodological or 
even terminological consensus whatsoever (Kuhn 1970, p. viii).    There are no Kuhnian 
“paradigm shifts” between periods of “normal science”; there are only “style changes” or 
fashion shifts (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 30).     The only widely accepted research program, the 
secularization thesis (that was central in the very rise of the social sciences), is now 
abandoned and with the same “uncritical haste” with which it was previously embraced 
(Bell 1971; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Greeley 2003; Berger 2005; Martin 2005; Taylor 
2007).   The tide has turned such that sociologist José Casanova asks, as the very first 
sentence in his major work, “Who still believes in the myth of secularization?” (Casanova 
1994, p. 11).     
                                                          
6
 Charles Taylor notes:  “The model for all explanation and understanding is the natural sciences which 
emerge out of the seventeenth-century revolution.  But this offers us a neutral [value-free] universe:  it has no 
place for intrinsic worth, or goals which make a claim on us” (Taylor 1993, p. 211) (Taylor 1995, p. 37-39).  
Or also, “Our personhood cannot be treated scientifically in exactly the same way we approach our organic 
being” (Taylor 1985, p. 3).   
7
 Reformed theologian Bob Goudzwaard argues that it was not Adam Smith, but Kant who laid the 
foundation for a value free science.   Later it will be seen that Kant indeed, in the field of moral/practical 
reason privileged timeless “episteme” that is more appropriate for the natural sciences, over variable 
“phronesis” or wisdom that is more appropriate for the human sciences.  Max Weber and Carl Menger, 
following him, “expel[led] from the field of the study of economics [notions] that contain a seed of 
uncertainty” (Goudzwaard and Lange 1995, p. 50).  
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However, a new but old approach, delineated by Aristotle but recast in modern form by 
Bent Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg 2001), argues that a rehabilitation of the social sciences is 
possible but only if it abandons its “physics envy”, that is, abandons its aspirations for the 
certainty obtaining in the natural sciences.
8
   As Aristotle argued, “it is the mark of the 
trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature 
of that subject permits” (Aristotle 2004, p. 5).   This rehabilitation of the social sciences is 
possible through a retrieval of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, prudence or practical 
wisdom that seeks ethical guidance for action in specific situations concerning what is 
good and bad for man (Aristotle 2004, p. 4).   This approach, a corollary of the virtue 
approach to ethics that will loom large in this thesis, aspires towards real knowledge about 
ethically appropriate behaviour in concrete situations.  This social science tradition holds 
great possibility for positive interaction with theology provided theology can positively 
include human agency. 
This is all to say that the social sciences are in a state of radical flux.  From within this flux 
however, the lineaments of an improved dialogue between theology and the social sciences 
is emerging (Chatterji 1967; Wilber and Jameson 1980; Shepherd 1982; Matthews, Nagata 
et al. 1986; Lehmann 1990; Villa-Vicencio 1999-2000; Janis and Evans 2004; Thomas 
2004; Haar and Ellis 2006; Lim and Putnam 2010).   It is worth exploring whether a more 
positive relationship between faith and human reason is possible by adding new voices into 
the conversation, both from the social science side, but from the side of theology as well.    
Surely it is significant that “viewed from a historical standpoint, the shipwreck of faith and 
reason was strictly a western phenomenon.  In the Christian East, there occurred no such 
                                                          
8
 Others advocate this “phronetic” approach to the social sciences.  Robert Bellah and colleagues’ Habits of 
the Heart is considered an exemplar (Bellah 1996) and has long offered insights in this regard (Bellah 1976; 
Bellah 1982).  Charles Taylor has done much to rehabilitate this view (Taylor 1985; 1993; 1995) and others 
(Richardson 1994; MacIntyre 1999; Richardson 2002).   Also, more directly in terms of development studies, 
is (Farmer 2003).   As will be seen, this emphasis is also central to the capability approach. 
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result” (Bradshaw 2004, p. x).   While this statement is perhaps an exaggeration, it can be 
taken to signal new possibilities for dialogue. 
EO and the social sciences can, it will be seen, interact on many fronts, but there are also 
some potential roadblocks that must first be signalled.   As will be developed later, 
Maximus the Confessor (and picked up by Staniloae) defines human “development” or 
salvation in terms of the movement from 1) Being to 2) Well-being and on finally to 3) 
Eternal-being.   Social science could potentially interact with each of these categories, 
though obviously the latter only indirectly, such as the possible beneficial or negative 
effects of holding a belief in an afterlife.   Ernest Becker received the Pulitzer Prize for 
showing how humans engage in heroic acts to transcend death through what he called 
“immortality projects” (Becker 1973).   This “denial of death” is an underlying factor in 
the production of human culture (including oppression) and shows that the search for well-
being beyond this life shapes actions within this one.   This line of analysis could be 
attractive to a religious point of view that affirms the importance of life after death, or the 
yearning for infinity, a theme also employed by Blaise Pascal, Paul Ricoeur,
9
 and many 
others including Orthodox thinkers (Hopko 2007). 
However, this emphasis on immortality can distort if it is the singular dimension as is 
sometimes the case in Orthodoxy.   In an important essay entitled “The Meaning and Place 
of Death in an Orthodox Ethical Framework”, Perry Hamalis (in Papanikolaou and 
Prodromou 2008) argues that Orthodox theology needs to be viewed as thanatomorphic, as 
                                                          
9
 In Fallible Man Ricoeur argues that there is a basic disproportion between the finite and the infinite 
dimensions of a human being (Ricoeur 1960).   There is disproportion between finite and bounded bios and 
the infinite and unbounded logos.  Later in his career he argues that this phenomenological reading of the 
human disproportion between the finite and the infinite is inadequate to explain radical evil, hence his 
“hermeneutical”, or interpretive turn in terms of methodology.  This narrative approach will be picked up 
several times later in this thesis, but especially chapter nine. 
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having its leading concepts and questions formed by death.
10
  Many important insights are 
offered that are faithful to EO.  However, the author deals exclusively with the question of 
mortality per se, that humans die and do not live forever, and, in turn, how Christ’s 
resurrection is an answer to this need for Eternal-being.  Important as this dimension is, it 
must be pointed out that it is tragically inadequate in dealing with the full reality of the 
phenomenon of death and the qualitatively different kinds of death humans’ experience.  
When a grandmother lives a long, full life, has a quiver of grand-children and passes away 
in her eighties or nineties, one generally says she has “lived well”, even though she dies.  
This is profoundly and scandalously different than a child whose life is blighted, whose 
powers of imagination never develop, who never experiences the joy of play or receives an 
education, and dies malnourished at an early age.   And this happens for millions upon 
millions—and it is preventable.  EO in fact is not orientated to death in only the way 
Hamalis depicts it.  There is a genuinely theological notion of human well-being between 
the bookends of birth and death that must not be overlooked and needs retrieval.  If death 
is “unnatural” as Orthodoxy affirms, then premature and unnecessary death is doubly 
unnatural.    
A theological methodology that is one-sided, where theology is “calling the shots”, can 
discourage reflection on an adequate range of issues and impoverish theology.  This is 
where a dialogue with the social sciences in general, but especially development studies, is 
imperative.  DS investigates the nature and causes of premature death and preventable 
morbidity, as well as many other analyses both empirical and speculative on what is good 
and bad for humans.   Reflection on these contemporary concerns can help prevent 
distortions, enrich reflection, and help Christians take the second Great commandment as 
                                                          
10
 John Zizioulas is another prominent EO theologian who seems to orientate soteriology almost exclusively 
to the overcoming of death as existential fact (Zizioulas 2002; Papanikolaou 2003; Zizioulas 2006).   A 
theology of well-being or development would be difficult to construct on these lines. 
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seriously as they have taken the first.   Indeed, this is not alien to Orthodoxy as some 
Orthodox authors argue for “the sovereign power of the second commandment" 
(Skobtsova 2005, p. 11).
11
 
This study is thus less concerned with death as existential fact, but primarily preventable 
morbidity and mortality, why a Japanese woman can expect to live to her 80’s and a 
Botswanan woman merely half of that.   The approach here is concerned primarily with 
remediable impediments, or what Paul Farmer (borrowing from the Haitians) called 
“stupid deaths” (Farmer 2003, p. 144).  The central issue is the relationship between 
Orthodox theology and well-being (Maximus’s middle category above) and the ability to 
fulfil various potentialities in this life—development now being regarded as a fundamental 
human right (Sengupta 2000).  And neither does well-being have only to do with the 
remedying of obstacles, but is flourishing in its fullest sense, including subjective well-
being.  Though not coming from an academic source, the slogan of a British Christian 
charity captures perfectly the emphasis aimed at here:  “We believe in life before death”.12  
Gustavo Gutierrez writes, “In the final analysis poverty means death: unjust death, the 
premature death of the poor, physical death” (Nickoloff 1996, p. 144).   The uncomfortable 
reality is that large percentages of the globe face structured risks for no fault of their own, 
whereby the absolute chances of dying from any number of diseases or dying in a 
“routine” automobile accident are scandalously higher than other contexts.   To say death 
is premature and thus preventable, or that a life is stunted, implies developmental, and thus 
moral, norms in nature (Antony 2000).    (Orthodoxy calls these developmental norms 
                                                          
11
 Saint Maria Skobtsova of Paris (called by some as the “Dorothy Day” of EO) complained about the 
Philokalia (Kadloubovsky and Palmer 1992), a devotional treasure of Orthodoxy, that “material about the 
attitude towards one's neighbour takes up only two pages out of six hundred [in the first volume], and in the 
second volume, only three out of seven hundred and fifty” (Skobtsova 2005, p. 50). 
12
 http://www.christianaid.org.uk/ accessed March 16, 2008. 
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“logoi”, which will be detailed later.)   And to say that “the death of that child was 
preventable” is to combine a fact with a value, it is to say that it should not have happened, 
and corrective action is required.   
Unlike Kantian approaches that emphasize autonomy and formal reason and are suspicious 
of creation as a source of revelation or wisdom (Moltmann 1993), EO values “data” from 
within human experience and thus natural norms are a source of spiritual obligation.   God 
has placed “rational norms of existence” within not only the human intellect, but material 
reality and developmental and relational processes as well.  When these norms are not 
achieved, whether through intent or accident, a failure to achieve God’s purposes for well-
being has occurred.  
Facts imply values.
13
  This correlation can be straightforward or more complex where 
larger patterns can be observed through statistical analyses.  For example, Florence 
Nightingale laboured to pioneer statistical methods to organize descriptive data into chains 
of causality.  “Nightingale believed that statistics were a means of discerning the will of 
God”.  She proved to a sceptical audience how improving low nursing standards could 
bring about palpable health benefits (Bornstein 2004).   It is this combination of a) moral 
vision and thus quality of motivation and b) empirical analysis provided by the social 
sciences, that is sought after in this dialogue between religious faith and development.   In 
EO, where grace operates through nature, these types of interrelations can readily be made, 
as further arguments will demonstrate. 
                                                          
13
The strict separation of fact and value is seen by many as intellectually dishonest (Toulmin 1976; 1990).  
Hilary Putnam and Willard Quine have persuasively argued that this dichotomy can be transcended by 
“objective resolutions of problematical situations” (Putnam 2001, p. 156; 2004).    
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One main concern for any theology of development is the quality of insights provided by 
the social sciences (or DS) as an aid for achieving worthwhile well-being objectives.  A 
famous example that Amartya Sen brought to light is that a serious famine has never 
occurred in a functioning democracy and this due to the effects of free press and other 
protective mechanisms such as free and fair elections (Sen 1981).
14
   In social science 
parlance, these subtle links are the realm of explanation versus mere description, 
explanation revealing something that could never (or not easily) have been discovered with 
the naked eye (Craib 1992, p. 13).  These types of correlations or structural explanations 
are important and can offer strategic intervention points for moral/spiritual obligation that 
would otherwise go unnoticed.  
However, exterior and “objective” social science analytics needs supplementing with a 
more interior, or subjective approach.  There is another approach in the social sciences 
such that the drivers of change and history have to do with subjective and internal issues of 
meaning and purpose “causing” human action.   This tradition is called the hermeneutical 
or interpretive approach, as opposed to the explanatory (Hollis 1994).   To oversimplify 
somewhat, the exterior approach seeks to understand what happened; the interior or 
hermeneutical approach seeks to understand why.   This, as will be seen, often involves 
“narrative”, or making sense of one’s life as a story (Taylor 1989, p. 47).  These two 
opposite traditions can, if extreme versions are excluded, be complementary.  
Emphasizing this complementarity is important because there is a move towards the 
interpretive or hermeneutical approach in development studies which is praiseworthy 
(Deneulin and Rakodi 2011).  But going entirely in that direction and ignoring the 
                                                          
14
 This does not mean that “functioning democracies” may well not have played roles in tragedies outside 
their borders.   Democracy in its Athenian foundations was proudly and aggressively imperialistic (Galpin 
1983). 
 61 
positivistic (exterior/objective) altogether, the realm of nature or structures, can create 
problems.  The positivistic approach can, and must, serve as a feedback mechanism for the 
effect of religious values and practices on well-being.  For instance, one can imagine many 
traditional (or modern) practices that make perfect internal sense to the religious adherent 
or community, yet are positively disastrous.  A recent case in the US illustrates this.   A 
“parent-centred”, strict scheduled feeding program for infants became popular and claimed 
to be the “Biblical” view, based on the notion that humans are depraved from birth.  Babies 
will cry and manipulate, but parents must not “give in”—so mothers were enjoined to keep 
their infants on a strict, “Biblical”, feeding regime.   It was only after a nationwide 
pandemic of dehydrated and low birth weight infants eventuated that this tragedy was 
revealed.   Scores of paediatricians interviewing mothers connected the dots, and 
discovered that mothers were feeding less and in turn not able to produce enough breast 
milk.     Based on objective data (and no doubt because of the national scandal) the authors 
have amended their “godly parenting” texts (Cutrer 2001).   This example is just to say that 
human nature, its needs (e.g. basic needs) and functions (e.g. capabilities) are uniform 
enough that “interpretive” practices producing ill-being can be discerned.15  This may 
appear quite obvious but in the flush of interest in the hermeneutical, a role, even if 
chastened in the light of postmodernist critiques, should be allowed for positivistic science 
or what can be called the norms of nature.    
Understanding both of these approaches to the social sciences, the internal and external, is 
also important to grasp the ideas and legacy of one of the founding fathers of the social 
sciences, Karl Marx.  Marxist thought will be investigated now for two important reasons.  
First, Marxism provided the analytical basis for perhaps the most profound interaction 
between theology and the social sciences:  liberation theology.   Second, and even more 
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 This is exactly the role that Nussbaum argues her list of universal dimensions can play vis-à-vis family and 
religion in terms of a protection against abuses of basic human functioning (Nussbaum 2000).    
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importantly for this thesis, understanding Marxist theory is necessary to gain insight into 
the challenges facing most EO cultures.    Indeed, the downplaying of internal causes and 
human action, in favour of a strong structuralist approach, was instrumental in the collapse 
of the largest social science experiment ever attempted in the history of humanity. 
3.2 The Marxist Precedent 
As is well known, Marxism has presented great promise in theory but tremendous perils in 
practice.  Liberation Theologians in the Latin American context boldly enlisted Marxism in 
their search for answers regarding questions of extreme poverty and entrenched injustice.  
But it is the historical tragedy of Marxist inspired Communism in the former Soviet Union 
and satellite states that provokes the question of whether a theology of development must 
be constructed on a better basis than Marxism.    The question that this section will be 
driving towards is not merely that of finding a “better” social science or development 
framework than Marxism, but rather one that can help interpret and address the very 
damage left by a failed social science experiment.   Thus a question this chapter is 
preparing and will be addressed directly in the next is the capacity of Amartya Sen’s 
capability approach (CA) to interpret and provide recommendations for the Communist 
legacy.  This is vital to assessing the viability of the CA as a broad based development 
theory, given the global impact of Communism.  Indeed, in 1977, 32% of the world’s 
population, or about 1.4 billion persons lived under consolidated (full blown) communism 
(Kornai 1992, p. 391).  And within these contexts, Orthodoxy’s voice is still important as 
Communism attempted but did little to eradicate religious belief (Greeley 2003).    
The intention is thus to explore an alternative “liberation theology”, amenable to EO 
sensibilities, aware of and sensitive to the development challenges of these contexts 
(indeed, phronesis demands attention to context), but still employing a similar 
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methodology of partnering theology and the social sciences.  As will be seen, fundamental 
is the question of cultivating “reliable agents” working towards “reliable success” in 
change for the better.  As the virtue ethics scholar Linda Zagzebski has well written:  
A kind, compassionate, generous, courageous or just person aims at making the world a 
certain way, and reliable success in making it that way is a condition for having the virtue 
in question.  For this reason virtue requires knowledge, or at least awareness, of certain 
nonmoral facts about the world.  The nature of morality involves not only wanting things, 
but being reliable agents for bringing those things about (Zagzebski 1996, p. 136). 
This is a powerful apologia for development studies in relation to faith.   It is now 
necessary to explore the “Liberation theologians”, who saw in Marxism a framework they 
believed would illuminate these “nonmoral facts” and live out more effectively the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ in the world. 
3.2.1 Liberation Theology 
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant attempts to integrate religious faith with the 
social sciences is liberation theology, pioneered by Catholic theologians in Latin America, 
Gustavo Gutierrez being the acknowledged leader.
16
  Marxist concepts such as “class 
conflict” and “alienation” were mined to reveal structural injustices harming the poor, 
those on the “underside of history” (Nickoloff 1996, p. 216).   Structural injustices are 
injustices that are not the product per se of one person’s greed, malice, or error, but rather 
are systems that force, often unconsciously, persons in directions against their own or 
others well-being.   Marx contended that capitalism is inherently unjust and not only 
facilitates but necessitates the expropriation of the poor.   It can be hard to detect structural 
sins, thus the insights of social science are called upon, which are not merely superficially 
descriptive but explanatory in a deeper, non-obvious sense.  One example from Marxism 
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 Other notables are Leonardo Boff of Brazil and Juan Luis Segundo of Uruguay.   
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would be the existence of a fundamental (even if unconscious) class conflict whereby the 
rich oppress the poor and the poor acquiesce in this oppression, legitimized through 
various legal and institutional arrangements—including religion.   Recognition of this 
hidden dynamic, should, in turn, alter the behaviour of the Church from an elitist 
institution to one serving the poor.
17
   Following the teachings of Jesus the Liberator would 
be to exercise a preferential option for the poor, and to liberate persons and communities 
from injustices of all sorts: economic, political, and international.   Minimally it would 
mean to exercise solidarity with and on behalf of the poor and vulnerable; maximally, 
outright revolution to overturn unjust structures, though not all advocated revolution.  The 
following from Gutierrez summarizes these themes well, including class conflict: 
But in the liberation approach sin is not considered as an individual, private, or merely 
interior reality—asserted just enough to necessitate a “spiritual” redemption which does 
not challenge the order in which we live … there is a confrontation between social classes 
and, therefore, a struggle for liberation from oppressive structures which hinder man from 
living with dignity and assuming his own destiny (Gutierrez 1980, p. 174-5).  
Redemption must be political and economic, and not merely personal.   Apart from any 
specific insight of Marxism, what was attractive was philosophy or theology as critical 
reflection upon action.
18
   Marx wrote in “Theses on Feuerbach” that “The Philosophers 
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” 
(Marx and Engels 1964, p. 72), which Gutierrez appropriated as “human action as the point 
of departure for all reflection”.19   Marxism was a captivating option, serving as a surrogate 
faith for those such as Nobel poet Andre Gide who felt that Christianity had failed him.  “It 
was not through Marx, but through the Gospels, that Gide had reached Communism”  
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 Casanova shows that this in fact happened in Brazil, beginning with the famous 1968 Medellin conference 
of Latin-American bishops that was really a recognition of what was already happening on the ground 
(Casanova 1994, p. 114-134).  
18
 Gutierrez (like Staniloae) utilized Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of action to depart “from an empty and 
fruitless spirituality” and move towards theology understood as “a critical reflection on action” (Gutierrez 
1980, p. 9).  
19
 In a later work, Gutierrez kept this theme: “spirituality is following Jesus … and reflection on the 
experience of following Jesus is the central theme of any solid theology” (Gutierrez 1984, p. 1). 
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(Crossman 2001, p. 173).   The great existentialist philosopher Sartre said at one point, 
“Marxism, as the formal framework of all contemporary philosophical thought, cannot be 
superseded”  (in Gutierrez 1980, p. 9).   Sartre’s use of the “cannot” gives a sense of the 
hypnotic power Marxism commanded as a framework for social change.  That an 
Existentialist thinker from a freedom oriented philosophical tradition could be captivated 
by Marxist “structuralism” and pay this type of public homage is remarkable indeed.  
Marx’s often confusing but scintillating diatribes had the moral fervour of an Old 
Testament prophet.   
Gustavo Gutierrez and the liberation theologians argued that Marxism qua social science 
can provide insights not given, as it were, to the naked eye, in order to help close the gap 
between what is in the empirical world, and what ought to be in the Christian vision of 
equality and fraternity, embodied also in Marx’s “each according to their ability to each 
according to their need”.20   The question of whether Marxism can be apprehended 
piecemeal was not lost on Gutierrez; he did not swallow it whole and employed other 
interpretive frameworks that were conceptually at odds with Marxist theory.    Indeed, 
Gutierrez points out that Marxism was in tension with other competing and contradictory 
theories.  However all were intended to help illuminate the situation of “structural 
injustice”, such as the distinctively Latin American “dependency theory” (Nickoloff 1996, 
p. 45).  Gutierrez himself wrote in an essay titled “Theology and the Social Sciences”: “if 
there is a meeting, it is between theology and the social sciences, and not between theology 
and Marxist analysis, except to the extent that elements of the latter are found in the 
contemporary social sciences…” (Nickoloff 1996, p. 43).   This was the methodological 
innovation of Liberation Theology, employing social science to aid in the struggle against 
oppression, to fulfil the Great commandments, rather than the uncritical adoption of any 
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 This expression is also found in Acts 4: 32-35 and describes the primitive and voluntary communism of the 
early Church, where all things were “held in common”. 
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particular Marxist notion.   The aim is to follow this approach, mutatis mutandis, in this 
thesis linking EO with DS.  However, key insights in DS emerged directly out of difficult 
lessons that history has taught due to Marxism.  
3.2.2 Marxist inspired Communism 
This section turns first to investigate Marxist theory and later to empirical Communism.  
The focus here on Marxist theory will explain its leading concepts beyond the previous 
discussion.   Even if Communist practice deviated from Marxist theory in key respects, the 
development challenges are not unrelated to the effects of Marxist theory itself.  Thus, 
what is termed “Marxist inspired Communism”21 can plausibly be viewed as an 
overwhelming international social science experiment, where many of the actors, or rather 
victims, had little or no choice to play in the matter.  Indeed, this issue of reduced choice or 
“agency” has become a central theme in the social sciences and development (Giddens 
1979; Bhattacharyya 1995; Deigh 1996; Imbroscio 1999; Drèze and Sen 2002; Ballet, 
Dubois et al. 2007).   Understanding both the causes and the effects of this reduced agency 
in relation to Marxist theory is critical for making sense of the Communist legacy and 
conceptualizing a relevant approach for these contexts.   
Interpreting Marxism is a delicate issue on many fronts.  For instance there is the question 
of reconciling his earlier views with his later views, which is to say his early works 
containing his profound philosophical anthropology in the 1844 Manuscripts (Marx and 
Engels 1988) which is based on human creativity, freedom, and a vision of the capable 
person, with the later development of historical materialism in Das Capital, which appears 
in many respects to deny or lose this selfsame freedom in the larger dialectic (structure) of 
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 As mentioned above, this term is consciously employed to show the link between Marxist theory and 
empirical existence, but not equate the two.   
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history.   There is also the contested relationship between pure Marxism, and empirical 
communism, and similarly, the “good Lenin, bad Stalin” thesis.  Concerning the latter, 
some argue that Lenin was more or less true to Marxism, while Stalin corrupted it—which 
is now widely considered a distinction without a difference (Stephane Courtois et al 1999).   
This section limits itself to describing a few aspects of Marxist theory that have given rise 
to the development challenges, especially in light of the fact that the stated intention of 
Marxism was to promote “the free play of humans’ physical and mental powers”.   These 
can be described inter alia as diminished agency (apathy and learned helplessness) 
(Bhattacharyya 1995, p. 62), interpersonal mistrust  (Badescu, Sum et al. 2004), 
depression, lack of civil society (Barndt 1999-2000; Eberly 2000; Havel 2000; Fukuyama 
2001; Howard 2003; Badescu, Sum et al. 2004; UNODC 2008), lingering corruption 
(Miller, Grodeland et al. 2001; Karklins 2002; Los 2003; Sajo 2003; Gallagher 2005; 
Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005)—and an overall lack of social solidarity.   One illustration 
can help identify the challenges.  A widely employed and celebrated grassroots 
development framework is called Participatory Action Research, or PAR, associated with 
Robert Chambers (Nelson and Wright 1995; Chambers 2000).   This involves community 
members getting together and discussing their shared concerns and seeking solutions.  As 
one researcher put it about his work in Hungary, a context where “one would have thought 
that socialism was premised upon such solidarity”, “he was finding it very difficult to 
make the villagers come together and talk about their problems.  The culture of sharing 
personal problems had been destroyed by ‘socialism’” (Rahman 1993, p. 227).  “People’s 
self development” is compromised where adults have an ingrained “fear of offending the 
hierarchies by horizontal dialogue”.   Understanding this dynamic of fear, and the related 
inability to work together, is vital to design development strategies where viewing persons 
as “adaptive agents” (i.e. Sen’s theory) is greeted with little success. 
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All of these concepts and others are important.  However it is necessary here to focus 
primarily on diminished agency, or freedom, which links directly with the “structure-
agency” debate.   However, these other themes, and especially the importance of solidarity 
and shared nature or structures, will be picked up later.
22
    
There are tendencies toward diminished agency in Marxism even if Communism in 
empirical practice is distinguished from Marxism as ideal theory.  It seems clear in Marxist 
theory that the focus on the structural transformation of economic relations (or relations of 
production) was conceived precisely to give space for the natural creativity of the 
individual “in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity” (in Cowen and 
Shenton 1996, p. 149).   Thus the structural focus was linked with a vision of creating the 
space for a very capable version of the person; the structural factors require transformation 
because these restrain or facilitate the flowering of distinctive human capacities.  This is 
how the early (humanist and freedom oriented) and later (focusing on external economic 
structures) Marx might be reconciled.  For Marx, what it means to be human as a “species-
being” (he did not use the term human nature) is the capacity for changing one’s 
environment and then adjusting to and altering human nature to meet these new 
conditions, but less as individuals and rather for humanity as a whole, qua species.   
“Alienation” is that state whereby one’s relation with structures (relations of production) 
cut one off from the free exercise and development of human powers (Craib 1997, p. 89).  
Alienation means that one’s inner motivation is destroyed and external compulsion takes 
over.   Capitalist alienation of course is in view with its commoditization of labour 
(commodity fetishism), the estrangement of the human person from the fruit (profit) of her 
work, the alienation of the producer from the product, and thus the human species from its 
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 The explicit aim is to bring about the combined effect of the agency-solidarity-structure approach 
mentioned in chapter one on natural theology.   Recall that this triad, emerging “bottom-up” as it were within 
a Trinitarian understanding of creation, parallels and was even anticipated by the person-communion-nature 
theological anthropology of Staniloae.  The argument is that human development will be defectively 
conceptualized without this minimum complexity.  This case will be made in this and the following chapter. 
 69 
true nature which is defined in relation to meaningful work—homo laborens.   The famous 
end of the Communist Manifesto is well-known:  “The proletarians have nothing to lose 
but their chains.  They have a world to win.  Workers of all countries, unite!” (Marx and 
Engels 1988).   
Marx offered a powerful vision of mass liberation.  Yet what in fact happened is that these 
hidden structural aspects became the basis for a superior gnosis of the few, the “vanguards 
of history”.  Advancing the Dialectical Laws of History required a “socialist trusteeship”; 
those select persons who understand the true material nature of historical progress must act 
on behalf of, and often times against the explicit wishes of, the many, the hoi polloi.    
This “trusteeship” was based on the conviction that Marxist materialism superseded first 
religion and then Hegelian idealism
23
 by showing the true material and economic basis of 
humanism: 
It is the task of history, therefore once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish 
the truth of this world.  The immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of 
history, is to unmask human self-alienation in its secular form now that it has been 
unmasked in its sacred form (in Jones 1975, p. 190). 
This Hegelian “progress of mind” that ignores the flesh, ignores the material conditions of 
existence, was superseded by what Marx understood as the real progress of humanism 
based not in abstract thought (representing all philosophy previously), but in material 
relations and history’s immanent drive towards development.  Marx’s argument against the 
Hegelians was that they exercised “the art of converting real objective chains that exist 
outside me into merely ideal, merely subjective chains, existing merely in me and thus of 
converting all external sensuously perceptible struggles into pure struggles of thought” (in 
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 Marx considered that the alienation involved in religion had already been overthrown by Ludwig 
Feuerbach. 
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Cowen and Shenton 1996).  Thus Marx’s famous “turning Hegel on his head”.  The aim of 
this dialectical movement of history was thus to give free development to humans’ natural 
capacities, including mental activity, for indeed humans are an absolute unity of mind and 
body.   This aspect of Marxist theory is not that controversial, and indeed quite attractive.  
Again, the person as a moral agent was not conceived in Marxism to be passive in this 
process of the development of productive capacity, as the role of the active mind is to 
develop the immanent productive capacities of nature through work.    
Yet, and this is the important point that must be returned to, in the “early stages” of the 
Communist revolution, history must necessarily be advanced by its trustees, by a “handful 
of chosen men” (Cowen and Shenton 1996, p. 135) who act on behalf of others—and even 
against the uninformed desires of the masses—“until theory itself becomes a material force 
when it has seized the masses” (in Jones 1975, p. 190).  Persons must, to use the phrase of 
Rousseau, “be forced to be free” (Rousseau 2004, p. 53).  It is the trustees that understand 
the true nature of the dialectic of history, including class conflict, that is, that truth must 
demonstrate itself, as Marx says, ad hominem, by being radical enough to boldly use force. 
However, whatever Marx’s intentions in these matters, it is clear that empirical 
Communism never departed from the force and violence of the “early stages”.24  The 
coercion and terror which began in the early war-time “revolutionary-transitional phase” of 
early Communism never really ceased.   
It is essential here to note that Marxism claimed to beat capitalism at its own game, and 
that was the arena of material productivity.  By conquering scarcity, by transcending class 
conflicts, this would in turn unlock deep reservoirs of human potential and productivity by 
overcoming the alienation between labour and labourer which will occur when the means 
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 One noted scholar argues that Lenin knew “terror would be directly inscribed into the legal system” 
(Kolakowski 1990, p. 211). 
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of productivity are put back in the hands of the workers themselves.   An extremely 
important corollary of Marxist materialism and his philosophical anthropology is that 
injustice and inequality are not moral categories as traditionally understood, but the 
epiphenomena or by-products of structural constraints induced by a lack of material 
provisions.  Morality as traditionally conceived is bourgeois ideology, a form of false-
consciousness bent on justifying the unjust status quo.  According to Marxist thought, it is 
the scrabble for scarce resources that produces and in turn justifies injustice, which is to 
say private property.    Morality and an entire legal apparatus sanctions unjust, 
“bourgeois”, relations of production.  This is no more clearly seen than in the arguments 
for private property and unlimited accumulation (and thus the basis for possessive 
individualism) so ably articulated by John Locke (Macpherson 1962; Locke 1980).  
This philosophical anthropology is why Communism aimed so heavily at industrialization; 
morality would become otiose when the right “structural” or material conditions were in 
place.   Equality and redistribution were only secondary values to production—this latter 
value was the primary reason for the enforced transfer of ownership of the means of 
production (the “expropriation of the expropriators”) under the belief that productivity 
would increase if workers were not alienated from their labour.  This is also linked once 
again to the fundamental importance Marx gave to humans as labourers (“workers of the 
world unite”, not just the poor), which Hannah Arendt explores so forcefully (Arendt 
1998).   
This Marxist approach to human development was a “comprehensive” solution, 
encompassing all aspects of life (Kymlicka 1992, p. 161).  Just as the ancients 
experimented with nature in order to promote solidarity among the poleis (and most 
notably Sparta), so Communists reoriented everything towards increasing productive 
capacity and accelerating the dialectic of historical development.  This involved, inter alia, 
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the razing of peasant villages and rapid urbanization into the hastily erected and 
ramshackle block apartments.  It also involved exercising reproductive control over 
women’s bodies which meant the strict outlawing of birth control and abortion as well as 
coercing mothers into having more children—the reason for the glut of institutionalized 
children (orphans) that shocked the world after the revolutions of 1989.   Both of these 
instances, forced urbanization and the institutionalization of children, were direct results of 
the drive to increase industrial productivity and build human capital.
25
  Art and culture 
were subject to industrial propaganda—every bucolic scene in a painting required a factory 
blazing somewhere on the horizon.  T.S. Eliot’s adage “Communism aimed at a system so 
perfect that no one had to be good”, despite its schematic flavour, is rather accurate as 
moral categories such as “goodness” would wither away when sufficient material human 
needs are met.    
This discounting of the moral, subjective and agency aspect of humans, from which post-
communist societies still suffer today, was not merely a product of “empirical 
communism”, but rather is evident in Marxist “structuralist” theory and his willingness to 
employ force as an “argument”.   However, the exact nature of this structuralism merits 
further investigation. 
3.2.3 Marxist Structuralism 
In terms of one longstanding social science debate, Marxist theory itself (and not just the 
“aberration” of Communism) weighted a structural explanation over, and even at the 
expense of, an agency understanding of the person and change and social improvement 
                                                          
25
 The “orphans” were taken in by the State to increase human capital and therefore industrial production.  
This was their purpose and it was not viewed as terribly odd that these children should not have natural 
parents, and instead have a “direct” relationship with their real father, the State.  Indeed, the very purpose of 
the terror and social atomization was to destroy horizontal relationships and create a sense of absolute, direct 
dependence on the Party. 
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(Hollis 1994; Smith and Seward 2009, p. 221).   For a “structuralist”, structural issues are 
the true causal factors, while individual freedom, subjective consciousness or personal 
values, are by and large effects or by-products—events happen “independent of their will”, 
despite what persons may subjectively think is actually going on.    Marx states this in an 
unequivocal form which deserves quotation in full: 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material productive forces.  The sum total of these relations of 
productions constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which 
rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness.   The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and 
intellectual life process in general.  It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx 
1977 (1859), Preface). 
This is hyper structuralism.  External change in this ontology is much deeper than the 
agent’s awareness which is irrelevant, an epiphenomenon of the “real foundation” which is 
the economic structure of society and the “conflicts” or dialectic involved.  Structures of 
economic production and their relations are the determining conditions which in turn give 
rise to political superstructures and forms of subjective consciousness—and thus causality 
runs in the direction of material to the mental/moral, the latter being but secondary effects.   
Yet, not only would morality and legality itself be unnecessary once humanity has arrived 
at the ideal classless society, a proposition that is understandable if the Marxist view of 
human nature is accepted.  However, morality and legality were set aside on the journey to 
the ideal society—led by the vanguards who have comprehended the above truths and 
exercise the conviction and violence required to bring it about.   This requires power, 
which was the primary attribute of the social system.  “One purpose for which the power is 
needed is to force people against their own will to adopt a way of life that eventually will 
lead to their own good” (Kornai 1992, pp. 88-9).  It is easy to see here how the amoral 
ends are carried over into the means:  if the requirements of morality are not part of the 
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ultimate vision of a society and if the ultimate aims will be achieved when adequate 
production is achieved, then it is rather easy and understandable to justify the revolutionary 
fervour that trampled cultural and social values and institutions that stood in the way.  Here 
however, the disjunction between Marxist theory and Communist practice in Bolshevism is 
important to note:  Marx believed that true socialism must follow advanced industrialism 
and must flow out of the internal contradictions generated by the later stages of capitalism; 
it is going against the grain of dialectical history to have forced the revolutions on agrarian 
and peasant economies as was the case in the Bolshevik revolution.
26
    So in a certain 
sense, it is true that Communism betrayed aspects of Marxist theory by not respecting the 
dialectical stages.  Communism should have taken root in England and the United States, 
the most advanced industrial states.    This understanding of the dialectical stages of 
history is why industrialization was “rushed” in peasant societies such as Russia so that 
that they could “catch up” historically with Marx’s theory.    
Besides the problems mentioned before such as apathy and the social legacy of mistrust, 
Communist societies were overrun by corruption.
27
 “Communism created structural 
incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviours, which became such a widespread fact of life 
that they became rooted in the culture in these societies” (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005).  
This merits further consideration as it bears directly upon present day development 
challenges.    
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 Marx’s view about human nature was, however, naive it seems in two inconsistent senses: a) Marx’s 
pessimism about capitalist man’s ability to display any capacity for reform.  In fact, reforms were being made 
under Marx’s nose in England that he ignored which would ameliorate some of the class-tension such as 
child labour laws; b) his optimism concerning socialist man, that they could seize power and not be corrupted 
by it.   
27
 Many argue that traditions of corruption predate Communism (Mestrovic 1993).  At any rate, to take one 
recent example of its pervasiveness, for the energy sectors of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Romania, and Kyrgyzstan suggest that theft accounts for up to thirty percent of total 
electricity sales.  This compromises infrastructure development even effecting delivery of services itself 
(Ruth 2005, p. 120).     
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The official “command economy” under Communism was so dysfunctional (this will be 
more fully explained in the next section) that without the underground economy people 
would have starved.   In capitalist economies, the “seller” tries to corrupt the “buyer”, 
meaning that the seller faces competition and must somehow win the buyers loyalty.  But 
in Communism, because there was no competition and there were constant shortages, the 
“buyer” was forced to bribe the seller to provide terrible services, often given in a 
condescending manner  (Kornai 1992, p. 454).   Because there was no competition, there 
was no spurring of the producer to innovate or improve product quality, or even be 
sensitive to the needs (much less the wants) of the “buyer” (the entire population).    
Furthermore, the whole concentration of power in Communism meant that the means for 
extortion were never far from hand.   “Officials have an incentive to create unnecessary 
problems ... to maintain the conditions for bribery”.  Corruption meant brutalities to the 
very poor that have no means to pay bribes (Miller, Grodeland et al. 2001, p. 13).   Stealing 
from one’s work and then selling these items on the “black” market often meant the 
difference between life and death.     
Another feature that consolidated corruption was that ruthless and uninhibited forms of 
leadership quickly rose to the top (c.f. Marx’s ad hominem argument).  In Communism, 
there are few if any accountability mechanisms:  “the unscrupulous and uninhibited are 
likely to be more successful in a society tending towards totalitarianism” (Hayek 1974) and 
this contributes to the rise of “authoritarian personalities” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik et al. 
1982).   Bribery is used to soften the sharp edges of totalitarian power.   But the pervasive 
nature of these features meant that the system itself was broken and corruption became 
thoroughly entrenched.    This structural nature of corruption means not so much that 
persons were more evil and abusive (though the system did pervert moral character), but 
“the system was found unworkable unless fraud and deception were allowed on a vast 
scale” (Miller, Grodeland et al. 2001, p. 14).    
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The result is that a “plausibility structure” (Berger and Luckmann 1989) or “social 
imaginary” (Taylor 2004) for corruption was created that deforms the exercise of agency 
and legitimates the “violation of established rules for personal gain and profit” (Sen 1999, 
p. 275).
28
   Corruption can be perceived as normal and necessary—i.e. part of the culture 
and the State’s apparatus (Los 2003; Sajo 2003).   Corruption most simply is where “take” 
becomes more plausible than “make” (Olson 2000) and “socially unproductive, but 
personally lucrative activities” are normalized (Klitgaard 1991, p. 44). 29   Agency or 
human action in such a context can become cynicism, or pulled in directions not 
benefitting the common good.   In such contexts where politics itself is corrupted, an 
increase in, for example, political activity by youth can actually consolidate corruption 
(Robertson 2009).     
Reducing corruption is a major global challenge.  There are certain technical issues that 
policy-makers and citizens can be involved with that play an important role that are fairly 
well understood.  These involve limiting discretionary powers of local bureaucrats, making 
information public, ensuring property rights (Soto 2000), public vigilance, etc.  But even 
though some of these issues might be straightforward, identifying the solutions are the easy 
challenges; the incredible difficulty of implementing them in contexts of resistance and 
entrenched interests is why corruption is so durable.   According to Mancur Olson, while 
corruption hurts everyone, the small elite group who benefit from it gain much more per 
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 Most definitions of corruption, such as that of Transparency International, the World Bank and the IMF 
focus more on the institutional or public aspects than the definition provided above by Amartya Sen. Sen’s 
definition may be aiming at the “private corruption” that occurs within the non-public domain of the family, 
and is a major source of ill-being.  This is important because of the scaling effect of the family as a basic 
institution in society.   See also (Noonan 1987; Klitgaard 1991; Karklins 2002).  
29
 Corruption is widely considered a, if not the, principal obstacle to development (Myrdal 1970; MacMullen 
1988; Klitgaard 1991; Kaufmann 1997; Svensson 2005; Marshall 2008; UNODC 2008; Allaby 2013)  and 
even distorts development organizations such as the World Bank (Giacomo 2004).  Some argue that petty 
everyday corruption is the worst.  This is because: 
The real damage to society occurs when entire generations of youth are miseducated--by example--
to believe that personal success comes not through merit and hard work but through favouritism, 
bribery, and fraud (Chapman 2005, p. 66).  
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capita than the large group stand to lose from it—per capita.  Thus the corrupt few who 
command greater resources will apply more focused energy for its maintenance than the 
larger but dispersed group will be able to for its resistance (Olson 2000).   Where 
corruption is entrenched, resistance can often be nothing more than a symbolic act.    
But this symbolic act can be important for fighting corruption is about attitudes, creating a 
sense of disgust, that “something is wrong when great wealth coexists with squalor ... 
something is wrong in societies when corruption takes over (Klitgaard 1991, p. 210).   
Some cultures or groups within cultures do, in fact, manage to resist and fight corruption 
better than others.  Some societies do reach the “tipping point” where corruption does not 
dominate almost every layer.  This would seem to lead back to the interpretive approach 
that tries to get “inside” both individuals and groups to answer these types of questions.  
Max Weber argued that “Without adequacy at the level of meaning, our generalizations 
remain mere statements of statistical probability, either not intelligible at all or imperfectly 
intelligible” (in Hollis 1994, p. 183).  Thus while many of the structural or enabling 
features of corruption are very well known, the internal power to resist it is much more 
mysterious.  
A major question for development studies is under what conditions some individuals, 
groups, and societies do fight corruption even if fighting it appears irrational, which is to 
say that the likelihood of severe punishment is much higher than any possible benefits of 
resistance.
30
   One well known answer is that where there is a pervasive sense of trust in 
the “generalized other”, this can reduce corruption, and where there are strong “in-groups”, 
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 If x risky action is done to expose or resist corruption, the almost certain outcome is getting fired, or worse.   
Also, one is completely unsure if the action will even make any tangible difference at all.    Furthermore, the 
more corrupt the society, the higher the risk for resistance, and the less likely that any one person or action 
can make any discernible difference.   There is a tremendous collective action problem here, which is 
helpfully analyzed by (Olson 1971).   Fighting corruption requires a kind of mystical faith; it cannot be 
approached from a perspective of economic rationality.   
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this can facilitate corruption.  But this seems oversimplified if one reflects on the 
conditions under which the strengths to fight corruption (at considerable cost!) can become 
operable in societies already permeated by corruption.  This leads to the recognition that 
strong sub-group or “communitarian” identities are necessary to create a counter 
plausibility structure of meaning, norms, and social support.   Thus, at least a partial 
solution can be religious communities taking a firm stance against corruption, because 
corruption is ultimately about values, and religion influences values.    
For Orthodox cultures, this is one arena where the Church, given her prominence in her 
respective cultures, can truly make a difference. This prospect, however, is difficult when 
the Church exists in a privileged relationship with the state.  There is however, no intrinsic 
reason why a stronger stance cannot be made given the high public trust of the Orthodox 
Church in many countries and recognizing that adopting a prophetic stance and speaking 
“truth to power” would further enhance the Church’s prestige (Marshall and Saanen 
2007).
31
   While the empirical relationship between religion and corruption is ambiguous, 
religion has “the power of [shaping] discourse in creating a political community committed 
to an anticorruption agenda” (Marquette 2010, p. 22).   
But back to the original (and admittedly limited) problematic posed earlier within the 
social sciences: does the structure form the person, or the person the structure—or both?   
Of course many, if not most, social theorists now view this dichotomy between agency and 
structure as a false problematic (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1979; Bandura 1986; Berger and 
Luckmann 1989; Bandura 1995).  However, for societies under communism, one side of 
this problematic was imposed with disastrous consequences that require further 
investigation. 
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 In Romania for example, the Orthodox Church is consistently voted the most trusted public institution 
(Stan and Turcescu 2000; Gallagher 2005). 
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3.3 The Communist Catastrophe 
Marxist inspired Communism did not see much of a debate between structure and agency:  
human “individuals are puppets, controlled from offstage by the interplay of forces and 
relations of production” (Craib 1997, p. 6).   Unfortunately, as is now well known, many of 
these Marxist “dialectical laws” of history (at least in terms of how they were put into 
actual practice) were simply fictitious and therefore disastrous.    Entire societies were 
reengineered according to these fictive dialectics, these ideologically derived structures or 
“scientific” laws that were often completely disconnected from reality:  Five-Year Plans, 
Golden-Ages, and Scientific Nourishment Programs,
32
 almost all of which debased not 
only humans’ physical existence, but language, art and intellectual life.    Science itself 
was viewed “dialectically”, which meant ideologically and thus was subject to arbitrary 
interventions.
33
  One striking example was the Russian biologist Lysenko who employed 
the “dialectical method” of growing wheat more effectively, which eventuated in 
disastrous crop failures (Craib 1997, p. 206).   Amartya Sen points out that the “Great Leap 
Forward” in China was actually a famine that killed close to thirty million people in one 
region precisely at a time when other areas were glutted with grain (Sen 1999, p. 181).  
These are not isolated examples and their pile-up is what precipitated the collapse of the 
empire.   Communism aimed at destroying all previous structures:  “Wherever it rose to 
power, it developed entirely new political institutions and destroyed all social, legal, and 
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 This was a part of the continual perversion of language.  This “Scientific Nourishment” program 
elaborated in 1982 by Iulian Mincu in Romania, “stipulated the number of calories and percentage of proteins 
allotted for every member of society-according to age, sex, and profession” (Treptow 1997, p. 550-551).  In 
reality, these were barely above starvation rations. 
33
 In Romania, admittedly an extreme case in terms of the Communist regime type, Ceausescu would make 
“working visits” and give “valuable advice”, which was dutifully implemented, but which “left managers and 
workers in a daze and merely had the opposite of the desired effect by increasing inefficiency” (Deletant 
1998, p. 176).    Scientific dissertations had to include a very high percentage of “scientific references” to 
Elena Ceausescu (the dictator Nicolae’s wife), who apparently did not even know the molecular formula of 
water.   
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political traditions of the country” (Arendt 1968, p. 158).34  Persons literally lost contact 
with meaningful human experience for “ideological thinking ruins all relationships with 
reality” (Arendt 1968, p. 172).  The new human nature, homo sovieticus took shape 
through propaganda; the dialectical (conflict) process was read everywhere, and in the 
spirit of Hegel who said, “so much for the facts”, 35 so in Communism when they do not 
agree with the dialectic of the system.   One commentator notes: 
The “engineers of human souls” were given a law on the basis of which to make their 
“judgements”.  It rejected reality and truth and replaced them with a decision of the 
supreme authority as to what did and did not correspond to “reality in terms of its 
revolutionary advance” (Heller 1988, p. 217). 
This Promethean view entailed humanity’s triumph over nature.  But because many of the 
so called Marxist dialectics were chimerical, the “structure” that was in fact followed in 
Communist societies was no rational structure at all but sheer and unmitigated power—and 
this required fear.   Hannah Arendt exposed with precision the “logic of terror” in the 
soviet style system and thus the necessarily pervasive role of the gulags or corrective 
labour camps (Arendt 1968).   Perverse incentives were set up to induce betrayals even of 
friends and loved ones who spoke against or questioned the wisdom of the Party.  The 
ideal citizen was an exceptionally lonely one (“Loneliness, the common ground for terror, 
[is] the essence of totalitarian government”) that was paralyzed by terror and unable to 
make moral distinctions, rendering the inability to protest almost an inevitable outcome 
(Arendt 1968, p. 173).  George Orwell’s well known 1984 and Nobel Laureate Czeslaw 
Milosz’s The Captive Mind details “afresh the stages by which the mind gives way to 
compulsion from without” (Milosz 1981, p. xiv).   Freedom of association of any type was 
a threat and was suppressed (Tismaneanu 1992) by schemes aimed at generating 
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 In exchange for absolute vertical loyalty to the Party the individual obtained “liberation from a substantial 
share of the responsibility for the effectiveness of his work”. Endemic alcoholism is prevalent in many Soviet 
or former Soviet satellites.  “If vodka interferes with your work, give up work” (Heller 1988, p. 134). 
35
 Hegel:  “All this [the dialectic] is the a priori structure of history to which empirical reality must 
correspond” (in Cowen and Shenton 1996, p. 130). 
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interpersonal mistrust; they “consistently destroyed all manifestations of uncontrolled 
thought and action, particularly in any organized form” (Schopflin 1990, p. 4).     
It bears mentioning again that in 1977 32% of the world’s population lived under classic, 
“command style” communism.  This is why there was serious talk of the “Soviet 
Achievement” in the West (Nettl 1967) and real fear when Kruschev said in 1961 “We will 
bury you” (Skidelsky 1995).  However, by the spring of 1991, such was the cataclysmic 
fall of Communism that according to Janos Kornai, only .006% (representing North Korea 
and Cuba at the time of his writing in 1992) of the world’s population lived under this 
regime type—a shocking reversal.    This global failure inevitably meant that Marxism 
would be embarrassing as a basis for theologies of liberation.  If not completely logically 
discredited,
36
 it is largely psychologically discredited (though some critical theorists still 
take inspiration (Hoy and McCarthy 1994)).  Apart from a few academics, “It seems that 
any regime that calls itself Communist is now discredited” (Craib 1992, p. 149).  
Significantly, the liberation theologian Leonardo Boff has embraced the Trinity as the 
framework for liberation—or as he puts it “The Holy Trinity, Our Liberation Program” 
(Boff 1988; 1988).  
Yet if Marxism has lost traction for liberation theologians, it is even more unreliable for 
EO as an aid to conceptualizing human development.   Debates aside about the “real” 
reasons for its failure, Marxism has left a legacy of moral and environmental corruption 
and personal unhappiness.   One of the most astute commentators on Communism 
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 “The wry mood of the Muscovites at the time [of the fall of the Soviet empire, after the fall of regime after 
regime in Eastern Europe] is nicely caught by a Russian cartoon … It shows a tattered Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin seated on a Moscow kerbstone with hats held out for kopecks.  Marx is saying to the others, ‘But the 
theory remains true!’” (Hollis 1994, p. 1). 
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remarked that “The program for transforming human material [into homo sovieticus37] 
required infantilization of the individual” (Heller 1988).  The system engendered a 
“learned helplessness” (Klicperova, Feierabend et al. 1997) that left its subjects ill-
prepared to face the future.  The sudden transition from communism to capitalism has not 
provided solutions, especially in the fight against corruption.  And in countries where there 
were no “lustration laws” preventing the return of Communist leadership, leading 
politicians have all too often been carry-overs from Communist times (Gallagher 2005).   
This is sobering in light of the Communist leadership profile described above.  
Now the account is in a position to ask the important question:  what type of development 
approach or moral resources can be called upon to help remedy this situation?   Marxist 
inspired Communism was the most aggressive development project in the history of the 
world.  As many as 100,000,000 lives (!) were sacrificed at the altar of its dogmas 
(Stephane Courtois et al 1999).   Minimally, this should signal warnings about 
“development” that is predominately “for” and not “by” persons.   It will be seen in the 
next chapter that the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen gives pride of place to agency 
or freedom.  Yet importantly, the account above raises questions not only about the role of 
individual agency, but rebuilding human solidarity, and the role of structures in both 
humans and the natural world.   
Boiling the development challenges down to core principles, it is necessary to deepen the 
hypothesis presented earlier concerning the presence of these three irreducible dimensions 
in human development:    
                                                          
37
 “Medical students in the Soviet Union begin their Latin course with the sentence, ‘Homo Sovieticus sum’ (I 
am Soviet man).  In their first year … the future doctors learn that there are two types of human being:  
Homo sapiens and Homo sovieticus” (Heller 1988). 
 83 
o Agency/person:  a sense of and capacity for personal efficacy, freedom; the 
ability to bring about desirable change; also, the sacredness and 
irreducibility of the person to communion or nature’s processes; each 
person as a bearer of dignity; 
o Solidarity/communion:38 a sense of shared communal identity, seen as 
intrinsically valuable; communion or solidarity requires actual relationships 
and stability in these; it can aspire beyond these communitarian bonds (i.e. 
towards concern for humanity as such) but is often limited to them; 
o Structures/shared nature:  the realm of universal laws, dimensions, or 
functions requiring fulfilment (one of which is communion) for well-being; 
shared human nature is a basis (strongly so in Orthodoxy) for cosmopolitan 
ethical obligations. 
There may be more principles or factors necessary for conceptualizing human 
development, but surely not less.
39
   The next chapter will investigate all three of these in 
dialogue with Amartya Sen’s CA in relation to Communism.  However, the third category 
merits further comment.    
Structures should not be abandoned even if the concept was abused by Marxism.   The 
Marxist understanding of “structures” was ideological; it disconnected humans and 
                                                          
38
 “Solidarity” is preferable to the social capital language in that solidarity carries stronger moral resonances 
of actively seeking the good of others.   Social capital can sound as if the social dimension is merely a means 
to the monetary.   There is however an important and rich literature on this in relation to post-communist 
societies, but also international development (Fukuyama 1999; Putnam 2000; Fukuyama 2001; Evers 2003; 
Badescu, Sum et al. 2004; Hoksbergen 2010).  Michael Woolcock has done important work linking social 
capital with faith (Woolcock 1998; 2002).    
39
 This Trinitarian conception is synchronic in the sense that it does not obviously imply a movement through 
time.  The Incarnation, the other major dogma, captures this movement, the diachronic developmental aspect.  
But the Incarnation is a movement from, and back to the Trinity that incorporates the entire human race.   
This will be dealt with in chapter five and following. 
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societies from natural and truly empirical processes in a way that destroyed agency and 
solidarity and ultimately the entire Marxist infrastructure.  It viewed human nature as too 
plastic; it viewed external structures (the dialectic of history) as too determinative; it 
viewed advancing the species level as ultimate, but in a way that trampled human rights of 
individual persons.  Marx’s emphasis on the “species-being” was in view of ushering in the 
“new man” that uproots the “regular” version of humanity.   Orthodoxy’s understanding of 
shared nature serves the exact opposite function and serves as a basis for the moral and 
spiritual unity of the human race.   
Is there a social science theory that conceptualizes human development along all three of 
these three aspects?   As mentioned, all three of these have been theorized in various paired 
combinations, but it does not seem they are brought together in a conscious and balanced 
way.  Marxism stressed the species level and solidarity, but its vision of humanity 
encouraged it to transgress the sacredness and freedoms of persons in search of the new 
humanity.   However, each of these three appears to be irreducible and each category must 
be interpreted in light of the others.  Specifically for Marxism, human nature cannot be 
interpreted without reference to the inherent dignity and agency of the person.  Key to the 
argument here is that Trinitarian theology brings these three inchoate dimensions in the 
social sciences together in a harmonious vision of the goods of the human person.  
Revelation “tightens the links of nature”, as Basil so well put it. 
Even if this approach is promising in terms of a conceptual framework, EO is not being 
suggested as a simplistic solution.  Practice influences values, as values influence practice.   
EO as both institution and religious culture was deeply affected by Communism.  Not only 
was its leadership imprisoned and abused (Staniloae spent seven years in prison), any type 
of ecclesial based social work was prohibited (Stan and Turcescu 2000).   In variegating 
levels therefore, Orthodox Churches, if not physically destroyed outright (as in Russia), 
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were disallowed from engaging in any social praxis, including public charity work, which 
would de facto be an insult to the Party’s omnicompetence.   (Ideologically understood, 
Communist societies cannot have social problems.)   Churches left to exist were allowed 
only to participate in the liturgy; there could be no “liturgy after the liturgy”, no service for 
the world arising from the service within the Church (Bria 1996).   
While the argument here is that EO can and should be part of the development solution 
where the Orthodox religion predominates, this challenging situation left by Communism 
renders the question of a social scientific dialogue partner all the more pressing.   This 
motivates the subject of the next chapter, which is an examination of Amartya Sen’s 
capability approach which centres itself on the role of agency that was devastated under 
Communism.
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4. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH OF AMARTYA SEN 
This chapter will outline the basic contours of Nobel Economist Amartya Sen’s influential 
capability approach, or CA.
1
   The CA is a leading approach to human development and 
has been fundamental for the United Nations Human Development Reports and has 
attracted other important thinkers such as Martha Nussbaum to its side.  The account will 
ask whether the CA can helpfully analyze and propose solutions for post-communist 
development challenges, and thus be an aid for an EO theology of human development.  
The argument will proceed by first showing the basic concepts of the CA and its analytical 
strengths. The argument will then interrogate the CA via the previously developed 
Trinitarian categories—agency (person), solidarity (communion), and structures (shared 
nature)—in light of the post communist legacy.  That each of these dimensions has a role 
in Sen’s moral ontology will be demonstrated; it is the relative weight of them that will be 
scrutinized.   The argument contends that for Sen’s approach to be truly helpful, it must 
move beyond development as expanse of individual freedoms and include communion and 
shared nature as well.    
4.1 Equality of What? 
The CA is “the most recent paradigm in the evolution of development thought” (Deneulin 
and Bano 2009, p. 45), at least of a sort that is receiving widespread acceptance.   As 
Martha Nussbaum notes, prior to the shift with Amartya Sen and the UN Human 
Development reports beginning in 1990, “the most prevalent approach to measuring 
                                                          
1
 The CA is also called the “Human Development” approach in the UN Development reports, and there is a 
journal dedicated to the CA that recently combined these two names:  the “Journal of Human Development 
and Capabilities”.  This approach is also called “People Centered Development” on the cover of that journal.  
The account here will stick to CA as a shorthand.  
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quality of life in a nation used to be simply to ask about GNP [Gross National Product] per 
capita”  (Nussbaum 2002, p. 126), a very crude measure as will be seen.    
The CA can perhaps best be thought of as a multifaceted argument for a specific way of 
conceptualizing development that explicitly includes ethical reasoning.  This is to say that 
the CA has:  a) recovered the normative foundations of the social sciences or the “how one 
should live” question, and b), offered a specific answer to it.  The title “human 
development” (used as a synonym with the CA literature) is a clue that development is to 
be more centred on actual human lives, while the term capabilities is about how to achieve 
human development, or that “expansion of capabilities” constitutes what human 
development is.   These “capabilities” are perhaps best understood at this stage as freedoms 
“to be and do”, some of which are very basic (e.g. food, shelter), some more refined (e.g. 
political participation).   These now famous words from the inaugural “Human 
Development Report” in 1990 capture the essence of the approach: 
People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an 
enabling environment for people to live long, healthy, and creative lives. This may appear 
to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the 
accumulation of commodities and financial wealth (UNDP 1990, p. 9). 
This sounds so obvious as to be trivial.  But conventional measures of well-being, for 
example, focusing on GNP, have missed out in nontrivial ways on the real nature of human 
development.  Poverty and well-being are, thus human development is, multidimensional; 
it cannot be reduced to one variable or dimension. 
Important for this overall thesis, the CA is rather faith-friendly, even though the chief 
architect, Amartya Sen, is sceptical about religion or any strong group identities not rooted 
in reason or democratic discourse.   The CA is faith friendly because “it brings values back 
to the centre stage”.   Religion is a powerful source of values, and “what counts as 
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development is inevitably based on values” (Deneulin and Bano 2009, p. 45-6).   Other 
voices, including the number two in the movement, Martha Nussbaum, argue for a more 
positive, even if critically scrutinized, role for religious identity as a desirable dimension of 
human development (Nussbaum 2000, pp 167-240; Deneulin forthcoming).
2
   Conceptions 
of development have moved away from crude utilitarianism and positivism that would 
uncritically reject religious faith, or even values, making a dialogue more possible.  This 
evolution involves Sen and others’ attacks on positivistic theories that separate fact and 
value.  Development for Sen is the promotion of valued beings and doings, and for 
Nussbaum, “development is itself an evaluative concept” (Nussbaum and Sen 1993, p. 
232). 
To truly understand the CA is to understand its debates with rival approaches to 
development.   The previous chapter’s discussion about the burdensome structuralism of 
Communism is part of the widespread resurgence of the concept of agency.  And indeed, 
the CA is strongly oriented to this value and this has determined its choice as a dialogue 
partner in this study.  As Sen writes, “free and sustainable agency emerges as a major 
engine of development” (Sen 1999, p. 4).    This emphasis on agency is critical to 
understanding Sen’s views on “Development as Freedom”, yet he balances the focus on 
“self-help” arguing that the substantive freedoms persons enjoy “are extremely contingent 
on personal, social, and environmental circumstances” (Sen 1999, p. 284).    The expanse 
of substantive freedoms is indeed the goal of development, but it is not its exclusive 
means; it requires social support: “Individual freedom is a social commitment” (Sen 1990).   
                                                          
2
 Nussbaum writes: “religion is itself among the important human interests, both in itself and because it 
represents a central exercise of human choice” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 239).   But religion is more than one 
“interest” alongside others.  It functions as a meta-interest that integrates and provides a framework and 
orientation for other interests and human powers.     
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The CA is philosophically attractive and has proven a captivating approach, and this has to 
do with its multidimensionality and extensive range of questions it covers.  As Sen asks 
time and again, what do humans desire commodities for?  Sen cites Aristotle from the 
Nichomachean Ethics: “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely 
useful for the sake of something else” (Sen 1999, p. 14).  And as will be developed in the 
following chapters, there is a formal similarity between CA and Eastern Orthodoxy (of a 
potentiality to actuality developmental structure) which appears to have a common origin 
in Aristotle.
3
    Sen’s approach is though highly eclectic; pinning a label on him is very 
difficult.   He is pro-market, but not laissez-faire, he promotes agency, but is keenly aware 
of social preconditions and obstacles (what Sen calls “unfreedoms”); he is liberal in his 
approach to freedom, but is not against state intervention and redistribution (thus not 
libertarian
4
); and he combines profound empirical and philosophical analysis in his works. 
Development theory is deeply linked with, but not always explicitly, an account of what 
counts for justice and injustice.  Sen’s work Development as Freedom opens by 
highlighting the disparity between the “unprecedented opulence” of the few—hard to 
imagine even a century or so ago—with a world of still “remarkable deprivation, 
destitution, and oppression”.   He states, citing the practical and not merely theoretical 
nature of this enterprise, “Overcoming these problems is a central part of the exercise of 
development” (Sen 1999, p. xi).   This question of providing considered convictions about 
the nature of justice and equality, defining, defending and critiquing competing notions, 
has been at the core of philosophy at least since Socrates.  Indeed, one task of Plato’s 
Republic is Socrates’ attack of Polemarchus’ definition of justice as “treating your friends 
well and your enemies badly” (Plato 2008, p. 10), and why this definition cannot pass the 
                                                          
3
 This is the capability-functioning, image-likeness (theosis) parallel, both of which take the “potentiality-
actuality” structure.  Aristotle is a common source in terms of form (Tatakis 2007, p. 94), though of course 
the content explored within these formal boundaries may be different.   
4
 Sen forcefully critiques Nozick’s libertarian theory presented in (Nozick 1968; Sen 1999, pp 65-67). 
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test of the examined life—the only one worth living.  Sen would agree with this line of 
enquiry. 
In terms of a theory of justice, a good place to start with the capabilities approach is the 
question Sen raised in his Tanner Lectures (1979): “Equality of What?”.  Justice is related 
in some fashion to the value of equality, injustice to inequality, and the CA offers a 
distinctive answer to this in terms of the “information space” within which well-being and 
equality is assessed.  As Sen points out, all theories of normative social arrangement offer 
some answer to this question of what information is to be included, or excluded, precisely 
in terms of differing understandings of equality.  Income egalitarians demand income 
equality, while libertarians demand equality in terms of untrammelled rights to their 
earnings, free from redistributive constraints.  To choose equality in terms of a certain core 
variable such as income, or resources, or property rights means to allow inequality in 
peripheral variables (Sen 1992, p. x).  Not only what is said, but what is left unsaid is 
important.   
For Sen and capability theorists, the space within which equality is to be evaluated is the 
“capability space”, or less technically, freedoms “to do and be”.  Admittedly this 
terminology is vague and requires some explanation, especially in light of further technical 
distinctions such as capability versus functioning.  (Functioning is the actual achievement, 
capability is the freedom to choose and not be coerced into a particular achievement.   This 
will be picked up below.)  Most simply, capabilities or functionings—for now they can be 
viewed as synonymous—are “beings and doings” or more concretely, they answer the 
question: “What is one actually able to do and to be?”  The connection with freedom and 
agency should be apparent.  Capability development is about expanding people’s 
substantive freedoms and enabling them to live long, healthy, and creative lives.    The 
goal is human freedom or more precisely, capability expansion.   The CA asks how people 
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are faring, not just how production is doing.  It is about living with dignity, viewed as 
inseparable from freedom, freedom to do and be what one has “reason to value”.5   
Critically, Sen and the CA emphasize that cultural values can also enhance or impede these 
freedoms to pursue one’s own lifestyle, guided by reason.  The UN Development Program 
(UNDP) launched the first human development report under Mahbub ul Haq in 1990 with 
guidance from Amartya Sen, with the single goal of putting people back in the centre of 
the development process, and not mere incomes.   
More profoundly, this notion of  “capability” is informed by an Aristotelian notion of 
human functioning or flourishing, developed especially by Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1992; 
2000), but also informing Sen’s approach though less vigorously so (Nussbaum and Sen 
1993, p. 46-7).  These human functionings are seen as constitutive of human well being.  
Such functions include, inter alia, “being adequately nourished, being in good health, 
avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality … [and] more complex 
achievements such as being happy, taking part in the life of the community, and so on” 
(Sen 1992, p. 39).  Martha Nussbaum, the other highly distinguished advocate of the 
Capability Approach, writes, “The basic intuition from which the capability approach 
begins … is that human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed” 
(Nussbaum 2002, p. 124).  She differentiates the CA from preference based (utilitarianism) 
or resource based approaches (basic needs), and insists that the central question of the CA 
is not “How satisfied” is this woman, or “How many resources” she is able to command, 
but what she is actually able to “do and be” (Nussbaum 2002, p. 129).  Even if a definition 
of complete human functioning cannot be agreed upon in a comprehensive fashion, 
agreement is not hard to obtain when major dimensions are unfulfilled.  “The greatest 
                                                          
5
 This “reason to value” phrase is employed often by Sen as a signal, as it were, for the demands of 
rationality, versus a willy-nilly version of freedom.   
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relevance of ideas of justice lies in the identification of patent injustice” (Sen 1999, p. 
289). 
While freedom and valuable beings and doings are potentially infinitely rich and 
immeasurable, there are some proxy measures that can operationalize it.  As the most 
famous example, the Human Development Index (HDI) takes three variables, namely 1) 
longevity or life expectancy, which will indirectly reflect infant and child mortality 2) a 
weighted average of education (enrolment rates-1/3, and adult literacy-2/3’s) and 3) the 
level of adjusted income per capita (the effect of income on improvements in well-being is 
considered increasingly marginal at approximately $5000-$6000 per capita).   These three 
combined in a weighted manner, while admittedly omitting much, are a much better 
measure than crude GNP.  There are two distinct reasons for this.  The first reason is the 
presence of what are called “conversion factors”.  One’s ability to put income (or a 
uniform set of basic commodities) to good use for human flourishing is variable.  For 
example, to achieve a certain level of functioning to keep warm requires significantly more 
calories both in terms of food, and combustible materials (heat) in Siberia, than in the 
tropics.   In many situations, this variability in conversion factors can mean the difference 
between life and death.  Furthermore, a person with disabilities will require even more 
resources to approximate an “adequate” level of human functioning (Nussbaum 2006).  
Development analysis and informed public policy should, under the light of the CA, take 
account of these divergences, these conversion factors, and not orient itself to an invariable 
set of basic needs or a fixed income function.   
The second reason is that GNP tends to look at income at the household level which can 
hide serious injustices under this umbrella such as males commanding the lion’s share of 
food.  For instance, Sen and many others have pointed out how intrafamilial injustices (sex 
biases in poverty) can be undetected if income is measured in terms of the family unit.  Per 
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capita income measured at the household level can “hide” important, even life threatening 
information in terms of individuals, usually females, living under the same roof (Sen 
1997).  While aggregate GNP at the household level will not capture this dimension of 
injustice, education and longevity, the other two dimensions of the HDI, measured at the 
level of the individual, will.   And these two latter variables correlate strongly with (if are 
not direct causal factors of) many other well-being concerns, such as the ability to find 
work outside the home, which in turn reflects how persons are treated in the family and 
whether or not they might receive fair income or commodity shares.  It is important to 
mention though that the CA does not omit the importance of income for achieving well-
being outcomes.  It is rather that this income variable alone does not provide an adequate 
indication of human well-being—and this is one of the foundational points of development 
studies.    There indeed have been dramatic and widespread increases in, for example, 
health outcomes worldwide.  Studies show that some countries such as Costa Rica and Sri 
Lanka have made strides in life expectancy and literacy significantly greater than other 
countries with similar per capita incomes (Sen 1992, p. 126).   This means that well-being 
cannot be fully correlated with income, which stands in tension with the overly simple 
“wealthier is healthier” relationship (Kenney 2009, p. 34).   
While per capita income is important for well-being, it must be put in its proper 
perspective.  A staple contention of development studies is that countries with relatively 
low incomes can, in fact, achieve dramatic increases in basic well-being.   Kerala is 
perhaps the most storied example, which features prominently in Amartya Sen’s writings.   
The very first Human Development reports that:   
Fairly respectable levels of human development are possible even at fairly modest levels of 
income.  Life does not begin at $11,000, the average per capita income in the industrialized 
world.   Sri Lanka [another example] managed a life expectancy of 71 years and an adult 
literacy rate of 87% with a per capita income of $400 (UNDP 1990, p. 2). 
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The inverse also holds true, that the rankings of HDI can illustrate how a relatively high-
income country can fare very poorly in other development goals such as literacy and 
longevity (Ray 1998).   
If human development can be regarded as a theological concern, and the argument here is 
that under certain theological paradigms it very well can be,
6
 development analyses can 
have potential dividends in the promotion of social justice and broad-based well being.   
Another important example is the debate over the trade-offs between economic growth and 
meeting basic needs, or put in other terms, free market vs. state intervention in 
development.   Amartya Sen has shown in the case of Sri Lanka that it would take between 
58 and 152 years for Sri Lanka to achieve the same level of basic needs (supports for 
human functioning) through a “trickle-down” strategy of economic growth rather than 
through direct public/state provision of basic needs (Sen 1981).   Further, it is highly 
doubtful that real tensions exist between economic growth and public investment in basic 
needs, and the latter promotes the former (Hicks 1979).  These are the type of analyses 
theologians can hardly be expected to provide, and yet, inasmuch as Christians should be 
interested in human well-being, familiarity with these concepts becomes important as a 
basis for informed advocacy.  
Here, the CA can be further clarified by comparing it with competing notions of human 
rights, including those informed by Marxism.
7
   Rights schemes or debates have 
traditionally been cast in terms of negative vs. positive liberties, a distinction made famous 
in Isaiah Berlin’s 1948 essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin 1969).    Freedom in the 
“negative” sense is often what “Moderns” mean by it, freedom from coercion, freedom to 
                                                          
6
 This connection should not be assumed.   Colin Gunton from a Protestant perspective writes, “salvation and 
flourishing of human people is, and should remain, at the heart of Christian teaching”, but his entire work is 
to demonstrate why this has not been the case and how it can be rectified (Gunton 1998, p. 166). 
7
 Of course Marxism rejected Western individual rights as bourgeois luxuries, but the types of socio-
economic rights enjoined by Marxism will be discussed below. 
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be and do what one wants, even freedom from any type of political participation.
8
   
Freedom in the “positive” sense, on the other hand, is “freedom for”:  virtues or powers to 
be and do certain things.  Classically, this positive freedom demands political participation.  
As Aristotle inimitably put it, to not be involved in the life of the polis is to be either a 
“beast or a god” (Aristotle 1999, p. 14).9   The distinction between these two types of 
freedom is important to the liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy (discussed 
in chapter two), but recapitulated in development studies. According to Berlin, these two 
visions of rights, the negative and the positive, need not be incompatible, though they 
imply different values.  Amartya Sen agrees with Berlin that both of these types of 
freedoms are among the types of things worth doing or being.
10
  Sen repeatedly 
emphasizes the importance of public participation and views this as key to the formation of 
values. 
Though not mirroring this distinction exactly, another major controversy over how to 
characterize rights occurred primarily in the 20
th
 century, and is associated with Marxist-
inspired Communism.  “Western” style rights, in opposition to the economic rights argued 
for in Communism, focused largely on political entitlements, the rights of free speech, and 
less on rights that might be understood to more directly enable human flourishing—such as 
shelter and work.   The rift between these rights regimes is so deep that there are two 
                                                          
8
 This restricted understanding of rights is why some Orthodox have “opposed” Western human rights (Pollis 
1993; Guroian 1998; Yannaras 2002).  For a more balanced perspective, see (Harakas 1982).   It is important 
to note that EO questions the adequacy of the human rights framework for many similar reasons as the CA, 
as well as some of the “communitarian” reasons that questions “rights talk” and the impoverishment of 
political discourse by focusing on autonomy (Glendon 1991).  
9
 Socrates would appear to be an exception here; he refused to participate in many aspects of the political life 
of Athens and was accused of “living in the clouds” by the comic poet Aristophanes, of being above the 
moral claims of local politics.  This is evident in the “Apology” (Grube 1981).  Aristotle talks about the 
differences between the virtues of the man qua man, and man as citizen of a particular polis (Aristotle 1999).   
Aristotle sided “mostly” with the latter.  The liberal-communitarian debate is foreshadowed in the debate 
between Socrates/Plato and Aristotle, and even between Aristotle and himself. 
10
 Sen references Isaiah Berlin’s classic distinction as referring to “whether a person’s lack of ability to 
achieve something is caused by an external restraint or hindrance [negative freedom], or by a limitation 
internal to the person [positive freedom]” (Sen 2002, p. 11-12).   
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separate UN Covenants, one on Civil and Political Rights, and one on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights.
11
   A major distinguishing factor and the hallmark of Marxist thought is 
the “right to work” (Uvin 2004, p. 11), along with other items not found in the Covenant of 
Civil and Political rights, such as adequate shelter.   
The CA is concerned with providing the framework for both of these types of rights—
economic and political—as both of these are enabling conditions for adequate human 
functioning.  Thus the CA provides the rationale for the provision of basic needs such as 
food, shelter (taking into account conversion factors), but also for the provision of 
adequate space for the effective exercise of one’s agency, the freedom aspect of 
development.
12
   Nussbaum’s “list”—delineated in the next chapter—aspires to provide an 
overlapping “political” consensus (i.e. not a controversial metaphysical account) of the ten 
core human functionings that all societies should support regardless of what else they may 
believe or hold dear.   For Nussbaum, these are the core elements of any flourishing human 
life—and her list includes both types of rights.  Sen, however, is reluctant to specify any 
such universal list, keeping his approach more general in a principled stance of “assertive 
incompleteness”.  He does include however five distinct types of freedoms that are viewed 
as “instrumental” for the exercise of individual freedoms.   These include:  1) political 
freedoms 2) economic facilities 3) social opportunities 4) guarantees of transparency and 
5) protective facilities (Sen 1999, p. 10).
13
 
                                                          
11
 These deep differences over rights are the reason that rights language did not enter development discourse 
until the 1990’s. 
12
 Obvious here is a paradox, or an aporia (Greek for impasse or puzzlement):  what comes first, the social 
conditions (structures) that enable the effective exercise of agency, or the agency required to create the 
conditions (structures)?   This is a paradox at the heart not just of Sen’s CA, but any theory will face this 
challenge.   
13
 Sen’s genius lies in exploring the surprising empirical connections between these diverse freedoms.  
Already mentioned was the connection between freedom from famine (i.e. freedom to experience life itself) 
and the freedoms associated with democracy.  
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A central idea of the CA is thus that poverty is multidimensional, going beyond any single 
dimension such as income or health; or stated positively: “Freedom is an irreducibly plural 
concept” (Sen 2002, p. 585).   It was mentioned above that the HDI (Human Development 
Index) has received criticism such that a “full assessment of human development requires a 
much broader set of indicators than HDI alone” (Ranis, Stewart et al. 2006).   It is 
important to note that Human Development (the CA) goes far beyond the HDI, with which 
it is often mistakenly equated.   Recent work to detail this fuller understanding of the 
dimensions of human development, and a corresponding aspiration to operationalize a 
better set of indicators, is the Multi-Poverty index which helps reveal “missing 
dimensions”.   Like Nussbaum’s list, this Multi-Poverty Index (MPI) moves even more 
clearly beyond mere political entitlements to the provision of basic needs, but with a few 
further refinements. 
The new MPI was included in the 2010 UN Human Development report (UNDP 2010) and 
is utilized by the Mexican, Colombian and Bhutanese governments.  Unlike other 
indicators, the MPI can measure the intensity of multi-dimensional poverty, but is also 
sensitive to regional differences.  For instance, one report notes “the highest incidence of 
multidimensional poverty in 2008 was Chiapas, with 76.7 percent of its population in this 
situation (CONEVAL 2009, p. 3)).  This reflects interregional variations of poverty that an 
overall indicator such as GNP or even HDI cannot easily capture.   However, the MPI is 
not without its problems such as data collection:  all the data must come from the same 
house-hold survey and better sources of data are often unusable.   Also, some of the 
poverty weightings imply value judgements that are questionable.  That the death of a child 
(in the health category) can even be compared with and placed side by side with not having 
a television, or having a dirt floor (both of these are in the standard of living category) can 
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be offensive.
14
  However imperfect, the MPI is but one of many attempts to better measure 
and operationalize the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and well-being.    
Social analyses provided by the CA can provide needed focus for Christian’s 
“neighbourly” obligations.  In a globalized world where there is a sense of responsibility 
now for distant neighbours, infinite obligation can overwhelm and numb.   The types of 
analyses development studies provides can offer focused insights into where help is most 
needed, often the type of help needed as well, and unearth surprising causal connections 
that can provide entry points for efficient intervention.  And the CA’s focus is on extreme 
poverty, though it is not limited to this.  Amartya Sen wrote in the introduction to the 2010 
Human Development Report:   
the human development approach is motivationally committed to concentrating on what 
remains undone—what demands most attention in the contemporary world—from poverty 
and deprivation to inequality and insecurity (UNDP 2010, p. vi). 
But much is still to be learned in this evolving field, and more interaction with religion is 
necessary to properly conceptualize valuable beings and doings in non-Western contexts 
but also and especially to motivate human development.  The account now turns to 
analyzing why GDP
15
 (or more simply, development understand in purely economic terms) 
was completely inadequate as an indicator of well-being under Communism, a fact which 
can further illuminate the post-communist legacy and also demonstrate the relevance of the 
CA. 
                                                          
14
 The MPI has ten indicators in three dimensions:  health, education, and standard of living.  Each of these 
domains receives equal overall weight, with sub-domains in each. 
15
 Previously GNP, Gross National Product was used.  This includes incomes earned internationally by 
citizens of a country.   This applies less to Communism so GDP, Gross Domestic Product, is employed.  This 
expresses what is earned within the geographical boundaries of a country.    
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4.2  Communism and the relevance of the CA  
If GDP is an imperfect indicator under most political regimes, under Communism it is a 
perfectly irrelevant and even deceitful indicator.  This is important because sometimes it is 
argued that life was “better” under Communism, or that productivity under capitalist 
regimes is negative compared to that under communist regimes.  The following account 
will put these claims in perspective and demonstrate the relevance of the CA to make 
nuanced judgements.   
It is a serious mistake to compare pre-revolution GDP figures to post revolution figures 
and take this comparison at face value.  First of all, regimes regularly doctored statistics so 
that GDP was almost meaningless in a communist economy.  Not only was this due to 
inaccuracies and mistakes in the accounting system, but there was also a tendency to 
present a more favourable picture than was really true (Kornai 1992, p. 51).   Communism 
developed its own unique accounting system whereby digging a hole one day and filling it 
in the next can both be counted as productive activities in terms of overall GDP.   As 
Hayek points out, the nature of a totalitarian state is characterized by a wartime mentality; 
anything, including unfavourable comparisons with other countries, which can cast doubt 
on the government and its plans, can be viewed as treason (Hayek 1974, p. 160).   Socialist 
governments also experienced very high corruption as mentioned, but this also distorted 
reliable information (Svensson 2005, p. 24).   These distortions are results of the 
‘command” type economy and the type of character and value formation that took place in 
a continuous wartime mentality.    This will be examined more extensively shortly. 
Second, GDP and economic productivity are misguided indicators because Communism 
was a type of forced growth; great quantity was achieved at the expense of quality.  
Despite occasional high industrial output, often the goods were not what “customers” (the 
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entire population) wanted or even needed.  There was no pricing system to signal 
customers’ needs or desires—almost everything was bureaucratically decided.   So while 
productivity may have been high, it was not always aimed at the needs and desires of the 
populations of these regime types, and the quality of goods was so shoddy that there was 
little chance for export on the world market.  Nowhere is this more graphically illustrated 
than the fact that East Germany was “among the world’s most highly developed countries 
in per capita production and consumption terms, yet it was still a shortage economy.  East 
German citizens could not get the things they wanted to buy with their money” (Kornai 
1992, p. 289).
16
   This coordination/allocation problem applies a fortiori to most other 
Communist countries.   
Besides these reasons for the inappropriateness of GDP comparisons, a leading scholar on 
the political economy of Communism, Janos Kornai (whom this section has relied heavily 
upon), points out “system specific” reasons why shortages were so common, even 
universal, under Communism.  There are two types of shortages; one is due to a low level 
of economic development, and the other is due to “the failure to satisfy buyers”.  Kornai 
argues that beside specific instances of incompetence, faulty economic policy (e.g. 
mistakes in the production plan), economic backwardness and the like, there are system 
specific features such that it can be scientifically understood why certain “failures” will 
occur more within one system type than another—even despite good intentions.  While it is 
not important to enter into the complexities of his argument, Kornai asserts that the 
shortage syndrome is linked to the “basic traits of the system:  the structure of power, 
official ideology, bureaucratic public ownership, and dominance of bureaucratic 
coordination over other coordination forms [e.g. price mechanism]” (Kornai 1992, p. 291).  
                                                          
16
 For example, the celebrated coal miners, the working class par excellence, would often receive very high 
salaries, but without connections to other markets (informal or underground), the money meant very little in 
terms of purchasing power as there was little worth buying. 
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The lack of a signalling system between buyers and sellers meant that even with the best of 
intentions, massive failures would occur.   The shortage syndrome was thus endemic to the 
Communist regime type.
17
 
But even beyond this question of whether GDP is a reliable indicator for well-being, Sen 
would argue that even if adequate provision is made in terms of commodities, serious 
losses in well-being would be entailed if freedom is seriously curtailed.  As Sen points out, 
to deny persons the right to interact with each other in markets entails social losses (Sen 
1999, p. 26)—to put it mildly.  Human freedom thus has its own value and its value is 
independent of its instrumental contribution to the free-market system.   This can be 
illustrated by analyzing some genuine achievements of Communism. 
It is well known that many communist countries have fared comparatively well in health 
and education such as Vietnam and Cuba.  Are these achievements simply to be dismissed?  
Is the failure of Communist economies due to their heavy investment in social services?  
Capital-ism has its own ideology which can cause it to mistake the reason for the failure of 
socialist economies.  It was not because they supported social services.  Rather it was the 
aforementioned intrusive, military nature of the command-economy such that there could 
be no signal between buyer and seller—all was coordinated in a top-down fashion.  This 
absolute concentration of power entailed the systemic failure of Communism, not its 
provision of social services.  In line with this, a point that merits continued emphasis is that 
the correlation between income and overall well-being operates through the provision of 
basic social services.   Sen has empirically shown that the positive correlation of GDP to 
life expectancy operates only through the medium of higher public spending (Drèze and 
                                                          
17
 These massive shortages meant many hours standing in line and conversing.  This eventuated in jokes such 
as the following:  “What happened when the desert became communist?  Well, nothing for a while, then there 
was a sand shortage”.  This type of humour was ubiquitous under Communism, and illegal.   Sociologist 
Peter Berger called humour in the face of difficult situations a “signal of Transcendence” (Berger 1970). 
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Sen 2002).  Similarly, markets can be highly defective as a signalling system at critical 
times for the basic needs for the poor.   In Sen’s work on famines he has shown that “the 
needs and wants of the poor register faintly in markets” (Sen 1981; Anderson 2005, p. 249) 
and these “market failures” can mean widespread starvation even in the midst of adequate 
foodstuffs.   Thus, there are times when the “free” market simply cannot be relied upon as 
an indicator of, engine for, or guarantee of human well-being.  Direct state intervention is 
required.   If markets are to be judged superior as an overall economic system (and Sen 
believes they are, with various qualifications), it is because they have a superior ability to 
provide basic social supports for human functioning—and a principal mechanism for this is 
increased public spending.    
It might be argued at this juncture that the Communist economic system could be 
legitimated less in terms of economic output but more on the achievements of equality 
under Communism.  There was indeed a radical redistribution of wealth in the early 
“revolutionary transitional” phase such that the Communist system came closest to 
applying truly egalitarian principles and made real achievements (more on these below).  
Yet as Communism became consolidated, as the initial revolutionary fervour subsided, 
these achievements receded.  Along with the abovementioned distortion in the statistical 
reporting, exaggerating the equality achievements was rampant as this also served 
ideological ends.  The “Gini Coefficient” comparisons (a measurement of inequality within 
a country) of income distribution are only marginally helpful as the nonmonetary income 
of the elite is not registered.  Still, with distortions taken into consideration, the cross 
country Gini comparisons themselves do not reveal any decisive achievements in equality 
under Communist regimes that would justify the suffering inflicted.   Better achievements 
towards the ideal of equality were made by Scandinavian welfare economies (Kornai 1992, 
p. 318).  Western literati who travelled to Communist countries, looking for a beacon of 
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hope in terms of human equality, returned disillusioned at the profligacy of the 
bureaucratic elite (Crossman 2001).   
This brief section has tried to show the relevance of the CA by focusing on capabilities as 
the basis of development, and the irrelevance of GDP under communism.  An important 
feature of the CA is that it can help cut through sterile debates such as “States or Markets?” 
(Colclough 1993).  It can recognize and combine the real strengths of each system—
Communism’s investment in public services and the market’s economic efficiency.  
“Without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must look well beyond it” (Sen 
1999, p. 14) for the real nature of human development.    
The question however is where beyond economic growth “we must look”?  It was 
suggested earlier that development requires minimally three dimensions—agency, 
solidarity, and a focus on structures—and that Communism damaged all three of these 
dimensions.  The account will now query Sen’s CA on each of these.    This will illustrate 
characteristic strengths and perhaps weaknesses but it will also serve to clarify the 
valuational priorities of the CA in relation to EO. 
4.3 Beyond Individual Freedoms:  a Trinitarian imaging of human 
development 
Development has been interpreted as various combinations of agency, solidarity, and 
structures.   But for Sen, the focus is almost exclusively on agency:  development as 
freedom.   The argument here, inspired by an EO conception of the person, but emerging 
through reflective interaction with DS, is that freedom is extremely important, but it is not 
enough.  The anthropological formula “persons in communion within the medium of a 
shared nature” can help clarify development challenges precisely because it is a more 
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adequate view of the multidimensional character of human development.   To transpose 
Sen’s language: “without ignoring the importance of freedom, we must look well beyond 
it”.   Furthermore, the same applies ceteris peribus for the other values, 
communion/solidarity and structures/nature.  In other words, focusing on only one or two 
of these dimensions may mean misdescribing human development.   
Human development is not just a theoretical exercise, but what David Crocker called 
(somewhat inelegantly) “development theory-practice” (Crocker 1992, p. 585).   
Development as was seen in the CA calls for actually “overcoming these problems” (Sen 
1999, p. xi) of global injustice, stunted lives and removing various forms of unfreedom.  
Sen’s version of the CA, profound and elaborate as it is in many regards, may prove flaccid 
because it undervalues important sources of solidarity (such as shared nature or 
communitarian values) in favour of agency or freedom.   Moderns fancy that moral 
obligations only arise from within situations in which persons have freely given their 
consent (Gillespie 2008, p. 246).   The argument here seeks to broaden the moral bases for 
human development beyond, but including, individual freedoms. 
4.3.1 Agency (Person) 
There is little doubt that Sen’s version of the CA privileges agency or freedom (the two 
terms are not clearly differentiated by Sen).   Other values can come into play, but they 
appear to be instrumental to this end.  Occasionally, there are exceptions (see below), but 
the overall thrust is that the means of development, but more importantly, its ultimate end, 
is the exercise of individual agency.   From the very first Human Development report came 
the famous line:  “Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 
1990, p.1). 
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For Sen, development is clearly about one goal and that is the increase in the range and 
quality of individual choices, or freedoms.   There may be many means, some necessary, to 
this end, but the end is the expansion of choice.   For Sen, individual agency is ultimately 
central to questions of poverty reduction, but clearly not only that.  Sen conceives of these 
freedoms as the greater “part of the content of, rather than the conditions for or means to, a 
full life” (Crocker 1992, p. 604).   Freedom is constitutive of human development.  Martha 
Nussbaum reiterates this point:  “The core idea seems to be that of the human being as a 
dignified free being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively shaped or 
pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal” (Nussbaum 2002).   
Agency is about conceiving the person as a “doer”, an  agent, and  not merely a patient 
(Sen 1987, p. 59).   There are profound truths here, but one can note that development as 
expanse of freedoms appears incompatible with the idea that development might also be a 
process of narrowing and structuring one’s choices in the light of the sacrifices involved in 
helping or giving space for others to achieve their freedoms.  The “information space” of 
Sen’s CA may not be constructed in a way that the conflicting or complementary nature of 
freedoms is well registered.  It may miss many of the “social facts” and that well-being 
may not best be understood  primarily in terms of expansion of individual choice (Gasper 
2002; Gasper and Stavern 2005).    These themes will be returned to under solidarity 
below. 
An important distinction between “capability” and “functioning” was mentioned earlier.  
The purpose of this fundamental distinction is to highlight the role of free agency and its 
genuine importance can be illustrated from the experience of Communism.   In the CA, 
functioning is the actual achievements or outcomes, while capability is the freedom to 
choose a particular achievement or set of achievements.   Communism provided a fairly 
adequate set of human functionings, such as work and shelter (and these were real 
 107 
achievements), yet this was done without sufficient regard for agency.   The considerable 
human functionings that the State was to provide for its subjects under Communism were: 
1) Full employment and freedom from the oppressive threat of unemployment; 
2) Free Public Education; 
3) Comprehensive public pension system, covering the entire population; 
4) Housing (provided one works); 
5) A welfare net provided by the State if one’s own family cannot provide; and 
6) Public Security, of a very strict sort (Kornai 1992, p. 312-313). 
To use Sen’s terminology, Communism aimed at the expansion of human functionings, but 
not (enough) at the exercise of capabilities, or freedoms to achieve various combinations 
of functionings.   Communism sought to install a set of human functionings based on the 
above list, and moved persons around like chess-pieces on a board.    The disregard for 
basic freedoms (or capabilities) was so severe that Marxism is incompatible with many 
basic human rights (Hook 1968; Lukes 1982; Kolakowski 1990; Lukes 1993).  Marxism 
viewed individual rights as bourgeois ideology and as an impediment to social 
reconstruction.
18
  It was thought, perhaps understandably at the time, that development 
could be largely for persons, and not by persons.  This element of by persons however is 
the element of agency and is the fundamental element of Sen’s articulation of the CA.   
The 1991 HDR writes:  “It has to be development of the people, by the people, for the 
people” (UNDP 1991, p. 14).    
                                                          
18
 In this vein, Marx opposed what were called the “True Socialists” who opposed the doctrine of open class 
warfare on the grounds that that this would violate the rights and ideals of equality for which they laboured.  
Marx believed this approach was utterly naïve and that those in power would never respond to mere moral 
argumentation (Berlin 1965, p. 146-147). 
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This is why Sen is so adamant about not specifying a “natural” set or list of human 
functionings as this would “restrict the room for democratic decision making” about 
valuable beings and doings (Sen 1999, p. 286).  Broad guidance however is provided by 
Sen’s CA in terms of the removal of unfreedoms, but his silence on a normative set of 
human functionings (unlike Nussbaum) signals Sen’s esteem for individual agency as the 
goal for development.   Both Nussbaum and Sen however differentiate clearly between a) 
functioning and b) the freedom to pursue various functions, or in other words, 
capabilities.
19
  Capabilities are a set of “vectors” of functioning, possible sets of outcomes 
that are freely chosen (Sen 1992, p. 39; Nussbaum and Sen 1993).   Communism shows in 
a decisive way the necessity of freedom as a fundamental human development value.  The 
question now is whether there are reasons to move beyond this singular focus.  And 
indeed, Amartya Sen does so, but in a very tentative fashion. 
4.3.2 Solidarity (Communion) 
In following chapters the question will be raised whether Sen’s notion of agency should be 
enriched through the virtue tradition, critically appropriated in the light of development 
needs, but precisely in order to tie agency more closely to solidarity.   This at least is what 
a theology of development along EO lines (and Adam Smith
20
) might advocate.  But here 
the role of solidarity in the CA must be examined on its own terms.  On the one hand, 
solidarity is clearly a strong background value; even though infrequently mentioned it is 
everywhere assumed.  That capability development is to be universal is everywhere 
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 Nussbaum argues similarly that “capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal” both because 
her list of central human capabilities attaches great importance to practical reason (i.e. agency), and also to 
avoid paternalism (Nussbaum 2000, p. 87).   Whether this aim for capability and not functioning is a feasible, 
operationalizable goal is one that cannot be addressed here but the CA is subject to this criticism—and is 
perhaps why the Millennium Development Goals gathered such momentum so quickly.  
20
 Chapter six will show that Sen “cherry-picked” important ideas of Smith’s such as the Impartial Spectator 
that rely on his virtue theory.   
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implied, meaning a cosmopolitan (global) reach of the value of solidarity, not merely local 
or nationalistic understandings.  Sen does attempt to justify solidarity by appealing to 
reason (Sen 1999; Sen 2000; Sen 2002) and  notions such as “open impartiality”, a 
retrieval of Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator” device which tends toward a cosmopolitan 
type of ethic (Sen 2002).  Sen’s solidarity is decidedly not communitarian (Sen 1999; Sen 
2006).  This type of liberal cosmopolitanism is abstracted from concrete relationships and 
is rooted in nothing besides personal freedom guided by reason exercised within 
idealistically conceived democratic processes.   Despite the Aristotelian resonances of the 
CA, Sen (more so than Nussbaum) is quite weak on the intrinsically relational nature of 
humans, the “Aristotelian” point that humans are “by nature” social and political animals.21    
According to this Aristotelian perspective on human functioning, human well-being has 
relational and not just freedom bearing properties.  Later, an attempt will be made to 
reconcile communitarian expressions of solidarity with the cosmopolitanism implied in 
human development and show that the very heart of Christianity is a position best 
described (in social science language) as “communitarian cosmopolitanism”.  
For Sen, solidarity is “occasionally” a strong value in an explicit sense.  In his work co-
authored with Jean Drèze on India, Sen argues that democratic processes are often 
defective due to the lack of “voice” of the poor because socio-economic inequalities limit 
their effectiveness in public participation.  The voices of the disadvantaged, even though 
they are many, are crowded out by the rich who receive disproportionate attention due to 
superior education, communication skills, and wealth.   The remedies for this 
“voicelessness” are two:  one is “assertion”, which is the self-assertion of the 
underprivileged through political organization.   This idea of “assertion” corresponds 
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 Sen does make frequent reference to democracy (Sen 1999, p. 148) and this comes very close to Aristotle’s 
notion of man as a political animal.  But Sen seems to ignore or treat adversely other forms of sociability, the 
family, religion and other communal identities (Sen 2006).   
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almost exactly with agency and this characterization can help clarify what forms agency 
might take in terms of public action.  The other remedy for “voicelessnes” is solidarity on 
behalf of the disadvantaged by those who are better placed due to the advantages of 
“formal education, media contacts, economic resources and political connections” (Drèze 
and Sen 2002, p. 29).   And on the same page they write that “Both self-assertion and 
solidarity may be regarded as important parts of the creation of social opportunities, with 
intrinsic as well as instrumental value”.    Later in the book, they write, “The real answer to 
global inequality lies in the growing possibilities of solidarity across the world, which are 
part of “globalization” in the broad sense” (Drèze and Sen 2002, p. 345).   Solidarity needs 
to be exercised on behalf of the victims of deprivation and inequality.  This is an important 
point harmonious with Biblical concerns for justice:  to care for the orphan, the widow, the 
dispossessed.  
There are however dangers for an overreliance on solidarity—which Sen and Drèze point 
out in their work on India.   Those acting on behalf of and in solidarity with others may not 
properly understand or represent their interests.  This was the case par excellence with the 
Communist bureaucracy acting on behalf of the hoi polloi, the “proletariat” (the passive 
masses).  Solidarity, even well-intentioned, can violate the principle of subsidiarity, which 
is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and where 
possible, by the citizen.
22
   Still, there are many cases where solidarity (aid for the 
disadvantaged by those who are privileged) is the only option, especially in contexts where 
citizenship is denied and “assertion” is impossible.  In the Indian context, Sen and Drèze 
write:  “Ultimately, both assertion and solidarity are needed for effective political action” 
(Drèze and Sen 2002, p. 30).   
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 Subsidiarity is now EU policy but had its origins in Catholic Social Teaching.    
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But does this balanced approach between agency and solidarity, which can provide some 
minimal moral guidance for freedom, receive sustained attention in Sen’s other works?  
This does not seem to be the case.  Other values, including and especially rationality for 
Sen, may come in to inform freedom, but freedom is the supreme value.
23
   Sen cleverly 
notes that “Individual Freedom is a Social commitment”, which is the last chapter in his 
Development as Freedom.  Social commitments may be important, as are various 
structures that qualify freedom:  “the freedom and agency that we individually have is 
inescapably qualified by the social, political, and economic opportunities that are available 
to us” (Sen 1999, p. xi-xii).    However, these social commitments and structural features 
are clearly instrumental, and not intrinsic, goods.   
To further this point, Sen often writes as if, by means of freedom and rationality, deeply 
embedded identities (which are themselves powerful sources of solidarity) can be 
exchanged rather casually.  For instance, in his work Identity and Violence, he sounds 
many notes in the following key: “The reasoning in the choice of relevant identities … 
may have to take note of the social context…”, or, “In each social context, there would be 
a number of potentially viable and relevant identities which one could assess in terms of 
their acceptability and  their relative importance” (Sen 2006, p. 27-29).  At this point, one 
must question Sen’s social psychology.  His account makes it too easy to stand outside of, 
and exercise reasoned choice over, one’s identity (or identities), as if a person’s identity is 
entirely separable and not derived (at least in part) from their communal context.  Without 
being reductionist, it is important to mention (contrary to Sen’s emphasis) that identities 
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 Sen apparently believes reason alone can give adequate guidance to freedom to bring about sufficient 
solidarity to move persons and societies closer to human development.  However, these chains of reasoning 
are complex and they are heavy:  Sen’s one book dedicated specifically to the linkages between freedom and 
rationality runs over 700 pages.  While this is no argument against the approach per se, it is perhaps an 
argument against its utility (Sen 2002). 
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are more like lenses through which persons look and perceive what is rational and 
acceptable and even what features of the context are relevant.
24
 
Still, Sen rightly focuses on agency.   The Communist disaster was largely due to the 
exclusion of freedom or what Sen calls the capability (vs. functioning) aspect in 
development.  But while Sen does not exclude the possibility of other values coming into 
play, it seems that he does not allow them to have a binding, or intrinsic status—they are 
instrumental to the summum bonum of expanding individual freedoms.  Many others have 
lodged similar criticisms of the CA including:  the need for a greater focus on 
responsibility (Giri 2000) and a more normative or “perfectionist” approach (Deneulin 
2002); the dangers of an instrumentalized view of community (Gasper 2002); lack of 
structures of living together (Deneulin 2008); a lack of a critique of opulence (Cameron 
2000); a stronger role for groups and group agency (Stewart 2005); ignoring the existence 
of “irreducibly social goods” (Taylor 1985; 1995; Gore 1997), and, perhaps most plainly, 
insufficient attention to “responsibility for each other’s freedom” (Ballet, Dubois et al. 
2007).
25
   These critiques of Sen’s version of the CA from the social scientific literature are 
in line with what this dissertation argues:  for development to achieve its worthwhile aims, 
agency as a fundamental value of development must not only be balanced with, but 
empowered by a specific vision of social solidarity; otherwise, agency risks being aimless, 
irrelevant and powerless for achieving the moral aim(s) implicit in development theory-
practice.  Thus solidarity (or some moral equivalent) must be given a non-instrumental, 
and thus “ultimate”, status in the ontology of the CA.   Appealing to the “dictates of 
rationality” (Sen 2002, p. 29) as the singular guiding feature of freedom is insufficient and 
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 However, this point should not be overstated.  Contrary to the “narrative identity” (communitarian) 
approach, and to Sen’s, the argument here is that no one dimension is exercised without being mutually 
implicated in the others.  Identity formation could be conceptualized as an ongoing dialogue between 
reasoned agency, communal tradition(s), and shared human nature.  This point will be further developed. 
25
 Adding to these lines of criticism, it should be noted that Sen misreads the social capital literature and does 
not note the most basic “bonding versus bridging” distinction and treats it all as “bonding” or “in-group” 
orientated (Sen 2004). 
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could result in an infinite regression.
26
  Marxism also claimed to be guided solely by 
reason.  
Agency is nourished and guided towards various ends by various moral sources, including 
communitarian or traditional conceptions of what it means to be a human.   These include 
religious faith that informs one’s very notions of personhood (Smith 2010), and also as a 
powerful source of activism (Smith 1996).  But neither should Sen’s emphasis on reasoned 
scrutiny be dismissed as communitarian norms can indeed be defective.     
In terms of concepts of personhood that can provide values for human development, which 
is to say linking agency more closely with human solidarity, this can be nourished by 
stronger notions of a) humans having a social/relational nature and thus a basic need being 
communion, and b) shared nature as a moral basis for extending this communion outward.   
Sen’s “liberal” version of the CA, focusing as it does on individual freedoms as the means 
and ends of development, risks ignoring at best, or undermining at worst, important 
sources of well-being and social solidarity  that have both intrinsic worth in themselves, 
and instrumental significance for other development objectives.   The next section enriches 
this discussion by a careful appeal to the notion of nature that can balance both the focus 
on freedom and communitarian forms of solidarity. 
4.3.3 Structures (Nature) 
Human development such as that envisioned in the capabilities approach presupposes an 
extremely robust sense of solidarity among humans.  Justifying and making sense of this 
value should be one of the principal aims of development studies.   Sen leans heavily, if 
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 Sen writes: “There could be, I hope, reasoned scrutiny of the role assigned to reasoned scrutiny in this 
approach to rationality” (Sen 2002, p. 48).   This is admitting that reason alone may not be enough.  Not 
surprisingly, Sen does not follow up on the implications of this. 
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not entirely, on autonomy and rationality, understood broadly as “the discipline of 
subjecting one’s choices—of actions as well as objectives, values and priorities—to 
reasoned scrutiny” (Sen 2002, p. 4).  Solidarity appears to be guided somehow by 
rationality, but it seems always to return back to an appeal to the core value of individual 
freedom.  “The use of socially responsible reasoning and of ideas of justice relates closely 
to the centrality of individual freedom” (Sen 1999, p. 261).   
Interestingly, Sen rarely addresses the “why” question of human development.  Sen argues 
tepidly that “we have the ability to contemplate the lives of others” (Sen 1999, p. 183), but 
having the ability to do so does not explain why one should, that is, whether there is an 
actual moral obligation to do so.    And if one does bother to contemplate others’ miserable 
lives, what is to motivate one to potentially difficult action to improve their situation?    
Here, as a partial answer to this question, the role that shared human nature can play will 
be examined.   Appealing to nature is indeed a thorny issue (and Modernity can be 
interpreted as a “breakdown in the accepted order of nature” (Toulmin 1990, p. 170)), but 
it is undoubtedly more problematic to ignore it because “If we have no essential nature as 
human beings, how are we to understand the complaint that certain kinds of treatment are 
‘dehumanizing’” (Antony 2000, p. 11)?  The notion that there is a “nature” or essential 
human functions has historically provided important safeguards for human dignity and can 
be a bridging point between religion and development.  Indeed, the natural law tradition 
has been a significant historical carrier of human rights (Pogge 2002, p. 54; Wolterstorff 
2010).
27
 
However, before the role of nature is defended in conceptualizing human development 
(along with freedom and solidarity), cautions are necessary. This is because the category of 
                                                          
27
 However, understanding shared nature must be viewed as an ongoing, unfinished project, it cannot be 
closed down, and it cannot be owned by anyone or any particular group. 
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nature has also played the opposite role in undermining rights.  Note this remarkable quote 
by Marx.  Communism is: 
the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and 
man.  It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual 
and species.  It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution (in 
Lukes 1993, p. 27).  
Communism elevated the species level over the individual and “discerned” laws of history 
that would accelerate the evolution of the entire human species—but not in a way that 
would safeguard the dignity of each of its members.  In the strength of this belief in an 
evolutionary progress that supplants homo sapiens with the superior species homo 
sovieticus, Communism ran roughshod over human rights and anyone and any concepts 
that hindered this advance.   In fact, the old version of humanity should be replaced.  The 
point to be taken from this is that an appropriation of the concept of human nature is not 
without the need for very careful qualifications.   However, an approach that 
overemphasizes freedom can fall prey to similar abuses as there are few safeguards for 
action guidance.  Similarly, an approach that focuses on communal norms can also fall 
prey to racism or other ideologies and be equally dangerous if these identities are viewed 
as absolutes.  
The problems here are profound and show how precarious the rationality behind notions of 
advancing human development really is and that this requires a potentially perilous leap of 
faith.   Reflection on even the relatively uncontroversial domain of human rights can make 
this point plain: 
 116 
Human rights theories point beyond actual conditions of existence—beyond the “real” in 
the sense of what has already been realized—to the possible, which is viewed as a deeper 
moral reality (Donnelly 2003, p. 15).
28
 
This could apply perhaps equally well to capability development.  The author then goes on 
to say,  
Human rights ultimately rest on a social decision to act as though such “things” existed—
and then, through social action directed by these rights to make real the world they 
envision (Donnelly 2003, p. 21).    
But if “human nature is a social project more than a presocial given” caution must be 
exercised.  The lesson of Communism is not the complete rejection of this statement, but to 
qualify it, that much more serious attention to what is “within the possibilities of the 
natural” must be taken when “envisioning” the advancement of human nature.   Visions 
without being grounded in empirical reality can be dangerous hallucinations.  Speaking to 
this very dilemma under Communism, Nobel Laureate Czeslaw Milosz writes:  
A man may persuade himself, by the most logical reasoning, that he will greatly benefit his 
health by swallowing live frogs; and, thus rationally convinced, he may swallow a first 
frog, then the second; but at the third his stomach will revolt (Milosz 1981, p. xiii).  
This example shows that human rights (or development of various capabilities) do not rest 
merely on social decisions to act as though such “things” exist, though such decisions are, 
indeed, necessary to activate concerns for these.  (Social decisions are the proximate, but 
not their ultimate source.)   Their existence must be real, or the decisions will be, in time, 
tragically falsified.  Having registered these cautions about how the concept of human 
nature can be abused, this section will demonstrate how this neglected category can be 
retrieved in a way relevant for modern human development concerns.   
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 One of the sobering maxims of Communism was “everything is possible”.  This began as a triumphant 
phrase, but ended up as a piece of dark humour.    
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The first feature of shared nature and its diverse functions is Aristotle’s well-known notion 
that humans are social animals.
29
 The house and its extension, the polis, are not merely 
social conventions; humans are naturally amiable, pairing, and bonding.  Though this 
sounds like the previous category of solidarity/communion (it is), it is being viewed here 
from its universal perspective.   This means that an individual who chooses (even freely 
and “rationally”) to pursue only self-interest, and not other interest as well, is functioning 
in a defective, a characteristically non-human manner and there is incontrovertible 
empirical evidence that well-being is fundamentally relational (Holt-Lunstad, Smith et al. 
2010).  Humans universally require non-universal concrete, particular, relationships to be 
happy and healthy, to fulfil their existence, and this requires enduring human structures of 
solidarity, warmth, and meaning.
30
    And these relationships are not merely instrumentally 
valued—others must be genuinely valued in their own right.  If this is the case, then well-
being or proper human functioning, and thus the aim of human development, cannot be 
conceived adequately as the exercise of individual freedoms, it must also be the exercise of 
communion or solidarity.  Doing full justice to the sphere of the social is not well 
characterized by describing individual freedoms being “inescapably qualified” (Sen’s 
phrase), as if this is something to be escaped from if only humans could!     
But if humans are naturally social, they are not necessarily or correctly so, meaning that 
social tendencies are open, shaped and misshaped by human choice and social conventions.    
The expression of social nature, while intrinsic for well-being, can nonetheless be 
defectively expressed especially if human development is the explicit aim.   However, this 
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 Natural social inclination was emphasized even more strongly by Aquinas, but in terms of both the human-
God and the human-human dimensions (Keys 2006, p. 24).   This is very similar to Orthodoxy’s sustained 
emphasis on the equal priority of both of the Great Commandments.  Martha Nussbaum cites modern 
Thomism as a “relative” of her Aristotelian based version of the Capabilities Approach (Nussbaum 2000, p. 
xiii). 
30
 Furthermore, the importance of secure relationships is not limited to childhood—it never ends.  One of the 
most comprehensive studies ever performed on well-being over a lifetime (a Harvard-led study that tracked 
268 men over 72 years) concluded:  "the only thing that really matters in life are your relationships to other 
people" (WHO 2011).   
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is where the second feature of the diversity of shared human functions can be brought in as 
a balance.  Injustice can be thought of as defective social functioning, and is defective 
largely because others’ human functions remain unfulfilled in one’s relations of 
responsibility.  For instance, a family relationship is understood as morally defective where 
more resources are consistently given to males, rather than females, such that other critical 
functionings such as literacy or adequate nutrition are denied to some.   There is a 
relatively uncontroversial “minimum content of natural law”, a cluster of basic goods and 
functions “without which human beings and societies as we know them cannot flourish” 
(Keys 2006, p. 54).   The proper or moral expression of the human social function can be 
tested by whether it brings about the full range of human functionings in others for whom 
one is responsible.    
To summarize this account so far, it has shown that “nature” provides a basis for solidarity 
in two ways.  First, by showing that humans are naturally relational; humans need to and 
actually enjoy living in communities and experiencing “caring-for”, not only being “cared-
for”.   This is relatively uncontroversial but it is necessary to note that this relational 
function is necessarily concrete and not an abstract property.  But the second role of nature 
was that the healthy or morally correct exercise of this social function of “caring-for” is 
tested by how other critical human functions are, or are not, provided for in one’s relations 
of responsibility.   Nussbaum’s list can provide a good baseline for this. 
However, it is important to note that this account has not yet provided an adequate ethical 
basis for human development, but only political ethics.  Human development presupposes 
not just a moral obligation to one’s friends and relations, one’s polis or one’s nation, but to 
all.   Development ethics must strive to make sense of, justify, and further enhance this 
sense of obligation, and not neglect the others (agency, solidarity of the bounded type) that 
are also important.   The above account of the various dimensions of human functioning 
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does provide limited insight as to why solidarity might be expressed (humans are relational 
animals) and even how it should be expressed (by the development of the diverse human 
functions), but it provides an insufficient basis for the extended who implied in human 
development.    The sense of obligation to develop “each” person’s critical human 
functions might be felt only for one’s localized community, which is why the diverse 
functioning argument does not help much.
31
  With this recognition the third major role that 
nature plays can be examined and this is expanding the radius of solidarity to the human 
community.   
Amartya Sen hints at a basis for solidarity that is not the result of or grounded in the 
choices of the individual.  He cautiously mentions the possibility (notice not moral duty) 
“of recognizing the relevance of our shared humanity in making the choices we face” (Sen 
1999, p. 283).    But such references to the relevance of “shared humanity” are extremely 
rare and are highly qualified.   However, they are significant and going in the right 
direction, which is away from individual choice as the exclusive source of ethical value.  
But this raises the question:  if shared humanity is indeed a source of solidarity that is 
“right before our eyes”, as it were, why does it seem to be “hidden in plain sight”?  Why is 
this not better recognized and acted upon?
32
   
The notion that all humans share a nature and that this is a ground for universal ethical 
obligation, while weakly asserted by Sen is strongly asserted and fundamental in EO.    
Humans exercise choice and participate in concrete expressions of community within the 
shared medium of an essential human nature that is a basis of unity, a nature that calls for 
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 It does provide some moral obligation.  Nussbaum’s argument that the existence of human abilities “exerts 
a moral claim that they should be developed” is correct and can be affirmed from the perspective of natural 
theology/law.   But a principal concern is how to expand the reach and intensity of these moral claims. 
32
 Postmodernism’s rejection of structures or foundations is one reason; these are not unlinked to illegitimate 
appeals to “human nature” as a means of subjugation (e.g. slavery as natural).   
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respect and should not be allowed to fall into disrepair in any of its persons or any of its 
functions.   Universally shared human nature commands respect and is a basis for human 
rights and capability development and thus is a powerful basis of cosmopolitan solidarity.   
This understanding is, however, not given to humans in the same way that humans 
understand that the square root of nine is three, or predict that Haley’s Comet will appear 
in 2061.  It takes a hermeneutical or narrative tradition to gain this understanding.  While a 
closely shared human nature is an empirical fact rooted in humanity’s closely shared 
genetic heritage, perceiving this as an imperative for human development is, however, 
unfortunately not given in nature.    Humanity’s closely shared nature is an “under 
interpreted” concept and needs to be situated in a larger narrative in order to make this fact 
morally relevant and actionable.  This is how EO views nature (based on its Trinitarian 
theological anthropology) and this is a case where the hermeneutical and positive sciences 
overlap and complete each other.   
Amartya Sen can shore up his own sources of solidarity by developing this theme of shared 
human nature that he briefly mentions.  The notion of a source of values in nature not 
arising from human choice can lead not only to a stronger notion of solidarity, but point the 
way to finding value in nature as such (e.g. non-human nature).   This latter point can be 
important for increasing the ecological sensitivity of the CA.
33
  These themes can be built 
upon, but not without relaxing the supremacy of individual freedom as the hegemonic 
value in human development. 
More so than Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has sought to clarify the values inhering in 
the CA.  She writes that the fundamental idea of the CA is the “principle of each person’s 
capability”.   This principle entails that “an organic good for the group is unacceptable if it 
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 For example, if all value is in individual choice, it is hard to see how non-human nature, how endangered 
species and rainforests, can have any intrinsic value (Rolston-III 1989).  This points to a severe limitation in 
any exclusive focus on humans as the source of values. 
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does not do good for the members taken one by one” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 188).  EO agrees 
with this, as long as this is not over simplistically understood such that at critical (but non-
exceptional) times, persons may need to sacrifice for others.  This occurs for parents, for 
example, with the arrival of a new child and the significant requirements at this key 
juncture so that the child will not experience a life of permanent acute capability failure.   
Persons are ends, but also are means to others’ functioning, especially at critical times of 
vulnerability. 
This mention of the family however points to cases where Nussbaum can sound as if there 
is no intrinsic good whatsoever to the “organic” dimension of existence.34   Nussbaum 
writes that “the family has no moral standing ... it is persons who have moral standing” 
(Nussbaum 2000, p. 181).  This formulation of the nature of persons is alien to Orthodoxy 
and many religions beyond Christianity, and shows the Western individualism inherent in 
the approach.      
Staniloae, referring to John Chrysostom writes about the basic social ontology even behind 
that of the family:  
for each of our members has both a particular and a common activity, and likewise there     
are in us two kinds of beauty [or good]: one which is peculiar to each member, and another 
which is common to all (Staniloae 1980, p. 59).
35
  
This is referring to humanity’s shared nature as a basis for solidarity but reflects the idea 
that there is more to well-being (even if there is not less) than just the “principle of each 
person”.   The CA is sometimes called “ethical individualism” (Robeyns 2005; 2006).   In 
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 And Sen, in general, appears even less optimistic than Nussbaum about the role of group identities (Sen 
2006). 
35
 The early Fathers were conscious of this “ontological” move towards giving greater importance to the 
individual person by balancing the overwhelming claims of the “species” (shared nature) realm, or the 
community (polis) of the Greeks.  
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EO the principle of each person’s capability is radically affirmed36 but also the shared 
“organic” dimension which is also essential to conceptualize and assess human well-
being.
37
   Staniloae’s formula was more subtle still and reflects not just two, but three 
dimensions:  persons—in voluntary communion—within the medium of a shared nature.   
Human development cannot be adequately conceptualized as the property of individuals 
and valuable functionings taken separately, nor just of persons in communitarian relations, 
nor primarily in terms of shared nature, but all of these as mutually implicative and 
necessary for human development.   
This formulation helps explain why the union of the family has such standing in Orthodoxy 
and is generally considered the highest (but inadequate) “icon” of the Trinity (Cabasilas 
1974, p. 46; Staniloae 2003, p. 39) and is “in nature” as Aristotle also taught.38    The 
family “structure of being together” (Ricoeur’s term) illustrates perhaps most clearly the 
summum bonum of existence because it gathers together the three values in a supreme way:  
it is a voluntary commitment, respecting the free choice and dignity of the persons 
involved; it is profound and intimate communion that is based on love, mutual respect and 
mutual sacrifice; it is a sacred commitment taking place within a complex unity of shared 
human natures—male and female, and is in turn generative of other natures in procreation.   
Such communion of difference between the sexes is all the more profound because the 
ultimate unity is not of exactly identical natures, but of a beneficial diversity within the one 
human nature that exists as both male and female.   This bond is said to be “sacramental”, 
                                                          
36
 In the Orthodox view of the Trinity, there is a relative priority of freedom where personal diversity is 
preeminent over essential unity (Meyendorff 1979, p. 184).  
37
 Orthodox in general, including Staniloae, employs a Russian term, “sobornicity” to describe this, which is 
a “true organic unity and plurality” (Staniloae 1980, p. 221).   
38
 However, the family is not in nature for Orthodoxy in the way that Aristotle and most of the Classical 
world taught, and that is of structured inequality and subordination.  Nussbaum rightly argues that the family 
as “existing in nature” has often been abused by custom and tradition to subordinate women, but she also 
argues that “nothing follows” from the existence of actual biological tendencies and we correct them as we 
do faulty eyesight (Nussbaum 2000, p. 254).  This is a poor analogy because nearsightedness is always a 
defect; surely being in family relations is not always a defect even for Nussbaum!    
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holy, and not merely instrumental to the good of persons taken separately. Such bonds 
constitute the well-being of persons and the healthy continuance of the human race through 
offspring and the marriage bond exists as a sacred “space” for their needs as well. 
Affirming the family as an intrinsically valued “organic” unit, intended by nature, 
emphatically does not mean it cannot be criticized.  The relational function of humans is 
naturally structured within the parameters of the family,
39
 but this does not mean (as with 
all functionings) that it may not be perversely expressed.   The proper functioning of the 
organic social unity of the family must be scrutinized in terms of its contribution to the 
well-being of each person (and their respective functions) within the circumference of the 
given unity.
40
   But just as organic communions must be critiqued for their contribution to 
the well-being of persons, individual freedom must be critiqued for its contribution to the 
relational matrices of personal existence, to the concrete expressions of solidarity that gave 
and give it life.  Thus every organic unity has a spiritual function to contribute to the well-
being of those within—a dimension that is well-recognized.   But what is not so well 
understood is that every unity has a moral responsibility also to those without.  This is why 
Chrysostom argued that the key educational role of the family (the most fundamental 
institution of humankind, and shaping all others) with the mother as the chief pedagogue, 
was to instil a universal and inclusive love of humankind, of agape, versus a more 
exclusive love, eros (Spidlik 1986, p. 162).
41
   This is also a fundamental role of the 
Church.   Thus every organic unity has a bi-directional ethical horizon, inward and 
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 Monks are an exception to this form, but they are understood to exist in even more profound communion 
with God and in their communities. 
40
 Here an analogy from the political realm can help.  Just as the “constitution” in terms of the fundamental 
agreement about ordering society gives shape to the excellences of the citizens in Aristotle’s politics (and 
who is excluded), so marriage as a structure or institution can vary and give rise to different understandings 
of the roles within.   The Christian view of marriage is clearly mutual submission. 
41
 This can perhaps help explain why the Apostle James argued that pure religion is to care for the orphans 
and widows.   Creation and especially familial relations provide a form of “grace” or support for well-being 
or adequate human functioning.   The role of the Church and faith is to be those graces for those for whom 
these creational supports have failed.   The idea that grace is in nature, and particularly in the family as a 
vehicle for well-being, makes sense of this.  
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outward.  This is the “communitarian cosmopolitanism” principle which stands in 
conscious contrast to both the abstract cosmopolitanism of Kantian liberalism, and the 
communitarian-ism whose moral horizons are often truncated.  This principle will be 
further elaborated in various ways in this thesis. 
For the religious believer, there are further, and precisely in their quality as religious, more 
compelling reasons to engage in human development.  There are sources of moral 
accountability “external” as it were to the subjective individual will.   Persons are 
accountable to God, to scripture (and traditions of interpretation), to human nature itself (in 
EO), and to a concrete community and the force of role models within that community.   A 
cosmopolitan ethic is at the very core of the Great Commandments, one that implies not 
merely the “do no harm” ethic of JS Mill, but positive moral obligation to those outside the 
traditional lines of loyalty.  Thus, Christian faith can be a profound source of motivation 
for what Kant called “imperfect obligations”, where it is not clear exactly who could be 
held accountable for a failure to act (Rainbolt 2000).  The Samaritan parable places 
imperfect obligations as a, if not the, central religious duty for all Christians (Kleinig 1976; 
Mack 1980; McFarland 2001).   And imperfect obligations are closely related to, if not at 
the core of, human development (Sen 2009, pp. 372-376). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to human development in light 
of the post-communist development challenges discussed in chapter three.  Sen’s approach 
was then “read” through a conception of personhood inspired by the Trinitarian notion of 
person, communion, and shared nature that has been developed in dialogue with 
development studies.  There appear to be good reasons why development as theory-
practice requires all three of these as intrinsically valuable, even on secular terms.  Sen’s 
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agency orientation is helpful, but human development cannot be adequately conceptualized 
in terms of an expanse of freedoms simpliciter.  It requires concrete communion, but also 
the cosmopolitan perspective that shared nature brings. 
Behind this concern, there is the practical need for development to be grounded in 
something more substantial than individual human choice alone, including the possibility 
of shared nature and religious values to motivate and guide action towards solidarity.   This 
is important because if the poor are increasingly conceptualized as agents of their own 
development, and the poor are largely religious, it could be disastrous for development 
studies to ignore or undermine this.   Sen’s focus on individual choice risks ignoring the 
real, operative, springs of human agency.    
But it is important not to go overboard with criticisms of Sen’s form of the CA,42 failing to 
recognize its genuine achievements.  Anyone concerned with human well-being, religious 
or otherwise, can be thankful to Sen’s pioneering work with the CA.   As Sabina Alkire 
notes, Sen’s painstaking and decades-long work for the UN adoption of the CA Human 
Development Reports has shifted attention away from a narrow technical or engineering 
rationality to include explicit ethical rationality in development studies (Alkire 2005, p. 
125).   And though Sen largely omits this in his oeuvre, religion can be among the valuable 
beings and doings a person can choose (Alkire 2002).   Nobel Economist Kenneth Arrow 
has noted that Sen’s life work has shown considerable unity, showing special concern for 
the welfare of individuals in situations of poverty and offering leading analyses both within 
the domains of economics and moral philosophy (Arrow 1999, p. 172).   That his concern 
for individual well-being is indeed an important unit of analysis for a viable development 
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 There is much more internal diversity to the CA than can be reported here (and the same is true of EO vis-
à-vis Dumitru Staniloae).  It is important to keep in mind that this study is trying to model a dialogue and 
knowingly, if reluctantly, has kept almost entirely with Sen’s version of the CA with some recourse to 
Nussbaum.  This is to keep the lines of argumentation from becoming cumbersome.  Some versions of the 
CA stand in fact much closer to the arguments of this thesis (Deneulin forthcoming). 
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ethics can be affirmed—the question of course is if this is sufficient.43  Freedom to become 
one’s own person can become freedom “to do one’s own thing” and thus Western 
individualism (Cowen and Shenton 1996, p. 453).   But this is surely not Sen’s aim.   The 
main point is, as David Crocker points out, that a “development ethic must be constructed 
in a dialectical relation with empirical investigation into what causes and impedes (good) 
development as well as what produces and prevents poverty, famine, endemic hunger, 
exploitation, sexism, and other development failures” (Crocker 1992, p. 587).   The 
insights of development studies, many of which Sen helped mainstream, are neither 
obvious nor trivial.  They can help religious faithful fulfil their own obligations towards 
neighbour love.  And an important aspect of this is informed contribution in policy debates, 
advocating on behalf of the poor and vulnerable.   
The conclusion is that the CA can aid in an EO theology of human development provided 
it relaxes its assumptions about the supremacy of individual freedoms as the basis for HD.  
Indeed, the argument has been that the capability approach itself can be enriched by 
including these further dimensions of communion and shared nature that the Trinitarian 
social scientific picture of the person has brought into view.   In light of this, these last 
three chapters should be viewed as an integrated argument for how supernatural revelation 
(Trinity) can stand near natural revelation (human development) but still illuminate it and 
contribute to it even on its own terms.  It is necessary now to investigate the other 
foundational dogma of EO, the Incarnation. 
                                                          
43
 There are cases where for practical or operational reasons, it may be best to analyze well-being at the 
individual level.  But this should be recognized as a tactical move, not an ontological one, not about the 
nature of human development. 
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5. INCARNATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
While the first three chapters of this thesis investigated the Trinity in relation to human 
development, the rest of this thesis will investigate the Incarnation in a similar fashion.  
These two dogmas are, in fact, the two pillars of EO (Staniloae 1994, p. 71).  Like the 
Trinity, the Incarnation is central to salvation; the Incarnation however, has its own 
characteristics and calls for distinct lines of analysis.  
The Incarnation is the basis for what is called in EO theosis or deification.    Theosis, 
though based on the Incarnation, was not a term invented by the Church Fathers, but was 
borrowed from the Greek Classical authors, for whom theosis as flight from the world was 
often dominant.
1
  These “gnostic” temptations to despise the material world (Lee 1987; 
Gunton 1998) linger and infect almost all Christian traditions.  With this problematic in 
mind, this chapter will examine how the Incarnation and theosis express, but can more 
fully be conceptualized as, a multidimensional theology of human development.   This will 
be done primarily by examining Maximus’s framework of theosis as the movement from 
Being to Well-being and Eternal-being to illuminate EO’s understanding of “change for the 
better”.  All of this will be done in continued dialogue with Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach to human development.   
 
                                                          
1
 Plato gives the famous formulation in the Theatatus: “to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as 
possible; and to fly away is to become like God as far as this is possible; and to become like him is to become 
holy, just, and wise” (in Spidlik 1986, p. 56).  This is especially the case for monastic “polity and ideology, 
its foundation upon the notion that ‘the Kingdom of God is not of this world’” (Meyendorff 1979, p. 66).  
This of course can be counterbalanced with “Thy kingdom come ... on Earth as in Heaven” of the Lord’s 
Prayer.  Staniloae points out that the early Church Fathers “took over the notion of a matter opposed to the 
divine Logos” but that Maximus the Confessor later rectified this (Staniloae 2000, p. 45).  
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5.1 Theosis:  deification as ‘humanification’ 
The touchstone for the EO understanding of the Incarnation is Athanasius: “God became 
man so that man might become god”, a statement based on Psalm 82:6.  Staniloae cites St. 
Gregory’s stronger and more paradoxical version that “humans have received the order to 
become god” (Staniloae 2000, p. 84). Justin Martyr in the second century writes:  “it is 
proved that all human beings are deemed worthy of becoming gods and of having the 
power to become sons of the Most High” (in Russell 2004).   The Second Epistle to Peter 
(2:4) notes that God gave great and precious promises so that “you may participate in the 
divine nature and escape the corruption in the world”.   Theosis is the “consensus” doctrine 
that unites the varying parts of Orthodoxy and distinguished it from the West (Meyendorff 
1979, p. 4).  For Orthodoxy, the Incarnation concerns theosis and theosis involves 
movement, an “extension of the good”, or as the Eastern Fathers put it, “change for the 
better” (Anastasios 2003).   Staniloae called it the “human being’s will to develop correctly 
in harmony with all his fellow humans, with the whole of reality, and with the highest of 
reality as a whole” (Staniloae 2000, p. 31). 
In a magisterial study on deification, Norman Russell argues that there were four 
approaches to deification, the nominal, analogical, ethical, and realistic.   These developed 
separately and only were later combined through the creative syntheses of Maximus the 
Confessor.   It is not important to detail these except to say that Staniloae primarily 
followed the Cappadocian approach, which emphasized the agency and ethical aspects of 
deification (Russell 2004, p. 9).  Theosis is a journey on the “road to ethical perfection” 
(Staniloae 1994, p. 163) and implies the exercise of “one’s own capabilities, one’s own 
power to grow in goodness and wisdom” (Spidlik 1986, p. 87).   Staniloae was also 
influenced by the later Fathers, principally Maximus the Confessor, but also Gregory 
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Palamas.  With these varying emphases, in the opinion of Staniloae scholar Emil Bartos, he 
kept a balanced approach and did not let any one theme dominate (Bartos 2002, p. 210).    
5.2 Change for the Better:  Image to Likeness 
The developmental logic of EO can be seen in the structure of the imago dei, whereby the 
image of God in humans is not only a basis for human dignity, but as a dynamically 
conceived theological anthropology.  The “image” of god is a potential to be developed.  It 
is a capacity given to all that has to be activated into the “likeness”, or an actualization of 
certain potentials.  This terminology (imagelikeness) is based on Genesis 1: 26-27 and 
while the exegetical foundations of this may be contested (Gunton 1998, p. 196-97), it is 
the spiritual picture behind it, of human development, or “human becomings” that is 
important.  Not all Fathers made extensive use of this distinction, but it became 
synonymous with deification (theosis) and thus Orthodoxy, over time.   Emil Bartos avers 
that “image refers to humankind’s dignity, while the likeness to our ethical duty”.  The 
image is a gift, while the likeness is a task, a mission (Bartos 2002, p. 221).
2
 
However, within the framework of this basic structure, interpretations vary.  If image 
represents potential and likeness represents the actualization, what features are to be 
cultivated and actualized?  Some argue that the image of God represents that which is 
“highest” in humans, namely intellect, or some champion freedom—and that these special 
capacities should be singled out and developed.   However, authorities spanning from 
Irenaeus, Maximus the Confessor, and Staniloae (and this seems to be the consensus view), 
view the imago dei as residing in the human composite.  This composite nature means that 
                                                          
2
 More specifically, Bartos argues that Staniloae balanced the ethical and the realist approaches (Bartos 
1999).  This can be interpreted to mean that Staniloae affirms both the role of human action (Bartos 1999, p. 
10), but also the participation in the divine energies (more on this in chapter nine).   According to Bartos, 
deification includes, but is “much more than simply the imitation of Christ” (Bartos 2002, p. 207). 
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the very good of human nature is multidimensional and cannot be reduced to one element 
(i.e. spirit or body); thus the human body, corporeality, is part of the imago dei just as 
much as is freedom or rationality.   This conclusion was a considerable achievement in the 
face of much ancient thought (Doceticism and Gnosticism) for which materiality as such 
was seen as the source of ill-being, un-reality (Lee 1987). 
Taking this line of thinking further:  there is a rationality and intentionality and goodness 
in created matter—including biological and emotional processes (Staniloae 2003, p. 86) as 
well as in the realm of freedom.  This is part of a theme ever present in EO, and that is that 
physical nature itself is not alien to grace:  
There is a close interconnection between the biological and the spiritual; one realm 
influences the other both in the decline and in the restoration of man.  Here a vast field of 
research is possible on the details of the interdependence between the biological and the 
spiritual (Staniloae 1980, p. 81). 
 Staniloae is however particularly insistent on the rational nature of spirituality.  Thus “the 
pious one is rational … and irrationality is a “stunting of the spirit, or of the mind, or of 
love” (Staniloae 2003, p. 100), but he is also insistent at the same time on the goodness of 
the body and emotions.
3
  He is willing to correct, albeit gently, his master, Maximus the 
Confessor, in this regard.
4
    This is because theosis strengthens human nature in all its 
capacities, not just the intellect,
5
 and this is founded upon the Incarnation—that Christ took 
upon and healed or restored in principle all human capacities.   As Irenaeus wrote long 
ago, “Wherefore also He [Christ] passed through every stage of life, restoring to all 
communion with God” (Stevenson 1987, p. 119).  Restoration to God is not conceived as a 
                                                          
3
 Staniloae:  “This element of bodily affectivity or emotionality which grows from the biological side isn't 
condemnable, and we must not struggle against it, because it constitutes the basis of our growth in the 
spiritual life” (Staniloae 2003, p. 86). 
4
 Maximus argued, according to Staniloae, that all natural passions will cease after this life.  Staniloae argues 
it is better not to say that they will cease, but to say that their energy will be put in service of the human 
spirit, of relational existence, instead of being cast downward to sensual gratification (Staniloae 2003, p. 87). 
5
 Flowing from Augustine but finding expression in Boethius then par excellence with the beatific vision in 
Aquinas, it is the “nous”, the intellect that is emphasized, and not the body.   This derives not only from 
Plato, but also from Aristotle via the Nichomachean Ethics (Bradshaw 2004, p. 256). 
 131 
flight from nature, but a restoration to nature, to human well-being in all its dimensions 
and powers. 
While theosis (imagelikeness), is movement toward the good, or toward God, this 
demands further clarification.  An improved picture can be obtained by analyzing how 
theosis is thwarted through sin and the relation of sin to underdevelopment.  Sin, or better 
selfishness (not to be confused with Protestant notions of original sin), dulls receptivity, 
dulls activity, it is against nature and weakens nature’s true potentials.  “We believe that 
the passivity to which the image is reduced lies in the fact that it cannot of itself bring its 
potencies into act along the proper path” (Staniloae 2000, p. 91).   Sin directs, or is the 
direction of, human energies away from the good, away from that which is truly according 
to nature.  The structures or initial capacities (the image) are essentially the same in 
sin/selfishness, but activated through human agency in a way contrary to nature’s 
intentions and this diminishes and corrupts the strength of nature’s functions.  Because 
shared nature is such a powerful concept in Staniloae, the non-response to another’s need 
is seen as unnatural, a self-contradiction or self-diminution.  Staniloae writes: 
Anyone who responds negatively to the appeal of another and does not see what is limitless 
[ultimately valuable] in the other still preserves the capacity of making a response; it is 
only that he is responding in a way that is contrary to his own nature (Staniloae 2000, p. 
91).  
The Incarnation is the basis for this return to nature.  Christ is the archetype of humanity, 
the New Adam, the restoration of the “image” to its true nature in actuality (in love), which 
means that human nature as such has received afresh the potential to be renewed.   This is 
the basis for viewing the human being as a “creature who has received the order to become 
god” (Staniloae 2000, p. 89) and to become god is to live naturally. This is modelled on 
and empowered by Christ as the one who restored the image to its grandeur. And union 
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with God or theosis is inextricably linked, and inconceivable without union with one’s 
neighbour; more will be said on this later. 
“Image” is thus the ontological structure of various potentialities/functions, while 
“likeness” is not only the final state of deification, but the entire journey, the “entire path 
along which the image develops through the agency of the human will stimulated and 
assisted by the grace of God” (Staniloae 2000, p. 89).6   But it is vital to mention that while 
this ontological structure is indeed a structure, it is an open and dynamic one.   John 
Meyendorff notes that “The central theme, or intuition of Byzantine theology [EO] is that 
man’s nature is not a static, “closed” autonomous entity, but a dynamic reality” 
(Meyendorff 1979, p. 2).   Staniloae puts it more succinctly:  “man cannot  reach perfection 
if he does not reflect nature and is at work on it” (Staniloae 2000, p. 1).    This fact is 
important to emphasize in light of the previous chapter’s focus on shared nature and its 
dimensions as a basis for conceptualizing the person—that it is not a static view of human 
structures as in scholasticism.  This will be discussed further in Chapter seven.  
There will be much more to say on this later, but theosis in Orthodoxy presupposes the 
exercise of effective human agency, and that grace comes not to thwart agency, but to 
empower it towards acts of solidarity with the aim of restoring the disrepair of human 
nature.  Thus grace is also involved in nature itself—they are not separated as has appeared 
to be the case in much of Western theology historically.  “In the East, grace has always 
been linked closely to the nature of man and especially his soul” (Staniloae 2000, p. 84).7 
                                                          
6
 This divine assistance for human agency is “synergy”, which will be discussed in chapter 9. 
7
 The separation of social ethics and theology cited in the introduction is an example of this separation of 
grace and nature. 
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Salvation or theosis thus concerns positive change, or development.  As mentioned 
previously, Archbishop Anastasios, Patriarch of Albania, has asserted that “‘change for the 
good’ is the core of our Christian heritage” (Anastasios 2003, p. 156).    The early 
Christian approach is set in conscious distinction from the Platonic philosophical tradition 
that sees change as a form of decay.
8
  Even Aristotle’s entelechy9 was towards a fixed 
telos, an already given and unchangeable form gradually realized in material life.  
Deviation from or progress beyond this form was unthinkable and the Aristotelian “ideal is 
clearly one of complete absence of change of any sort” (Lloyd 1968, p. 303).  Similarly, 
reason was, for the Stoics, conformity and submission to the logos, the unchanging pattern 
within nature.
10
  Progress in the lights of Orthodoxy is not towards a closed end, but is 
never-ending, and this requires malleable, open structures.  St. Gregory of Nyssa 
formalized the doctrine of epektasis to capture this never ending change or movement (that 
involves human creativity).  About Gregory of Nyssa’s idea of “perpetual progress” or 
epektasis, Patristic (and Staniloae) scholar Lucian Turcescu writes:  
[R]ather than upholding a static vision of God in eternity, Gregory believes in an unending 
journey of discovery of the infinite—[this] ranks him even above the great Plato who 
interpreted change in only the negative sense of deterioration from better to worse.  For 
Gregory, change can also connote progress from the inferior to the superior (Turcescu 
2005, p. x).    
Only in light of the Greek classical background (that underappreciated both change and 
thus material existence and its “flux”) can the significance of salvation understood as 
                                                          
8
 Bradshaw argues that a major difference between East and West, already present in Augustine and 
perpetuated in Aquinas, is a lack of categories for this notion of perpetual progress (Bradshaw 2004, p. 256-
7). 
9
 Entelechy, in Greek entelécheia, was coined by Aristotle.  According to one prominent interpreter, 
Aristotle invents the word by combining entelēs (complete, full-grown) with echein (= hexis, to be a 
certain way by the continuing effort of holding on in that condition), while at the same time punning 
on endelecheia (persistence) by inserting telos (completion). This is a three-ring circus of a word, at 
the heart of everything in Aristotle's thinking, including the definition of motion (Sachs 1995, p. 245). 
10
 Consider the following by a noted scholar of early church history and late antiquity: “Of all elements of 
Christian teaching, there was none more remarkable than the notion of progress and none more incongruous 
with the thought and practice of classical antiquity” (Cochrane 1944, p. 266). 
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holistic “change for the better”, defined as the heart of the Christian message, be fully 
seized. 
These themes of change for the better, or the “image to the likeness” are fundamental to 
the teaching of the Church Fathers,
11
 and are given modern expression by Staniloae.  There 
is no doubt they need fuller expression in EO—but the teaching is there, fundamental, and 
not part of a theologically “liberal” or modern deviation from ancient truth.    Furthermore, 
this “change for the better” that involves human agency in interaction with dynamic 
structures, is constitutive of salvation—it is not a mere by-product or spill over effect.  
However, theosis receives a more profound treatment by Maximus the Confessor.  
Maximus conceptualized theosis as the movement from Being to Well-being, and on to 
Eternal-being—a framework that Staniloae also employs. 
5.3 Maximus’s Triadic Movement 
As mentioned, a decisive influence on Staniloae is Maximus the Confessor (580-662), a 
Church Father recognized by both the Eastern and the Western Church.    Maximus was in 
many ways the theologian of unity and diversity (Törönen 2007), a theme relevant both for 
the Trinity, but also the Incarnation.
12
   Maximus also formulated, in opposition to 
Origen,
13
 the definitive idea that theosis is a movement from Being to Well-being to 
Eternal-being, or, as some prefer, existence to good existence to eternal existence.    The 
former terminology based on the usage of Maximus scholar Lars Thunberg will be used; 
                                                          
11
 And especially the three great “ecumenical teachers”:  Basil the Great (330?-379), Gregory the Theologian 
(329-390), and John Chrysostom (354-407).    
12
 The two diverse natures—God and man—make up the one person of Christ.  For Maximus and Staniloae, 
the idea of a union without confusion is critical to safeguard freedom and is the basis of communion. 
13
 Just how important this general thematic of positive change is in Orthodoxy can be seen by the Church’s 
treatment of Origen (184/185 – 253/254), the Christian Platonist.  Origin, a brilliant theologian and highly 
respected in the ancient world, was nonetheless ultimately condemned as heretical, precisely for rejecting this 
notion of movement or change for the better.  Origin’s thought, like Plato, held that motion or change is an 
instability and is a result of sin or the Fall, and bodily existence and the material world is the punishment 
thereof.   The definitive repudiation of this was made by Maximus the Confessor.     
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the latter terminology is employed only when quoting Staniloae directly.
14
    The “well-
being” terminology is employed to highlight the potential overlap with development 
studies and the social sciences.
15
   Obviously the critical question is whether the overlap is 
substantial, or merely semantic.  The contention here is that while there will not be 
complete agreement between secular and spiritual understandings of development, there 
can be a significant “overlapping consensus” that can provide a basis for mutual 
enrichment.  Thus, when EO and development studies discourse about well-being, they just 
may be talking about the same thing—namely the development of natural capacities, the 
employment of agency, the importance of relationships for human flourishing, 
cosmopolitan moral obligations, and the like.   This is the case even if EO would situate 
this “natural” development in a broader framework that includes eternal life and other 
resources, namely Divine assistance.   The following quote from Staniloae highlights many 
of the themes that will be unpacked: 
Saint Maximus treats movement as a means given to creatures by God from the moment of 
their creation for the purpose of their achieving full union with him; it is, therefore, a 
movement that passes from existence [Being] bestowed as a gift to good existence [Well-
being], which is acquired through the contribution their own will makes in actualizing their 
power of movement … The power given to us by God has as its purpose that we put into 
real operation those natural powers of ours which have also been given to us by God; this 
process of putting them into real operation is nothing other than the movement stamped 
upon us and guided towards God, as towards the good proper to us, by our own will and 
consciousness (Staniloae 1994, p. 188). 
Staniloae mentions movement and agency (the contribution of one’s own will) as a gift of 
God but for the purpose of the activation of natural human powers, among other themes 
implicated in theosis.   Amid the lofty language of “union with God”, it is important to 
note that “the growth of the human spirit in power is an ethical growth, for due to the fact 
that no one can approach God as source of power unless he loves him as the good, growth 
                                                          
14
 Thunberg actually uses Being, Well-being, Ever-being, but Eternal-being seems more consistent with 
natural language. 
15
 These terms are capitalized to signal their usage as technical terms in the Orthodox Triad.   When well-
being is used in its general sense as in development studies, it is lower-case.  Often “flourishing” is used and 
these are treated synonymously.     
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in existence is a growth in the good” (Staniloae 1994, p. 193).    This “growth in the good” 
has for its foundations the ontological structures given by God in creation.  These fall 
under Maximus’s category of Being in the Being, Well-being, Eternal-being triadic 
progression.  
5.3.1 Being (Existence) 
Maximus’s schema parallels the image-likeness distinction, but uses more philosophical 
language than the Semitic idiom from Genesis.  “Image” thus corresponds to Being, or 
existence, while the movement to “likeness” parallels that of the movement to Well-being 
and Eternal-being.  Being or “image” can be viewed as potentiality, while Well/Eternal-
being or “likeness” as the actualizing of potentialities.   Admittedly, there can be no 
absolutely clear demarcation between these categories (there is a unity in the diversity), but 
the term Well-being has the distinguishing characteristic of involving human agency in the 
activation of human power or capacities given in the category of Being.  Thus Well-being 
is fundamentally involved with the exercise of agency while Being can be interpreted as 
the ontological or creational structures given in nature. 
But the category of Being does not just involve human beings, but all of creation.  Thus the 
possibilities for human flourishing cannot be conceptualized in isolation from physical 
nature and environmental conditions.  In EO as mentioned, humans are viewed as a 
microcosm and thus in continuity with all the elements (mineral, vegetable, animal, and 
celestial) in the universe, combining and building upon them, but transcending them all.  
Being is thus structured for its own development, its own transcendence.  Humanity 
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therefore includes, but also surmounts the law-like nature of mineral and biological 
existence:
16
   
This means that nature is structured in such a way that it leaves room for human interventions ... 
and that these laws are not predetermined to yield the most useful results all by themselves, but 
instead find their wholeness through the intervention of human freedom (Staniloae 2000, p. 47). 
“Being” includes biological and other structures or foundations, but it also, and 
importantly, includes and interacts with human freedom.  Staniloae argues “The basis for 
the entire greatness of the human’s person divine image lies in his freedom” (Staniloae 
2000, p. 107).   But this freedom is not unconditioned, it is dependent on and operates 
through both internal and external (environmental) structures, and in this category of 
Being, it is a not yet activated possibility. 
This reflects the main idea mentioned before, that both material body and spiritual soul are 
included in the imago dei, and thus subject to the “beneficial movement” which is theosis.  
As Staniloae says, “the road to God passes through our humanization” (Staniloae 2000, p. 
26) and this is multidimensional,
17
 incorporating biological processes in the domain of 
salvation.   Theosis is not a negation of human natural capacities, but their completion 
towards the good which is characterized by a communion  that respects the contribution of 
its individual members.  This is a vision of a truly good and natural life, where “all the 
capacities of man are utilized for his healthy development” (Thunberg 1985, p. 59).18 
                                                          
16
 The Incarnation “reset” as it were, human nature so that it can employ agency responsibly, that is 
according to nature and nature’s “reasons”, best understood at this point as “keeping the commandments”, 
that is, the two great commandments of God and neighbour love. 
17
 Archbishop Anastasios argues in a chapter titled “The Dynamics of Universal and Continuous Change” 
that “change for the better”, is the Orthodox ideal, and this “embraces everything, life in its entirety, in all its 
dimensions and meanings” (Anastasios 2003, p. 155).   
18
 For EO, the imago-dei is in human nature itself as creature, that is, as human qualities and their 
actualization.  Contrast this with the position of Alan Torrance, who, remaining “loyal to a radical Barthian 
epistemology” (Rogobete 1997, p. 74) insists that the imago dei does not have to do with the natural state or 
capacities of persons (Torrance 1996).  This is significant as Barth was the most important Protestant 
theologian of the twentieth century.    
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This language of fulfilment of natural capacities (given in Being) has remarkable overlap 
with development studies.    As mentioned, DS focuses on the removal of obstacles that 
stand in the way of well-being.   But DS asks another question, one more related directly to 
Maximus’s category of “Being” and is reflection on what humans everywhere  require for 
a decent, dignified life.   This is not just items like shelter and nourishment, but is the 
question of valuable “beings and doings”.   What are the fundamental potentialities or 
natural functions (rooted in Being, humans’ ontological constitution) that merit 
development or actualization?   In DS in particular, there is sustained reflection and debate 
over core human functioning or abilities, and the consequent generation of development 
“lists” (Alkire 2002), of which Nussbaum’s is one of the most well-known.   These lists 
seek to capture the basic prerequisites and fundamental functions of good existence—and 
these lists are remarkably similar.  The Chilean development economist Manfred Max-
Neef called these “fundamental needs” and described them as ontological conditions in 
that they stem from the fundamental condition of being human.
19
   Nussbaum herself uses 
explicit “ontological” (Being), or normative structure, language:  “The very being of these 
basic capabilities makes forward reference to functioning” (Nussbaum 1992, p. 228).   
The main point here is that the structure of movement (capabilities to normative 
functioning) within the CA is similar to the image-likeness (or Being, Well-being) schema.   
This likely reflects a common Aristotelian background for EO (Tatakis 2007)
20
 and the CA 
as well (Nussbaum 1992; Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum 2000).    Important is that 
choice is not exercised in a vacuum, but operates through the structures and groundwork of 
Being that is, at least in part, pre-established.  Aristotle noted that “In general, all human 
beings seek not the way of their ancestors, but the good” (in Sen and Nussbaum 1993, p. 
                                                          
19
 Max-Neef classifies the fundamental human needs as:  subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, 
participation, leisure, creation, identity and freedom (Max-Neef 1991; 1992, p. 18). 
 
20
 Staniloae scholar Emil Bartos writes “Staniloae employs the optimistic Aristotelian structure” in place of 
the pessimistic Platonic-Origenist view (Bartos 1999, p. 125). 
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242) and offered a set of human functionings, or “spheres” of life where choice can be 
exercised well, or poorly, and thus become virtue or vice.  These are not relative;
21
 they are 
not extractable merely from local tradition or practice.   Martha Nussbaum brings this 
discussion up to date with her “neo-Aristotelian proposal” and offers the following list of 
“central human functional capabilities”.  These are potentialities inherent in existence (or 
their preconditions—e.g. shelter) that are thought to be universal.   These, in condensed 
version are: 
1) Life: not dying prematurely; 
2) Bodily Health:  nourishment, shelter, reproductive health;   
3) Bodily Integrity:  movement, safety against assault, domestic violence; choice in 
matters of sexuality and reproduction; 
4) Senses, Imagination and Thought:  freedom of political, artistic, and religious 
expression;   
5) Emotions:  to love those who love and care for us;  not having one’s emotional 
development blighted by trauma; 
6) Practical Reason:  being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life; 
7) Affiliation:  
a. being able to recognize and show concern for other human beings; 
b. having the social bases of self-respect; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others; 
8) Other Species:  being able to live with concern for and in the world of nature;22 
9) Play:  being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities;23   
                                                          
21
 Despite the quote from Aristotle above, there is also ample evidence that Aristotle believed virtues were 
not universal but regime specific and shaped by one’s socio-political environment (Aristotle 1999).   There is 
no reason why both cannot be true and Nussbaum deals with this issue by showing that these are basic 
dimensions, underspecified, that are fulfilled in differing ways in various cultural contexts. 
22
 Nussbaum notes that this dimension has been the most controversial (Nussbaum 2000, p. 80).  
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10) Control over One’s Environment: 
a. Political:  being able to participate effectively in choices that govern one’s 
life;  
b. Material:  having the right to hold property and seek employment on an 
equal basis with others. 
 
Nussbaum argues that this list of central human functionings can, in terms of constitutional 
guarantees, serve as “as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires” 
(Nussbaum 2000, p. 5).   This approach does admit of lower and higher functionings 
(namely affiliation and practical reason) and threshold conditions.  Nussbaum conceives 
this list as free from any metaphysical grounding and justifies this in terms of a procedure 
of “self-hermeneutics”.  Nussbaum’s “modern” methodology for deriving her list will be 
investigated further in the next chapter. 
There are profound areas of overlap here with Orthodoxy.  Consider the “architectonic 
capabilities” of practical reason and affiliation, and that these correspond to Staniloae’s 
ultimate categories of person (agency) and communion (solidarity).    And while 
Nussbaum grounds her approach in self-interpretation (not communal interpretation or 
Tradition) as mentioned, and is thus typically “liberal”, she still ends up with a shared 
nature defined by her list—somewhat similar to the three dimensions of the Orthodox 
Trinitarian anthropology.   
The individualistic self-hermeneutical starting point, however, poses problems.  
Nussbaum, like Sen, grants intrinsic moral status only to individual persons—despite the 
presence of number seven (affiliation and equal worth) above.   As was seen at the end of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
23
 An important work for this dimension is Huizinga’s, Homo Ludens, or “playing man” which suggests that 
play is a necessary but insufficient condition for the generation of human culture (Huizinga 1955). 
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the previous chapter, “It is persons who have moral standing”—not any type of moral 
grouping, including the family (Nussbaum 2000, p. 251).  The family and other social 
groups may have instrumental importance as the locus of a person’s development (after all, 
persons are relational), but it seems that no particular type or structure of relationship 
(including humanity itself as an organic unity) can have any intrinsic, and therefore 
permanent, significance. 
This is why in the CA, relationships sometimes appear optional to existence, even (if 
somewhat less so) in Nussbaum’s version.  “The appropriate goal of public policy is the 
capabilities of citizens to form such relationships, should they choose to do so” (Nussbaum 
2000, p. 2-51).  But what if they should not choose to do so?  EO and many traditional 
approaches would view as defective a life that is devoid of relationships, and stable ones, 
even if one should freely choose this.  Of course Orthodoxy would not say that 
governments should coerce relationships, but rather that Nussbaum’s retreat to the political 
approach is sidestepping important issues about well-being.  Should humans choose to 
shun relationships, shun sociability, shun moral obligation in their various forms, there is a 
moral and ontological defect, and ultimately suffering will eventuate.   This is because 
“communion of wills is the very good of human nature” (Thunberg 1985, p. 24) or the 
human good cannot be actualized as a property of individuals separately conceived—even 
should they freely choose this.   This has been addressed in previous chapters, but the case 
must be pressed once more from a different angle, and that is the relational requirements 
for universal human development itself. 
Being (according to Maximus) is the ontological structures or potentialities that lie hidden, 
as it were, in human nature—waiting to be unfolded.24   Being could be thought of as the 
                                                          
24
 Also, environmental structures are included inasmuch as these are preconditions for human development. 
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realm of healthy development that is not entirely dependent on one’s own moral25 
choices—but, paradoxically, it can be completely dependent on others’. The complex 
nature of this interdependency between the domains of Being (natural structures) and Well-
being (agency) can be seen by examining more carefully the developmental needs of 
infants.  Even prior to birth, discerned through an ultrasound, the femur of a baby “should” 
be within a certain range of centimetres; the amount of amniotic fluid in the womb 
“should” be within a certain range; the heartbeat rate is normal within a certain threshold, 
and myriad other points of data that give a picture of health.  All of these are, in Maximus’ 
approach, principles of Being, or what Lossky calls “norms of existence” (Lossky 1978; 
1991).  Science discovers and builds on these.   The example of the infant is employed 
precisely to point out a profound interdependence between the domains of Being, where 
moral choice is not involved, with the domain of Well-being, where the moral choices of 
others are involved.  The actions or inactions, attitudes, dispositions, of others, and 
especially parents, can alter the very structures of another being (Makinodan, Rosen et al. 
2012).   A mother excessively smoking (exercising a certain kind of free choice) leads to 
hypoxia in an infant (Sparrow, Chapman et al. 2012) and can impair the biological 
foundations of existence for another person—forever.   
There are also profound relational requirements of infant development which were 
“discovered” (at least by the scientific community) in the Romanian orphanages which is 
yet another tragic result of Communism’s playing willy-nilly with nature’s structures.26   It 
is now a commonplace that the normal development of infants, their very neurological 
structures, requires adequate and stable parental love, and from both parents (Gerhardt 
                                                          
25
 This is called moral choice because in very young children there is choice, but it cannot adequately be 
described as moral choice.     
26
 “Many decades ago high mortality rates were observed among infants in custodial care (i.e., orphanages), 
even when controlling for pre-existing health conditions and medical treatment. Lack of human contact 
predicted mortality.  The medical profession was stunned to learn that infants would die without social 
interaction” (Holt-Lunstad, Smith et al. 2010).   These authors argue that this surprise came because of an 
instrumental view of human sociability in the human sciences.  
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2004).  Parental love is essential to brain development in the early years of life and 
interactions between infants and their parents have serious and lasting consequences.  And 
this begins even in pregnancy where familial stresses can adversely affect development.  
Normal genetic development is increasingly seen to be influenced by nurturing and 
environmental influences (Sparrow, Chapman et al. 2012).
27
  Orthodoxy (as do many 
religions) views the family as fundamentally rooted in Being and meant to safeguard the 
structures of Being; it is not just another “lifestyle choice” (Davies, Berger et al. 1993). 
“Let marriage be held in honour among all” (Hebrews 13:4).  
Furthermore, if there are no intrinsic values for organic identities or relations “close to 
home” to protect and nurture the development of vital functions, how can the case be made 
for a duty to the larger grouping, the “human family”—which (metaphor aside) seems to 
be the fundamental moral presupposition of HD?  One can attempt a case on the basis of 
“the principle of each person as an end” alone, but it is an uphill battle where shared moral 
identities (including a metaphysical notion of shared nature) are rejected as mystical 
“organicism” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 247) and the only real value resides in individual rights 
or capabilities.   If family as a moral unit (“the two shall become one flesh”) is just an 
antiquated metaphor, if moral communities have no intrinsically valued status, then 
freedom risks being without any roots or channels in human experience.  As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, family and other group identities need to be critiqued based on their 
contribution to individual capabilities, beings and doings—but this does not mean they 
have no intrinsic moral value.   Indeed, a fundamental question is, and this must be 
highlighted is:  whether the “principle of each person as an end” can be better served by 
                                                          
27
 Nature fits in the category of Being; nurture in the category of Well-being—thus showing how these two 
interact and are mutually implicated. 
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this principle alone, or by recognizing the organic nature of human lives and that these 
holistic entities are fundamental, and not merely instrumental for human development.
28
  
While Amartya Sen would not go this far, one can see increasing tendencies in his work 
showing that human nature is structured for communion.  Sen is very individualistic, but he 
has increasingly invoked a tradition from David Hume and Adam Smith that made the 
capacity for natural sympathy, “of feeling others people’s pain” (Sen 2009, passim), a 
foundation for morality.  David Hume writes here, from his Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, undoubtedly with Protestant views of total depravity in mind: 
What surely, without the greatest absurdity cannot be disputed, that there is some 
benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human 
kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf 
and serpent (in Darwell 2003, p. 96). 
This sympathetic foundation for other-regarding behaviour residing in creation is akin to 
Orthodoxy.  And similar to Orthodoxy (but not in exactly the same way), Sen seeks to 
extend these “natural” sympathies in cosmopolitan directions, through reason.29  For Sen, 
natural sympathy is a ground for benevolent action, but it is incomplete because it involves 
self-interest in the sense that “one person’s welfare is affected by the position of others’... 
for example a person can feel depressed at the sight of misery of others” (Sen 2009, p. 
188).  Sen offers another moral category sensibly titled “commitment”.  In this category of 
commitment, it is less about feeling another’s pain, but more “being able to see reasons to 
help a person in pain (or suffering from any other serious adversity or deprivation)” (Sen 
2009, p. 372).   The basic obligation in this category of commitment is to ask what one can 
reasonably do to help another—even if another’s suffering is not affecting one.   Sen thus 
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 And it is no argument to say that these organic entities are often abused; so are individual freedoms. 
29
 For Orthodoxy (especially evident in Maximus and Staniloae), central to religion is to actually become 
more rational so that one will care more about, and take action for human development.   However, EO (and 
other religions) can affirm in a strong or “ultimate” way what Sen can only suggest in a very weak way due 
to his emphasis on choice and individual reasoning. 
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appeals both to a natural tendency or human faculty for sympathy as a foundation for 
morality, but also reason as another faculty that is brought in to extend these other 
regarding actions as “commitment”.30 
However, Sen recognizes that there is a quite large gap between a reason for action (“I am, 
in fact, in a position to help that person”) and an actual duty to undertake action (“I must, 
in fact, help that person”).  Sen sensibly and correctly asks:  how strongly must a person 
take a reason for action for it to serve as a possible duty?   This is the right question to be 
asking.   However, the answer for Sen in effect is, “be more rational”, and, part of this is 
what he calls an “escape from isolation”.  This “escape from  isolation” contributes to 
one’s own quality of life or well-being (Sen explicitly acknowledging the relational 
dimension of well-being), but also this “escape from isolation” can contribute to being 
reasonable, that is, “understanding and responding to the other deprivations from which 
human beings suffer” (Sen 2009, p. 415).     
One must ask if this can actually give an account of how reasons are reliably turned into 
effectual reasons, which is to say translated into actions and not mere intentions.  In fact, 
one more distinction (at least) is needed.  Most persons do feel senses of obligation and 
duty, but do not regularly enact them.  They ignore them, suppress the reasons, forget 
about them, or give up after the least bit of difficulty—“Well, I tried”.   A third category is 
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 In Sen’s latest major work, he increases the role of sympathy putting it alongside and almost equal to 
reason (Sen 2009, p. 415).    Sympathy is an interesting dimension because it is, even on Sen’s own account, 
a feature of shared human nature.  It is in the realm of “who we are, not merely who we choose to be”.   
Sympathy is a “passion”, it is something that happens to, or seizes persons and is not something chosen, and 
these sympathetic passions are increasingly incorporated into Sen’s work as a foundation for moral 
responsibility.    Reason however is called in to add moral obligation beyond the reach of this sympathetic 
“passion” where interests are subjectively experienced as connected.  However, it is very clear from Sen’s 
language that these reasons for social obligation are similar to the sympathetic passions in that they seem to 
have a force or pressure that cannot be accounted for only in terms of individual choice or reasoning.   They 
“act like” they are external, pressing upon one to follow them—and that one should respond to them.   There 
are “basic general obligations”, “universal ethical demands”, “the necessity to ask that question” whether one 
can help another, and so on (Sen 2009, p. 372-74).    Sen clearly, even if implicitly, relies upon a wider 
framework than individual choice and reason.   
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needed to translate the sense of moral responsibility reliably into action, and not just one-
off action, but stable action, habitual action, the kind of structured  and reflective actions 
that can be truly helpful for human development.  This third category is of course a 
community of shared meanings and loyalties that cultivates standards of practice and role 
models, exemplars.  This is to return to the “communitarian” point which will not be 
belaboured here except that it must be recognized that communities of meaning are where 
reasons and commitments are shared, are held “reverently” or with intensity.   While Sen 
needs to better recognize this “communitarian” point, the commitments of the Christian 
community should follow more closely the Samaritan story.  Paradoxically, this provides a 
basis not just for communitarian reasons, but public, human development reasons.     
Before moving on to the category of Well-being, Being must be connected briefly with the 
Trinity.  This connection can highlight the deep connection in EO between creation and the 
Trinity, which theology is struggling today to ascertain (Gunton 1993; 1993; Gunton 
1998).   In the West, natural theology was either denied, or was the realm of the One God 
of discursive reason, not the Tri-Unity corresponding to the human experience of unity and 
diversity (Rahner 1998).  However, for Eastern Orthodoxy “The mystery of the singular 
and plural in man reflects the mystery of the singular and plural in God” (Lossky 1978, p. 
67).  In other words, Being bears evidence of the categories of person, communion, and 
shared nature.   
5.3.2 Well-being (Good Existence) 
If there is a single concept for linking Orthodoxy and the social sciences and DS, the 
second aspect of Maximus’s Triad, “Well-being” is a promising candidate.  Well-being is 
redolent with meanings in the entire gamut of social sciences and is often described as the 
aim of development and the antithesis of poverty (Hulme and Toye 2007).  Everyone 
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putatively aims at well-being, living fully, or an authentic human existence.  This sense 
was captured long ago in the famous phrase of the Christian humanist, Irenaeus of Lyons:  
“the glory of God is man fully alive”.31    But are religion and social science talking about 
the same realities?   Are they fundamentally alive to the same aspects in that state 
characterized as “well-being”?    
There is no general answer to the question of the (in)commensurability of theology and the 
social sciences’ understanding of well-being.  This is because there are versions on both 
sides that illustrate hostility or conciliation.   In theology, there are approaches that 
emphasize discontinuity and a type of strong communitarian reasoning (and thus a 
rejection of natural theology), where it is difficult to conceive of any type of overlapping 
consensus.  John Milbank, mentioned earlier, is a prominent Protestant theologian who 
views sociology as a secular heresy.  Experience and data are, in this view, so theory laden 
that persons outside the ecclesial context may not even be experiencing the same things.  
Richard H. Roberts dubs this approach, despite its sophistication, a form of “post-modern 
fundamentalism” (Roberts 2005, p. 373).32    However, in Orthodoxy, there is a strong 
theological basis for shared understandings because of, among other things, Orthodoxy’s 
more optimistic view of human nature in general, the rational nature of the cosmos, and 
humanity’s ability to perceive an order both internal to, and independent of the self.  This 
does not mean that theology cannot have its contribution, it’s “plus” of interpreting 
experience, but rather it is a way of interpreting shared experience.   There is no “brute” 
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 The fuller context of this famous passage reads:  "The glory of God is man fully alive, and the life of man 
is the vision of God.   If the revelation of God through creation already brings life to all living beings on the 
earth, how much more will the manifestation of the Father by the Word bring life to those who see God" 
(Irenaeus 2001 [c. 180]; Osborn 2003).  Notice the clear continuity between the apprehension of God in 
creation and the Incarnation.   
 
32
 Milbank is a leader of the movement known as “radical orthodoxy”, not to be confused with Eastern 
Orthodoxy.  Milbank’s stance is “politically alarming” in its unfairness to, and caricatures of, liberalism 
(Insole 2004).  In terms of the present argument, radical orthodoxy is much more communitarian in its 
epistemology than Eastern Orthodoxy.  For literature on the dialogue between radical orthodoxy and Eastern, 
see (Pabst and Schneider 2009). 
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experience that is uninterpreted, that is not already theory laden as Kuhn and others have 
taught—this is true (Kuhn 1970).   But theory does not create external reality whole cloth 
(Barrow 1988, p. 336).  Experience is both-and:  interpreted and given; theories need not 
be seen as a priori incommensurable. 
“Being together”, sociological existence, in EO (and not exclusively in EO) is a spiritual 
phenomenon precisely because it is relational.   This is an aspect of the secular spirituality 
of social science that the classical sociologists Durkheim and Simmel articulated (Lim and 
Putnam 2010, p. 916) such that the community itself is the ground of religion.    Staniloae 
would, in a sense, concur but would argue that the empirical community itself is but one 
ground of value, and a legitimate one, but there are normative considerations in terms of 
their ethical qualities.    Staniloae writes of the Kingdom of God as the “Kingdom of the 
Between”, that frontier where the “I” meets not an object, but another Subject in the “I-
thou” relationship made famous by Martin Buber (Buber 1958).  This meeting (but 
importantly the purification of communion away from selfishness) constitutes true 
spirituality and is a primary role of the Holy Spirit (Staniloae 1980, p. 63).  Orthodoxy is 
called a “spiritual sociology” (Spidlik 1986) and this is because of the spiritual value given 
to social existence per se, based on the Trinity.   
What merits further attention here is that “spiritual growth” is a very comprehensive term 
with Staniloae.  It is not merely about one’s relationship with God for “Human beings 
cannot achieve full spiritual growth only in relation to God” (Staniloae 2000, p. 38).   But 
neither is spiritual growth entirely about relationships with others as well, but involves 
support for biological existence, understanding nature’s “reasons”, or in other words, 
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science, both natural and social, as well as the proper exercise of human agency and the 
unfolding of truly natural development processes, the “intendencies”33 within creation.   
An example that Staniloae frequently employs to highlight these interacting levels between 
Being and Well-being is language.   Language reveals a certain law-like tendency or 
universal potential within human experience and is one of nature’s meanings, or logoi or 
structures.
34
   But language involves human agency or struggle—“why every human learns 
to speak only through effort” and language is not merely given within experience, it is 
earned.   But language can only be acquired communally, and is itself an expression of and 
the means for further communion.  (It is an irreducibly social good, to use Taylor’s 
description (Taylor 1995)).   All these are aspects of what Staniloae calls “spiritual 
growth” or Well-being.35  Furthermore, the “Trinitarian” structure of language is seen in its 
status as a given rational capacity or structure within existence, as requiring personal 
agency and struggle for its acquisition, and as inextricably communal.  There are individual 
reasons of things (logoi), but larger covering reasons, or “more complete reasons” for 
things.  The more complete reason for language is communion and as an expression of 
solidarity, but this does not negate the spiritual nature of the preliminary aspects of 
language structure and acquisition.  As Staniloae writes, “communication reveals itself not 
only as a permanent  rationality [Being or logoi], but also certain meanings of an ever more 
exalted kind [agency and communion]” (Staniloae 2000, p. 39).  These more exalted 
meanings represent an “erotic” aspiration (i.e. from within nature), towards the fullness of 
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 This is a neologism combining “intended” and “tendencies”.  It is not to be confused with words like 
superintendent or managerial functions.   
34
 Logoi are not just laws, patterns, but also powers that can be described as broadly shared functions.   As 
such however, their complete specification will be necessarily personal, spiritual, done in freedom and thus 
bear features of the particular as well as universal. 
35
 Strictly speaking, the undeveloped but nonetheless existent capacity for language would be in the previous 
category of Being.  In the other schema, the ImageLikeness framework, it would fall under the image, or 
the capacity.    
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Trinitarian communion as the Archetype—that is, ever more complete communion with 
God and others.    
Staniloae argues that the “rationality of things” has two purposes.  The first is to be helpful 
to humans in their biological existence.  The second,  
and equally is to foster human spiritual growth through the knowledge of meanings, the 
knowledge of the ever deeper conformity of these meanings within himself, and finally, the 
knowledge of their ultimate meaning, which is God, who most fully satisfies the thirst for 
ultimate fulfilment (Staniloae 2000, p. 38). 
Notice the “and equally”.   First the biological is placed equally important with the 
spiritual, then there is a spiritual process which is an understanding of nature’s laws (or 
meanings) external to humans; next is the same laws’ culmination in humans, and finally 
seeing the ultimate reasons for these reasons in God who Staniloae calls the Supreme 
Reason.   Notice also the “and finally”—which denotes a developmental sequence which 
has communion with God as its outcome.   This process of beholding the reasons within 
existence is itself a form of communion with God.   Staniloae writes that St. Maximus is a 
stranger to the idea of a spiritual vision which one might attain by bypassing the forms and 
laws of the cosmos.  “On the road of our approach to God stands the world—we must pass 
through the understanding of it”, and Staniloae quotes Maximus directly:  the one who 
“investigates with the mind in a wise way the logoi in each created thing, discovers God...” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 204-5).   One cannot jump straight to God and bypass creation. 
Given these general comments, it is necessary now to define more precisely how Well-
being
36
 is used in its strict usage by Maximus the Confessor and Staniloae (versus its 
general usage in the social sciences).   This Well-being aspect is, to use the Aristotelian 
                                                          
36
 Henceforth, when referring specifically to the second category of Maximus’s Triad (Being, Well-being, 
and Eternal-being), the capitalized Well-being will be used. 
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terminology that Staniloae employs, “bringing the powers of his nature into act” (Staniloae 
2000, p. 36).   Well-being in this technical sense concerns the activation of nature’s powers 
through the agency of the will.  Staniloae’s (and Maximus’s, therefore all of Orthodoxy’s) 
understanding of human nature is that of an agent, one who is not merely structurally or 
communally determined, but as one who can will and act.   Staniloae was conversant with 
debates about the human person and consciously sought an agent oriented understanding of 
the person, versus the Cartesian “thinker” (Rogobete 2002, p. 206).    But agents are not in 
isolation, and the activation of human powers is not an insular project.  For indeed God 
gives each a power of their own, but “in the same way their powers are linked to one 
another among themselves and to the divine power” (Staniloae 1994, p. 193), the divine 
power being the energy or source behind all powers—and a power that meets human 
powers to orientate and fulfil them precisely in their natural capacity.  The main point here 
is that this technical notion of Well-being in Orthodoxy implies not only agency, but an 
openness or responsiveness within nature (within the structures or laws of Being) to human 
agency.   That is, nature is neither entirely structured in a rigid fashion such that it is 
impermeable to agency, nor is nature entirely unstructured (random) and without certain 
normative tendencies that are unresponsive to human action.  Following the Great 
commands, or the logoi (another use of the polyvalent term logoi—meaning also principles 
of their future development)
37
 structures human actions in a way that begins the process of 
unlocking these God-given potentials latent within creation—and ultimately it is love 
which does so.   
Mentioned earlier in the discussion on Trinitarian natural theology was the distinction 
between hypostasis and ousia, the former referring to that which is unique and constitutes 
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 “The logoi of things presently is also the principles of their future development and in the kingdom of 
God” (Thunberg 1985, p. 136), which is to say the commands orientate humans to the proper use and 
development of their diverse functions.  This pertains to the eschatological, or the “forward” orientation of 
EO (Clendenin 1994). 
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the “individual” person and is the “power of their own”, and ousia as the shared aspects, 
the essence of human nature.   This has pointed to a unity of human nature (ousia), but 
multiple unique instantiations of this nature (hypostases) as persons—and all Orthodox 
agree that persons have some kind of “priority” over nature inasmuch as the person cannot 
be reduced to nature.  However, another similar set of terms, logos and tropos, can perhaps 
better clarify the role of agency and its relation to nature within a person and not between 
persons sharing a common nature.  Logos is that aspect of human nature that is law-like, 
universal, and is in principle subject to the natural and social sciences.  It is the “fixity of 
created natures or species” (Thunberg 1985).   Logos represents the “what-ness” of human 
existence.   Tropos, on the other hand, is how this “nature” is particularized, activated, 
through the agency of the unique human will in relation to a unique environment.   Tropos 
is the “who-ness” of diverse, concrete, and particular instances of human natures.   Thus, 
personhood is both the investigation of the shared “what-ness” that exists already (logos), 
but it is also the moulding of that which is dependent on one’s unique activity and the 
personalization of nature (tropos) through the gift of freedom interacting with the openness 
of logos.
38
 The “great message” of the ancient mystics was this: “human nature is 
changeable” (Tatakis 2007, p. 135).  Nature never exists merely in an abstract or universal 
form, but only in, and through, and for its personalization.   
It is important to note that there are two dimensions to the exercise of agency in this 
category of Well-being.  While Orthodoxy is rather optimistic about human nature and 
fulfilling these potentials, there remains the fact that Well-being exists in challenged 
conditions, which is the “Fall”.  The exercise of agency in Well-being therefore has two 
dimensions, and a set of separate tasks.    The first is to note that even without the Fall, 
                                                          
38
 As mentioned in chapter two but using different terminology, these two dimensions, the logos or “what-
ness” and the tropos or “who-ness” of persons, corresponds to the two basic forms of social science, the 
positivistic and the hermeneutical. 
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humans would still have the mission of bringing certain potentials to fruition through 
action.  The task of theosis or human development is thus not merely a response to the 
“Fall”.  The Divine intention was always for humans to bring into actuality certain 
potentials through their own effort.  But because human selfishness has misplaced the 
proper role of agency, and acts unnaturally, this process has become challenged and there 
are further, reparative and ascetical tasks involved in theosis.  The shared human nature 
that should be a source of unity and solidarity has been “shredded by sin” (Maximus).  
Social divisions, inequalities, and structured risks separate humans and destroy the unity in 
love that was God’s original intention for creation.  Social and natural distinctions that 
could be sources of beneficial diversity become the grounds for violent divisions (Zizioulas 
2006). 
Maximus delineated five features that restore the effects of the Fall,
39
 most of which are 
cosmic in scope and outside the realm of human agency.  However, it is significant that the 
principal human responsibility or task in theosis is repairing the discord that occurred 
between male and female in the Fall.  As the early chapters of Genesis reveal, sin created 
(or was itself?) a discord or an “enmity” between the sexes and the first task of theosis is 
repairing this.   This theological analysis is significant because it parallels a principal arena 
of development studies which is the analysis of gender related injustices (Sen 1999, 
passim; Sumner 2006, p. 645).  The task now is to look at Maximus’s and Staniloae’s 
approach to gender reconciliation and correlate this with DS.       
Maximus the Confessor did not have a very high view of marriage or sexuality, or even 
sexual differentiation, which he viewed as due to the Fall, but for reasons which should not 
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 The first three of these illustrate the cosmic dimensions of salvation.  The Incarnation achieved decisively 
the first.  The five, in a very truncated version are:  1) between the created and the Uncreated; 2) within the 
world between the intelligible and the sensible realms; 3) between heaven and earth; 4) on earth, between 
paradise and the world of men; and 5) in humanity between man and woman, or the masculine and the 
feminine (Thunberg 1985, p. 80).    
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be missed.   For Maximus, the male “division” of the human unity represents the 
passion/function thumos (anger, ambition, activity), and the female represents the 
passion/function epithumia (concupiscence, sensuality, and passivity).   Both of these 
“passions” must be subordinated to the common nature, the logos, of both sexes in a 
relation of reciprocity and equality on the moral basis of shared nature.   Marriage and the 
passions involved in procreation are not rejected as these are instituted by God.   Marriage 
and sexuality are the divinely ordained means for achieving this unity and the continuation 
of the species; but there is “a more noble form of relationship between man and woman, a 
relationship in their common logos of human nature” (Thunberg 1985, p. 83) that 
somehow transcends gender.
40
   
There are, however, potentially problematic features with this division between the genders 
to be “overcome”, which did not seem to be lost on Staniloae.   Staniloae references this 
very schematic of Maximus, but he alters Maximus’s approach in that he omits any 
specific mention of the division rooted in sexual differentiation. He writes:  “The believer, 
freed from passions, overcomes his separation from his neighbours, then the separation that 
divides him from the sensible world” (Staniloae 1994, p. 180).  There is no mention of 
gender whatsoever and the discourse changes to “neighbour”.   One possible reason for the 
change is this:  it seems that for Maximus the common logos of human nature (and the 
imago dei) is something which is neither male nor female per se, while for Staniloae, it 
seems that the one logos of human nature is by its very nature both male and female.  This 
is more in accord with the principle of a unity that is not one of sameness, but is a unity or 
wholeness that is combined of genuinely diverse parts, or as Staniloae quoted from Lossky 
when discussing this very issue, the “wholesome diversity of love” (Staniloae 2000, p. 96).  
Gendered-ness may not be something to be transcended and need not be viewed as a result 
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 Spidlik writes:  “Perhaps only John Chrysostom understood that the essence of marriage is love and that its 
primary aim is to unify mankind” (Spidlik 1986, p. 220).   Most of the Church Fathers, East or West, did not 
have a very positive view of sexuality. 
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of the Fall:  “male and female he created them” exist as a fundamental unity in diversity in 
the imago dei.  But it is important to note the strong “cosmopolitan” strain in Maximus, 
which gives an “ontological” status, to “In Christ there is neither male nor female”.41   It is 
perhaps an overly radical equalization of the gender divide, but the moral aim is a universal 
charity, a reciprocity and equality between the sexes, and this as the first task of theosis. 
However, reflection on global development challenges, which development studies 
elucidates, can provide reasons for not ignoring gender divisions and folding them within 
the category of “neighbour” as Staniloae did.  Perhaps a form of Maximus’s position 
should remain as the first task of unifying the cosmos through human agency.  This is 
because the “shredding of human nature through sin”, the defacing of the imago dei and 
the stunting and thwarting of human flourishing, is highly correlated with gender 
deprivations.      
Amartya Sen highlighted the phenomenon of “missing women” in a series of papers in the 
late 1980’s and early 90’s (Sen 1989; 1990; 1992) demonstrating that up to 100 million 
women were “missing”, which referred to the number of female foetuses aborted or born 
girls left to die. This is based on a comparison with sub-Saharan Africa where the natural 
female/male ratio at birth is about 102 to 100.  However, in India it is 93 females for every 
100 males, in Bangladesh, China and West Asia it is 94 and only 90 in Pakistan.   These 
numbers represent around 100 million females who have ‘disappeared’ just because they 
are girls—ranking it with the worst human catastrophes of the twentieth century.  This 
number has “increased in absolute terms, but fallen as a share of women alive” (Klasen and 
Wink 2005).   These numbers are staggering and they reflect only the most extreme forms 
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 Staniloae’s approach on this is not altogether dissimilar but he affirms a type of marital relationship that 
can be more profound than one based on sexual passions: “we may even say that such love can grow more 
profound and is more lasting where no preoccupation with this pleasure exists”.  However, as Staniloae goes 
on, “Human beings need to multiply … in order to foster that unending richness … of persons (unique in 
their originality) occasions for the benefit of every human being and for that of humanity in general” 
(Staniloae 2000, p. 96).   
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of deprivations; other ones deserve scrutiny as well such as lack of rights to work outside 
the home (Koggel 2005),
42
 the double work day, undervalued domestic labour, rape as a 
war crime, and others. 
Any credible theology of human development must focus more attention on women’s 
rights to, and challenges for, capability development.  For example, female agency faces 
challenges that males do not experience and requires greater practical reason and emotional 
intelligence (Onyango and Jentoft 2011).  Important and more controversial is how social 
relationships are structured in terms of the concrete practice of institutions.  The gendered 
hierarchy of religion may play a role in “women-unfriendly religious practices” (Robeyns 
2005, p. 85).  In Orthodoxy, the two most prominent “icons” of the Trinity, as has been 
mentioned, are both the Church and the family.  However, some argue that the exclusion of 
females in the exercise of social power in the Church is perhaps the “effectual truth” and 
can influence negatively the exercise of social roles both within the family and society at 
large.  There is debate on this within Orthodoxy: the “social inclusion of women is, in a 
new historical form, to be converted to the Gospel”, and the “soaring theologies versus the 
empirical realities are an insult to women” (Behr-Sigel 1991).   But such voices are just 
beginning to be uttered, much less heard.  But it is important to note that this problem is 
not unique to EO, or even religious institutions (Robeyns 2005, p. 85).   
There are further reasons for focusing on specifically female social improvements.   
Advancing female capabilities often has a much greater overall effect, relative to males.  
Noting that child mortality is a fundamental indicator for overall human development, it is 
noteworthy that “the effect of [an increase in] female literacy on [a decrease in] child 
mortality is extraordinarily large” (decrease from 156 per 1000 to 110) while other 
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 Under Communism, however, women were forced to work outside the home (Andjelkovic 1998; Fodor 
1998; Rueschemeyer 1998). 
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variables, including male literacy and overall economic development, are negligible in 
comparison (Sen 1999, pp. 197-8).   Compared with male literacy, a similar increase (from 
22 to 75 percent) results in a child mortality reduction of only 169 per 1000 to 141.  But 
perhaps even more noteworthy, a 50 percent reduction in the incidence of overall poverty 
only reduced the predicted value of child mortality from 156 per 1000 to 153!   Thus 
increased female literacy serves as a major multiplier for other critical social outcomes for 
all. 
However, there are other areas beyond gender deprivations where the CA can make 
contributions in this EO category of Well-being, concerned as it is with agency and its role 
in unlocking the capacities given in Being.  One final example here concerns the need for 
human shelter as a basic right to protect valuable functionings, and the way Communism 
went about providing this versus the way the CA might approach it.  Shelter is connected 
with many central human capabilities, the most general being bodily health, but this in 
relation also to basic comfort and other aspects such as opportunities for raising a family.  
It is laudable that Communism aspired to provide widespread public housing to meet this 
basic need, and in large measure they succeeded.  Homelessness was unheard of under 
Communism, and its presence in capitalist societies was received as incontrovertible 
evidence of Communism’s triumph.   However, if other development values are allowed to 
enter, the way they achieved this objective was not laudable.  It is not laudable that in order 
to provide this basic function, whole villages were bulldozed and persons forced to move 
on short notice into dehumanizing and hastily erected block apartments.  It is not laudable 
that people were moved hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles away from their 
native geographical region with no consent.  It is not laudable that the provision of public 
housing was all part of a larger system of control in a command economy where people 
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were herded about like cattle.
43
  Thus, in the provision of this basic need, praiseworthy as it 
is, fundamental rights and development values were trampled.   What difference would the 
CA make here?   The CA first of all would agree with Communism in terms of provision 
for this basic capability.  The CA would not side with an exclusively political form of 
rights.  But it would, however, work hard to obtain a solution in concrete practice that 
would meet this basic need for shelter but not needlessly undermine agency.   For example, 
various options could be given that give more respect for choice.  And even if a perfect 
solution was not at hand, it would include those whose lives were being affected in 
selecting the best result from a set of viable options.  
In one of the few official documents by EO on the theme of “development”, this role of 
agency is affirmed: 
Because human beings are created in God’s image and are stewards of His creation, they 
are co-workers with God, which means that human beings are agents of their own 
development and of the development of others (Tsetsis 1983, p. 91). 
Theosis is a movement towards fullness of life that incorporates the social, biological, 
agency, and in principle every dimension of human existence.  Staniloae puts this point 
remarkably clear:   
We might say that God who created both man and nature proposes certain ends  to man 
through nature, certain rational goals of a higher kind, so that from among the many 
possible ends open to his choice he may choose to fulfil and to develop these higher ones 
(Staniloae 1980, p. 225).      
This approach to salvation that includes human agency can perform important work on 
many fronts, not least of which is a better integration of Christian faith and development 
                                                          
43
 One of Staniloae’s only openly negative references to Communism in his Dogmatics refers to this situation 
of forced housing:  a “physical proximity that has been imposed” that paradoxically creates “enormous gulfs 
between men”.   A “hardening of spiritual distance is taking place that no longer provides one person with the 
motivation or the possibility of moving towards another”.   So strong is Staniloae’s language that he 
immediately says, “In such a case God himself, together with his uncreated energies, has withdrawn as a 
linking bridge and as longing and attraction between men” (Staniloae 1994, p. 178). 
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concerns.
44
  If EO can give a coherent theological and motivational framework for 
“capability development”, the CA on the other hand provides analyses of what factors 
hinder and can promote this, principal among these being gender related deprivations.   
And it is significant that the principal task in Well-being, for repairing human unity, is 
related to this.  And, to lead into the next section on Eternal-being—it is not implausible 
that a belief in eternal life can unleash tremendous motivational capacities to address these 
issues (Kung 1985).  Temporal human development objectives and the immense challenges 
and sacrifices involved can be charged with splendour, rendered radiant, within a 
perspective of their eternal significance.    
5.3.3 Eternal-being (Eternal Existence) 
The third and final aspect of the movement constitutive of theosis is Eternal-being.   It is 
not necessary to deal with this dimension at length in this present study because Eternal-
being begins “only after the resurrection” (Staniloae 2003, p. 369).  However: 
Every single aspect of eternal happiness is promised by the Lord as the result of certain 
ways of living and acting in this life, as the fruit of certain seeds sown and nurtured in the 
fields of this world (Staniloae 1980, p. 207). 
Thus Eternal-being and Well-being are interconnected, as Being and Well-being were.  But 
it is important to show the relationship between Well-being and Eternal-being by noting 
the distinction which Staniloae makes between deification in the broad sense, and 
deification in the strict sense: 
We can say that deification [in the broad sense] … coincides with the process of the 
development of human powers to their limit, or with the full realization of human nature, 
but also with their unending eclipse by grace (Staniloae 2003, p. 363). 
                                                          
44
 Chapter seven will show that some forms of theology, out of fear of denigrating grace, are unclear about or 
even deny the role of human agency. 
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This “unending eclipse by grace” is deification in the strict sense (Staniloae’s term) and is 
this category of Eternal-being.  It is immortality, the conquest of Death by Life, 
foreshadowed in the Incarnation, Transfiguration, and Resurrection of Christ.  This strict 
sense of deification happens after the natural has reached its limit, and “belongs only to the 
ages to come” and is only anticipated here “for brief moments”.   In this context, Staniloae 
writes of deification as “an exit from the laws of nature in general” (Staniloae 2003, p. 
366), thus implying the sphere of Well-being is implicated in natural laws and thus can in 
some way be the subject matter of the human sciences, as will be investigated in chapter 
eight.   This is further evidence that theosis involves the elevation of natural processes, 
processes involving inter alia human agency, structures (logoi), and communion.   
Eternal-being, or deification in the “strict” sense, is entirely a gift of grace.  But eternity is 
for Staniloae not the negation or the opposition to this life, but its “natural” telos, or 
completion.  Eternity serves as a lure towards wholeness within this life, towards 
normative, unceasing, development.   In this sense, Eternal-being can be seen as an 
extension of the irreducible value of the person, or personality viewed as the highest value 
in the universe.  The human is a someone and not merely a something.  This understanding 
“sustains within him both the will to exist and the will to be perfecting himself eternally, 
while his irreplaceable uniqueness shows itself worthy of enduring eternally” (Staniloae 
2000, p. 65).
45
   Staniloae quotes Gregory of Nazianzus:  “In my quality as one belonging 
to the earth, I am attached to life here, but being also a divine particle, I bear within me a 
                                                          
45
 Note this remarkable quote by Staniloae that includes the logic of Eternity in relation to temporal 
existence, and shaping nature in a higher direction: 
To a judgement that sees only the rigid order of nature, the wisdom manifested in nature will seem 
superior to the wisdom revealed in that revelation which culminates in Christ; it may even seem to it to be 
the only true wisdom.  But, according to our conception, a wisdom that reveals the order of the world as a 
basis for the development of the human being towards an eternal existence is, in reality, more profound.  
For this is the one that responds to the worth and longing of the human being; more profound yet is a 
wisdom that reveals the order of the world as a basis for a higher and eternal dialogue of the human being 
with God and his neighbors; still more profound therefore is a wisdom that reestablishes the human being 
with the higher and complex order of normal interpersonal relations sustained by the dialogue with God, a 
dialogue of endless exactingness, subtlety and complexity, a dialogue that can shape even the order of 
nature in a higher direction (Staniloae 1994, p. 213). 
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yearning for the life to come” (Staniloae 2000, p. 81).  As expected, this dignity as a value 
is “located”, as it were, in multiple aspects:  freedom, communion, corporality, but also 
rationality.   Staniloae quotes Maximus asserting that “man will come to the consciousness 
of his glory as a rational being” (Staniloae 2003, p. 85).    
It is fundamentally important in Orthodoxy that God be “personal”.  If God were not 
personal the human “return” or union with the Absolute would be a return to, and a union 
with an impersonal something and not a Someone—to a level of existence inferior to the 
human.  This would imply an absorption of the human person into an unconscious 
absolute, a “less-than” human, an eradication of freedom, and would violate the 
ontological order of the superior dignity of persons over the inanimate and lower orders of 
creation.  Indeed, secular human development in many respects presupposes this moral 
order, of persons over things, as human or capability development over merely 
materialistic development and provision of basic needs.  In the context of this category of 
Eternal-being a question must be asked:  does the value of the person merely end in 
absurdity, in nothingness and meaninglessness after death?   If one answers Yes, then this 
can slide easily into nihilism.  As Maurice Blondel launches his magnificent Action (1893), 
a work influential on Staniloae:  “Yes or no, does human life make sense and does man 
have a destiny?” (Blondel 1984, p. 3).  Secular development presupposes this Yes, but 
suppresses serious reflection on it.   This leads to an aporia:  development can be seen as 
both requiring but “coming to a halt in face of questions which … it cannot help but ask, 
yet cannot hope to answer” (Macmurray 1969, p. 218).  Perhaps this is as it should be, but 
this means that development is “liminal”, it points, or “aspires” beyond itself for a more 
ultimate type of fulfilment.  Human development raises questions that only theology can 
answer. 
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In Orthodoxy’s theological anthropology, humans were “made” for eternal life; they were 
created to participate in the Uncreated.   Eternal being is thus integrally connected with the 
previous categories of Being and Well-being, stages where human’s valuable lives are 
lived subject to nature’s laws.   But one of these laws is that humans are theotropic, 
meaning they have a built in tendency towards and yearning for God and a state of 
wholeness, and the “actualization of life as communion” (Russell 2004, p. 319).  Thus the 
tendency toward eternal life is not just a response to sin, but rather is conceived in 
Orthodoxy as an intrinsic part of human nature.  Staniloae argues that “The potency for 
immortality was given … in the garden … but lost” (Staniloae 2000, p. 105) because of 
misused freedom such that the reign of corruption and death entered.   But nostalgia for 
this wholeness remains, this primordial shalom that serves as a lure.  Staniloae quotes 
Vladimir Lossky: 
But human love would not be pregnant with such paradisiacal nostalgia if there did not 
remain painfully within it the memory of a first condition where the other and the world 
were known from the inside, where, accordingly, death did not exist (in Staniloae 2000, p. 
96).  
Homo sapiens are simultaneously homo capax divini—humanity capable of the divine.  
Humans are both “fitted”, and “thirsty”, for the divine (Staniloae 2003, p. 78).   It is 
important to note that it is the Incarnation that reveals and rehabilitates this capacity, this 
“potency for immortality” that was lost.     
However, despite deification in this “strict” sense being entirely a gift of grace, Staniloae 
creatively connects Eternal-being closely with Well-being by connecting the two major 
dogmas of Orthodoxy.  He writes: 
Living as they did in a period when the ideas of person and of interpersonal communion 
were still not very well developed, the Fathers, in their treatment of the resurrection, placed 
greater emphasis on the share that human nature had in the incorruptible divine life.   The 
two aspects, nevertheless, form a single whole.  Incorruptibility belongs to the perfection of 
communion, hence to the Trinitarian love (Staniloae 1994, p 73). 
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Staniloae here integrates Eternal-being with Well-being, thus integrating the Incarnation 
(representing for the Early Fathers incorruptibility or Eternal-being) with the Trinity, 
which is to say with social concerns (the perfection of communion).   This legitimates 
raising the question of whether and under what conditions faith in a higher order can shape 
and motivate social action—one of the most important questions for a theology of 
development.   Clearly, religion is not always positive as a force for social change (Garrett 
1989).  But neither can religion’s role nor focus on eternal issues be dismissed negatively 
or ignored as it has been in development studies. 
In this regard, Amartya Sen misunderstands the crucial role of such “Eternal” ideals and 
how they provide a motivating framework for social action.  Sen, in his recent book The 
Idea of Justice, calls for a “new” approach to thinking about justice that focuses less on 
idealized visions of perfect justice, and more on the diagnosis and removal of “clearly 
remediable injustices”.  Early in the book, he calls forth examples of persons who “were 
not trying to achieve a perfectly just world … but they did want to remove clear injustices 
to the extent they could” (Sen 2009, p. vii).  He then says that this desire to remove 
concrete obstacles is “what animates us” to think about justice and injustice.   But is this 
right—is this what animates “us?”  Clearly it is on one level, the tactical aim is generally 
not for complete justice but the reduction of injustice.  It is also right in the sense that Sen 
is trying to argue that development studies can find a common ground in the condemnation 
and removal of clear injustices (that all can putatively agree on) rather than a controversial 
version of the good that everyone must agree upon before action can begin.   This 
formulation of justice can indeed help differing traditions collaborate on development 
challenges and not quibble over ultimate foundations. 
But it is wrong in terms of, and analytically disjointed from, a generalized theory of “what 
animates us” to think about striving for justice or development.   It is wrong about the 
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sources of motivation for development precisely because it confounds the practical “what” 
question of development with the more mysterious “why” question.46  Sen confounds the 
domains of the external with the internal; he confounds the “next tactic” with the fuller 
animating vision—theoria—in its original sense.   On this “what” level of development it 
can be acknowledged that Sen’s Idea of Justice is a legitimate advancement—i.e. the 
removal of concrete injustices is a better way to think about the practical requirements of 
justice rather than a perfect description of justice.  But functioning as a general theory of 
“what animates us”, it is completely misleading.  Sen cites the important example of 
Martin Luther King Jr. to illustrate his point. Sen argued that King did not strive for a 
perfect reconstruction of society, but for an improvement of existing conditions and 
solving specific problems—which is not an altogether truthful description.   In actual fact, 
it is well known that MLK was motivated by something analogous to the Trinity as an 
ideal model of human society.   Speaking at the end of the Montgomery bus boycott in 
1956, MLK declared that their goal was not simply the end of segregation as an institution 
through the non-violent bus boycott (Sen’s reduction of an injustice).  This was indeed the 
proximate tactical goal.   But there was a broader spiritual horizon motivating King: “the 
end is reconciliation, the end is redemption, the aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of 
the beloved community” (King-Jr. 1963).   Charles Marsh in a study on MLK described the 
effect this vision of the beloved community played and how “the imaginative stress of 
envisioning the world made whole, enables moral discipline and discernment” (Marsh 
2005, p. 213).  As Marsh notes, the civil rights movement is all too often recast as a secular 
movement “that used religion to its advantage”, when, if anything, it was the other way 
around for Dr. King.   It is well known that he viewed his principal identity as that of a 
                                                          
46
 Sen does recognize that the motivational question is separate, which would seem to give a place for 
religion.  But he later blocks this option by setting in stark opposition traditions of “reasoned argument” from 
“reliance on faith and unreasoned convictions” (Sen 2009, pp.xiii-xiv).   Sen seems to censor any positive 
mention concerning the role that religious faith plays in development, while he frequently retells an anecdote 
from his childhood about the Muslim day-labourer “Kader Mia” being stabbed to death in a Hindu area and 
“the terrible burden of narrowly defined identities” (Sen 1999, p. 8; Sen 2006). 
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Baptist pastor and it was this tradition and leadership role within it that not only provided 
motivation in the fight for justice, not only honed the rhetorical skills so critical to his 
effectiveness, but also give shape and specific content (e.g. non-violence and forgiveness) 
to these justice concerns as well.
47
  A mere glance at the non-violence pledge attests to the 
role of religious faith in this world-changing expression of social activism: 
Martin Luther King, Jr's "Nonviolence Pledge:" 
1. As you prepare to march, meditate on the life and teachings of Jesus.  
2. Remember the nonviolent movement seeks justice and reconciliation -- not victory.  
3. Walk and talk in the manner of love; for God is love.  
4. Pray daily to be used by God that all men and women might be free.  
5. Sacrifice personal wishes that all might be free. 
6. Observe with friends and foes the ordinary rules of courtesy.  
7. Perform regular service for others and the world.  
8. Refrain from violence of fist, tongue, and heart.  
9. Strive to be in good spiritual and bodily health.  
10. Follow the directions of the movement leaders and of the captains on demonstrations 
(King-Jr. 1963, p. 537).  
Development studies can improve itself by obtaining a fuller picture of those “internal” 
factors, dogmas, beliefs, supporting communities (those “narrowly defined identities” as 
Sen calls them), and practices which promote concerns for, and more importantly, 
sustained practice on behalf of justice.  “Eternity” is usually understood as a vision of ideal 
states of human flourishing; the Kingdom of God is “a perfect community” (Staniloae 
1980, p. 128).  This mystical vision of a world made whole is often the real motivational 
                                                          
47
 Sen asks “what kinds of reasoning could count” in assessment of ethical concepts and it is not clear how a 
religious understanding such as MLK exhibited, could “survive reasoned confrontation with others not 
restricted by the same parochialism” (Sen 2009, p. viii).  Sen’s criteria would seem to exclude MLK, his own 
example!   However, for an important discussion of how religious based understandings can be used in 
public, see (Perry 1997). 
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reason behind great history-changing actions on behalf of human development such as 
William Wilberforce’s lifelong campaign to eradicate slavery (discussed in the next 
chapter).  Staniloae writes that development is:  
The transcending of every one-sided image and all such images taken together [and this] 
proceeds from the intuition of a perfection beyond created things, a perfection in which these 
images have their source and toward which they tend (Staniloae 2000, p. 49-50).    
It is, as John Rawls, Adam Smith and Amartya Sen said in a different voice:  trying to look 
at situations “impartially”, sub specie aeternitatis48—from the point of view of eternity or 
wholeness, or fullness of life. Both theology and development presuppose this tension 
between the ideal and the actual.  Development studies can provide a helpful analysis of 
the problems and injustices that should be addressed, but religious type “reasons” and 
communities play a crucial role in envisioning a world made whole, and providing a 
spiritual vision and motivational context for attacking these complex issues to begin with.  
Sen is right, more reasoning is needed and his latest work signals a helpful move in this 
direction.  It is doubtful, given his commitment to free choice, that he would take the next 
step toward the necessary moral formation of actors motivated and committed to actually 
becoming problem solvers for human development.   And this freedom based refusal may 
itself not be reasonable. 
The “virtues” will now be examined to address this very issue.   The argument in the 
remaining chapters is that the virtue tradition can serve as an important bridge between 
faith and development.  This is because the virtue tradition is already in the social 
                                                          
48
 John Rawls ends his magisterial Theory of Justice with a religious eulogy to his “original position”.   
Notice the blatantly religious language:   
Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it 
is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view.  The 
perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the point of view of 
a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt in 
the world … [and note the very last sentence of the book] Purity of heart, if one could attain it, would be 
to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command from this point of view (Rawls 1999, p. 514). 
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sciences/DS but is also firmly ensconced in many, though not all, broad forms of Christian 
faith.  And for EO, this approach would be especially attractive as theosis receives its most 
complete expression in terms of the virtues. 
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6. THE VIRTUES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter begins the first stage of a multi-chapter argument which explores the virtue 
tradition as a key strategy for integrating faith and development.  The logic of this chapter 
relative to the next is that in this chapter the virtues outside of the Christian faith will be 
discussed, while the next chapters investigate virtues within theology.  This chapter argues 
that human development can “change for the better” by embracing the virtue approach.  In 
Sen’s development vision for example, postulating individual freedom as both the means 
and ends of development and giving a “space” for the possibility of altruistic behaviour 
does, in fact, little to move persons toward human development actions.  The virtue 
approach can address important gaps in development theory—namely how persons can 
actually become reliable agents of change.  Furthermore, several different versions of the 
virtues will be offered to counterbalance weaknesses in particular perspectives. 
The virtues have, however, a controversial background that presents perils for HD if not 
handled carefully.  Both secular and Christian accounts of the virtues are shaped by this 
primarily Aristotelian background, sometimes in harmful ways that merit scrutiny.  But 
before this can be addressed, a difficulty must be resolved that hovers over this entire 
discussion:  does a distinct virtue tradition even exist? 
6.1 Is there a distinctive virtue tradition? 
Martha Nussbaum has raised serious doubts whether a single virtue approach with a 
definable core exists, calling it a “misleading category” (Nussbaum 1999).  Virtue ethics is 
often set as an alternative to utilitarianism and Kantianism, but, as Nussbaum points out, 
both of these employed a virtue approach, Henry Sidgewick and JS Mill for utilitarianism, 
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and the importance of Kant’s virtue ethics for his entire system is now widely recognized.1  
Virtue theorists have been defined more by who they, often mistakenly, thought they were 
against than by any discernible core.   
Even so, Nussbaum herself shows that certain family features can be observed and these 
justify continued reference to a discernible, even if not entirely distinct, virtue tradition.   
In terms of these family features, first of all, there is a return “to the Greeks” for inspiration 
in thinking about ethical matters.   Kant himself noted that "the ancient moral philosophers 
… pretty well exhausted all that can be said upon virtue” (in Sherman 1997, p. 3), even 
though Kant fundamentally altered their approach.   Second, and this is a principal critique 
of utilitarianism, the virtue approach recognizes a plurality of human goods.   “Each virtue 
is an organized way of cherishing a particular end that has intrinsic value.  Taken together, 
the virtues ... represent a commitment to cherish all the valuable things...” (Nussbaum 
1999, p. 183).  Third, and in line with this, emotion and desire are valuable ends; they are 
“not simply mindless pushes” but shape and are shaped by reasoning.  Ethical theory 
influenced by Kant mistakenly sought “to establish a metaphysic of morals where reason 
alone is the source of moral authority” (Sherman 1997, p. 2).   Fourth, there is a focus on 
ethical decision making from within history and specific contexts and all the particularities 
of the human case.  This point is especially important.  Ethical reasoning involves not just 
isolated acts of choice, but patterns of action and intentions and reason shaped by historical 
forces (Deneulin 2006).  Anglo-American philosophy from the 1950’s –70’s ignored these 
time-implicated features of “character” and viewed ethical decision making as “in the 
moment”.   Fifth and last, virtue thinkers are often interested in literature or narrative 
which can display “long-term patterns of character, action, and commitment, while 
investigating the relevant passions...” in a “way that “isolated philosophical examples 
                                                          
1
 This was  led by inter alia Onora O’Neill (O’Neill 1989) and (Sherman 1997) who demonstrated the 
similarity of Kant’s virtue approach to that of Aristotle and the Stoics. 
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cannot” (Nussbaum 1999, p. 175).   These five considerations show that there are indeed 
sufficient family features to justify continued reference to the virtues as an ethical tradition.   
To continue with these family features, a very brief overview of the virtues as a formal 
concept will be offered before turning to specific accounts.  Virtue, from the Greek arête, 
denotes the excellence of a thing and comprehends notions of strength, capacity, 
flourishing, correct attitudinal states, proper functioning, moral goodness, and most 
importantly, practical activity performed well.  The point of the virtues is not simply to 
know about goodness, or excellence, or justice, but to become good or excellent persons 
through habitual right action, and action right for specific contexts.  Thus one definition of 
virtue is “the capacity to do what is right, and what is right in a given case” (Woodruff 
2001, p. 6).  Of course this is not the same in every situation or cultural epoch—but it 
seems that every culture has notions of human excellence. 
One important technical distinction found in Aristotle will be advanced here:  the 
difference between virtue and practical reason.   The term “virtue” denotes a specific 
excellence within a specific sphere of action or feeling such as bravery (the right exercise 
of the emotion of fear) or the virtuous use of money.   Practical reason (phronesis), which 
is sometimes called prudence, is, however, overall human excellence.  It is human 
excellence in terms of an agent who reasons well about what it is to be a human, and 
deliberating on the moral ends of life as a whole, and life characterized as “activity”.  This 
is why Aristotle says that phronesis contains all the other virtues, and why “virtue” is 
sometimes used synonymously with the exercise of practical reason.  Much more than this 
cannot be said about virtues in general for the virtues depend on the specific context and 
values of the system or community in which they are found—although the extent to which 
this is the case is debated as well.     
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6.2 Homeric, Platonic and Stoic virtues 
There is an important but troubled historical background for the virtues that must be 
examined.  Human development emerges partly out of the modern identity, but the modern 
identity is in large part developed out of a Greek background.  That the ancients play an 
important, even if romanticized role can be seen in JS Mill’s famous words: “Mankind can 
hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates” (Mill 1991, p. 
27).   This background is important also for Christianity, and especially EO, whose identity 
is directly related to a synthesis of Greek and Biblical forms of wisdom.
2
   “Aretology”, or 
the study of the virtues and their classical background, is therefore critical (Tatakis 2007, 
p. 115).  
As mentioned above, “virtue” is Greek for arête, which is etymologically linked with 
words like aristocrat, and harks back ultimately to the Greek word for male, aner.   Built 
into the very foundation of virtue is thus the notion of male strength or characteristically 
masculine excellence.  This was associated, of course, with the ancient Greek warrior 
ethic.  A specifically male set of traits or excellences were celebrated; kudos, or glory was 
attributed primarily to courage, bravery, and prowess in battle, in defence of, or in 
conquest for, the polis.  The celebration of these traits is seen in the opening of the great 
Homeric poem the Iliad:  “Sing goddess, the wrath of Achilles” (Homer 1995) and 
Thucydides noted that the Greeks used to walk around with swords.    Aristotle echoes this 
about the “former” customs of the Greeks:  
The customs of former times might be said to be too simple and barbaric.  For Greeks used 
to go around armed with swords; and they used to buy wives from one another; and there 
are surely other ancient customs that are extremely stupid (in Nussbaum 2001, p. 242). 
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 Byzantine or Eastern theology “was nothing but a continuous effort and struggle to express the tradition of 
the Church in the living categories of Greek thought” (Meyendorff 1979, p. 2), which is to say, philosophy. 
 173 
Aristotle finishes this passage pointing out however that the Greeks changed.  The reason 
for the change was that humans seek not the “way of their ancestors, but the good”.  Here 
is recognition of the search for an “objective” moral order and that traditions are often out 
of line with this and can self-correct. 
There is evidence of tensions within the ancient conceptions of human excellence already 
in the Homeric poems.  Achilles, as the icon of bravery and physical strength, was 
contrasted with Odysseus, gifted with verbal cunning and persuasion.  This tension 
foreshadowed the transition to the softer virtues, those of wisdom, justice, and so forth 
expressed by Plato—and Aristotle following.3   Plato was offering Socrates as the new 
model of human excellence, the new human hero, centred on dialogue and reason—
intentionally set against the Homeric exemplars.   In defence of his peculiar way of life, 
Socrates often appealed to “the god” to explain his more “cosmopolitan” perspective and 
criticism of the injustices and criminality of the polis.   
But far from being a modern liberal “champion of choice”, Socrates was a gadfly, set upon 
the city of Athens, by “the god”, to teach true human excellence, arête: 
Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for 
the city than my service to the god.  For I go around doing nothing but persuading both 
young and old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as 
strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you:  Wealth does not bring 
about excellence, but excellence brings about wealth and all other public and private 
blessings for men (Grube 1981, p. 35).
4
 
This is from the Apology where Socrates is defending his way of life before an Athenian 
tribunal because he has been accused of atheism (questioning the gods of the polis) and 
                                                          
3
 This transition of course is linked with cosmopolitanism, Socrates seeing himself as a “citizen of the 
world”.  For more on the “cosmopolitan” strains in classical Greece, including considerable evidence within 
Homeric poetry itself, see (Harris 1927). 
4
 Compare this with Matthew 6:33, “But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things 
will be given to you as well”. 
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corrupting the youth.   This question of defining “excellence” will be picked up later with 
Aristotle, but clearly Plato is advocating a shift away from the warrior vision of excellence 
celebrated in the Homeric poems towards the Socratic model.  In the Platonic dialogue 
Meno, Socrates refers to virtue as “a gift of the gods” (Grube 1981, p. 88).   
Besides the “divine” perspective of virtues, Plato also offers a “social change” perspective 
that would be influential.   Interior psychological virtues or excellences should mirror and 
be shaped according to the social roles required for the good ordering of the polis.  When 
this balance is achieved, with philosopher kings ruling the city just as reason rules the soul, 
“Calipolis” (the “beautiful” or harmonious polis) is possible.   Plato’s Republic implied the 
radical ability of the political scientist/philosopher king to shape human nature.  Indeed, 
Plato advocated the dissolution of the traditional structure of the family (as a way of 
transcending “mine and thine”; parents not knowing who their own children are)—
something that Communism also attempted in its early stages.   At the basis of this insight, 
dialectical in nature, is that “If man is formed by circumstances, these circumstances must 
be humanly formed” (Stevenson 1974, p. 57).  The virtue tradition is thus not only about 
individual responsibility, but it recognizes the importance of social and structural 
influences on character.
5
  For Plato, this radical reshaping of the social order was, however, 
in light of an ascent “out of the cave” of unreality, to an Ideal Order.  Virtues are part of a 
pre-existing moral order and are not merely the product of social convention as the 
Sophists taught.  
There is another influential virtue tradition and that is the Stoics, founded by Zeno, just 
after Aristotle’s death.  Like Plato, the Stoics were impressed by Socrates, largely by his 
                                                          
5
 This point is important because the virtue tradition is often presented in a one-sided fashion:  “Through 
action, then, a moral agent shapes his or her moral character, deliberately” (Rourke 2011, p. 252).  This one-
sided approach can engender a conservative “victim blaming stance”.  Liberals, on the other hand, blame the 
system/structures, but it is “naïve to assume that the simple removal of unjust structures will undo the moral 
damage” (Tessman 2005, p. 46).   Both sides, character/agency and structural/system based, are needed. 
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independence of character and indifference to circumstances.   The Stoics believed in a 
universal Cosmic Providence or Order (like Plato)—but rather than reforming the present 
order in light of that higher Reality, pronounced that the good life consists in accepting that 
everything that happens comes from the Providence of God (Taylor 1989, p. 147).   
Poverty, pain, suffering and death are not evils and the truly virtuous person will be 
“indifferent to everything that happens to him” (Jones 1970, p. 326).   Virtue for the Stoics 
was apatheia, “the peace of mind that comes through acceptance of the universe as it is” 
and an indifference to events (Jones 1970, p. 331).   As is evident, this is quite 
incompatible with the idea of “change for the better” at the heart of human development 
and shows the difficulty of relying on Stoic accounts of virtue.
6
 
However, the Stoics, believing as they did in the rationality of the cosmos, displayed an 
intense interest in science and in human nature in particular.   They believed that happiness 
is living in harmony with and accepting the cosmic order, but the emphasis on universally 
shared human nature led to the apparently “new” idea of the universal brotherhood of man, 
or cosmopolis.   It is worth highlighting that the “first” notion of cosmopolitan identity was 
birthed by the Stoics, and was done so with shared human nature as its moral basis.  Both 
Romans and Christians borrowed this cosmopolitan idea, the former to justify the 
imperium, the latter, (but modifying its static nature to give room for action) on behalf of 
universal human concern.   These cosmopolitan concerns function as the presupposition of 
modern development studies. 
The Stoic’s cosmopolitan vision, however, would be stillborn.   This is because the Stoics 
advocated the extirpation of all passions including pity and compassion as this impinged 
on self-sufficiency or autarkia (Nussbaum 1994, p. 508). Though the Stoic can view 
                                                          
6
 Adam Smith, whom Amartya Sen relies on, borrowed primarily from Stoic understandings of virtues, 
including a sense of benevolent Providence (Peet and Hartwick 1999, p. 24).     
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humanity as one cosmopolitan family, other principles in their system militate against the 
passionate urge to change things for the better or being deeply bothered by human 
suffering.   This aspect of Stoicism is fatal for an ethic of human development. 
But an important point to reiterate here is that the ancients, despite their considerable 
variety, viewed the virtues as part of living in harmony with a larger “natural” order.  This 
involves what Charles Taylor called “ontological accounts” that are “not only ‘gut’ 
feelings but also implicit acknowledgements of claims concerning their objects” (Taylor 
1989, p. 7).  The virtues involve, but are not reducible to, individual choice.  However, it is 
important to note that Modernity, understood as a “turn to the self”, occurred in large part 
because these very notions of “nature” were used to justify indifference, or even terrible 
practices.  Slavery was viewed as “natural” in the democratic poleis, as was the 
subordination of women, and other doctrines such as divine right of kings.  Thus, to reform 
this “natural” order, meaning or purpose (value) was evacuated from things; nature was 
desacralized, disenchanted.   As Charles Taylor points out, “The stress on relieving 
suffering has grown with the decline of this kind of belief” in a cosmic order.  The thrust of 
the Enlightenment critique was “protesting against the needless, senseless suffering 
inflicted on humans in the name of such larger orders or dramas” (Taylor 1989, p. 13).  It 
was in part the modern move toward the priority and dignity of the individual and the 
decline of an unchanging cosmic order that facilitated this concern with the alleviation of 
suffering.    
However, if the ancients feared failure to live according to an objective moral order, the 
modern problem is quite the opposite:  tumbling into the abyss of meaninglessness and 
nihilism where only choice has value and therefore all choices, no matter how sordid or 
noble, are equally unassailable.  Both of these emphases, an unchanging cosmic order of 
nature, or the rebellion against this in individual freedom, pose severe dangers for human 
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development.  This being noted, the account now will investigate the Philosopher who 
takes better account of this complexity, precisely because he gives a better (but ultimately 
insufficient) account of real development through time. 
6.3 Aristotle:  practical and contemplative reason 
In order to understand the approach to virtues that has been most influential, one must, of 
course, come to terms with Aristotle and especially his Nichomachean Ethics.   His is a 
much more sophisticated approach, steering between extremes of Stoic apatheia, and the 
radical reshaping of social conventions as in Plato’s Republic (Nussbaum 1996, p. 370)).   
In order to introduce Aristotle’s virtue approach, first some general reflections will be 
offered followed by an analysis of three principle terms: arête (virtue), phronesis (practical 
reason), and eudaimonia (happiness).   The account will then turn to two dangers in the 
Aristotelian legacy relevant for development concerns.  These are:  a) the preference for 
contemplative reason over practical reason, and b) social exclusion.   These twin defects 
have vitiated both philosophy and theology in terms of giving more serious consideration 
to human development.   Later (chapter eight), it will be seen that EO countered the 
Aristotelian legacy by giving practical reason (praxis) priority to contemplative reason 
(episteme). 
To begin, it is important to notice the parallel of the image-likeness (or Being-Well-being, 
Eternal being) distinction in Orthodoxy with Aristotle’s influential terminology of dunamis 
and energeia.  Dunamis is a power, a capacity, a potency or potentiality (the Latin is 
potentia) that is not yet an energeia, not yet an act, an exercise or an actualization of a 
capacity (Aristotle 2004, p. 311).   It is also important to note that Aristotle distinguished 
between two different meanings of dunamis:  one is a secondary sense and is the notion 
that something might happen by chance or merely be possible.  Everything is, in a sense, in 
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the range of possibilities or chance—such as the chance happening of a person picking up 
a guitar and making noise with it.  But there is a stronger sense of dunamis, and that is the 
sense of “good” possibilities, of not only acting in any which way, but acting well, acting 
in accordance with and developing the potentialities or telos (end or purpose) inherent in 
something.
7
  A guitar being played well by Andres Segovia is not the same as an amateur 
fumbling through basic chord progressions.   Similarly, it is in the nature of human life not 
merely to be lived any which way, but to be lived well, with characteristic human 
excellences, and the virtues aim to define these excellences.   
According to Aristotle, “moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice” 
(Darwell 2003, p. 36) meaning that virtue involves freedom or agency, but it implies 
choosing well qua the quality of being human and the excellences pertaining therewith.  
This implies at least a relatively responsive view of human nature, that choosing well, or 
choosing poorly, can shape character.    But the virtues are related to ontologically 
structured freedoms, the cultivation of dispositions, tendencies to act in certain ways given 
by nature, and tradition/custom (as historical experience) can provide helpful or harmful 
insights into nature’s intentions.  This is dunamis in the second sense of the word above:  
choosing well within the range of possibilities.    And this is what liberal philosophy has 
problems with, with the teleology implicit in the virtue tradition, that nature has purposes 
beyond, or at least not entirely reducible to, the exercise of individual choice.   
Agency or choice is structured into virtues by practice and habituation.  It is the result of 
consciously choosing (or having chosen for one but this is a lesser good) certain actions 
that over time become stable habits (hexis)—the role of iterative action in acquiring the 
relevant disposition or characteristic being key.  Virtues can be said to be “the more 
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 Sen’s formula for this is “value and have reason to value”, thus choosing well is choosing rationally.   
Undoubtedly this is right, but the question is if Western liberal accounts of reason that are highly 
individualistic and are often divorced from natural existence, can, in fact, have the bases to choose well. 
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enduring of a person’s qualities” and come closer to providing a definition of the type of 
person one is (Zagzebski 1996, p. 135).   However, the relationship between “nature”, 
freedom, and virtue is complex.  Aristotle writes: 
The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by, nor contrary to, nature; we are 
constituted by nature to receive them, but their full development in us is due to habit 
(Aristotle 2004, p. 31). 
Nature then, has thrown open pathways or channels of choice within human experience.  
Virtues thus have to do with characteristic spheres of action or feeling, and the formation 
of morally correct tendencies exists within these spheres or channels.   
Virtues’ morally right tendency generally lies in a mean between excess and deficiency, 
virtue being the proper balance between the two extremes, vice being the defect of too 
much or too little.    For example, in the sphere of “Fear and Confidence” (virtues have to 
do with dispositions as well), rashness is the excess, cowardice is the deficiency, and 
courage is the mean—the right amount.   For the sphere of “getting and spending”, there is 
prodigality, illiberality or meanness, and the right amount is liberality.  Aristotle includes 
many other domains such as anger, conversation, pleasure and pain, self-expression, 
honour, social conduct and shame.   Aristotle apparently does not claim to offer an 
exhaustive list.  However, the virtues are aspiring towards the definition of an “excellent 
human” in various spheres of action and feeling, and this is constitutive of moral goodness 
and is good apart from subjective or external results.   However, Aristotle believes that 
good results, feeling and consequences, often accompany virtue.  “[P]leasure perfects the 
activities” and this is because the goodness or “bounty of nature is clearly beyond our self-
control” (Aristotle 2004, p. 278).  
Virtue ethics is a practical science meaning it is not enough to know or understand what 
good men are like, but the purpose is to actually act as good men act—the point is not mere 
 180 
knowledge but action in line with the telos of becoming good men.  Furthermore, it is not 
merely acting as a good man would act ad hoc, but it is habitual action intended for the 
formation of “character”, an enduring disposition to act in a reliably certain way.   An 
occasional act of justice no more signals the virtue of justice than the appearance of a 
single swallow signals the arrival of springtime. Moral agents become brave by doing 
brave acts, temperate and disciplined by acting temperately and in a disciplined fashion.  
And the inverse is true as well:  those who act intemperately, those who cannot control 
their appetites develop habits of excess or deficiency.  Furthermore, this defect of 
incontinence affects one’s ability to reason well; strong appetites “drive out reason” 
(Aristotle 2004, p. 80).   The actions that first sprinkle in the soul the seeds of the virtue in 
question, these same actions are also how the seed develops into the mature fruit of virtue.   
(Ceteris peribus for vice—but vice is “stably” unstable—it is a corruption or defect and 
weakens human nature).   
For Aristotle, there are two types of virtues, one moral and one intellectual.  Moral virtues 
are the sphere of practical science and include virtues such as courage, temperance, 
liberality and the aforementioned list.  They belong to the arena of political life, debate 
among equals (free-born male landowners) in the agora or public space.   Any “good” man 
or excellent human exemplar fulfilling his specific purpose qua human will ordinarily have 
these virtues.   Human excellence is thus linked with being a citizen, that is, political 
participation, and this is the sphere of the variable, the “changing”.    This, however, is for 
the “ordinary” aristocrat or citizen, those who are not able to engage in the more strenuous 
and “divine” activity of contemplation.  This more divine activity is the exercise of the 
intellectual virtues and associated not with the moral or practical sciences, but with the 
universal sciences such as theology and geometry (the sphere of the invariable, or 
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unchanging).
8
   Practical reason is thus not the excellence of the philosopher who 
contemplates unchanging universals, but of the practical person, the politician, the 
statesman, the educator.  This fateful distinction and prioritization of contemplation as 
more “divine” will be revisited shortly after the other terms, phronesis and eudaimonia, are 
investigated. 
Phronesis is often called practical “wisdom” and the relevance of this term is seen in the 
fact that practical reason is called a science, but an inexact one.   As mentioned above, 
Aristotle believed that virtue lies in a mean between excess and defect; this requires 
balance, and finding that balance
9
 comes not through definitional precision, or the stalwart 
application of moral principles to situational cases, but through experience, through 
practice and reflection on action and the outcomes of action.  Again, it is not mere 
knowledge of the good or the good for or about man, but the domain of practice—of 
learning to become good through intentional action, prolonged experience therewith, trial 
and error, and thus the wisdom in judgement that accrues thereby.     General moral laws, 
framed as universal truths, can never adequately grasp the particulars of a situation—they 
always admit of interpretation and application.   Any science must admit of the 
definiteness, or precision (akribeia), which is appropriate to it.  Moral virtue or practical 
reason can never admit of absolute precision because situations vary; principles hold “for 
the most part”.   Courage is not always good and not to an unlimited degree; truthfulness 
can be exercised to a defect that violates other virtues (e.g. telling someone who has a 
handicap that he is unsightly). Still, knowledge and reason are required.  Thus, Aristotle’s 
precise definition:  “Phronesis is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard 
                                                          
8
 The theoretical/universal sciences are called episteme and are the sphere of the invariable.  The practical 
sciences are phronesis, the sphere of the variable.   The Greek mind had a preference for the unchanging, the 
universal, which was even more prominent in Plato than in Aristotle, but nonetheless persisted in Aristotle.  
9
 Not every action or passion admits of a mean; some are already vices as their very name suggests—
shamelessness, envy, theft, murder, etc. (Darwell 2003, p. 19). 
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to things that are good or bad for man” (in Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 2).10    It goes beyond, but 
includes scientific knowledge of the universal (episteme), and technical or productive 
knowledge (techne).  Some disciplines require less phronesis as they are related to 
information or abstract universals only (such as mathematics); disciplines such as ethics 
and especially political philosophy are the domain of phronesis.   They require broad 
experience and are inappropriate for youth, no matter how much information or knowledge 
or grasp of scientific universals they have; youth lack experience fitting the particular to 
the universal.
11
  The opinions of the experienced and recognized experts thus count for 
much in Aristotle’s moral judgments about the good life.    Phronesis is the art of dealing 
with the imprecision inherent in moral action, the realm of probability versus that of 
certainty.   Still, Aristotle designated it a moral science and argued that it is rational, 
capable of action and this in relation to what is good or bad for man.  
Eudaimonia is the third major term, and is what phronesis “aims” at.  Eudaimonia is often 
translated happiness—though this term can be misleading if not informed by other 
concepts.   Aristotle’s virtue ethics are eudaimonistic, but not hedonistic (Aristotle 2004, p. 
xxvii).   While happiness (eudaimonia) is the summum bonum, and happiness is indeed 
enjoyable, it is not about living a life of pleasure or immediacy in the common sense of the 
term.   It is about higher order happiness, the pleasure that attends a) higher order 
functioning appropriate to humans qua humans, and 2) happiness over a lifetime.  Only 
“the pleasure proper to a serious activity is virtuous” (Aristotle 2004, p. 265).    Habitual 
drunkenness cannot be eudaimonia in that while it might bring pleasure to the agent, it 
diminishes action and higher order faculties, and will kill one prematurely.   Eudaimonia, 
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 Another translation puts this important definition slightly differently: “Practical wisdom, then, must be a 
reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (Darwell 2003, p. 39). 
11
 It is interesting that the exercise of practical reason requires greater maturity/age and is thus clearly a more 
complex human functioning than theoretical reason, yet the latter is still viewed as superior by Aristotle.  
Plato, and many others, however did not make this distinction in his treatment of the virtues (Zagzebski 
1996, p. 139). 
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or true happiness, is based on the “bounty” or goodness of the natural order arranged such 
that “pleasure accompanies natural activity”.  “Aristotle believes that the full realization of 
man’s faculties is both a worthy and a satisfying end to set before themselves” (Lloyd 
1968, p. 244).    
Thus for Aristotle all humans aim at happiness, but not all have complete or helpful 
notions of what their own happiness consists in.   This is why Aristotle believes that some 
views of personal happiness need reforming, if not a complete overhaul.     Aristotle 
references the “belly-gods” (Darwell 2003, p. 32) whose appetites dominate and diminish 
their capacity for both action and reason.  Eudaimonia is, then, “activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue”, soul meaning here nothing religious per se, but the living, animate 
person as agent, as originator of actions and possessor of dispositions in accordance with 
the right balance (as judged by the possessor of phronesis) between excess and defect.     
Eudaimonia is concomitant with acting on what is noblest and highest in human nature and 
the satisfaction that accompanies this, which is why “happiness” imperfectly captures 
Aristotle’s intentions.   While happiness is not an altogether bad translation, flourishing or 
well-being is perhaps the more appropriate translation, for happiness must be over “a 
complete life”.   It thus has a success orientation, life lived well.   
So far, arête, phronesis, and eudaimonia have been put forward as three points of 
triangulation to obtain a bearing on Aristotle’s influential account of the virtues.  There are, 
however, questions surrounding Aristotle’s formulation, perhaps the most important of 
which is:  success for whom?  To whom does his attractive account of human flourishing 
apply—and more significantly—not apply?  If phronesis is reasoning about what is good 
or bad for man, then what is indeed good or bad for man, and is it only for males?  Before 
exploring further dimensions of the virtue tradition, it is important to address the two 
problems mentioned above:  that of withdrawal from social involvement by favouring 
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contemplation over praxis, and social exclusion.  Both of these have vitiated Aristotle’s 
legacy.    
There is a fundamental tension within Aristotle’s virtue ethics that was signalled above.  
Sometimes Aristotle speaks as if moral virtue (practical reason) is the summum bonum of 
human life, and that changing oneself (and perhaps the world) is the supreme good.   For 
instance, Aristotle notes that “In justice is summed up the whole of virtue” because it is 
practiced not only for oneself, but for another, and “this is a difficult task” (Aristotle 2004, 
p. 115).  Yet, at other times, and this seems to be the “chief thesis” of NE (Aristotle 2004, 
p. xxxi), it is the exercise of the intellectual virtues (contemplative reason) that is man’s 
true and highest end.   Contemplative “virtue” is exercising the mind (thus it is still an 
activity) with reflection on those things that are universal, which do not participate in 
change, and are not the result or realm of human action.   Aristotle writes that justice as an 
aspect of moral virtue (practical reason) is inferior to contemplation because the latter is 
more self-sufficient.  Justice requires dependence on “external” goods; it requires other 
persons for its exercise, while contemplation can be exercised alone, and is thus more 
“godlike” (Aristotle 2004, p. 70).  This is an expression of the Greek value of autarkia 
mentioned earlier in the context of Stoicism—freedom from dependence on external goods 
or events.
12
  Thus the first of Aristotle’s difficulties, and one that passed over into both 
philosophy and theology, is the privileging of contemplation or theoria over praxis—the 
favouring of intellectual contemplation (the unchanging) over practical affairs (the realm 
of change) or the realm of human activity.  This inevitably leads to the subordinating of 
justice concerns to theoretical speculation and thus a withdrawal or flight from practical 
affairs.   As one commentator argues, Aristotle’s locating happiness in some sort of 
contemplation leads to the idea that  practical reason is “pis aller”, an inferior pathway if 
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 This is not to be confused with autonomia:  self rule, linked with the proper exercise of freedom.    
 185 
one cannot mount up to the high road of theoretical contemplation (Aristotle 2004, p. 
xxxviii ).
13
  
This legacy has been decisive for Western thought, leading, among other things, to the 
alleged independence of cognitive states from feeling states, and to what Michael Stocker 
called a “purified view” of the intellect (in Zagzebski 1996, p. 138).   The human person is 
understood largely in terms of rational capacities and these are best isolated and purified 
from contamination by emotional or biophysical states (these passions imply “change”).   
The most celebrated expression of this tendency (but displaced from a cosmic order and 
teleology) is Descartes cogito ergo sum:  I think therefore I am.   This hierarchy of human 
goods (contemplative reason over practical) has led to many difficulties in conceptualizing 
and advancing human well-being which have not gone unnoticed.   One virtue theorist 
(from the Catholic tradition) argues that “the intellectual virtues ought to be treated as a 
subset of the moral virtues” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 139).  A similar problematic motivates 
aspects of Sen’s latest work, The Idea of Justice.  Sen is arguing in effect that development 
studies abandon the search for a perfect version of justice rooted in idealized thought (e.g. 
Rawls’ original position) and work on concrete problems of human injustices—the 
prioritizing of practical reason over speculative. 
In light of Aristotle’s intellectualized vision of the human good, some argue that his is 
really a theory of egoistic eudaimonism, an elevated form of selfishness (Aristotle 2004, p. 
xxx).     This seems too harsh inasmuch as it is clear, if NE is read with the Politics, that 
the polis is prior to the individual, the polis is his mother and the polis gives birth to the 
citizen.  Nonetheless, there remain fundamental tensions between the claims of practical 
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 For an alternative reading of the apparent dichotomy between the contemplative and the practical, arguing 
that Aristotle viewed both as necessary for the good life, see (Charles 1999).   Nussbaum largely agrees with 
this approach in her treatment of Aristotle (Nussbaum 1996).   Still, the overwhelming superiority of the 
“divine” realm, of the unchanging seems inescapable in Aristotle (Lloyd 1968, p. 303). 
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reason and contemplative in Aristotle.   Even if it is argued that Aristotle’s vision is not 
egoistic in any straightforward way, it can appear straightforwardly exclusionary, for it is a 
form of group egoism, and on two distinct fronts.  First there is the exclusion implicated in 
the communitarian-ism of the polis that Aristotle is associated with by setting one polis 
over against another (and the arguments for the normalcy of this in Politics including the 
very nature of rationality itself).  Second, there is exclusion within the polis based on 
privileging the intellectual virtues over the practical, (but noting that even both of these 
were aristocratic virtues).  Intellectual contemplation conceived as the highest good of man 
as male has a “commanding” function, while practical reason, and even more so productive 
reason, are viewed as inferior functions—an argument Aristotle used to legitimate slavery 
and gender subordination.
14
  Philosophic males must be allotted adequate time and leisure 
to think well. 
Given these problems with the Aristotelian tradition, one may wonder whether the virtue 
approach can meaningfully connect with human development.    Perhaps a less problematic 
framework is preferred.   This can be answered in several ways.  First, the Aristotelian 
framework is still today very influential both within development studies and theology, 
thus critical interaction with it cannot be avoided.   Second, it is likely that the success of 
human development as a moral project hinges on empowering it through the virtue 
tradition, or some equivalent.   This is because the virtue tradition is linked with the 
practical work of training oneself for fulfilling one’s social responsibilities.  The third 
reason is that the virtue approach tends to better understand the necessary role of the 
community’s responsibility to inculcate certain dispositions—to be angry in the right way, 
and about the right things, and at the right time.   This greater “realism” about human 
nature and the communal requirements for the formation of moral character—the nettle of 
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 With the complication that Aristotle argued that some slaves should be masters because of their superior 
intellects; he did not employ this argument for the female gender (Aristotle 1999).   
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which modern liberalism cannot firmly grasp—is among the reasons why Aristotle and the 
virtue approach is still being advocated today.   
6.4 MacIntyre, feminist concerns, and his shift from narrative to nature 
The strengths and weaknesses of the virtue tradition can be registered by how many and 
diverse, even contradictory, have been the thinkers claiming it through the ages.  For 
example, Nietzsche and Machiavelli were part of the virtue tradition, as well as Thomas 
Aquinas, Frances Hutchenson,
15
 and the great Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards.    To 
complicate matters further, in some contexts the virtue tradition passed over to the more 
secular ruminations of David Hume and Adam Smith, no doubt in large part because the 
early Reformers repudiated it as will be seen in the next chapter.   Virtues are sometimes 
viewed as purely natural properties (Foot 2003), having nothing to do with the 
supernatural, while others view them as half supernatural and half natural.  (This also will 
be dealt with in the next chapter).   Despite the diversity, virtue ethics has gained credence 
in modern philosophy since Anscombe’s influential intervention (Anscombe 1958).16  
Given the breadth of the literature involving the modern revival of the virtue tradition, the 
focus here must be extremely limited.  This account will begin with a brief example of the 
continuing controversy around Aristotle and the question of gender and family through 
Alisdair MacIntyre, and note important shifts in his more recent thought that are relevant to 
this study, particularly his “return to nature”.  The account will then move on to a) virtues 
in the capability approach, and b) in the field of “positive psychology”. 
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 Adam Smith called Dr. Hutchenson the greatest of all the virtue theorists, ancient or modern (Smith 2002, 
p. 355). 
16
 This will be explained in the next chapter under the Catholic virtues as Anscombe was a Catholic thinker.  
MacIntyre was as well, but it will emerge below why he is kept in this chapter on philosophy. 
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Alasdair MacIntyre, significant in the renaissance of the virtue approach, developed an 
influential critique of Enlightenment morality which grounds itself in individual choice 
(MacIntyre 1981; 1988).  Modern moral discourse for MacIntyre is narcissistic, morally 
degenerative, and should be replaced by virtues, largely as Aristotle described them.  These 
virtues should not, however, be grounded in his controversial biological claims, but rather 
within social and cultural practices.   Instead of appealing to Modernity’s notion of 
consensus (social contract) and the unencumbered reason of free moral agents, MacIntyre 
notes that reason and action are situated within narratives and these are embodied in 
practices and traditions which are perpetuated by institutions.  Human agency and reason 
are much more conditioned, communal, and linked to practice and local tradition than 
Enlightenment thinkers suppose.  He developed an influential notion of “tradition” which 
is: 
[an] argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined 
and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to 
the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those 
internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental 
agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 12). 
These “fundamental agreements” give rise to (or also are produced by) specific practices 
and institutions and forms of reasoning, which are the “locations” of the virtues, and thus 
are relative to communal interpretations.   Enlightenment liberalism itself is a tradition and 
upholds certain values.  MacIntyre’s narrative theory of human action has been attractive 
to religious types because it relativized the pretensions of Enlightenment rationality and 
provides a way of taking culture and religion seriously.
17
  However, there are problems 
with this narrative account that did not go unnoticed, and even by MacIntyre himself. 
                                                          
17
 This sentence was adapted from (Thomas 2005, p. 85) who applied MacIntyre’s approach to the study of 
international relations. 
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MacIntyre, according to his critics, fails to adequately address the sex biases and male 
chauvinism that was at the centre of the ancient virtues.  For example, the feminist 
philosopher Susan Miller Okin berates him for failing to come to terms with the fact that 
the ancient virtues were elitist, asymmetrical, parasitic, and linked to bloodlust.   Women’s 
virtues or excellences were defined in relation to men, were completely private (domestic), 
while men’s excellences were not defined in relation to women at all (Okin 1989, p. 50).  
In the ancient foundries of the Greek world where the links of the virtue tradition were 
hammered out, deep friendships were almost never seen as occurring between male and 
female.   Noble bonds of equals within marriage or between males and females in general 
were inconceivable.  Both Okin and Nussbaum argue that MacIntyre tacitly ignores these 
morally problematic features in his Aristotelian retrieval.   His account of the virtues does 
nothing to counter these gender asymmetries.     
In a later work however, and in a profound shift in his thinking, MacIntyre confronts these 
concerns.  Aristotle’s ideal was the megalopsychos (“great souled”) who carries on an 
illusion of self-sufficiency (MacIntyre 1999, p. 127) and was often unresponsive and 
haughty to the vulnerabilities of others.   Despite this, however, Aristotle was also the 
philosopher who was most sensitive to humanity’s animal nature.   MacIntyre confesses 
that in his earlier work, he tried to ground the virtues in social practices, making his 
account independent of Aristotle’s controversial biological claims.   However, MacIntyre 
writes, “I now judge I was in error in supposing an ethics independent of biology to be 
possible” (MacIntyre 1999, p. x).  This mistake led him to “under-perceive” human 
vulnerability as a universal moral feature, and “over-perceive” the likeness between 
Aristotle and Aquinas.   (Aristotle’s virtue of megalopsychos was, in fact, replaced by 
Aquinas’s virtue of misericordia (the Latin translation of the important Biblical Hebrew 
word hesed or loving-kindness) which “has regard to urgent and extreme need without 
respect of persons”.)   Where MacIntyre previously grounded the virtues in distinctive 
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social practices and narratives, his new direction is more universal, “in nature”, and aimed 
at deeper reflection on what is “needed in order to actualize the distinctive potentialities 
that are specific to the human rational animal” (MacIntyre 1999, p. 9).18   Vulnerability and 
dependency are features of any life, anywhere, and the exercise of the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence are necessary for anyone to become independent reasoners 
(MacIntyre 1999).   Note that the quintessential modern virtue of independent rational 
agency is affirmed by MacIntyre, but is highly dependent on humanity’s responsiveness to 
vulnerabilities emerging from their shared animal/biological nature.    
MacIntyre is thus aligning his virtue approach less with social practices and more with 
nature and nature’s norms.   But in one issue important for development contexts, such 
accounts only push key questions one step back.  What features of human experience are to 
be counted in what is “natural”, intended by nature?    The question resurfaces concerning 
the “naturalness” of the family and the related gender roles mentioned by Okin.19   
Aristotle affirmed that the family was in nature, but he also, like most of the ancients 
(Thucydides 460-399 BCE), believed in the subordination and inequality of women.  
Modernity’s characteristic method for dealing with this is to argue, as does Martha 
Nussbaum, that the family structure cannot be intended by “nature” (nothing, for that 
matter can be) so women’s natural virtues can never be defined in relation to the needs of 
males or even of the family (nor can the man’s).  This is to view the family as merely a 
                                                          
18
 It is important to note here that Macintyre’s position affirms nature/biology for many of the same reasons 
that the category of “nature” was affirmed in the earlier account on Trinitarian theological anthropology.  
This is to avoid the twin errors of disembodied agency in liberalism, and the communitarian-ism that finds no 
place for universal values.  Thus MacIntyre’s account here should be seen as functionally similar to the way 
inclusion of “nature” was intended earlier in the Trinitarian theological anthropology.  It has a distinctly 
cosmopolitan strain, but tries to affirm this while remaining grounded in human needs and particularity. 
19
 Liberals such as Nussbaum who affirm (in a sense) nature’s norms perhaps would argue there could never 
be a binding or natural norm between two persons; nature’s norms exist, but only for the individual.  This 
however is not entirely true even on a purely empirical level.  With the birth of children, there is a new 
biological “norm” (the baby) that is an ontological link, a link in the very genetic foundations of nature, 
pointing to the fact that natural norms do in fact exist in the “in-between” of persons, and not just in the 
individual. 
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social construct with no intrinsic value for human flourishing.
20
   Gendered roles with their 
attendant responsibilities are, it is argued, not in nature, biology is not destiny, and society 
can be reconstructed to transcend this institutional relic (Okin 1999; Elshtain 2008, p. 216).     
Rejection of the family as a norm in nature is indeed one way to conceptualize more 
equality in gender roles, but it is fraught with dangers (Berger and Berger 1983).  There is 
another way to think about increasing justice within the family—and it is by a more 
egalitarian construction of virtues within nature’s intended structure of the family.    Rather 
than seeking equality by defining women’s virtues with no regard for family because males 
have done so, perhaps another approach, and a better one for human development, is to not 
abandon “family” as being in nature but redefine men’s virtues in relation to women and 
the requirements of family life and childrearing.   In other words, justice for everyone is 
better achieved by men’s virtues being more closely aligned to the excellences required for 
family building than by women abandoning theirs.   This is strategic for if the family is 
indeed to function as the basic institution of justice, as many such as Okin argue it must, it 
will become so not by dislocating female roles from it, but by seeking justice, stability and 
marital affection by reforming primarily the male role and virtues within this naturally 
intended social structure.    
This is vitally important because, as Susan Miller Okin points out, “Contemporary theorists 
of justice, with few exceptions, have paid little or no attention to the question of moral 
development—of how we are to become just” (Okin 1989, p. 21).   Most liberals 
instrumentalize the family, but also other strong social bonds that can be important for 
instilling social virtues such as justice.  In this regard, they have neglected the relevance 
not only of the family as the “earliest school of moral development”, (John Rawls being 
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 Martha Nussbaum does argue for relationality as an intrinsically desirable dimension, but there are many 
ways to fulfil this function and family is just one option among many. 
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one of the few who give it attention), but other strong communities that can shape 
sentiment for the moral ends of universal human development.  Liberals tend to take 
mature, independent human beings as the subject of their theories “without any mention of 
how they got to be that way” (Okin 1989, p. 9). 
Viewing the family as “natural”, as an “essential” structure for human well-being, with 
differences arising from various cultural traditions on the underlying basic structure, yet 
striving also for equality in gender relations, with a view especially to giving proper care to 
the critical needs of children in times of extreme vulnerability—this view (rather than 
arguing that the family is in no way nature’s intention) can undoubtedly help development 
studies interact with more traditional contexts and with religion.  It can also help address 
Okin’s question of how moral formation actually takes place.    Aristotle’s view of the 
family as in nature, corrected by MacIntyre’s account emphasizing vulnerabilities, 
supplemented with Nussbaum’s core human functions, can provide basic boundaries 
within which to affirm the naturalness of the family (and thus its intrinsic goodness), but 
safeguard it against abuses. 
In tandem with this debate over the naturalness of the family, there is re-emerging interest 
among philosophers about the necessity of deriving “norms from nature”, however 
problematic and unstraightforward this might be (Antony 2000; Nussbaum 2001).   
Exploring nature’s norms involves, inter alia, exploring human virtues or excellences.  To 
further illustrate the importance of the virtues for human development, it will be shown 
that weaknesses in Sen’s freedom-based approach can be rectified by their incorporation. 
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6.5 Virtues (almost) in Sen’s Capability Approach 
Sen is unlikely seen as a virtue theorist, and should not be considered one.  But he is not a 
relativist and his approach edges at times rather close to virtue ethics.   The aforementioned 
incompleteness of Sen’s version of the CA is a strength for some applications, but 
ultimately it is a weakness—and the weakness should be addressed.  Sen cites positively 
the Aristotelian connection with his work, one that he seized on after developing his 
theory, noting the similarity between “capability” and the Aristotelian notion of dunamis 
(Sen and Nussbaum 1993, p. 30).
21
    However, he intentionally fails to develop it along the 
lines of the virtue tradition.   This is odd for Sen relies frequently on Adam Smith’s moral 
approach, whom Deirdre McCloskey calls the “last of the former virtue theorists” 
(McCloskey 2008).   Noteworthy here, Martha Nussbaum has pressed Sen publicly and in 
many of her writings on this issue.   This section will bring in a few fresh arguments for 
why the CA (in the context of Sen’s writings) calls for completion in the direction of a 
virtue approach.  
It is necessary to interrogate Sen’s ubiquitous formulation, “value and have reason to 
value”.   But before attempting this, one should be cognizant of a prominent distinction in 
ethical theory that Sen’s formulation is interacting with.  This is the distinction between a) 
welfarist or subjectivist claims, and b) objective or perfectionist claims.  Here is one of the 
clearest formulations of this distinction by Thomas Hurka: 
Claims about the good, and especially about the human good are standardly divided into 
two classes:  subjectivist or welfarist claims and objectivist or perfectionist claims. 
Welfarist claims make each person’s good depend on certain of her subjective states, such 
as her pleasures or her desires.  Hedonism, which holds that only pleasure is intrinsically 
good, is a version of welfarism, as are the views that equate a person's good with the 
                                                          
21
 However, as seen above, Aristotle offers two meanings within dunamis. One is simply what is possible in a 
formal sense, and the other is what is appropriate or fitting or right.  Sen’s focus on capability (versus 
functioning) appears to focus on the former. 
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fulfilment of her desires.   Perfectionist claims, by contrast, hold that certain states of 
humans are good objectively, or independently of their connection to pleasures or desires.  
Thus, perfectionists have held that knowledge, achievement, and deep personal relations 
are intrinsically good regardless of how much a person wants or enjoys them, and that their 
absence impoverishes a life even if it is not a source of regret (Hurka 1998, p. 181). 
It is clear in light of this that Sen’s lapidary “value and have reason to value” is affirming 
both of these—he is not a pure subjectivist (“utilitarianism” is Sen’s whipping boy for 
welfarism) and has some “perfectionist” tendencies, but he is chary of delineating these 
and emphasizes “freedom to lead different types of lives”.22    The argument here is that the 
formulation “value and reason to value” is not as safe as Sen believes it to be for reason is 
unstable (Ignatieff 2000) and it is precisely the role of virtues to give stability to reason’s 
role in ethical decision making and action.  This is what Adam Smith called “self-
command” (Smith 2002, passim).    Sen notes that the CA is combinable with other 
substantive ethical theories, and this “need not be a source of embarrassment”.   Yet he 
also notes that “the most powerful conceptual connections [with the CA] would appear to 
be with the Aristotelian view of the human good” (Sen 1992, p. 39; Sen and Nussbaum 
1993, p. 46) which is the virtue approach—but again, one which Sen does not include.   
The argument here is that Sen’s approach “yearns” for completion through the virtue 
framework to make his reliance on freedom and reason effective.   Further, by omitting the 
virtue approach, Sen commits a logical fallacy known as “cherry-picking” which lifts key 
features out of their original—here virtue-inspired—context, to fit one’s chosen 
hypothesis. 
In mind here is Sen’s frequent deployment of the Smithian thought experiment of the 
“Impartial Spectator” from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  The Impartial 
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 Objective and perfectionist claims are not the same in Sen.  Sen is strongly “objective” as seen from his 
arguments about positional objectivity (Sen 2002, pp. 463-83) where he argues that objective assessments 
can be made about the rightness or wrongness of an action, but that this assessment is not “position 
independent” (i.e. contextual features need to be factored in).  However, perfectionism is more about the 
development of, or the perfection of features or functions of human nature (Hurka 1993).   Sen appears 
perfectionist when he questions Rawls’ distinction between the right and the good (Sen 1992, p. 40), but 
overall weakly so as he refuses to identify specific features to be developed.     
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Spectator has, among other roles mentioned by Smith (several of which are ignored by 
Sen), to “humble the arrogance of his self-love”, and to check the “natural preference 
which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, [which] is what no 
impartial spectator can go along with” (Smith 2002, p. 97).    Sen appeals to this “Smithian 
device” in many contexts and for many purposes (Sen 1999, passim; Sen 2009), among 
others to critique Rawls’ “law of peoples” as being parochial and insufficiently impartial 
(Sen 2002).   This Smithian device is employed by Sen to somehow “guarantee” the virtue 
of impartiality, of employing reason correctly, along with other devices such as “positional 
objectivity” that take into feature local considerations and improve judgement (Sen 2009, 
p. 165-174).    The problem here is that Sen has shown selective attention to Smith’s theory 
by severing this Ideal Spectator from its original virtue context—the very context 
necessary to “guarantee” in any sense the effective operation of this principle in the moral 
agent.   This “ideal man within the breast”, this inner one “with the complete impartiality 
of an equitable judge” was psychologically linked in Smith’s corpus to his meticulously 
articulated and richly textured virtue framework.   This virtue framework had as its aim 
putting one into that state of self-command, (or strength of character as might be said 
today) where one would 1) desire to seek the ‘advisements’ of the Spectator in the first 
place; 2) gain the fortitude to put the advice into practice, and 3) avoid or limit self-
delusion that fails to allow one to view with honesty the deformities of one’s own conduct.    
This is important because reason is a function of the entire, “willing”, organism.  Reason is 
not a separate faculty that dominates others, but is in fact conditioned if not often 
dominated by them (Damasio 1994).  Reason is subject to the passions, is knocked off 
course, and it was the role of philosophy in the ancient tradition to bring about that wisdom 
that is the product of an entire way of living, involving self-discipline, taming the 
“passions”, and stability of character in the  pursuit of the good.   Adam Smith understood 
this well, as does Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1994). Both inside and outside of religion, 
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a role of virtue cultivation was purification of the irrational passions
23
 and of actually 
becoming a moral agent, not merely exercising in moral reflection.  So there is a limited 
“perfectionism” in Sen inasmuch as he seeks to provide a hedge about his position for 
welfarism/subjectivism through the inclusion of reason, but it is weakly formulated.   The 
formulation “value and reason to value” risks collapsing into merely valuing alone.   This 
can eventuate in a Nietzschean will to power or less dramatically, a strain of hedonic 
subjectivism.    But if Sen means by “reason to value” appealing to the broader features of 
humanity’s shared existence, the “conspecifics” or the shared particulars, then there is 
perhaps more room for agreement.  
This, unfortunately, does not seem to be the case as can be seen by exegeting Sen’s 
distinction between agency achievements and well-being
24
 achievements—a distinction 
which will now be explored in some detail as it reveals foundational divergences with EO.  
Well-being achievements are assessed based on the ability of the agent to pursue one’s own 
well-being (or have one’s own needs met by, for example, the State), while agency 
achievements are assessed based on a wider set of concerns, including other regarding 
concerns.  These well-being functions are intrapersonal properties, which is to say 
properties only of individuals—they are strictly not interpersonal—and are “central to the 
nature of well-being” (Sen and Nussbaum 1993, p. 36).   Note the reference to “being” 
language, and to nature—and the italics are Sen’s.    
The problem here is that Sen’s definition of well-being as being strictly a property of 
individuals risks destroying any conceptions of human unity, and thus reasons for 
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Staniloae views this as a principal role of asceticism, to allow reason, understood as ethical impartiality, to 
play the leading role (Staniloae 2003).   In one of the only theses linking Orthodoxy and the social sciences, 
this was the theme.  A study of the Philokalia (an important text in Orthodox monasticism) showed: 
The concept of the passions represents a sophisticated phenomenology of the inner life which explains 
why people fail to adhere to the virtues that they espouse and make judgements which do not withstand 
the light of reason (Cook 2010). 
24Exploring this will also clarify Sen’s terminology vis-à-vis the previous discussion on Well-being in 
Eastern Orthodoxy.  
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solidarity, not in individual choice.  It risks instrumentalizing others for one’s own well-
being and does not do justice to the shared and relational ontology of human existence.  
This is because, according to the strict logic of Sen’s construction of the nature of the 
person, one can be said to participate in the state of well-being without exercising any 
other regarding sentiments or actions.  Or to put it more strongly, one can experience 
“well-being” if well-fed while others around one are starving.  The contention here, and a 
plausible one if human development is in view, is that the “well-ness of a person’s being” 
(Sen’s alternate phrasing of well-being) should not be conceptualized without: a) the 
presence of other-regarding behaviour and especially distress at grievous injustices or 
capability failures, and b) the presence of meaningful relationships.   Despite claims to the 
contrary, Sen’s analysis of well-being does seem to be guilty of “methodological 
individualism” (Sen 2009, p. 243-47). 
Sen’s arrangement is a precarious one for human development because there is a deep lack 
of reciprocity:   one’s own well-being achievements, which are radically dependent on key 
others at key times in life, are subject to the realm of what appear to be the optional, the 
agency domain—they are not in the “way things really are” ontological category of well-
being.  Thus how one treats another and might permanently affect their well-being, is 
actually not in the category of well-being, but only of agency, of self-assumed choice.   For 
Sen, moral responsibility lies not in the domain of “who we are”, but only in the domain of 
“who I am”. 
This is not semantic hair-splitting for the problem with the agency/well-being distinction
25
 
becomes even more apparent when Sen (the “distinguished distinguisher”) adds the 
category of well-being freedoms to supplement well-being achievements.    Sen argues that 
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 Nussbaum questions this “prominently used” distinction of Sen’s (Nussbaum 2000, p. 14) for a different 
set of reasons, arguing that it does not bring any extra clarity.  Healthy functioning or well-being itself 
necessarily includes the exercise of agency, and is not merely a passive state of satisfaction. 
 198 
this addition is important because should a particular adult be given an equal set of 
freedoms as others by society, but “muffs” the opportunities by, for instance, consistently 
over imbibing in alcohol, “it is possible to argue that no particular injustice is involved” 
(Sen and Nussbaum 1993, p. 39).   Sen argues that this analysis applies to “responsible 
adults”.   Yet it must be asked in all seriousness: can Sen’s notion of a person muffing it up 
in this way apply at all to the category of responsible adults in the normal sense of the 
word?   The idea that someone can “muff their life” and that “no injustice is involved” 
violates basic moral intuitions on at least two levels.   First, it is almost impossible to 
imagine how a “responsible” adult who squandered their life will not negatively affect 
their “moral community”.  Sen’s example is fictitious and confounds the very meaning of 
the word “responsible”.  Sen’s analyses fail to articulate how freedoms necessarily 
interconnect and persons are mutually constitutive—for good or bad.    A second and 
perhaps more fundamental problem here is that this analysis implies that there is no duty to 
human “nature” itself.   Does not common sense dictate that someone who muffs their life, 
even if no direct harm to anyone else can be discerned, be labelled morally irresponsible?   
Does this not do an injustice to life itself?   For Sen, there can be no inherent duty to life 
itself. 
Sen’s individualistic definition of well-being becomes more problematic still if the new 
research on subjective well-being (SWB), or happiness is taken into account.  It is clear 
that SWB cannot be isolated from ISWB—intersubjective well-being.  Much of this 
research is finding that moral goods like strong marriages and close relationships of all 
kinds, including religious participation, are closely linked with personal happiness (Myers 
1992; Layard 2005; Bok 2010; Lim and Putnam 2010).  (This is important for analyzing 
post-communist societies as depression seems to be directly linked with social atomization 
and loneliness (Schopflin 1990; 1993)).   Furthermore, in regards to well-being, Sen’s 
association with Aristotle’s vision is thin indeed.  For Aristotle, it is fundamental that 
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humans are social animals, that the family is intended by nature, and that “to live well” 
requires the intrinsic goods of political activity, that is, life together in the polis, which is 
also one of nature’s intentions. 
Sen appears to be operating out of a voluntarist model, which has dominated the moral 
stage since the Enlightenment.  It is a model that seeks to account for all moral 
responsibilities, both special and general (special responsibilities are towards those of kin, 
local neighbourhood, etc., while general are in virtue of someone else’s humanity).   In this 
voluntaristic Enlightenment framework, all moral responsibilities are self-assumed 
obligations.  They are not rooted in features of human nature, a cosmic order, community, 
or revelation but in individual human commitments and promises.  
Sen is clearly in this tradition when he places other regarding concerns not in the well-
being category, but in the agency category.   Yet, there is a paradoxical result for Sen as 
the philosopher of universal human development, the philosopher of general 
responsibilities over against specialized (communitarian) ones.   As Robert Goodin notes:    
That model [the voluntarist], apparently virtually alone among all those that might account 
for our special responsibilities, would seem to justify our embracing those special 
responsibilities and those alone.  The model of self-assumed responsibilities offers an 
alluring rationale for shunning any general social responsibilities over and above those we 
have explicitly or implicitly assumed (Goodin 1985, p. 29).
26
   
This is a powerful, if not devastating, critique of freedom based approaches in light of the 
concerns of human development.  Sen tries to mask or has not embraced the full 
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 Goodin (like the later MacIntyre) locates the source of moral obligation in the vulnerability of others.  
Selznick argues that Goodin is only partially right and that it “is our own sense of identity and relatedness” 
that is the source of moral obligation (Selznick 1992, p. 204).   Selznick argues, for example, that the ground 
of obligation in a family is the parental “role”, and not in the child’s needs (vulnerability).     The argument 
here is that it can be both, and these are profoundly interconnected.  How these two can be combined 
involves the communitarian-cosmopolitan argument that will receive fuller expression in chapter nine under 
agape.  
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implications of individual agency as the flimsy basis for human development that it 
actually is.   
The virtue ethical framework, critically reconceptualised for human development concerns, 
can remedy a number of problems in Sen’s approach, while not abandoning the importance 
of freedom.   Virtues are agent centred (Tessman 2005, p. 3), emphasizing the role of 
moral choice and action in character formation.   However, virtues, some of which are 
other regarding, are intrinsically good for the agent regardless of their perceived subjective 
benefit and thus whether they are chosen (Hurka 1998, p. 181).   Virtues are intrinsically 
good for the agent and part of their goodness is because of what they do for another’s well-
being (e.g. the virtue of justice as the most complete virtue).   Unlike the voluntarist 
tradition, the virtue tradition recognizes that there are real tendencies, norms in nature that 
are flouted at the expense of well-being.    The virtue tradition also better recognizes the 
communal support required for value formation and human functioning, even if some 
traditions have been vicious examples.   Bringing all of these together, human development 
virtues can be conceived of as agency, structured within communities of character, on 
behalf of human solidarity.   
Virtue theory can assist in bringing about positive obligations and the practical activities 
that development requires.  These go beyond the exercise of mere negative duties, 
probably the real limits of an approach grounded in self-assumed choice and individual 
reasoning.  Adam Smith writes, and as a justification for a fuller virtue approach:  “We 
may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing” (Smith 2002, p. 
95-6).   Sen’s approach faces this risk.   
Academics are often guilty of seeking some “immensely simple theory … that will turn out 
to give a humane society” (McCloskey 2006, p. 1311).  Adam Smith also argued against 
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this tendency “of [thinkers] displaying their ingenuity, the propensity to account for all 
appearances with as few principles as possible” (Smith 2002, p. 353).   Sen is culpable here 
with his abandonment of Smith’s virtue ethics, wanting to retain the rational advantages of 
the “Impartial Spectator” without the moral work implied.   Sen’s thin sense of individual 
agency needs thickening, and revisiting Adam Smith would not be a bad place to start.   
With this recognition, the argument turns to two other approaches, both of which embrace 
in a fuller way the virtue tradition. 
6.6 Nussbaum’s derivation of her list and the CSV (positive psychology)   
Martha Nussbaum pushes Sen to articulate a more “perfectionist” stance.  She writes: 
It seems to me, then, that Sen needs to be more radical than he has been so far in his 
criticism of the utilitarian [subjectivist] accounts of well-being, by introducing an objective 
normative account of human functioning and by describing a procedure of objective 
evaluation by which functionings can be assessed for their contribution to the good human 
life (in Sen and Nussbaum 1993, p. 47). 
As was seen in chapter four, Nussbaum develops a neo-Aristotelian version of the 
capabilities approach and she champions an “objective normative account of human 
functioning” that Sen lacks. 27    Nussbaum defends a set of non-relative virtues.28  
Nussbaum however, unlike the ancients, derives this universal list from a characteristically 
modern approach entitled “self-hermeneutics” (Maris and Jacobs 2012).   This section aims 
to show that while this approach has some justification, it also faces important limitations.     
It is important to recall the reasons for starting with the self and rejecting external 
metaphysical natural law or the “cosmic order”.   As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
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 Nussbaum did soften her “essentialism” somewhat in later works (Jaggar 2006, p. 303), but the structure 
and purpose of the theory is the same, to justify a set of core human functions that offer an “ideal for the 
modern world” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 11). 
28
 Virtue ethics is often considered relativistic/communitarian, with writers as diverse as Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Bernard Williams, Phillipa Foot and Michael Walzer cited as examples (Nussbaum 2001, p. 243). 
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traditional natural law theories posited an unchanging sacred order that was often used to 
justify indifference or various forms of discrimination.   This “Platonic” natural order 
(often called metaphysical realism) understands moral norms and structures apart from 
human interpretation, intervention, or shaping (Nussbaum 1994, p. 29).   Nussbaum, on the 
other hand, proposes a set of natural norms, but derives these from an exercise of self-
hermeneutics or self-interpretation through which the human good can be discerned.   
Nussbaum is not naive to the obvious dangers here of perversions of desire (“preference 
deformation”) and subscribes to an “informed desire” approach, or what a mature agent 
would approve who is rational and critically scrutinizes their desires (Jaggar 2006).  
Nussbaum also occasionally mentions the idea of a therapeutic community as the context 
for the proper formation of  preferences (Nussbaum 2001), but as has been seen, no 
nurturing community (including family) has a normative, intrinsic moral status given her 
stalwart commitment to the principle of each person’s capability.   
It is clear though that Nussbaum’s approach, even on its own terms, cannot be adequately 
theorized on this “self-hermeneutical” basis.  In fact, she often explicitly (and everywhere 
implicitly) appeals to another fundamentum.   This is the principle of a shared human 
nature as a basis for moral obligation:  “Compassion requires the recognition of a shared 
humanity” (Nussbaum 1992, p. 239) within which self-hermeneutics must take place.  But 
similar to Amartya Sen, shared humanity is under theorized and why some argue 
Nussbaum lacks a theory of moral obligations (Gasper 2004, p. 187).   
It is important however that the rationale for Nussbaum’s typically modern appeal to self-
hermeneutics, and the related suspicion of nature and a “Transcendent” order, does not 
make sense within EO.  Nature, in EO, is not conceived as a Platonic timeless order—
which (according to Nussbaum) was carried over into Western ethics through Augustine 
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(Nussbaum 1994, p. 18).
29
  Rather, due to the priority of persons in Orthodoxy, as well as 
nature being viewed as a dynamic order, it is “human agency [that] discovers and achieves 
new applications of nature’s laws in pursuit of more and more useful results” for the 
development of humankind (Staniloae 2000, p. 25f).     This point of a malleable 
ontological/natural order, responsive to human agency, is fundamental in EO:   
In the human person alone does the rationality of nature’s undefined possibilities acquire 
meaning or a purpose ... as a consciously rational being whose knowledge of the rationality of 
nature and its meanings keeps on improving, only the human person himself becomes more 
rational through nature.   [Nature] is made complete by the rationality of the human subject who 
is also conscious of an inexhaustible wealth that is no monotonous repetition (Staniloae 2000, 
pp. 26, 29). 
The ontological order is thus advanced to higher stages through human agency and 
creativity.
30
   God intentionally created nature as an underspecified order that requires 
human creativity and ingenuity for its ongoing perfection.
31
   However, EO, unlike 
Modernity and Nussbaum, does not discard the natural order as having intrinsic or sacred 
value.
32
    
                                                          
29 Bradshaw writes:  “The most striking feature of Augustine's conception of being … is its static character” 
(Bradshaw 2004, p. 224). 
30
 John Meyendorff, a leading Orthodox thinker, argues that this dynamic theological anthropology “can 
prove itself to be an essential frame of reference in the contemporary theological search for a new 
understanding of man” (Meyendorff 1979, p. 2).  
31
 There has been much discussion of the “anthropic principle” by astronomers and cosmologists in recent 
years.  This is the idea that the universe is fine-tuned to accommodate human life (Barrow 1988; Barrow and 
Tipler 1988; Kauffman 1995).   Orthodoxy would add a “technotropic principle”, that the universe is also 
fine tuned to be responsive to human interventions and the discovery and development of nature’s laws and 
their application.  This scientific knowledge is to be employed as a means of human solidarity. 
32
 EO does not polarize in the same way as the West between “nominalism”—which denies the reality of 
universals and deems real only individuals or particulars, and “realism”—which gives ontological priority to 
universals (Gillespie 2008).  In fact, so alive have Orthodox been to this very issue that Photios, the great 
Byzantine sage of the 9th century, developed an alternative solution to this problematic (of the One and the 
Many), which cannot be entered into except to say that the “universal” exists, but is corporeal, instantiated in 
the particular material existence, and never without it, meaning that the universal is constituted by the 
particular, and vice versa.   Furthermore, as emphasized, the universal itself develops through time and 
human agency (Tatakis 2007, p. 241).   
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In Orthodoxy, self-hermeneutics is possible, but it requires the virtues and the self to be 
embedded in a community committed to these (Harakas 1983).  Staniloae notes that justice 
might have been derived from human experience, however: 
If sin had not in part covered over our authentic human reality, we should not ourselves have to 
start from an idea of justice but we could begin from the reality of justice that is given within 
our own equality (Staniloae 1994, p. 216). 
Dierdre McCloskey notes that for Nussbaum’s approach to work, it must more explicitly 
incorporate the moral virtues—it must start from the idea of justice—and not merely rely 
on individual practical reason as the starting point (Gasper 2006; McCloskey 2006).    EO 
corrects this fault by including the Samaritan commandment as a fundamental guideline 
and not merely relying on prudential (or instrumental) reasoning.  This is important 
because determining “what is good or bad for humans” cannot reliably be done through an 
exercise in self-hermeneutics simpliciter, but rather through a hermeneutics already 
committed to working for human development.  
At this point, the investigation of the virtues will, perhaps surprisingly, change directions 
and interact with a new approach.  This shift is justified partly because Nussbaum’s 
approach has been detailed in previous chapters, but also to demonstrate an important 
feature of development studies which is its multi-disciplinary nature.  Development 
studies, as seen in chapter two, is not one species of social science, but rather is “multi-
disciplinarity sans frontières” (Sumner 2006, p. 646).   This shift is thus methodologically 
appropriate.  But more importantly, this alternative version of the virtues can supplement 
weaknesses in Nussbaum’s version.  This assertion can only be explained after the basic 
features of the alternative approach have been given. 
The alternative virtue approach is an outgrowth of the “positive psychology movement” 
led by Martin Seligman that is intended to supplement the Diagnostic Manual of Mental 
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Disorders (DMS) that focused primarily on diagnosing human dysfunctions.
33
   Seligman 
and his colleagues point out that previous pictures of the person in psychology “assumed a 
diseased model of human nature” (Peterson and Seligman 2004).   However, the point of 
departure of this new approach is not the disorders afflicting humans, but the strengths and 
virtues that enable individuals and communities to thrive.   According to the Handbook, it 
represents the first attempt by the scientific community to identify and classify positive 
character traits of human beings.   Positive psychology, “itself a new endeavour”, flows out 
of the Aristotelian tradition and uses similar terminology:   virtue, flourishing, thriving, 
authentic happiness, eudaimonia.  It aspires to be a genuinely scientific endeavour, to map 
out universally desirable features that obtain for humans as such.   It is based on 
internationally applied research questionnaires with all the pros and cons that accrue to that 
methodology.   Seligman openly admits that these are “aspirational classifications” given 
the incipient nature of the research and the relative novelty of the approach.   
Within the Character Strength and Virtues (CSV) approach, there are six meta-virtues, and 
several sub-virtues for each; not all the sub-virtues are mentioned for brevity’s sake.   
These are:  a) Wisdom and Knowledge:  the strengths that involve the acquisition and use 
of knowledge (subcategories:  creativity, love of learning, etc.); b) Courage:  strengths that 
allow one to accomplish goals in the face of opposition (bravery, integrity, etc.); c) 
Humanity:  strengths of tending and befriending others (love, kindness, social 
intelligence); d) Justice:  strengths that build healthy community (citizenship, leadership, 
etc.); e) Temperance:  strengths that protect against excess (forgiveness and mercy, 
humility, self-regulation); and f) Transcendence:  strengths that forge connections to the 
larger universe and provide meaning (appreciation of beauty, gratitude, hope, spirituality).  
                                                          
33
 In terms of further justifying the inclusion of Seligman’s approach in this discussion, Nussbaum asserts 
that he “has one of the few profound and excellent minds in the field” of psychology (Nussbaum 2001, p. 
101).   
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In addition to this structure, each of the virtues is associated with a specific role model who 
paradigmatically illustrates that trait such as Martin Luther King for hope.
 
 
A further justification of this list as a supplement to Nussbaum’s is now possible.   First, it 
is important to note that Nussbaum, while she emphasized practical reason in her list, did 
not specify in detail the “moral” dimensions on her list.   The CSV retains important moral 
features of Aristotle’s multi-dimensional list, while correcting for the elitism, and includes 
virtues Aristotle would not (e.g. humility, forgiveness, hope, etc.).   Second, the political 
focus of Nussbaum’s list (if not supported by other approaches) actually may undermine 
agency, or at least not provide the moral resources for agents and communities to develop 
the strengths to engage positively in human development themselves (Gasper 2006; Giri 
2006).  Third, and related, the normative dimensions in Nussbaum’s list are conceptualized 
around what States should provide for their citizens, not in terms of how values form 
(Deneulin 2011) or what citizens can, or should become in terms of civil society actors and 
holding states accountable.  Fourth, the idea that the state is to guarantee these dimensions, 
while not unimportant, is inadequate for post-communist cultures.  The history of 
Communism in relation to the state shows that other pathways of human well-being are 
often necessary in the face of an unreliable state.  Fifth, the focus on values like moral 
integrity (included in the CSV but not included in Nussbaum’s list) can help resist 
corruption and facilitate the state actually playing the positive role Nussbaum envisions for 
it, versus a predatory one.  (Strong communitarian “islands of virtue” are often necessary 
for this.)  Nussbaum, in her vision of a society that ensures capability development, is over 
optimistic concerning the state’s “ability to inculcate the right attitudes and sentiments in 
people” (Nussbaum 2006, p. 411).34   Rather, as Vaclav Havel said so well, “Without 
commonly shared and widely entrenched moral values and obligations, neither the law, nor 
                                                          
34
 This is not to be taken as an argument against a role for the state; but just that it is naïve to rely on this, just 
as Nussbaum would argue it is naïve to rely only on the family. 
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the democratic government, nor even the market economy will function properly” (Havel 
2000, p. 401).   And finally, the CSV list provides a more spiritual overall picture of 
human well-being, including virtues like gratitude, forgiveness, and self-control.  
Obviously important is the distinct role for the virtue of Transcendence, which merits 
further comment. 
Spirituality and religiousness as practices and beliefs are described as “persuasive, 
pervasive, and stable”.   But not only is the virtue of Transcendence included as one of the 
core virtues or excellences in the CSV account, but it is a strength that enables other 
strengths.
35
  This is because through the virtue of Transcendence, life itself is viewed as 
“sacred”, the world is perceived “as a more coherent place” (Peterson and Seligman 2004, 
p. 609), and meaning is attributed to human action.  Moral excellence requires habituation, 
discipline, and motivational reasons for acting one way and not another—choosing the 
hard right versus the lazy wrong.  This sense of Transcendent purpose can help explain 
why religion adds strength and is a motor for the other virtues or human powers.  This is a 
radical departure from viewing religion as a defect—as an opiate for material scarcity due 
to defective relations of production (Marx), resentment buried as repression (Nietzsche), 
unfulfilled wishes (Freud), or unreasoned conviction (Sen). It appears that the CSV or 
positive psychology approach is among the first social science frameworks to view 
religious faith in a positive light.   
                                                          
35
 One reviewer of the work of Peterson and Seligman on universal human virtues writes:  
Although Peterson and Seligman are agnostics, they have now observed in their own analytic work 
that spiritual faith is a major dimension of character independent of hopeful self-directedness and 
charitable cooperativeness. Their finding confirms earlier psychometric work showing that 
spirituality is an important dimension of character that contributes to well-being … I hope that the 
authors’ integrity and open-minded humility will serve as an inspiration for other empirically 
minded humanists to evaluate the adequacy of their own worldviews, no matter what conclusions 
they may reach (Cloninger 2005).   
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Within this category of Transcendence there is much to be appreciated; there are also, 
however, important concerns.   The overall approach appears at times too “Protestant”, too, 
individualistic and indebted to William James’ influential understanding of religion as “the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (James 
1999/1902, p. 31-32; Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 601).  This is inadequate for an EO 
Trinitarian intelligibility; undoubtedly other traditions as well.  And where such narrow 
understandings of the nature of religion prevail, misunderstandings by the social sciences 
will continue to prevail as well.  But the CSV signals the potential for a remarkable 
improvement between the social sciences and religious faith precisely at the nexus of the 
virtues.   
There is one final issue that must be revisited from a new angle, and this is the relationship 
between the communitarian and cosmopolitan dimensions of the virtues.  Virtues have 
tended to be associated with communitarian positions.  For instance, Aristotle notes that 
“the excellence of the citizen must be relative to the constitution for which he is a member” 
(Aristotle 1999, p. 65).   It seems clear however that should the virtues be reoriented 
towards human development, this requires a shift.  It would require the continued 
recognition of the intrinsic importance of concrete “communities of character”, but these 
aiming for the inculcation of cosmopolitan, or “Samaritan”, or what the CSV list calls 
virtues of “humanity”.  However, this presents a dilemma:  the more cosmopolitan the 
moral commitment the more strenuous would seem to be the requirements of 
communitarian socialization.    The further persons extend outward in serving generalized 
humanity, the deeper and stronger must be the roots, the resources that nourish these very 
commitments.   This can be called the communitarian-cosmopolitan paradox:  the virtues 
conceptualized for human development will require robust communitarian features to build 
human strengths but also inspire a vision and cultivate the moral sentiments toward 
 209 
universal social inclusion.  This necessitates a theory that simultaneously values these 
particularistic loyalties (unlike liberalism), but orientates them both to a) the good of each 
of their own members but b) aspiring for the well-being of all.   As mentioned, the basic 
features of such a theory were already given by St. John Chrysostom where the family 
constitution is understood as an intimate moral community whose primary spiritual 
function is the inculcation of cosmopolitan virtues (Spidlik 1986).  The Church has the 
right to make such suggestions about the nature of the familial constitution inasmuch as it 
is the Church that continues to value and sacralise this bond.  
The different perspectives on human excellences offered in this chapter are important 
inputs for the emerging literature that views virtues as a key bridge between religion and 
human development.  For example, “building communities of character” in partnership 
with faith communities is theorized as a basis for partnership between faith based 
communities and secular development agencies (Thomas 2004; 2005, p. 206).  These 
conversations, while helpful, have often neglected to address which aspects of character are 
desirable or undesirable, and for whom.  Inadequate moral criteria or safeguards against 
defective understandings of the virtues can leave them too locally determined.  Further 
reflection on the shape of the virtues—and especially their simultaneously individual, 
communitarian, and universal dimensions—is necessary.   The voice of the CSV, which 
appears “religion-friendly”, but arising from the social sciences and offering a universal 
perspective, can aid this conversation—not only in terms of what States might be expected 
to provide for their citizens, but what persons and religious communities can expect from 
themselves and each other.
36
 
                                                          
36
 For many Orthodox countries the public role of the state in supporting religion is attractive, and in part 
because of the public repression of religion under Communism.    In Romania for example, the strict 
separation of religion between public and private is unlikely.   Following the influential criteria of the “Twin 
Tolerations” of political theorist Alfred Stepan, an established Orthodox Church is clearly not incompatible 
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The inclusion of religious faith as a strength within the CSV approach is provocative and 
can serve as a bridge between faith and development extending from the side of the social 
sciences.  But besides being provocative, it is also paradoxical because these same authors 
assert that Christianity is incompatible with virtue ethics: 
Moral philosophy changed with the growing influence of Christianity, which saw God as 
the giver of laws by which one should live.  Righteous conduct no longer stemmed from 
inner virtues but rather from obedience to the commandments of God (Peterson and 
Seligman 2004, p. 10). 
This is a gross oversimplification.   However, one aim of the next chapter is to show why 
this oversimplification occurs and occurs so often.   Briefly, the account will show that the 
early Reformers did indeed repudiated the virtue tradition, and that hidden within this are 
keys to understanding what one author called “the unnecessary shipwreck between faith 
and humanism in the Enlightenment” (Bradshaw 2004).  At any rate, why faith collided so 
strongly with humanism in the West is a complex issue.   A largely unexplored reason for 
this collision can be seen through an analysis of the virtues in Western theology.
                                                                                                                                                                                
with consolidated democracy (Stepan 2000), even if some control must be (and has been) relinquished.  
“With the exception of France, Western European democracies depart from the strict separation model” (Stan 
and Turcescu 2000, pp. 38-9).   
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7. THE VIRTUES IN WESTERN THEOLOGY 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the virtues are emerging as a promising bridge between 
religion and development studies.   However, on closer inspection, the passability of this 
bridge quickly becomes uncertain.  This is because, while on the one hand the virtue 
tradition is endorsed by Catholicism, and as will be seen also by EO, nonetheless it is 
asserted to be actually incompatible with Christianity (Schneewind 1998; Peterson and 
Seligman 2004).   If the virtues can indeed provide a conceptual bridge between “the 
Worlds of Development and Faith” (Thomas 2004; 2005; Marshall and Saanen 2007), 
perhaps understanding why the virtue tradition is considered incompatible with 
Christianity can illuminate aspects of the tensions between faith and development.  
Furthermore, if there are problems in this regard, it is important to discern whether this is a 
generalized incompatibility between virtues and Christianity, or is rather endemic to a 
particular tradition.    
Why then do philosophers and social scientists consider that Christianity is incompatible 
with the virtues?   Because, as the first part of this chapter will show, with the exception of 
a few thinkers, Protestants from Luther until Barth tended to ignore or reject outright the 
virtues.  This rejection of the virtues is explored as a conceptual difficulty for connecting 
the realms of religious faith and human development in the West.  A second aim of this 
chapter is to investigate the Catholic approach to virtues.  Catholics on the one hand 
vigorously affirm the virtue tradition, but on the other tend to separate them into natural 
and supernatural categories, which (apart from being odd from an Orthodox point of view) 
presents its own but lesser difficulties for conceptualizing the relation between faith and 
development.  This has not prevented profound contributions to human development 
through the papal encyclicals, in part linked with the changes occurring at Vatican II, and 
the affirmation of a “new” virtue aimed specifically at human development, solidarity.    
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This investigation into the Protestant and Catholic approaches to virtues also serves as a 
necessary foil to understand EO virtues and their specific relation to HD which will be 
developed in subsequent chapters.  However, prior to investigating the Protestant and 
Catholic approaches, a few words will be said about heroism.   Recovering the sense of 
heroic action within the virtue tradition may prove vital for meeting human development 
challenges, many of which are daunting. 
7.1 Heroism and Human Development 
Ethical systems admonish equality, and the virtues also do this, but virtue ethics recognizes 
the importance of public praise for deeds that are especially noble in service of one’s 
community.  Thus the virtue tradition sanctions inequality on behalf of equality, the 
possibility of heroism and the necessity of its celebration through public ritual.    Hannah 
Arendt writes concerning ancient Hellenic politics that its art was to bring forth the great 
and the radiant—and echoing Democritus:  “as long as the polis is there to inspire men to 
dare the extraordinary, all things are safe; if it perishes, everything is lost” (Arendt 1998, p. 
206).     
It will not come as a surprise for anyone who has spent time reflecting on this dynamic of 
heroic action, the community’s necessary role in this, and the role of corporate memory, to 
notice parallels between the heroes celebrated by the Greek polis and the Saints celebrated 
in the Church, both East and West.    While the structure and the imagery are remarkably 
similar, the moral ends are not.   A liturgical reading in the Orthodox Church Calendar 
proclaims in the context of the saints’ lives, “Great are the achievements of faith”.   Saints 
are heroes for the faith:  athletic and martial imagery is employed; virtue and glory are 
celebrated.   Saints who are martyred are called “hoplites for Christ” and the arena of 
contest is often described in gladiatorial terms; blood is splattered, necks are crushed by 
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ram’s horns.  But it is not the saint doing the crushing as in typical celebrations of martial 
virtues.  The saint (or here martyr) is the one being crushed in service to and imitation of 
Christ’s love for humanity.  
The purpose of these heroic accounts in the life of the Church is to celebrate the memory 
of those who accomplished great actions for humanity,
1
 imitating God’s love for 
humankind, His philanthropia.
2
 There is a celebrated category of saints in the early 
Church, the Holy Unmercenaries (literally the “holy ones—without silver”) who, in 
conspicuous contradiction to the conventions of their day, offered medical and healing 
services without charge, that is, without silver.   Each of these Unmercenaries (seven sets 
total) are granted their own respective celebration day, and there is a special Sunday 
Synaxis (or service, same root as synagogue or “coming together”) celebrating all the 
Unmercenaries.    Traditions of faith nourish such commitments, celebrate them, and 
encourage them in others.  Staniloae sums up these sentiments well, even if laconically:  
“those who make special efforts on behalf of the good of all should enjoy a particular 
honour” (Staniloae 1994, p. 217).   Similarly, Staniloae quotes Maximus saying “God, by 
nature good and without passion, loves each person equally, but glorifies the virtuous” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 307).   There are in these formulations a “cosmopolitanism” of God’s 
                                                          
1
 The Church calendar states on All Saints:  “we the pious honour all the Saints, the friends of God, for they 
are keepers of God's commandments, shining examples of virtue, and benefactors of mankind” (Monastery 
2012).   One striking example is St. Telemechus, a monk “from the East”, who dared to stop a gladiatorial 
combat in progress, knowing that he himself would be martyred in his attempt to bring an end to this atrocity.   
As he tried to stop the fight, the “sanguinary [bloodthirsty] spectators” descended on him and stoned him to 
death.   This pricked the Emperor Honorarius’s conscience and contributed to the final banning of 
gladiatorial combats around 404 a.d. (Theodoretus 1844). 
2
 Often enough, the Church calendar celebrates bizarre feats such as living atop a pillar (“stylite”) for 
decades, or living in a hole for extended periods in social isolation, acts concerning which it may prove 
challenging to link with a theology of human development.   Staniloae has provided theological cautions 
about spiritual heroics rooted apparently more in Greek ascetical practices and an antipathy of material 
existence than positive love.   Other prominent voices within Orthodoxy, such as Paul Evdokimov have 
registered similar reservations about spiritual leaders such as Arsenios the Great who enjoined “Flee from 
men ... and thou shalt be saved” (Evdokimov 2001).   Staniloae calls for a new, positive asceticism, positive 
and obligatory for all (Staniloae 2000, p. 6). 
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love, the “good for all”, but also a special glory (kudos) for those who display these virtues 
that benefit humankind.   
The history of development achievements, while involving structural or environmental 
transformation, usually requires sacrificial, heroic activity and often over a lifetime 
(Bornstein 2004).  William Wilberforce’s campaign against slavery in the British Empire is 
a powerful example of a religiously inspired “hero for humanity” (Belmonte 2002).3   This 
heroic activity, however, often requires strong communal identities as a source of values.  
Heroic virtue is not likely to emerge full grown from liberal neutrality, as did Athena from 
Zeus’s head in Greek mythology.  This can be framed as a “law” of development:  
sustained action for justice or human development is highly implausible without a 
corresponding plausibility structure (Berger and Luckmann 1989) that provides a “social 
imaginary” (Taylor 2004), which is to say a community of expectations.    
William James is a modern philosopher who reconceptualised the ancient virtue tradition 
for human development.   He notes that the virtue tradition was closely allied to martial 
values;
4
 military heroism “was the gory nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness” 
(James 1962, p. 314).   William James correctly sensed that this strong heroic ethic cannot 
be abandoned as liberalism implies; rather, it must be retrained.   He writes in his classic 
essay “The Moral Equivalent of War”:  
The martial type of character can be bred without war.  Strenuous honour and 
disinterestedness abound elsewhere.  Priests and medical men are in a fashion educated to 
it … We should be owned, as soldiers are by the army, and our pride would rise 
accordingly.  We could be poor, then, without humiliation … The only thing needed 
                                                          
3 Wilberforce was an evangelical Christian and his work to fight slavery emerged from these commitments.   
This is a significant point to ponder for a secular mentality that sees faith as irrelevant to human 
development.  A noted human rights scholar writes: “All human rights activism in the modern world properly 
traces its origins back to the campaigns to abolish the slave-trade and then slavery itself” (Ignatieff 2000, p. 
293). 
4
 The word hero comes from the Greek and meant warrior, or protector. 
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henceforward is to inflame the civic temper as past history has flamed the military temper 
(James 1962, p. 326). 
But how is this to happen?  James’ solution rests on two features, one highly “liberal”, one 
highly coercive.  The first is his recognition that global injustice and the caprice of fortune 
can arouse pity and moral indignation in reflective minds and be a motivation for bold 
action.  This is unproblematic.  But then he offers the mechanism for turning “can do this” 
into “will do this” and it is nothing other than forced conscription of entire populations of 
youth into global humanitarian service.    
James’ proposal for tapping the heroic ethic swings wildly between the branches of free 
moral reflection and coercive conscription.
5
   An alternative proposal however, and one in 
line with the overall approach of this thesis, is that in the global fight against poverty, 
religion can and should (and already does) play a more profound role than is currently 
recognized in fostering heroic virtues necessary for human development—one that relies 
more on the internal motivating power of tradition and less on the external power of 
government coercion.  Religion is perhaps the only non-coercive “authority” that has a 
chance to strongly encourage this with any legitimacy.   Jacques Maritain, who will be 
examined later in this chapter, notes: 
It is impossible for a vitally Christian transformation of the temporal order to come about 
in the same manner and by the same means as other temporal transformations and 
revolutions.  If it is to come about, it will be the result of Christian heroism (Maritain 1973, 
p. 120).
6
 
The heroism embedded in the virtue tradition provides further reasons for suggesting it as a 
link between theology and human development.    But as has already been mentioned, not 
                                                          
5
 Forced volunteerism however, does not work and has left a civic vacuum in post-communist cultures where 
a major research questions is: “Why don’t people volunteer?” (Howard 2003; Robertson 2009).    
6
 For Maritain, the US industrial grassroots community organizer/agitator Saul Alinsky, embodied Christian 
heroism (Doering 1987).   He called such persons a “prophetic shock minority” (Maritain 1951). 
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all Christian traditions are likely to see the excellences of the virtue tradition.  The account 
now turns to Protestantism, which is one.  
7.2 Protestantism’s difficulty with the virtues 
At the end of the previous chapter, it was noted that Christianity is perceived as 
incompatible with the virtue tradition.   Similarly, a premier Enlightenment scholar J.B. 
Schneewind’s asserts that “Christianity itself, however, suggested serious moral 
misgivings about an ethics centred on virtue” (Schneewind 1998, p. 287), and there are 
similar claims.
7
  This section attempts to address the causes and significance of this 
misunderstanding that is so persistent despite the centrality of virtues not only within EO, 
but also Catholicism.   However, before exploring these issues it is important to address 
whether it really matters if Christianity is incompatible with the virtues.  
If Schneewind and others are correct in asserting Christianity’s incompatibility with the 
virtue tradition, it could suggest that Christianity is incompatible, or at least ill-fitted, for 
the moral demands associated with democracy.   Schneewind does not place the point so 
sharply, but it is clear that this question is not far off stage and that it was not far from the 
minds of many Enlightenment thinkers.   Schneewind raises the question of whether 
democracy is based on a morality of obedience, or upon self-governance, what Adam 
Smith called “self-command”.   Schneewind believes that the latter is the requirement for 
democratic societies.
8
     
                                                          
7
 See also:  (Rachels 1998, pp. 669-670), “[for the ancients] ‘the virtues’ occupied centre stage in all their 
discussions.  As time passed however, this way of thinking about ethics came to be neglected.  With the 
coming of Christianity a new set of ideas was introduced.  The Christians, like the Jews, were monotheists 
who viewed God as a lawgiver and for them righteous living meant obedience to the divine commandments”.  
The author goes on to cite St. Augustine as the root of this shift and his distrust of reason. 
8
 However, Schneewind does point out that “The ethics of self-governance was created by both religious and 
anti-religious philosophers” (Schneewind 1998, p. 9).   
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The conception of morality as self-governance provides a conceptual framework for a 
social space in which we may each rightly claim to direct our own actions without 
interference from the state, the church, the neighbours, or those claiming to be better or 
wiser than we.  The older conceptions of morality as obedience did not have these 
implications (Schneewind 1998, p. 4). 
Christianity, as will be seen, is often assumed to be equivalent to a “Divine Command” 
theory or an ethic of obedience to law (deontology).  This “morality as obedience”, unlike 
the self governance mode (virtues), means that the human person is seen as more fitted to 
be ruled in what has often been called “slave morality”, and not to the dignity and freedom 
of self-rule.  This morality of obedience has historically not embraced the relative equality 
of moral capacity (Schneewind 1998), another feature of democracy associated with 
universal enfranchisement and the notion that all persons have a moral right to participate 
in the decisions that affect their lives.   The important point here is that if democracy 
requires self rule, the stakes for rejecting virtue theory in favour of simple obedience to an 
external authority may indeed be high.
9
      
In what follows, the argument will review this rejection of the virtue approach in 
Protestantism via Luther and Calvin, and bring these effects up to date with Karl Barth.  It 
is to be kept in mind that this account is primarily trying to address the very limited 
question of why virtues could be perceived as incompatible with Christianity and 
secondarily, to raise the more challenging question of whether the rejection of the virtues 
represents a conceptual
10
 incompatibility between faith and development within 
Protestantism.  In attempting to answer this, it is to be noted that at least two things 
                                                          
9
 Stanley Milgram’s important experiments show how “obedience to authority” can over-rule personal moral 
values and “persuade” individuals to willingly perform actions (e.g. shocking a person in a memory 
experiment with a potentially harmful, if not lethal, 450 volts) that he would otherwise find horrifying 
(Milgram 1974). 
10
 This term “conceptual” is being emphasized because the argument is not that Protestantism has not made 
great contributions to human development.  The question is over what the rejection of virtues may have 
meant for the relationship between, and even perhaps generating, a Western form of humanism that all too 
often viewed itself in opposition to Christianity. 
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happened in Protestantism.   The first was the transformation of the virtues where they 
were not rejected, and the other, was their outright rejection.      
In terms of their transformation, the virtues were made more difficult in that a) human 
inability and moral corruption were emphasized through a doctrine of original sin, 
simultaneously with b) making the virtues even more morally rigorous and demanding.    
Under this tendency, the virtues became so elevated and often so “other regarding” that 
they in many ways ceased to be human virtues at all—not rooted in actual human 
sympathies and emotions.   Adam Smith critiques this tendency in Dr. Hutchenson who 
believed “that virtue must consist in pure and disinterested benevolence alone” (Smith 
2002, p. 356) and anything falling short of this was either morally irrelevant or 
blameworthy.   As was often the case, the virtues were related to an understanding of 
Divine agape that was in sharpest contrast from human eros;  any form of self-interest, 
reciprocity, or any concern for “special relations” such as family excluded the sentiment in 
question from the category of virtue altogether.   This transformation of virtue often had 
similar features to that of Kantian liberalism such that "Regard is for every person qua 
human existent, to be distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which 
distinguish particular personalities from each other" (Outka 1977, p. 9).    
These tendencies to elevate virtues beyond natural morality are evident in the great Puritan 
thinker Jonathan Edwards who welded Lockean psychology to Calvinism (Holbrook 
1973).   Edwards writes: 
A selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and sordid.  
But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more, and his regards extend so far beyond 
his own single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still to a 
larger circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of being in 
general; his private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz., to pursue the interest of 
his particular object in opposition to general existence: which is certainly contrary to the 
tendency of true virtue (Edwards 1765/1960).   
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Affection that is not rooted in love for the “universal system” is a form of self-love and 
ultimately sinful.  Edwards stressed the distinction between natural virtue and “true” virtue, 
and he even called persons living by the former “altogether hateful” in God’s eyes 
(Holbrook 1973, p. 23).   Edwards required that the virtues go beyond even 
cosmopolitanism—a concern for all of humanity as the criterion of virtue—to a cosmic 
scope, love of Being itself.   Yet Edwards had a dim, if not morbid, view of human moral 
ability.  Edwards writes:  “As innocent as children seem to be to us, yet if they are out of 
Christ, they are not so in God’s sight, but are young vipers, and are infinitely more hateful 
than vipers” (in Lee 1987, p. 118).   So it is not true that within Protestantism there is no 
virtue tradition as some scholars hold.  But there is the tendency to transform the “human” 
virtues by severing them from natural sympathies and downgrading the relevant moral 
capacities of humans.   
But more often than transformation, there is an even stronger tendency within 
Protestantism to reject outright the virtues, viewing them as an opposing factor to grace—
or in other words, “Obedience to virtue is far removed from obedience to God” (Minear 
1946, p. 48).
11
   This tendency is widespread enough that noted Yale ethicist Gene Outka 
asserts, “Protestants object to any claim that certain agents possess something laudatory or 
that such a state can deliberately be cultivated” (Outka 1977, p. 146).  Or more succinctly, 
Protestants reject the virtues.
12
  Given this widespread dynamic, it was natural that: a) the 
                                                          
11
The larger context of this quote is worth mentioning, as well as the fact that ethicist Outka cites this as 
representative of Protestant attitudes to virtues.  This quote can also help make clear the rationale behind the 
Divine Command Theory which will be discussed further below. 
The Bible ethic remains throughout an ethic of present decision ... Obedience to God cannot be absorbed 
into a stable character pattern so that each subsequent decision becomes easier and more assured ... 
However many times repeated, it does not become a fixed personality trait.  Every present moment 
presents a new occasion for disobedience as well as a new need for divine help.  When one objectifies 
obedience as a virtue to be cultivated, his choices become determined by his relation to that virtue rather 
than by relation to God (Minear 1946, p. 48; Outka 1977, p. 146). 
12 Here is further confirmation of this important, but controversial point by a Protestant theologian:  
“Protestants have typically understood grace to be primarily God’s extrinsic act of forgiveness. If they 
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torch of the virtue tradition passed over to secular Enlightenment scholars such as David 
Hume and Adam Smith, and b) social scientists would assert that “Christianity” is 
incompatible with the virtue tradition.  Today, very few prominent Protestant theologians 
embrace the virtues; Stanley Hauerwas (investigated below) and more recently N.T. 
Wright (Wright 2010) being two exceptions.  
The roots of this entire tendency can be exposed by digging back to the early Reformers.  
Luther rejected the virtues and loathed Aristotle, especially the Nichomachean Ethics: 
This pagan has attained supremacy, impeded and almost suppressed the Scriptures of the 
living God ... I cannot avoid believing that the Evil one introduced the study of Aristotle … 
his book on Ethics is worse than any other book, being the direct opposite of God’s grace 
and the Christian virtues ... Oh! Away with such books from any Christian hands (in 
Schneewind 1998, p. 32). 
Calvin was hardly less pessimistic about relating Christianity to the virtues.  Virtues have 
nothing to do with redemption, though there was perhaps some relevance for them in the 
political arena: 
As for the virtues that deceive us with their vain show, they shall have their praise in the 
political assembly and in the common renown among men; but before the heavenly 
judgment they shall be of no value to acquire merit (in Schneewind 1998, p. 36). 
God’s grace in such statements appears unrelated to person’s capacity as agents.  God 
providentially can use these virtues in order to bring about his will, but the exercise of 
human virtue is without any true spiritual value.   This is all to say that a discernible 
tendency to dichotomize between God’s power and humans’ is evident and is in large part 
responsible for the idea that virtue is incompatible with Christianity.
13
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
include the notion of power for obedient life, it is typically understood as a “supernatural” power that 
irresistibly reforms human nature” (Maddox 1990, p. 37).   
13
 As will be seen in Chapter nine, EO has a “synergistic” view between God’s power and humans even in 
redemption itself.  
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But it is not just the virtues that came under attack in separating God’s grace from human 
nature, but freedom itself.   Virtue was in many respects but a casualty of the larger battle.  
Notice the following by Luther, the fountainhead of the Reformation:   
I misspoke when I said that free will before grace exists in name only; rather I should have 
simply said: "free will is a fiction among real things, a name with no reality."  For no one 
has it within his control to intend anything, good or evil (in Gillespie 2008, p. 145). 
The role of human agency was denied by Luther in such a strong way that some argue he 
represented a “clear break with the previous Christian tradition (Gillespie 2008, p. 155).14  
Such a position puts meaningful notions of human responsibility in peril.  
However, even where agency was not entirely rejected, there is another way which God’s 
sovereignty or power is conceived to render any cultivation or structuring of human 
powers (i.e. virtues) as an opposing factor to grace, and is seen with Karl Barth in his 
“Divine Command Theory”.  For Barth, human nature is not merely a passive instrument, 
but nonetheless “Barth reflects the Protestant suspicion ... to the subject of virtue” (Outka 
1977, p. 233).   Barth indeed moves a step towards a position of “cooperation” between 
God’s freedom and humans’; it is, however, but a very small step and cannot embrace the 
virtues.  This is because Divine Sovereignty is perceived to be infringed upon unless “there 
is a final sense in which it is God who commands in the present moment”.  God’s grace 
must be spontaneous, ever new, and there is no question of humans “appropriating grace” 
or God’s love and growing in “character” or habit formation or stable dispositions or 
preferences—the virtues.15 Grace, to be grace, must be experienced as “new every 
                                                          
14
 Luther also argued that the will was placed between God and Satan, “between the two like a beast of 
burden” and, “nor can it choose to run to either of the two riders”.  Luther believed, apparently mistakenly, 
that this image of the will being ridden by either God or Satan to be from Augustine when it has been traced 
back by scholars to Origen and the Manicheans (Gillespie 2008, p. 154). 
15
 This explains why “character development” literature, which is deeply related to the virtue tradition, has 
not been widely accepted by Protestants and on the other hand Catholics have been involved in and even lead 
this domain (Lickona 1991).    Protestant theologian Emil Brunner is cited as one of the few Protestants who 
did not reject the virtues (Outka 1977, p. 149).   Brunner argued early on (German publication 1932) for 
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morning”.16   This is Barth’s “Divine Command theory” that the “Proclamation of the 
Word” opens: 
It [the Proclamation of the Word] commands not only how man is to think and act here and 
now, but also quite specifically what is to take place inwardly in his mind and thoughts and 
outwardly in what he does or refrains from doing. It leaves nothing to human choice or 
preference.  It thus requires no interpretation to come into force.  To the last and smallest 
detail it is self-interpreted (Barth, Dogmatics III/4:11-12 (in Outka 1977, p. 230)). 
This leaving “nothing to human choice or preference” excludes the very possibility of 
virtues in that virtues (historically understood) involve the conscious effort to structure 
human agency.  Yet there is a tension between this and the existence and operation of 
creational structures that are more stable and give (to use Barth’s terminology) “constancy 
to God’s command”.   These creational structures have value, whether under the label of 
Barthian “spheres”, the “orders” of Brunner, or the “mandates” in Bonhoeffer.  Outka 
views this tension between the spontaneity of grace and the stability of creational 
structures as a fundamental inconsistency in the system of the dialectical theologians 
(Outka 1977, p. 231).  The main point though is that this Divine-Command approach is at 
odds with a virtue approach that values human action and the development of stable 
dispositions and patterns of freedom—and these as dimensions of grace.   As will be seen 
below, this critique of Barth is not idiosyncratic as the most important Protestant virtue 
theorist, Stanley Hauerwas, argues similarly.  
On this basis it can be argued that one plausible reason for the conceptual disconnect 
between Christian faith and human development concerns the role of freedom or agency—
and the virtues imply a valuable human agent.   Development theory and practice 
                                                                                                                                                                                
“what Aristotle and the Catholic moralists mean when they speak of virtue” (Brunner 1947, p. 168).  But 
several years later (German publication 1937) Brunner dedicates an entire chapter to the notion that 
“character development” is not a theological category; “It describes simply the forms in which men are 
different from one another, not as created beings but as sinful beings” (Brunner 1939, p. 317).   
16
 Outka helpfully describes this “Divine Command Theory” as “a kind of theological contextualism in which 
the agent must allow God to specify how love is to be applied in very particular situations” (Outka 1977, p. 
255).    
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presuppose some effective level of human agency.  While from any Christian perspective 
Amartya Sen exaggerates the role of human agency in his capability approach, one still 
might want to argue that human action/agency has some role in bringing about the good 
within human lives.  In other words, one need not go as far as Sen who defines 
development as expanse of freedoms, but nonetheless an honest rendering of the human 
condition must give some effective (even if incomplete) role to human agency—and the 
virtues demand this.   
Generalizations are hazardous for a movement as complex and diverse as Protestantism 
and without doubt Protestantism has made great contributions to human development 
despite its difficulty with the virtues.   The great statesman and theologian Abraham 
Kuyper points to Calvinism’s activism (Kuyper 2002) which is linked to the “inner-
worldly asceticism” described by Max Weber that proved so transformative (Weber 1958, 
p. 170-171).   Nicholas Wolterstorff articulates a profound theology of shalom, shalom 
being the working out of well-being and delight in all dimensions of existence 
(Wolterstorff 1980; 1983).    Walter Rauschenbusch spearheaded the social gospel that 
awakened Protestants to the influence of, and thus work to transform, social structures 
(Rauschenbusch 1916; Dillenberger and Welch 1998, p. 231).
17
  Recent Protestant 
theologians have analyzed the structural injustices of capitalism and offer powerful 
theological and economically informed critiques (Goudzwaard 1975; 1975; Storkey 1979; 
Daly and Jr. 1990; Goudzwaard and Lange 1995; Hay 2004).  There is also evidence of a 
movement towards “integral [holistic] mission” in Evangelicalism (expressed in the 
Lausanne covenant and organizations like World Vision and Tearfund) that lessens the gap 
between evangelistic and justice concerns, and suggests a more nuanced engagement with 
                                                          
17
 John Wesley is known to have prioritized the Eastern Fathers over the Western and “it was primarily 
through Chrysostom that Wesley came to his distinctive assessment of the Christian life as ‘faith filled with 
the energy of love.’” (Maddox 1990, p. 31). 
 224 
the world (Myers 1999a; 1999b; Bonk 2011).
18
  Perhaps most fundamentally, the 
Protestant Reformation was critical for one of Modernity’s achievements, what Charles 
Taylor calls the “affirmation of ordinary life”—“those aspects of human life concerned 
with production and reproduction, that is, labour, the making of the things needed for life, 
and our life as a sexual being, including marriage and the family” (Taylor 1989, p. 211).  
There can be little doubt that the lessening of social hierarchies and the corresponding 
dignifying of labour in the Reformation meant a broad increase in the “space” and 
dynamics for the exercise of human agency, even if its theological value was often denied.  
But this denial is the point in question.  The contention here is not that Protestant theology 
is unconcerned with or has not made great contributions to human development.
19
 But 
rather the question concerns the fact that it is not “Christianity in general” that rejects the 
virtues as is often asserted, but rather only one of its three major branches.   
Protestantism is, however, a highly diverse tradition and it would be surprising if there 
were no theologians who have “protested” and embraced the virtues.  If the virtue 
approach can indeed serve as a viable bridge between religious faith and human 
development as is being suggested, it becomes imperative now to investigate perhaps the 
most significant exception to the rule:  Stanley Hauerwas.   
7.3 A Protestant Retrieval:  Stanley Hauerwas 
If future historians of theology look back on the twentieth century and discern a movement 
of the Protestant flock toward the field of the virtue ethics, Stanley Hauerwas will have 
                                                          
18
 However, this positive engagement with the world may require rethinking stark approaches toward human 
depravity (and the related denial of natural law), as a Catholic theologian reviewing the Lausanne process 
attested (Schreiter 2011).    
19
 See (Prevette 2012) for a study of this problem in terms of evangelical NGO’s in Romania whose 
theological categories inhibit their ability to adequately describe and include their very own noble social 
work activities.  
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been its bellwether.  The account here will note Hauerwas’ reasons for embracing the 
virtues (which confirm the the critique especially of Barth provided above) and then 
analyze his approach in terms of its capacity to integrate with human development 
concerns.   
Stanley Hauerwas turned to the virtue tradition because he believed that the Divine 
Command Theory (DCT), the “principal metaphor of Protestantism”, was patently 
inadequate (Hauerwas 1975).
20
   The DCT approach to ethics denies any significance to the 
actual shape of a person’s life and “tends to be inherently occasionalistic with a correlative 
understanding of the self that is passive and atomistic” (in Black 2000, p. 246).21  Within 
this (Barthian) DCT framework, notions of Christian growth, context, or even the 
importance of community in moral formation were marginalized; any suggestion of “moral 
development” was seen as a form of “works righteousness”.22   Because of these problems, 
Protestants had no conceptual tools or vocabulary to describe their convictions about 
Christian growth.  Hauerwas countered this and argued that the “language of virtue and 
character is especially fruitful in providing moral expressions appropriate to Christian 
convictions” (Hauerwas 1981, p. 132) and laboured to re-articulate the virtues for 
Protestant thought. 
In 2001 Time magazine named Hauerwas “America’s Best theologian”, to which he 
responded, “Best is not a theological category” (Brierley 2011).   This riposte illustrates 
                                                          
20
 Hauerwas turned to Aristotle and Aquinas not only because of the theological problems in Divine 
Command theory, but also because he found contemporary moral theory to be unacceptable for similar 
reasons mentioned by Nussbaum in the previous chapter (the “snapshot” view of ethical decision-making). 
21
 Hauerwas criticises Karl Barth directly here, quoting a stark passage of his:  “Our sanctification is God’s 
work, not our own.  It is very necessary, therefore, that there should be an encounter, the confrontation of our 
existence with the command of God” (in Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 115).   It should be kept in mind, 
and why Barth is so radical, that Protestants have tended to assert that justification (which is the exclusive 
domain of salvation proper) is entirely God’s work, while sanctification is at least partly the work of the 
believer.  
22
 Oliver O’Donovan is an important Protestant Evangelical theologian who also rejects Divine Command 
Theories (O'Donovan 1994). 
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perfectly Hauerwas’ “communitarian” approach:  the Church is a distinctive polis 
constituted by its fidelity, as a community of expectations and practices, to the narrative 
revealed in Scripture.  This serves as a counter-story to the world’s way of doing politics. 
Hauerwas’ radicalism and commitment to the Christian story, his narrative approach to 
scripture and ethics, his bombastic style, the wide set of authors he draws from—from 
Bernard Williams, Stanley Fish, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Mary Midgley, and especially 
Aristotle (he once wrote “I am better acquainted with the text of the Nichomachean Ethics 
than I am of the New Testament” (Hauerwas 1994, p. 22))—have made him an intriguing 
author.   He is also influenced by the pacifism of the Mennonite, John Howard Yoder.  
Hauerwas offers many helpful criticisms of Enlightenment liberalism and its over-
identification of the human good with freedom, and especially negative freedoms.  One of 
his principal concerns is identical to this thesis and is to attack “the liberal assumption that 
a just polity is possible without the people being just” (Hauerwas 1981, p. 73).   Also in 
fundamental agreement with the present approach is Hauerwas’ insistence that “ethics 
depends on vital communities sufficient to produce well-lived lives” (Hauerwas 1983, p. 
15).   Hauerwas defends (in twenty-five books and hundreds of articles) an approach, 
where, according to Rowan Williams, the “context of all Christian reflection is the Church 
and its governing narratives” (Williams 2006, p.220).  Hauerwas is deeply influenced by 
George Lindbeck and his post-liberal “cultural-linguistic” approach to doctrine.23   It is 
primarily concerning this strongly narrative, communitarian, approach that questions have 
been raised. 
                                                          
23
 A few select sentences from Lindbeck are enough to show the parallels with the Hauerwasian position to 
be developed.   Doctrine is “communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude and action” (p.18).   To be 
religious, in the postliberal perspective is to “interiorize a set of skills [developed by the community through] 
practice and training” (p. 35).   And this one is most significant:  all religious traditions are understood to be 
“radically … distinct ways of experiencing and being oriented toward self, neighbour, and cosmos” 
(Lindbeck 1984, p. 40).   Each “language game” (Wittgenstein’s term) is largely incommensurable with 
others.   
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It is important to note that a shift occurred between Hauerwas’ earlier work and his later, a 
shift that has aroused concerns that are not unrelated to the analysis provided in this thesis.  
His earlier work emphasized the dynamics of character development, the inherently social 
dimensions of personhood and this as the foundation for human agency, and these features 
inspired by a narrative vision of the moral life that can depict a life of “wholeness and 
integrity” (Black 2000, p. 206).  His early work was concerned with making the person, in 
all her particularity, relationality, and history, the subject of moral deliberation. This 
“early” approach, however, was increasingly eclipsed by what became an almost singular 
focus on the narrative construction of moral virtue (Outka 1980).  For Hauerwas, the 
Christian narrative constitutes distinctive communities of shared commitments and also a 
distinctive notion of moral personhood which is dissimilar from that of the world 
(especially liberalism).
24
  Within such an approach, “we learn that our first moral question 
must be Of [sic] what history am I a part and how can I best understand it?” (Hauerwas 
1981, p. 100), or, “everything has to do with what story we are in.  This is so because 
stories form worlds” (Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 125).25   Hauerwas agrees with 
Augustine who “argued so adamantly that pagan [natural] virtue is nothing less than sin” 
(Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 27).  Hauerwas thus insists on a radical discontinuity 
between authentic Christian virtues and those of general humanity.  Hauerwas admits that 
such an approach abandons the very “attempt to develop a ‘universal’ ethic” and that this 
“involves a certain kind of relativism” but he hopes not a “vicious one” (Hauerwas 1981, 
p. 101).     
                                                          
24
 Hauerwas increasingly employed imagery of Christians as “aliens”, living on a “colony” and at war with, 
and being attacked by, a hostile world.   Writing about the good of fidelity in marriage, he notes: “fidelity in 
marriage is a discipline necessary to sustain us in the struggle with the enemy” (Hauerwas and Willimon 
1996, p. 37).   These virtues are necessary “to resist the world that would destroy us”.  Virtue language was 
increasingly described in martial imagery. 
25
 Hauerwas also argues though that the distinctive practices of the Christian community give rise to a 
distinctive reading of the Biblical text; praxis influences hermeneutics.   Hauerwas emphasizes, correctly, 
that one can only properly read the text when one is following the example of Christ.  There are parallels 
with Orthodoxy here that will be developed later. 
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Such an approach raises problems that have not gone uncriticized.  His latter works 
approached a narrative determinism and appeared to undermine human freedom.  
Hauerwas’ concern “is no longer on the self who does the choosing but on the story which 
gives directions to choice” (Bondi 1984, p. 203).  But this may really be a minor problem 
because it is indeed the point of the Christian story to “alter the possibilities of action” 
(Williams 2006, p. 220).  Patricia Jung, a sympathetic critic, notes however a deeper 
problem related to the (third Trinitarian) category of nature:  the “one sided 
intellectualistic” nature of this narrative approach fails to provide an account of the 
emotions and how these involve “the embodied nature of the moral agent” (Jung 1983).  
Faced with such criticisms, Hauerwas sought to include a better account of emotions in his 
theory, but did so in ways that further emphasized the narrative’s singularly constitutive 
role for moral virtues and their emotional counterparts.
26
  One can see this neglect of 
“embodied nature” when Hauerwas aligns himself with the “old” (strongly narrative) view 
of Alisdair MacIntyre discussed earlier.  “MacIntyre argues not only that the virtues are 
tradition-specific but so also are the desires” (Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 200).  This is 
why for Hauerwas it is important to “distinguish genuinely Christian notions of growth in 
the moral life” from the view that our moral development “unfolds from what is in us 
naturally as potential”.  In a similar vein, the virtues are not the “result of a teleology 
intrinsic to human nature” and thus Christian virtue “cannot be generic” (Hauerwas and 
Pinches 1997).
27
  Unsurprisingly perhaps, the feature of human nature that appears 
                                                          
26
 Roberts argues, in terms of the decline of interest in nature as a theological category in Protestantism, that 
“[t]he turn to the subject, initiated by Martin Luther [and Schleirmacher] ... loosen[ed] the hold of theological 
explanation on the ‘outer’ physical world” (Roberts 2004, p. 193; 2005).  This turn to subjectivity includes a 
neglect of the inner physical/biological world as well, the concrete human essence. 
27
 This dominating focus on narrative can lead to “research programs” within scripture that select certain 
claims about human existence, such as its fallen nature or depravity, for confirmation (Black 2000, p. 106).  
This is the leading aspect of Hauerwas’ understanding of human nature, which in turn justifies an 
understanding of salvation primarily as forgiveness from sins, which in turn gives rise to a focus on 
forgiveness as the “hub of the Christian virtues” (Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 121).    
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noteworthy from a theological point of view for Hauerwas is its sinfulness.
28
  Hauerwas 
calls the “reality of this world” the “world of sin” (Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 128).    
Hauerwas clearly overstates the role of distinctive communitarian narratives.  Noted 
already in the last chapter (and why he was included there) is that MacIntyre, against his 
own former views (which Hauerwas relies heavily upon) began to see the need to root 
virtues more in embodied nature, that is, in “facts about animality, disability and 
vulnerability” (MacIntyre 1999, p. xii).   It is not necessary to recount the details here, but 
there is a significant revolution in the human sciences in the twentieth century that makes 
Hauerwas’ position all the more problematic.   There is compelling evidence, arising from 
fields such as neuroscience and child development, showing that the moral life arises out 
of given cognitive structures and age-specific developmental features.  Two brief examples 
will be given.  First is the celebrated finding that “mirror neurons” in the brain allows the 
agent to sympathetically experience others’ states.  This biological capacity allows persons 
to experience the mind-states of others not through conceptual or narrative reasoning, but 
through direct simulation (Rifkin 2009, p. 83).  Humans literally feel the pain of others.  
Second, child psychologists have discovered that children as young as three years have an 
innate or ontogenetic sense of morality and can distinguish between personal, 
conventional, and true morality.   (There is also evidence for a minimal sense of right and 
wrong as early as three months (Hamlin, Wynn et al. 2007)).   Children do not learn to be 
moral primarily by being “taught” that hitting is wrong; they learn this “somatically” 
through engaging in social and embodied experience.   Empathy is an underdeveloped 
instinct, but it is already there as tendency and is developed directly through empathetic, 
embodied, experiences. 
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 This might be considered an overstatement considering Hauerwas’ emphasis on the Aristotelian “social 
nature”.  However, Hauerwas saw the social goods of the secular polis as fundamentally distorted and 
oriented towards war.  See footnote below. 
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It is hard to know whether such findings about “nature’s norms” can be integrated with 
Hauerwas’ emphasis on the Christian narrative and the radical distinctiveness of the 
Christian community.  Seeing Christian love as built upon an already empathic nature has 
often been a threat to theology, especially Protestantism that has tended to separate grace 
and nature (Burns 2006), although there are some promising discussions (Post, Underwood 
et al. 2002).   Orthodoxy has always been comfortable with and even would expect to see 
this altruism or empathy in nature believing that all dimensions of nature participate in the 
Trinitarian social reality.  Theological narratives help interpret and shape these 
experiences, but it does not create the genuinely moral and Christian nature of human 
experience ex nihilo.   Nature is already “graced” in many respects. 
This is not to reject the idea that some narratives are more “truthful” than others and 
neither is it to reject the idea that narrative can open up important possibilities for choice 
and decisively add to and even correct human experience.   Hauerwas’ insistence that to 
imitate Christ is to respond to evil with good, with forgiveness and non-violence, is indeed 
attractive and has been a distinctive Christian contribution to the shape of the virtues.  But 
this emphasis need not be seen in an a priori opposition to or separated from natural law or 
general accounts of human flourishing.
29
  Indeed, narrative interpretations of moral 
development need not be viewed at odds with universally held moral norms, any more than 
history, or the developmental laws of biology, are at odds with the “timeless” laws of 
physics.
30
   There are different levels of analysis involved and the psychologically astute 
narratives of Jane Austin or Iris Murdoch can attest to universal principles that require 
                                                          
29
 One author writing contra Hauerwas in relation to natural law notes:  “the story of Jesus is capable of 
producing behaviour that an observer can recognize as moral but which has not previously been identified as 
such by any rule” (Black 2000, p. 217).   Hannah Arendt pointed out that it was Jesus of Nazareth who first 
revealed to humankind the importance of forgiveness in social relationships (Arendt 1998).   This is a 
specific example of how narrative, or revelation, can reveal a universal truth that then becomes widely 
accepted. 
30
 Paul Ricoeur is exceptionally helpful here and shows how narratives, even the Biblical one, participate in a 
larger logos revealed by narratology (the principle of continuity), but also that specific narratives provide 
intensifications of specific themes.   This is to say that revelation can shape humanity’s general 
understanding of human experiences or the virtues.   This will be developed more fully in chapter nine. 
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maturation in concrete relationships, resolutions of conflict, and thus the narrative factor of 
time.   And there are other genres besides narrative in Scripture with a different relation to 
time:  commands, maxims, wisdom sayings.
31
   
The problem with Hauerwas’ approach is not his insistence on narrative, even less his 
insistence on community and the inadequacies of liberal freedoms.  Rather the difficulty is 
his insistence on the absolute distinctiveness of the Christian virtues and the sinful nature 
of natural virtues and what this overall approach means in terms of dialogue with the world 
and its needs.
32
  With this insistence, Hauerwas displays only a superficial alliance with 
Aquinas, whom he often references (O'Meara 1997, p. 255).
33
  Catholicism posits natural 
virtues and supernatural and a correspondence of sorts (this will be dealt with below), and 
this in turn creates the basis for a positive dialogue with society through natural law.  This 
correspondence provides the basis for what David Hollenbach called the virtue of 
“intellectual solidarity” where “there is a truth about the human good that must be pursued 
and that makes a claim on the minds and hearts of all persons” (Hollenbach-S.J. 2002, p. 
157).  Hauerwas rejects human rights discourse and especially the moral concerns of 
liberalism, even though liberalism is arguably a historical carrier of Christian values 
concerning the dignity of the individual (Stackhouse 1981).   And despite the evident 
problems of political liberalism, abandoning it (in favour of?) as a basis for ordering 
society can pose even greater problems (Insole 2004).   
                                                          
31
 Some have complained of Hauerwas’ selective choice of genres in the scriptures (Stackhouse 1997).   
32
 Rowan Williams wisely notes in the context of discussing Hauerwas and Milbank: “Story and community 
can in some circumstances become … divorced from hard questions about just and sustainable relationships 
between persons and within the social order” (Williams 2006, p. 221).   
33
 Hauerwas notes that Aquinas produced “the most satisfactory version of morality we have had so far”, but 
then notes that “Christianity is not a continuation of the Greek understanding of the virtues, but rather the 
inauguration of a new tradition that sets the virtues within an entirely different telos in community” 
(Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, pp. 62-63).   Hauerwas, borrowing from Milbank, presents the classical virtues 
much too simplistically as a “pre-Christian world of war” (Hauerwas and Pinches 1997, p. 67), failing to note 
that the rise of the later Socratic, Platonic, and even Aristotelian approaches can be seen as softening the 
warrior ethic of Homer.    
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This is a perfect time to note from a different angle that the early church did not see itself 
(for the most part) as a contradiction of classical conceptions, but their extension and 
completion.  Jose Casanova quotes Peter Brown, arguably the greatest historian of Late 
Antiquity (the period from 150-750) in this vein: 
While early Christianity may have made almost no innovation in moral matters, 
nonetheless it played a crucial historical role by "democratizing" the philosophers' upper-
class culture and by putting into practice "what pagan and Jewish moralists had already 
begun to preach" (Brown 1987, p. 260; Casanova 1994, p. 232). 
As another historian attested, “What Athens knew the Christians practiced” (Laeuchli 
1967, p. 36).
34
   However, there is something genuinely new if moral practice, success in 
bringing about generally recognized desired social change, is valued as a significant 
achievement above mere moral theorizing.   Here Hauerwas is right in his insistence that 
what is required is a community of virtuous agents following Christ’s example (Hauerwas 
2001); he just overstates the case for the discontinuity of the Christian virtues with those of 
wider humanity.  Perhaps a fuller appreciation of the “shared nature” dimension of 
Trinitarian anthropology can help Hauerwas’ approach link with human development 
concerns.  However, this question of Christianity’s unique contribution to human 
experience cannot be ignored and will be picked up in chapter nine.  With this problematic 
in mind, the account turns now to Catholicism, a tradition that has been much less 
pessimistic about the “pagan” virtues. 
7.4 Catholicism 
This section will describe Catholic virtues primarily to provide a basis of comparison with 
EO, but also to note the Catholic contribution to development.    To outline the Catholic 
                                                          
34
 The renowned Roman pagan physician and philosopher Galen (129-200 AD) noted that the Christians 
“number individuals who, in self-discipline and self control in matters of food and drink, and in their keen 
pursuit of justice, have attained a pitch not inferior to that of the genuine philosophers”, and he thought it 
significant to mention that these “include not only men but women” (Stevenson 1987, p. 137). 
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position, it is necessary to note the separation of the natural and supernatural virtues, and 
revisit one of the aforementioned Aristotelian themes, namely the privileging of 
contemplative reason over practical reason.   The account will demonstrate just how 
influential this priority of the contemplative over the practical has been by a brief 
exploration of neo-scholasticism and the deep changes in theology in the light of Vatican 
II.  The account will illustrate these themes primarily from an analysis of Jacques Maritain, 
a Catholic philosopher and activist influential on human rights in the 20
th
 century.  
Maritain is fascinating because he champions both the “old” neo-scholastic approach that 
was all but repudiated in Vatican II, but he was also an inspiration for the new direction of 
social concerns so evident in the encyclicals.  Three of these that bear directly on human 
development will be briefly analyzed.  
7.4.1 Vatican II and the decline of neo-scholasticism 
The defining event in twentieth-century Roman Catholic theology was the Second Vatican 
Council (Kerr 2007, p. 203).   Pope John XIII wanted to throw “open the window of the 
church and let in some fresh air” (Sullivan 2002, p. 17).   Changes were set in motion, 
many of which could have never been predicted (Curran 2008, p. 231).
35
   Just how much 
continuity or discontinuity this represented with the past is subject to much debate, and 
even harder to determine its effect on the subject at hand, the virtues, as will be seen.  But a 
defining feature of Vatican II was developing alternatives to neo-scholasticism.  “There is 
no doubt that the outstanding event in the Catholic theology of our century is the 
surmounting of neo-scholasticism” (Kasper 1989, p. 1), and this impacted Catholicism’s 
relationship with development concerns. 
                                                          
35
 The precedent for this was Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum that stunned the capitalist and 
Catholic worlds and is called the Magna Carta of Catholic social teaching (Holland 2003, p. 304).  Among 
other things, it affirmed the worker amidst the ravages of industrialization, advocated a just wage, and the 
right to form labor unions.   
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Catherine Lacugna notes that pre Vatican II theology (neo-scholasticism) was “widely 
criticized as unhistorical, ill-equipped to deal with the modern turn to the subject, out of 
touch with modern science, and overly focused on lifeless concepts as opposed to 
experience” (in Rahner 1998, p. viii).  Scholasticism was focused on the sphere of the 
invariable, the “universal”, and not with history and experience which are the realm of the 
variable, the realm of action and change.  All of this was considered to be founded securely 
on the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas.  Garrigou-Lagrange was 
considered the model Thomist and his contention was that “action, practice, experience, 
can never be the first criterion of what is true”; what is true is based on the necessary and 
unchanging laws of being (Kerr 2007, pp. 12-16).   Focusing on human experience, praxis, 
progress, or historical development of doctrine was the slippery slope to atheistic 
modernism.  Catholic clerics from 1910 until 1967 were forced to sign “The Anti-
Modernist Oath”. 
In a surprise for theology perhaps as great as the fall of Communism was for politics, the 
seemingly impenetrable scholastic edifice was all but dismantled in Vatican II—and for 
somewhat similar reasons!   Both focused almost exclusively on the necessary structures of 
being and neglected human agency.   Twentieth-century Catholic theology became the 
story of surmounting neo-scholasticism and developing alternative theological visions.
36
  
Names such as Yves Congar, Edward Schillebeeckx, Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, 
Bernard Lonergan, Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Hans Küng, Karol Wojtyla, Joseph Ratzinger, 
and Jacques Maritain
37
 all played decisive roles.   Much of this work involved new 
interpretations of Aquinas.  At the centre of the debate was the role of the relationship 
                                                          
36
 It is also the different story of a gradual rapprochement between Rome and Orthodoxy, at an official level.  
In January 1964, the first face to face meeting took place between a Pope and an Ecumenical Patriarch since 
1438/9.  The anathemas of 1054 were mutually revoked.  Kallistos Ware notes that “it is the Roman 
Catholics with whom we have by far the more in common” (Ware 1998, pp. 314-15). 
37
 Vatican II made policy many of the proposals offered by Maritain thirty years previous in Integral 
Humanism (Maritain 1973; Doering 1987, p. 93). 
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between nature and supernature.  Cajetan (1469 – 1534), an early interpreter of Aquinas, 
was blamed for setting up two separate realms, nature and supernature as two different 
destinies for humans.  This distinction (also affirmed by Suárez (1548-1617)), according to 
de Lubac, was the origin of the idea of human autonomy (i.e. a freedom that need make no 
reference to God) that led logically to atheism and secularism.  Both Lubac and Balthasar 
claimed that their own Catholicism was the womb within which secularism was birthed 
(Kerr 2007, p. 74)!
38
    Reinterpretations of Aquinas were offered, or not even bothered 
with; one was no longer required to frame theology in terms of Aquinas.   Balthasar 
reworked the entire tradition, largely from Patristic sources and profound encounters with 
Karl Barth.  Balthasar also wrote a seminal work on Maximus the Confessor and these 
Eastern influences are incorporated into his thinking (Balthasar 2003).
39
     
There can be no hope of doing justice to the issues involved here, especially interpreting 
Aquinas and the relation of grace to nature, about which even experts disagree (O'Meara 
1997).  However, even though neo-scholasticism lost its mandatory basis, this does not 
mean its influence has vanished, and that there are not losses.  Scholasticism served as the 
basis for Catholicism’s profound natural law treatment and a basis for human dignity, as 
will be seen in Jacques Maritain.  Indeed, the very separation of nature and grace was 
construed to give nature an autonomy, dignity, and coherence of its own—and provided 
the basis for moral collaboration not resting on controversial theological assumptions.   But 
as was seen above with Hauerwas, a turn to narrative, or “salvation-history” which 
Catholicism experienced post Vatican II (Ratzinger 1987) can present problems for natural 
law and thus dialoguing with those outside of one’s faith tradition.   Is there hope of 
                                                          
38
 Balthasar argued that Suárez, not Descartes, “laid the foundation for the metaphysics of modernity” (Kerr 
2007, p. 125). 
39
 Balthasar was considered to be the most cultivated person of his era, according to his mentor, de Lubac 
(Murphy 2008, p. 29).  He was also reckoned the greatest Catholic theologian of the twentieth century (Kerr 
2007, p. 121).  His work on Maximus was pioneering.   
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keeping the strengths of a natural law approach simultaneously with the focus on human 
action, experience, community, and salvation history?   Before examining how this 
important question is being addressed, a brief analysis of the Catholic virtues is in order, 
virtues that still bear within them the marks of the scholastic distinctions.   
7.4.2 Virtues in Catholic Theology 
That Christianity is often considered incompatible with the virtue tradition is all the more 
ironic as the revival of virtue ethics in modern philosophy is widely attributed to Elizabeth 
Anscombe (Anscombe 1958), a theorist within the Catholic tradition.   This is not even to 
mention the influence of other Catholics such as Alisdair MacIntyre (treated in the last 
chapter because of his shift to shared nature) and more recently Linda Zagzebski 
(Zagzebski 1996).   Anscombe is significant because she persuasively argued that most 
modern moral philosophy is incoherent because it rests on an inherited notion of 
“obedience to a Moral Law" that presupposed  the existence of a Divine lawgiver, but who 
is now rejected (Rachels 1998, p. 670).  This argument helped catalyze a shift to the virtue 
tradition in philosophical circles.  However, even prior to this, there were articulations of 
the virtue tradition within Catholicism since at least the 1860’s (and consistently from 
1560-1860) so talk of a “discovery” can, from one perspective, seem odd (O'Meara 1997, 
p. 255).   
In approaching the virtues in Catholicism, one immediately discerns language strikingly 
close to Aristotle.   The Catholic Catechism of 1993 (completed under Cardinal Ratzinger) 
writes:   
Human virtues are firm attitudes, stable dispositions, habitual perfections of intellect and 
will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide our conduct according to reason 
and faith. They make possible ease, self-mastery, and joy in leading a morally good life. 
The virtuous man is he who freely practices the good.   The moral virtues are acquired by 
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human effort. They are the fruit and seed of morally good acts; they dispose all the powers 
of the human being for communion with divine love.  
Visible here is the positive role of human effort, freedom, reason, and joy in the pursuit of 
the good.  And the Catechism in this context quotes the eastern Father Gregory of Nyssa 
stating that “the goal of the virtuous life is to enable us to become like God” (Paul-II 
1993).
40
    
The Catechism goes on to delineate the traditional seven virtues; the first four are the 
cardinal or “natural” virtues, and the latter three are the “theological” ones.41   The natural 
virtues, also called the pagan virtues, are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance—
borrowed straight from the classical tradition.   The theological virtues, also called the 
supernatural virtues, are, of course, faith, hope, and love—borrowed from Paul’s eulogy 
on love, 1 Corinthians 13.    Love of God is the summit of the entire sphere of the practical 
(but within the category of supernatural) virtues, that for which everything else tends and 
through which each virtue finds its orientation and completion.  (A table will be given 
shortly to help the reader keep track of these distinctions.)   Evident here is that in 
Catholicism grace, or supernatural virtue, complements and completes human nature—the 
natural virtues—thus a synergy of sorts is in operation.   This is in some respects similar to 
EO in that a more positive role is given to human nature and for human effort, but 
differences emerge as well.  For example, the distinction between “human” (natural) and 
“theological” (supernatural) virtues is Catholic and is not employed by EO.  Behind these 
distinctions (and one more important one below) is a particular relationship to Aristotle. 
                                                          
40
 Cited in the Catechism:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a7.htm   
41
 Peter Lombard first linked the three theological virtues with the four cardinal ones; later, Thomas 
Aquinas’s teacher, Albert of Cologne, joined a morality of virtues to a theology of grace (O'Meara 1997, p. 
263).  
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Thomism, as is well known, is the bold and brilliant attempt to synthesize the entire Greek 
classical tradition, but pre-eminently Aristotle, with Christian revelation.
42
   For Aquinas 
(unlike Aristotle), there are two sources of truth, that of the natural and that of the 
supernatural, but concerning the former, the natural realm or what is often called 
“philosophy”, Aristotle was regarded as the leading light.  There is some overlap in these 
domains of philosophy and theology, of nature and supernature (e.g. that God “is” as First 
Cause), but there are truths that the supernatural alone can reveal (e.g. that God is Trinity).  
There are also truths that philosophical reflection on common experience can give that 
Revelation does not, such as that the “sentient faculty never exists without the nutritive” 
(Albert, Denise et al. 1984, p. 108).
43
    Still, Aquinas believes that Aristotle (representing 
natural or philosophical reflection) gave the correct basic outline about human well-being 
and the natural virtues.    
Aristotle’s version is of course incomplete and requires completion from supernatural 
revelation.    This is important because this distinction between philosophy and theology 
(or natural and supernatural revelation) “is the foundation of the distinction between the 
natural and the supernatural virtues” (Coplestone-S.J. 1985, p. 316).  The human virtues 
operate in the realm of natural reason and effort (e.g. agency, solidarity, structures); the 
theological virtues are given by God and are entirely a gift of grace “beyond the natural 
capacity of human beings” (Rahner 1998, p. 1).  There is a latent disposition in human 
nature for the theological virtues, but this is activated only by divine grace, not human 
agency.  Though the theological virtues complete, in a way the natural ones, they are quite 
different.   All of this is confirmed by Aquinas’ own description:  these virtues are called 
                                                          
42
 One cannot speak of "Thomism" or "neo-Thomism" as though it might be a single theology or school. 
From universities, or more frequently from religious orders, came a variety of interpretations of Aquinas 
(O'Meara 1997, p. 270).   
43
 Likewise there are natural virtues that were hidden to Aristotle that reflection on humanity’s true end 
discovered, such as the virtue of religion:  “that by which men give God his honour and due not merely as 
final Cause, but Creator and exercising Providence” (Coplestone-S.J. 1985, p. 410).   This is an example of 
what theology can bring to philosophy, the latter being understood as striving towards an ever more adequate 
characterization of the human condition. 
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theological “first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us rightly to God; 
secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; thirdly, because these virtues are 
not made known to us, save by divine revelation” (in Jones 1969, p. 269). 
But the ultimate end of both of these domains for Aquinas—the natural and the 
supernatural—is the attainment of contemplative or theoretical wisdom, not practical 
wisdom.
44
   The end of nature’s powers (the natural virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, 
and temperance) is ultimately not practical wisdom but the truth of supratemporal 
universals, a fact which Aristotle asserted from the realm of philosophy under the name 
episteme.   The end of the supernatural power (the supernatural virtues:  faith, hope, and 
love) is similarly related to contemplative reason in the “vision of God” (or “Beatific 
vision”), which is an intellectual apprehension of God’s unchanging esse, His essence 
intuited as an intellectual act.   Humans are to discern the “species intelligibles”, the pure 
abstract truths and ideas that characterize Goodness as such (God), and no particular 
instantiation of it (Kirk 1931, p. 548).  Aquinas demonstrated that knowing God (God’s 
unchanging essence) is a more proper characterization of the telos of human life than 
loving God, which clearly is the effect of (or at least remarkably similar to) the Aristotelian 
privileging of contemplative reason over practical.    While Aquinas does make some 
concession for the unlearned, and did much to enhance regard for the corporeal character 
                                                          
44
 Aquinas writes: 
For perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are 
directed all the products of art that are necessary for life.  Moreover, it requires freedom from the 
disturbances caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and of 
prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which the whole governance of the civil life is 
directed.  So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations appear 
to serve those who contemplate the truth … and since happiness must consist in operation of the 
intellect in relation to the most noble intelligible objects … It is therefore evident … that man’s 
ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God (Albert, Denise et al. 1984, p. 114).   
The highest activity in man (operation of the rational intellect), is to be directed in contemplation of not 
merely scientific universals, but the “most noble intelligible objects”—God or Goodness itself—and thus all 
of life, including the moral and theological virtues, are ordained to this supreme end. 
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of human existence,
45
 the privileging of the contemplative over the practical, of theoria 
over praxis, became the basis for scholasticism.  
It must be pointed out how alien this approach is to Eastern Orthodoxy.
46
   Thomism (at 
least as it is characteristically understood) presents a vision of human happiness 
(eudaimonia) as intellectual participation in the Godhead.  One Orthodox writer comments:  
Aquinas’ teaching on the beatific vision exhibits with particular clarity the differences 
separating him from the eastern tradition.  The most immediately obvious is that, whereas 
for the East God [God’s essence or nature] is beyond knowing, Aquinas regards him as the 
highest intelligible object.  Aquinas is aware of this disagreement (Bradshaw 2004, p. 255).    
Orthodoxy uncategorically denies this possibility.  Gregory of Nyssa affirms that not even 
the angels know the essence of God to show that this inability is not a result of sin or 
weakness but is a result of creaturely existence per se (Bradshaw 2004, p. 255).   In 
Orthodoxy, this is a doctrine known as apophaticism (shared with other traditions, but 
differently deployed) and linked with the important essence/energies distinction of Gregory 
Palamas that will be investigated in the final chapter of this thesis.    
7.4.3 Maritain and Catholic Social Teaching 
Instead of continued exegesis of Aquinas texts, Jacques Maritain will now be analyzed as 
he was highly influential in the modern revival of Thomism and provides remarkably clear 
language concerning what Aquinas’ main theses are taken to mean.  Pope John Paul II 
hailed Maritain as an interpreter of Aquinas (Kerr 2007, p. 168).  
                                                          
45
 “Saint Thomas … is perhaps the first Christian philosopher to take the corporeal character of human 
existence calmly” (Kirk 1931, p. 384).  Bodily and emotional goods (and perhaps not the highest in this 
scheme) are still genuinely good aspects of human existence.       
46
 The separation of grace and nature, while “somewhat alien”, is perhaps intelligible from an Orthodox 
perspective inasmuch as grace and nature cannot be entirely reducible to each other.      
 241 
Maritain writes that the “superiority of the speculative [or contemplative] over the practical 
intellect constitutes an essential thesis of Thomism” (Maritain 1966, p. 24), thus 
confirming the main contention in this section.
47
    As mentioned, the object of the practical 
intellect is a good to be done or accomplished, while the good of the speculative or 
contemplative is related to the Good itself, and this does not admit of degrees, change, or 
improvement.   Because of the superiority of the speculative over the practical intellect, 
humanity’s resemblance to God “is less in the practical than in the speculative intellect”, 
and this likeness or union with God is accomplished by a “personal and solitary act of each 
one’s intellect” (p.25).    Thomism posits that the most superior of all these intellectual acts 
is the beatific vision and “through the intuition of the divine essence, each blessed soul 
becomes God, in an intentional way” (p. 87).  Note that this is superior to the theological 
virtues, faith, hope, and love (lying in the sphere of practical reason) for these are 
something to be realized implying a lack, whereas the beatific vision is related to (here 
Maritain is quoting Aquinas) “the most perfect beatitude [which] resides in the speculative 
intellect” (p.26)—where nothing can be lacking.  Thus the theological “practical” virtues 
of faith, hope and love are ordained to and serve the higher good of the contemplative 
supernatural good of the beatific vision.   The following table has been constructed to keep 
track of these admittedly complex distinctions between natural/supernatural and 
practical/contemplative: 
 
 
 
                                                          
47Thomas Hurka also concurs with this analysis:  “the superiority of contemplation or theoretical pursuits 
over the requirements of practical wisdom—a prioritization that Aquinas and much of theology also 
inherited” (Hurka 1987, p. 730).  Hannah Arendt notices that Aquinas does give a role to the vita practica, 
but its purpose is not an end in itself, but to “exhaust the soul for contemplation” (Arendt 1998, p. 15).    
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Aristotle’s natural virtues—realm of 
human initiative (these are also Aquinas 
natural virtues); 
Aquinas’ supernatural  virtues—realm 
of Divine initiative; (no theological 
virtues for Aristotle); 
Contemplative natural: or 
supratemporal goods, species, or 
universals—the unchanging:  geometry, 
etc.  Mankind’s highest end (without  
faith); 
Contemplative supernatural:  the 
beatific vision: supreme object of 
theoretical intellect—mankind’s 
highest end according to Revelation; 
Practical natural:  justice/prudence, 
ethics, politics, etc.  Anything involving 
action or change; because this admits of 
change, it is less noble/eternal (“divine”, 
per Aristotle) than the contemplative. 
Practical supernatural: 
faith/hope/love; primarily related 
Godward, but also to neighbour love 
and positive change; because it admits 
of change, it is less divine than the 
contemplative. 
Source: Own Compilation 
Thomistic virtue theory encompasses all of these quadrants and relates them upward and to 
the right toward the quadrant of the beatific vision, the realm of contemplative, 
supernatural virtue. 
Here is a final extended passage about the towering role of the beatific vision, the highest 
form of grace in Thomism.  Note the “theory of social action” in this approach that 
Maritain does not shy away from:   
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Because of its perfect immanence and its high degree of immateriality, contemplative 
activity is the highest of human activities.  It binds man to things divine.   It is better than 
life on the human scale.  In supernatural contemplation it takes place according to a mode 
which is itself superhuman … received in its entirety from God.  To it are ordained the 
moral virtues ... It is from it [the beatific vision] that the works of the active life must 
overflow … And if a man be called to abandon his contemplation to come to the aid of his 
brothers or to serve the good of the community, the reason for this call is not at all because 
the good of the practical order is of itself superior to his solitary contemplation.  He must 
accept it only because the order of charity can require that an urgent necessity of a less 
elevated good, in the circumstances, be given priority (Maritain 1966, p. 26-27). 
The tensions within this approach (both in terms of the nature/supernatural division, and 
the contemplative/active) are not lost on virtue theorists operating within the Thomist 
tradition.     Some theorists such as Jean Porter emphasize less the supernatural virtues and 
more those natural and philosophical (i.e. Aristotelian) features of human existence (Porter 
1990).  On the other hand, theologians such as Pinckaers emphasize the theological or 
supernatural elements, the virtues infused by grace (Pinckaers 1999), as did Hauerwas.  In 
terms of that other distinction within Thomism (and Aristotle), the contemplative over the 
practical, Linda Zagzebski brings speculative wisdom (episteme) closer in line with and 
subordinated to practical wisdom (phronesis).    Zagzebski’s approach here is similar to 
that of Orthodoxy which is not to subordinate, but rather to superordinate the practical 
virtues and to ferret out the “theoretical aspect of practical wisdom” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 
218).  Zagzebski (like Porter above and others including Hollenbach) however does not 
attempt to integrate the supernatural virtues with the natural ones; neither does Andrew 
Yuengert who focuses on phronesis the “charioteer of the virtues” while relating these to 
human development, even though he claims to be following Aquinas (Yuengert 2010).
48
  
These do not discuss how, as the Catholic Catechism terms it, “The human virtues are 
rooted in the theological virtues, which adapt man's faculties for participation in the divine 
nature” (Paul-II 1993). 
                                                          
48
 At least in her major and celebrated work on virtue epistemology, there are no references to the 
supernatural/natural virtue distinction (Zagzebski 1996).    In a treatment of specifically Catholic 
environmental virtue ethics (Rourke 2011), the theological virtues are mentioned in passing, but no 
integration is attempted. 
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Exactly how are the human virtues rooted in the theological?  How do these two domains 
relate and does this have anything to do with human development?    This is a much 
debated question.  However, the argument defended here is that Maritain’s theological 
vision still has enduring value even if certain aspects of his neo-scholastic approach are 
abandoned.  Certain enduring and genuinely valid aspects of his thought, and why he was 
so influential (and beyond Christianity), can be in danger of being lost in wake of the 
dismantling of neo-scholasticism post Vatican II.    
But before addressing this question of how grace relates to nature, it is important to note 
Maritain’s larger influence.  As mentioned, Maritain is perhaps best known as a champion 
of Thomism, but his legacy is much broader.   In virtue of this neo-scholastic framework 
(or some might say despite it) he birthed influential concepts such as integral humanism 
that provided a framework for a Catholic theology of development.   He (with John 
Courtney Murray) helped reconstruct the adversarial relationship that Catholicism held 
with democracy (Maritain 1946; Hollenbach-S.J. 1995, p. 148).   Gustavo Gutierrez notes 
that Maritain was deeply influential in Latin America (Gutierrez 1980, p. 55) and 
especially in Chile (Doering 1987).  He is an important exponent of “personalism” and a 
defender of the “common good” (both of these will be discussed below).49   Among other 
things, he developed the antecedent of Rawls’ and Nussbaum’s “overlapping consensus”.50   
                                                          
49
According to Archbishop Lazar Puhalo:  
Personalism generally agrees with those Existentialist philosophers who hold that man has no essence and 
must form it by his decisions and actions. His autonomy makes man "the being who defines himself".  He 
is sine matre creatum. This will not equal the patristic concept of hypostasis, but rather asserts an 
existence without an essence. Man would, in this system, give birth to his own essence and he would 
constitute his own essence. A particularly disturbing aspect of this is the disunity of mankind that such a 
position indicates.  Orthodox Christianity understands that all mankind shares in the same essence, the 
[same] human nature (Puhalo 2008).    
Bishop Puhalo’s description of personalism’s lacking an essence that serves as a basis for human unity does 
not fit with Maritain’s personalism, as will be seen.  (Roubiczek 1966) makes a similar criticism of 
existentialism. 
50
That is, a theory concerning how people of different intellectual positions can nevertheless cooperate in 
practical matters.  “Men mutually opposed in their theoretical conceptions can come to a merely practical 
agreement regarding a list of human rights” (Maritain 1951). 
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Yet he is also famous for his championing of human rights and playing an authorial role in 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.    And as mentioned, 
Maritain’s Christian humanism had a significant influence on the social encyclicals of 
Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II (Sweet 2008). 
Maritain’s thought is still considered highly relevant, but is being selectively appropriated.  
David Hollenbach, an important thinker in his own right in terms of modern Catholic 
social thought and human rights, employs Maritain’s insights to make a case for the role of 
the common good in Christian ethics.   Hollenbach notes that the notion of contemplation 
of the Divine esse (presented above) as the starting point has been “rightly questioned” 
(Brackley 1980; Hollenbach-S.J. 2002, p. 133). Maritain’s neo-scholasticism is set aside. 
However, there is another omission of Maritain’s thought that may pose trouble for a 
theology of human development, and is directly connected with the desire to rehabilitate 
the role of “shared nature” running through the entirety of this thesis.   Hollenbach calls 
Maritain’s approach “personalist communitarian” for its central affirmation that 
“personality tends by nature to communion” (Maritain 1966, p. 47; Hollenbach-S.J. 2002, 
p. 130).   Social relations are dimensions of a person’s “perfections”; they are not 
compensations for individual deficiencies and are developed through communal 
participation which constitutes the “common good”.   This of course is correct as far as it 
goes.  But what Hollenbach fails to point out, and what Maritain consistently championed, 
was that shared nature, or the human essence or species (Maritain 1973, 187) served as a 
fundamental category for human dignity and solidarity.  The human essence or nature is a 
common good that is beyond empirically experienced community and extends out and 
beyond the “communitarian” dimension of the common good.   This omission of 
Hollenbach is odd because in his major chapter on “The global common good”, he 
conspicuously omits this feature.  And what is even potentially disturbing is that no 
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theological justification for global concern is given as an “alternative to both an abstract 
cosmopolitanism and a status quo acceptance of existing boundaries” (Hollenbach-S.J. 
2002, p. 221).  Hollenbach, instead of appealing to Maritain (or specifically Christian 
thinkers or texts), reverts to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s tepid “rooted cosmopolitanism” 
(Appiah 2006) as a way to balance these moral claims.   Perhaps Hollenbach believed that 
the shared essence was a hangover from Maritain’s neo-scholasticism.   If this is the reason 
for this omission, it is, however, a mistake. 
Maritain provides powerful theological accounts of shared human nature as a basis for 
solidarity, for a global common good—and these do not depend on his controversial 
starting point in contemplation.   Furthermore, Maritain balances this emphasis on essential 
nature with other features, namely a) the category of person and b) concrete communitarian 
forms of the common good.   Maritain roundly criticizes both nominalists (who deny the 
existence of universals) for whom “human unity is but a word”, but also false forms of 
parochial solidarity and notes that great evils (e.g. Nazism) sought to create essential 
differences within the universally shared human essence (Maritain 1944, p. 6-7).   It is 
important to emphasize just how Maritain’s “essential human unity” or natural law is not 
based on his controversial neo-scholastic starting point.   It is rather similar to Martha 
Nussbaum’s that discerns from within experience nature’s normal functions—a study of 
the inclinations of human nature.
51
   However, unlike Nussbaum who relies on the 
principle of each person’s capability, for Maritain “The term unity of mankind is the 
Christian name, and the truest name, of the equality in nature between men” (Maritain 
1944, p. 18).  
                                                          
51This is also Aquinas’s starting point:  “Therefore, the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to 
the order of natural inclinations” (Albert, Denise et al. 1984, p. 117).  
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Maritain’s theological anthropology thus operates with the three Trinitarian features 
maintained throughout this study:  persons, in relations of communion, within the medium 
of a shared nature.   Maritain never seems to have clearly separated out these three 
features, and he often distinguished and paired off differing features: the “sociability of the 
person and the properly human nature of the common good” (Maritain 1966, p. 55), or 
sometimes “faith in the dignity of the person and of common humanity” (Maritain 1946, p. 
39).   But all three categories are clearly operative.  Furthermore, this framework and 
especially the role of shared nature concerns Maritain’s very understanding of supernatural 
grace and its relation to the natural virtues, or the human side of development.  Maritain 
contends that there is an “urge of a love infinitely stronger than the philanthropy 
commended by philosophers”; this love: 
Surmount[s] the closed border of the natural social groups—family group and national 
group—and extended to the entire human race, because this love is the life in us of the very 
love which has created being and because it truly makes of each human being our 
neighbour.  Without breaking the limits of flesh and blood, of self-interest, tradition and 
pride which are needed by the body politic ... such a love transcends to all men and at the 
same time transforms from within the very life of the group, and tends to integrate all 
humanity... (Maritain 1946, p. 42).
52
   
Thus supernatural grace is the work of building the human family as a family of families.  
It is the communitarian cosmopolitan position articulated in this thesis.  This emphasis of 
working for the good of shared human nature is thus similar to Maximus’s emphasis.53   
Balthasar notes about Maximus that: 
                                                          
52
 Maritain was friends with and inspired by Henri Bergson.  This passage is a commentary on a section of 
Henri Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Bergson 1935).  Maritain cites extensively 
Bergson especially noting how democracy presupposes an ideal spiritual order (as natural law), and that, 
according to Bergson, Christianity is the historical inspiration behind this, even if it has become secularized.  
53
 Staniloae notes, however, that the other concepts, person and interpersonal communion, were still not very 
well developed in the Fathers (Staniloae 1994, p. 73). 
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his letters constantly emphasize the duty to "universalize" one's personal efforts as a means 
of realizing the unity of human beings in their identical common nature, as something 
willed by God (Balthasar 2003, p. 162).
54
  
With this in mind, the earlier question can be restated:   Is there hope of keeping the 
strengths of a natural law approach simultaneously with the focus on human action, 
community, and salvation history?    Maritain maintained a firm insistence on both natural 
law, but also that the Christian “narrative” or theological understanding of the virtues plays 
a decisive, even leading role for revealing new possibilities for natural law, new 
possibilities for human experience itself.  Note the following:    
As there is a flowering of the natural law which can be attained only with the help of the 
virtues of the New Law, there is also a human flowering, a real humanism of civil life 
which can be attained only with the help of these virtues (Maritain 1944, p. 27).  
This remarkable quote combines natural law, virtues, and the role of supernatural 
revelation, or the New Law in raising overall human moral standards.  History “under the 
influence of the Christian leaven” (Maritain 1946, p. 43) gives rise to a new understanding 
of natural law, a new realization about what is possible for humanity and thus a revised set 
of moral expectations—and this widely recognized and not just to the eyes of faith.    Ab 
esse ad posse, valet illation—from reality to possibility is a valid inference.  Maritain thus 
addressed the question of how grace perfects nature in that grace, as a higher love, opens 
the heart to the love of all, and especially those “poor beings who have the same essence as 
we have ourselves, and the same sufferings, and the same natural dignity” (Maritain 1944, 
p. 108).   Human rights is a concrete example of this dynamic for Maritain—how the 
outworking in history of Christian energies gave rise to a new and generally accepted set of 
moral expectations, birthed within, but now operative outside of explicit Christian 
presuppositions.   
                                                          
54
 Balthasar writes of the importance of Maximus, that if he has understood him correctly, “then Maximus 
surely takes on an unexpected relevance for today's intellectual scene. He is the philosophical and theological 
thinker who stands between East and West” (Balthasar 2003, p. 25).    
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Many, including Hollenbach, believe that Maritain’s moral vision can be kept without his 
neo-scholastic starting point in contemplative reason.   This would indeed seem desirable. 
But a separate question (and perhaps confounded by Hollenbach) is whether Maritain’s 
moral vision can be coherently articulated if shared human nature as a theological category 
recedes from view.  The contention here is that this would entail considerable losses.  
Furthermore, this could affect the intellectual coherence of the catholic encyclicals 
inasmuch as they are based on his thought.55  This question is thus vitally important as 
several of these encyclicals have played a tremendous role in human development.  The 
account now turns to a brief investigation of three of these, which are also the context for 
the deployment of a “new” development virtue in Catholicism—solidarity.  
Populorum Progressio (On the Development of Peoples), written in 1967 by Pope Paul VI, 
was an historic bellwether, predating the UN Declaration on the Right to Development 
(1986) by twenty years.  Populorum emphasized that economic development should 
benefit all humankind and not just the few.  It called for integral or authentic human 
development, that is, development in all its dimensions; it condemned massive disparities 
in wealth and heavy military expenditures in light of widespread suffering; it was an 
eloquent call to action.  These insights are commonplace now, but at the time were 
revolutionary.  The opening paragraph notes: 
The progressive development of peoples is an object of deep interest and concern to the 
Church. This is particularly true in the case of those peoples who are trying to escape the 
ravages of hunger, poverty, endemic disease and ignorance; of those who are seeking a 
larger share in the benefits of civilization and a more active improvement of their human 
qualities; of those who are consciously striving for fuller growth (Paul-VI 1967). 
                                                          
55
Catholic theology after Vatican II shied away from abstract notions of human nature, and moved towards 
concreteness and natural hierarchies of human experience.  This is an important corrective to an excessive 
focus on the human essence, but can be dangerous if taken too far.  One author argues that Catholic social 
thought has been “concocted” on the basis of Maritain’s “equalitarian” and natural rights misreading of 
Aquinas and his neglect of the body (McAleer 2005, p. xv).  However, even if this criticism is correct, this 
would not supplant its social teaching as Catholic theology is not beholden to Aquinas as it once was.    
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Populorum was an expression of the new spirit of Vatican II and one of the final speeches 
was dedicated to Maritain.   
Twenty years later, Populorum was commemorated by Pope John Paul II with a new 
Encyclical, Sollicitudo rei socialis.  Sollicitudo noted that the world, “while preserving 
certain fundamental constants, has undergone notable changes”.   These include increased 
unemployment, lack of housing, international debt, demographic problems, and the 
ideological bloc mentality between West and East.  Sollicitudo repudiated both Western 
capitalism and Communism, “both concepts being imperfect and in need of radical 
correction”.  “In order to be genuine, development must be achieved within the framework 
of solidarity and freedom, without ever sacrificing either of them under whatever pretext”.   
Sollicitudo mentions solidarity as a “new” virtue.  Solidarity emerges not merely through 
the recognition of greater global interdependencies, but that this “fact” must be infused 
with and guided by ethical values, and not merely instrumental ones.  Interdependence can 
lead to greater vulnerabilities, domination, and injustices, or, if ethically guided, it can be 
beneficial and life-giving, that is, if the virtue of solidarity is exercised.  Pope John Paul II 
defined his motto as Opus solidaritatis pax—peace as the fruit of solidarity.  Hollenbach 
calls solidarity “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common 
good” (Hollenbach-S.J. 1995, p. 189).   Solidarity involves agency, communal 
associations, and (for Sollicitudo) all exercised on behalf of global solidarity, or shared 
humanity:  
An essential condition for global solidarity is autonomy and free self-determination, also 
within associations such as those indicated. But at the same time solidarity demands a 
readiness to accept the sacrifices necessary for the good of the whole world community 
(Paul-II 1987). 
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Solidarity is added to the list of virtues to tie human action more closely to addressing the 
needs of the world.   Furthermore, this virtue must be exercised on multiple levels:  
personal, communal-institutional, and with global-institutional ramifications.    
But how is this virtue classified?   Would solidarity be a natural virtue, and thus connected 
to human effort and agency, or would it be a supernatural virtue, a “created grace” infused 
by God?   Solidarity would seem to be most closely associated with the theological virtue 
of love.  But as Hollenbach notes, 
Solidarity will not be found on the lists of cardinal [natural] virtues of prudence, justice, 
temperance and fortitude that were central for the Greeks and Romans, nor among the 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, enumerated by Christian thinkers of the past 
(Hollenbach-S.J. 2002, p. 189). 
This inability to place solidarity involves the separation of the domains of grace and 
nature.    This inability to place the “new” virtue solidarity shows the problematic nature of 
these divisions.   However, it seems clear that in the light of Vatican II, there is less 
concern to fit all experience into a timeless theological system, and more of a focus on 
practice, truth as doing, truth as transformation.   
The Catholic Church’s social teaching directly relating to human development did not end 
with Sollicitudo but continued in Pope Benedict XVI’s Encyclical, Caritas in Veritate, 
published in 2009.   Much of it retraces old ground, but notes globalization as a key feature 
of the 21st century.  A continuing fundamental theme is that "the development of peoples 
depends above all on recognizing that the human race is a single family".   Pope Benedict 
states that while reason alone can identify and quantify inequality, and while globalisation 
has made all humans interdependent, neither can establish the sense of fraternity which 
flows from God's love.   Christian “truth in love” concerns transformative praxis, but the 
ontological horizon is not abandoned: 
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Truth, in fact, is logos which creates dia-logos, and hence communication and communion. 
Truth, by enabling men and women to let go of their subjective opinions and impressions, 
allows them to move beyond cultural and historical limitations and to come together in the 
assessment of the value and substance of things. Truth opens and unites our minds in the 
logos of love: this is the Christian proclamation and testimony of charity. In the present 
social and cultural context, where there is a widespread tendency to relativize truth, 
practising charity in truth helps people to understand that adhering to the values of 
Christianity is not merely useful but essential for building a good society and for true 
integral human development (Benedict-XVI 2009). 
While there were many expressions of Catholic moral theology in the wake of Vatican II 
that distanced itself from natural law (ontology) in favour of scripture or liturgy, or 
especially salvation-history, Cardinal Ratzinger (well before becoming Pope) did not 
abandon the universal logos, but combined it with the particularity of salvation history and 
the sphere of human action.  He sought a multi-dimensional approach and criticized 
theologies that were rooted only in agency/freedom—Bultmann’s existentialism, or 
salvation history in opposition to metaphysics/ontology—the early Barth, or only in the 
political community—Moltmann and Metz (Ratzinger 1987, pp/ 171-192).    
Other solutions to this problematic have been sought by Catholic thinkers emphasizing one 
or other dimensions.  The work of Germain Grisez and John Finnis involves a “new” 
approach to natural law that grounds itself in practical reason (agency) alone.  The 
motivation for this arises precisely from the failure of scholastic theories (which start from 
theoretical/timeless reason) to adequately “recognize the open-ended quality of human 
nature” which left “no room for [persons] to unfold themselves through intelligent 
creativity and freedom” (Grisez 1983, p. 105-6).   This is important because the 
capabilities approach is linked with this natural law approach which will be examined in 
the next chapter. 
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The earlier question of relating supernatural revelation understood as salvation history to 
human development is admittedly a challenging problematic,
56
 and one that will be fully 
addressed in chapter nine.   There are undoubtedly other ways this problem has been 
addressed in both Catholic and Protestant theology.   For EO however, the virtues are 
central to this task.   With this in mind, this chapter had the modest aim of demonstrating 
some historical tendencies in relation to the virtues with a view to a) understanding why 
the virtues are frequently asserted to be incompatible with Christianity (e.g. Protestantism 
rejects them), and b) providing a backdrop for interpreting the distinctive EO approach 
especially in relation to Catholicism.  This background work is important because it will be 
seen over the next two chapters precisely how it is that the virtues, and the related notion of 
practical reason, bridge the conceptual chasm between faith and human development 
within EO.  
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 Ratzinger commented on its difficulty, pointed to the brilliance of, but ultimately unsatisfying nature of 
Rahner’s attempt to adequately address the relation between metaphysics/ontology and salvation-history 
(Ratzinger 1987, p. 163).   
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8. META-ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ORTHODOX VIRTUES 
Not all Orthodox thinkers emphasize the virtues in theosis.  John Zizioulas, for instance, 
relates concern for the virtues to a “moralism” that is inadequate for the real problem 
which he describes as overcoming death.
1
  However, Maximus the Confessor notes that 
humans manifest God in the world through virtues (Russell 2004, p. 278) and Irenaeus of 
Lyons noted that the virtues are a participation in Christ himself (Spidlik 1986, p. 76).   
Nicholas Cabasilas in a classic text wrote “to tend towards virtue is to worship God” 
(Cabasilas 1974) and Staniloae argued that the movement from image to likeness (from 
Being to Well-being) is through the virtues (Staniloae 2000, p. 90).   Staniloae is thus 
unexceptional in his emphasis on virtue.   However, before investigating the Orthodox 
catalogue of virtues as might be expected at this point, it is important to follow up on 
several “meta-ethical” aspects, which is to say about the overall approach of Orthodoxy.    
By gaining a better picture of the overall structure and landscape, individual virtues, their 
sequencing and priorities, can receive a more penetrating treatment.  Not only this, but a 
meta-ethical analysis can facilitate a more profound level of dialogue between traditions, 
both religious and social scientific, than merely comparing lists.   Thus the discussion 
about the specific Orthodox virtues will not take place in this chapter as might be expected, 
but will be postponed until the next. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows:   First, the claim that Staniloae is offering a 
“moral science” of human development will be examined in dialogue with Aristotle’s 
phronesis.   Second, the account will explore in more detail the non-separation of natural 
from supernatural virtues and the significance of this for linking theology with HD.    
                                                          
1
 “No, death is not conquered like that … By morality creation improves itself but it does not save itself from 
death” (Zizioulas 2002; Zizioulas 2006, p. 258; Bates 2010).    
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Following this, the priority of practical reason
2
 over contemplative reason will be analyzed 
in that practical reason is indeed prior, or first, but there are also follow-up stages in the 
movement from practical reason to contemplative reason on the road to theosis.   This is 
essential to address the true nature of Orthodoxy’s “mysticism”, about which there is much 
confusion.  Lastly, a profound correlation will be examined between Orthodoxy’s 
emphasis on practical reason, and its central role in development studies.     
8.1 A phronetic science of human development 
At the outset, the perhaps striking thesis is offered that Staniloae presents EO as a 
“science” of human development or well-being, but scientific only if this is understood in 
the phronetic sense of the term.   To understand this claim one can reflect on what calling 
something a “science” might mean.  As Aristotle noted long ago, the sciences must deal 
with “what is good for all cases, or for a specific type; because the sciences not only are 
said to be but are concerned with common facts”; it is “to the study of the universal … that 
the sciences deal” (Aristotle 2004, p. 280-281).   Aristotle’s genius in his account of 
phronesis or practical reason was to combine this “universal” feature of science with 
reflexive human activity within concrete situations, which is to say, a “science” of how 
rational principles apply in variable activity-contexts.  And this combination of the 
universal and particular of course involves judgment or wisdom that can never be reducible 
to these selfsame principles.   But if universality is a validating criterion for a “science”, 
Staniloae is certainly offering Orthodox theology as a human moral science.   Staniloae 
signals this intention on multiple occasions and in multiple registers.  He writes 
consistently of the principles which serve the “general development of humankind” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 211), but also how the selfish “passions” actually distort one’s ability to 
                                                          
2
 Practical reason is simply the English translation of phronesis; it is more close to the original Aristotelian 
sense and is to be distinguished from the Kantian; this will be explained briefly below. 
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perceive the logoi, and the ensuing moral obligation to develop these potentials in oneself 
precisely to develop others’.  These passions distort not only perception of the logoi as 
universal signposts to well-being, but the passions deter one from embracing “the general 
remedy by which we can return to the way of truth … the steps of this healing” which are 
the virtues.  Staniloae describes this process of growth as “a going out from isolation and 
an entrance into the universal” (Staniloae 2003, p. 213). 
That Orthodoxy values the “universal” can easily be confirmed by noting again its 
Trinitarian theological anthropology, where person, communion, and shared nature are all 
emphasized.
3
   There are structures that are universals: “reasons”,  “sleeping possibilities”, 
“categories of being which make up the world”, “natural possibilities and laws of nature”, 
“bundles of common attributes”, “examples of the same species”, “notions” or “essences” 
of things, and so forth (Staniloae 2003, p. 200).   Thus shared nature, or the universal 
underlying features, is one dimension of the Trinitarian anthropology, but this is the 
dimension that clearly signals that Orthodoxy can be amenable to a “science” of human 
development.     
And it is significant that Orthodoxy views not just nature (or Being), but aspects of theosis 
(or the movement to Well-being) as a “scientific” developmental process in that there is a 
method (Staniloae 2000, p. 200), and clear stages, and it operates within the parameters of 
nature’s laws.    Staniloae thus affirms that not just the category of Being involves nature’s 
norms, but the category of Well-being as well:  “the first stages of deification [Being and 
Well-being] … are subject to laws of nature” (Staniloae 2003, p. 366).   Only Eternal-being 
is beyond the domain of these laws.   Thus there are not only structures for Being, but for 
                                                          
3
 Obviously communion is a property of universal nature, but it has to be actualized in concrete situations and 
relationships in non-universal ways.  This concrete communion partakes of both the involuntary (or already 
given—e.g. one is born into this particular family with these particular relations and this genetic heritage) but 
also the voluntary in the sense that this already given must be actualized through agency.    
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Well-being, that is, the exercise of agency.  This structuring of human agency is the 
virtues.   
Many other doctrines illustrate this possibility of a “scientific” principle in Orthodoxy, 
even including the previously mentioned one of humans being a microcosm.  “Man shares 
his essence with all the categories of beings”, but is to exercise his agency in the 
unification of the entire creation (Spidlik 1986, p. 141).   Humans make real through work 
and bring to completion a unity of voluntary love that is already there “involuntarily”, as it 
were, structured in nature.
4
  Lastly, and to show the continuity of natural revelation and 
supernatural, Staniloae explicitly says that the Logos or Christ is the “natural law”, and 
contrary to claims that Orthodoxy holds no natural law, “a threefold incorporation [or 
embodiment] of the Logos can be spoken of:  in nature, in Scripture, and in His [Christ, the 
Logos] individual human body” (Staniloae 2003, p. 221), the latter being the most 
unambiguous expression.
5
   
The claim that Staniloae is offering a universal moral science can best be interpreted in the 
light of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, or what Staniloae himself calls the “skill of 
discernment” (Staniloae 2003, p. 196) or even more clearly, “the relationship of our deed 
or thing with the universal order” (Staniloae 2003, p. 197).    Phronesis, though variable, is 
not merely subjective; it is still a moral science and epistemological criteria exist to 
distinguish between truth and falsehood.  Worth mentioning again is Aristotle’s precise 
definition of phronesis as "a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to 
                                                          
4
 This seems to be one of Paul Ricoeur’s concerns via existentialism where freedoms are too unstructured.  
Human action within the world involves an ontology of selfhood where self, and being in the world, are 
correlates.  But it is not the mere “facticity” of the world as ground of being that is of concern, but that the 
world is structured as potentiality and actuality, as are humans, and there must be a “specific coordination” of 
human action with a larger world that is itself not formless (Ricoeur 1992, pp. 312-315). 
5
 In Christ’s Incarnation, “for the first time, [righteousness reached our race and] appeared to men in its 
reality and perfection” (Cabasilas 1974, p. 53).  But this is not a simple negation of human loves: “But if 
human love is so great, the divine love is inconceivable” (Cabasilas 1974, p. 47). 
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things that are good or bad for man" (in Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 2).  This is to say that 
Staniloae’s affirmation of Orthodoxy as a science of human development is basically 
Aristotelian in structure (or best illuminated by this parallel) and follows major features of 
the phronetic tradition.   This phronetic aspect of Orthodoxy is so foundational that it must 
be returned to later, but after the relationship between natural and supernatural virtues is 
examined.   
8.2 No natural-supernatural separation 
It has been mentioned many times that EO does not separate the virtues into natural and 
supernatural; it is now necessary to elaborate this and its relevance for connecting faith and 
development.
6
   All of nature, every dimension, is a manifestation of God’s creative power, 
including and especially the greatest gift, human agency, but no more so than when it is 
expressed in and for communion and an extension of this communion especially to the 
vulnerable, whoever they are.    
In EO, all the virtues are understood to involve the exercise of natural, God-given, powers.   
Maximus affirmed:  “The virtues are natural, i.e. they are expressions of man’s true nature” 
(Thunberg 1985, p. 102) and anything that thwarts this development can be viewed as 
sinful, whether it have an internal source in human agency, or external source in 
environmental/structural factors.  Theosis is identified with the development of human 
nature itself, the structures of human nature, but above all free will (Spidlik 1986, p. 101-
102), or as Staniloae puts it, “man endowed with reason, with conscience, and with 
                                                          
6
 Staniloae does occasionally reference the supernatural virtues, but this is related more to the category of 
Eternal-being and was treated under this heading above about deification in the “strict sense” which “belongs 
only to the ages to come” (Staniloae 2003).  Similarly, grace and nature are closely linked, but occasionally, 
with exceptional experiences such as Maximus’s discussion of Paul being caught up to the “third heaven”, 
grace by-passes nature.  But these are exceptional cases as the normal spiritual development process of 
Staniloae will make clear.   
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freedom” (Staniloae 1994, p. 1).    Because of the non-separation of natural and 
supernatural virtues, the entire set of Orthodox virtues can in principle also be part of the 
social sciences because they are viewed as natural features of human existence.  This 
clearly implies the possibility of an improved relationship between the social sciences and 
religion where the virtues are simultaneously supernatural and fully natural. 
In Orthodoxy what is natural is what God’s original intention in creation was.   Notice the 
following remarkable statement:  
Christ has preserved free will delivering it from the passions and setting it at peace with 
nature.  It is precisely through this harmonizing of the will with nature that the 
reconciliation of man with God is achieved (Staniloae 1980, p. 190). 
Reconciliation with God and nature are on a similar plane, a similarity which has 
consequences for the relationship between natural and supernatural virtues.  Christ restored 
“the greatness of the divine image” meaning that reason and freedom (precisely as features 
of human nature) are liberated; they are freed from enslavement to the passions, to 
selfishness and “hostile pleasures” (Cook 2010), and are given the renewed possibility to 
be harmonized with the good of nature.   And “harmonizing the will with nature”, or 
reconciliation with God, has both to do with the proper exercise of each and every human 
function, but also restoring the will to a concern for common human nature that has fallen 
into disrepair, been “shredded”, because of sin.  “The human will has cut the bond of unity 
between men by its own arbitrary and selfish choice” (Staniloae 1980, p. 190-191) and 
restoring, reactivating this dormant unity and the functioning of the relevant capacities is 
central to theosis.    Christ then is the archetype of humanity who recovers union with God 
precisely by restoring union with and between humans, and the proper exercise of human 
faculties or powers (Staniloae 1980, p. 191).     All of this is to describe, in Maximus’ 
language, theosis as “joining inclination to nature” (Bradshaw 2004, p. 201).  How does 
one participate in this uniting of the will with nature, or nature’s true intentions?  Christ is 
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the Logos, and all of creation, all of nature, participates in the one unique Logos through 
the logoi, creation’s structures, principles, and tendencies which are summed up in Christ.   
Humanity activates this by a “working philosophy” or “keeping the commandments” 
which are simply the two Great Commandments:  to love God and neighbour.  In the 
category of Well-being (and this is the domain of the virtues), salvation is a return to, 
activation of, future exploration and thus extension of (c.f. epektasis) nature’s good 
possibilities.   There is no “ontologically pure” nature to which supernatural grace must be 
added for it to commit virtuous acts” (Tollefsen 2008, p. 181).   Supernatural revelation or 
grace “merely” (Staniloae 1994, p. 1) provides a support for that immanent direction or 
movement within nature—the voluntary movement of the human creature if it is acting 
rationally.   
But at this point one might rightly ask:  if Orthodoxy does not separate the natural from the 
supernatural virtues, what are the differences then between, for example, Aristotle’s 
understanding of the virtues and those of EO?   Staniloae notes that in many respects the 
Fathers follow Aristotle especially in terms of the various faculties (Staniloae 2003).   But 
there are at least three key differences between Orthodox virtues and Aristotle that will 
briefly be mentioned:  a) a natural human capacity for relating to God; b) the expanded 
scope of relations with humankind; and c) the role of humility.    
First, unlike Aristotle for whom God as Unmoved Mover is by definition indifferent to 
human concerns, it is “natural” in Orthodoxy for humans to have a tendency for 
communion with a God who has exercised his love (philanthropia) for them, even if only 
experienced dimly in creation.  Basil notes that the love of God is “innate in our souls and 
implanted by nature” (in Spidlik 1986, p. 299).  It appears to be a paradoxical part of the 
created to seek after the Uncreated.   There is, as was seen in the section on Eternal-being, 
an “ontological longing of our nature” (Staniloae 2003, p. 34) for the Transcendent.  Even 
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Aristotle’s preference for contemplation of the more “eternal” universal can be interpreted 
as a dim example of this human aspiration.   More fully for Orthodoxy, as natural 
properties “humans were endowed with tendencies [logoi] toward the good of communion 
with God and his fellow human beings” (Staniloae 2000, p. 103).  Well-being is 
multidimensional, but one of these dimensions is a capacity, expressed as longing, for 
communion with the Ultimate. 
The second difference with Aristotle is indeed about neighbour relations and is the 
Christian answer, versus Aristotle’s, to “Who is my neighbour?”, or, as one might say in 
Aristotle’s terms, “who is my friend”?  Aristotle notes that justice is connected to intimacy, 
to close friendships.    Goodwill is undeveloped friendship (Aristotle 2004, p. 239) and 
Aristotle is known to have argued for a limited scope of deep friends, as did Cicero (Cicero 
1971).  This leads to a sliding scale of moral commitments.  “It is natural that the claims of 
justice should increase with the intensity of friendship” (Aristotle 2004, p. 215).  Thus one 
dimension of the Incarnation, or grace, is meant to address this limited scope of concern.  
The Gospel is Good News for all because it is a moral vision aiming to extend the radius of 
concern beyond intimates and special relations.   While a cosmopolitan ethic that 
completely ignores special relations such as family is morally reckless, Christianity 
nonetheless seeks to extend the radius of moral concern beyond that of an Aristotelian or 
Ciceronian understanding of justice as tied to intimate friendship.  Aristotle’s methodology 
of appealing to social convention furthermore prevents him from challenging social 
conventions in a radical fashion.   The Samaritan story, as the decisive answer to the 
Christian question of “who is my neighbour”, aspires toward this moral universalism. 
Lastly, and this is linked with the two above, is the virtue of humility.   Aristotle’s portrait 
of the “magnanimous man” (the megalopsuchia, the “great-souled” mentioned briefly in 
chapter 6) is the opposite of humility.  Aristotle argues that the megalopsuchia is “disposed 
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to confer benefits, but is ashamed to accept them” and this because “one is the act of a 
superior and the other that of an inferior”.   The megalopsuchia takes on few tasks, except 
when they are “grand and celebrated”.   And: 
The accepted view … is that his gait is measured, his voice deep, and his speech unhurried.  For 
since he takes few things seriously, he is not excitable, and since he regards nothing as great, he 
is not highly strung … (Aristotle 2004, pp. 97-98). 
These traits are celebrated because they “are more consistent with self-sufficiency”.   This 
is in starkest contrast with the role of humility as a virtue in Christianity, emblazoned for 
all time when the “Teacher” donned the servant’s towel and scandalized the inner circle of 
his disciples by washing their filthy feet—and commanding them precisely in his quality as 
their Lord and Master, to do likewise.  Indeed, there can be no doubt that this ideal, derived 
from the Christian story, has become part of the common apprehension of humanity where 
“servant leadership” is commended in various domains (Greenleaf 2002). 
These three departures from Aristotle are interrelated.   Because God cares for all of 
humankind and is not indifferent, this expands the circumference of moral concern and to 
whom the virtue of justice should be exercised.  This in turn gives rise to a set of virtues 
that are less aristocratic and haughty, and orientated directly to social inclusion.   Christian 
virtues, however, are not mere abstract ethical principles that exist in a textbook (even 
Scripture); rather they emerge from reflective practice, from following the example and 
teachings of Christ as the new Adam, God’s full intentions for humanity—and this as the 
point of departure for practical reason or wisdom.   
It will be seen that Orthodoxy puts an emphasis on the virtues of “repair”,7 a set of virtues 
that are aimed not so much at giving a complete description of all dimensions of virtue or 
                                                          
7
 This “repair” is not to be confused with a juridical understanding of forgiveness of sins.  It includes 
forgiveness in the sense of God giving the human creature a new beginning.  Orthodoxy does see the cross 
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human functions, but at the more fundamental task of getting humanity back on track for 
well-being—and working for the well-being of all.  And placing practical reason prior to 
contemplative is critical for this reorientation. 
8.3 Practical Reason prior to Contemplative 
For Staniloae and the Orthodox tradition in general, this concern with getting humanity 
back on track has to do with prioritizing practical reason over contemplative.  There is a 
formula in Orthodoxy that is generally followed:  praxis precedes theoria, and it is only 
through praxis one can ascend into theory or contemplation (Spidlik 1986, p. 334).   Or as 
Staniloae puts it: 
The believer who wants to gain perfection, before he becomes a gnostikos (a knower) must be a 
praktikos (a doer).  Someone can’t see the logoi in things and by them God the Word, the 
Logos, if he hasn’t first dedicated himself to a “working philosophy” or to a “doing of the 
commandments” (Staniloae 2003, p. 43).   
This attempt to mitigate the effects of Greek rationalism (that also deeply affect theology) 
was simply the awareness that the mind or rational faculty is not separate and unaffected 
by one’s overall moral or spiritual orientation, or what is called “the heart”, the principle of 
unity within a person (Spidlik 1986, p. 105).   This is a fundamental concern for 
Orthodoxy, and Staniloae criticized scholasticism in this regard:   
The separation between God’s knowledge as a theoretical occupation and his wisdom as a 
practical occupation appeared in the West at the same time as scholasticism, and suffers 
from an exalting of the value of speculative knowledge in itself, detached from a 
transforming role that would thus connect it with love (Staniloae 1994, p. 211-12).    
                                                                                                                                                                                
playing this role: “We were justified, first by being set free … in that He who had done no evil pleaded for us 
by dying on the cross.  By this He paid the penalty for the sins which we had audaciously committed …” 
(Cabasilas 1974, p. 53). But theosis involves human agency in bringing about well-being or fullness of life 
for all, following Christ as example.   This will be detailed in chapter nine. 
 265 
However, before discussing in further detail Orthodoxy’s giving praxis priority to theoria, 
several cautions are required to avoid misinterpretation.   First, it is important to note that 
praxis here does not mean necessarily what it means in the West.  Praxis is related not only 
to social action or charity—it is this—but also relates to worship, to the practice of the 
liturgy, as well as moral asceticism and purification (Spidlik 1986).   Staniloae censures 
Western thought for separating dogma from “practice”, and this sense of praxis is indeed 
related to worship, but it is also related to social ethics, to “keeping the commandments” 
primarily understood as charity.  Staniloae would see these various understandings of 
praxis as an integrated whole in the Church, mutually implicating, and to abstract one 
dimension is to distort the fullness.   However, and this is the second caution, praxis is all 
too often understood as only the liturgical actions in the Church, and this is a major 
obstacle to a theology of development.   This limited understanding of praxis led to a 
privatized and ritualized understanding of religion.  This was enforced by Communism 
where religion was allowed no public role except praising the achievements of the 
communist party (Stan and Turcescu 2000, p. xiv).    However, Staniloae links the liturgy 
or practice within the church with the practice outside the Church, a theme which 
Staniloae’s disciple Ion Bria termed: “the liturgy after the liturgy” (Bria 1996).8  Third, and 
perhaps more obviously, Staniloae’s account of practical reason should not be confused 
with Kant’s.   Immanual Kant grounded the principles of ethics in individual reason and 
freedom alone (like Amartya Sen) and thus the discovery of his supreme (and highly 
abstracted) principle of practical reason, the “categorical imperative” (Beck 1984).9   These 
                                                          
8
 Bria references John Chrysostom who uses a beautiful metaphor of the Eucharist being food for “pilgrims” 
on their way from the altar of service in the sanctuary to the altar of service in the public square.  The term 
“liturgy” has a rich Greek background and meant public service.  Wealthy citizens were expected to 
discharge public needs at their own expense: outfit a warship, sponsor a festival, and many other public 
beneficences.   
9
 Kant (via the “categorical imperative” which is highly abstract) radically altered and many argue distorted 
the nature of Aristotelian practical reason that was concerned about right action for a specific situation.  The 
academic literature surrounding DS, especially Nussbaum (as well as philosophers like Ricoeur), use 
practical reason in the non-Kantian sense, and that is the sense intended here.  Sen distances himself from this 
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cautions being given, the account of how Orthodoxy does indeed prioritize praxis over 
theoria can proceed. 
The prioritization of practical reason over contemplative reason in Orthodoxy is expressed 
in many ways:  “the road to knowledge passes through the observance of the 
commandments”, “virtue precedes knowledge”, Orthodoxy as “mysticism”, and perhaps 
most significantly, in the Liturgy itself. 
Immediately before reciting the Creed in the Eucharistic Liturgy, we say these words:  "Let 
us love one another, so that we may with one mind confess Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the 
Trinity one in essence and undivided".  Note the words "so that".   A genuine confession of 
faith in the Triune God can be made only by those who, after the likeness of the Trinity, 
show love mutually towards each other (Ware 1998, p. 38). 
This asserts that theological truth is impossible without loving praxis, and in some sense, is 
prior to theology.  Indeed, “faith” itself in the scriptures and the early church often means 
praxis, not just belief, but the “lived” Christian life, which is impossible without charity.   
Charity, the pinnacle of praxis, proves the correctness of theoria (Spidlik 1986, p. 11).    
There are many reasons why practice is prior to theory, but perhaps the most important one 
for a theology of human development is that nature’s real or intended properties will not 
emerge without loving actions.  There are emergent human qualities that depend on certain 
kinds of practical activity (and emotional/dispositional states) for their development.  This 
is to say that the realm of contemplation (Aristotle’s realm of episteme, or universal 
features or structures of human existence) cannot even be conceptualized properly as 
properties of the human without preceding action to unlock, develop and discover these 
potentials.  There is thus a fundamental difference with neo-scholasticism (discussed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
universalizing aspect of Kantian practical reason with a position known as “positional objectivity”, or action 
that is right for a particular situation (Sen 2002).  
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previous chapter) in that a dynamic relationship is presupposed between moral agency 
(Well-being) with nature’s ontological structures (Being).   
Furthermore, it is not just any type of practical activity that unleashes universal potentials 
or functions.   As Rousseau quoted Aristotle on the title page of his famous Discourse on 
Inequality: “What is natural has to be investigated not in beings that are depraved, but in 
those that are good according to nature” (Rousseau 1997, p. 113).  Thus only the activation 
of nature’s tendencies and the relation of actions to outcomes, studied over intervals of 
time and even generations, can reveal nature’s true properties or structures (the realm of 
episteme).    And one can never rest content with any particular configuration because 
nature’s potentials are dynamic, not locked in time.  Thus nature’s structures cannot be 
fully conceptualized without human intervention that in turn acts on and develops these 
selfsame structures.  
8.4 Staniloae’s Three Stages 
EO does not focus only on praxis, but it does start there.  There is another analysis—in 
addition to the Being, Well-being, Eternal-being progression—of the movement in theosis 
that bears further examination in that it starts not with Being, but with the Well-being, 
agency, or practical reason category—thus reversing the temporal relationship.  Staniloae 
develops this considerably and there are three clear stages.   These are:  1) the life of 
practical reason, 2) natural contemplation, and 3) theological contemplation. 
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8.4.1 Practical Reasoning or phronesis (First stage of spiritual ascent) 
Phronesis, it will be remembered, is practical reason or wisdom,
10
 and is the 
comprehensive life of virtue, and virtue is constitutive of theosis.   While the term praxis 
used above clearly denotes activity or action, it does not capture the fullness of phronesis.   
Phronesis is a more comprehensive term and includes action, but also denotes rational 
reflection, and both of these in regard to what is good or bad for humans.  Many aspects 
relevant to this stage have already been touched upon, thus new directions will be 
emphasized.  However, a greater understanding of phronesis in EO is significant because 
the social sciences are being revitalized around this concept (Bellah 1982; Taylor 1993; 
Richardson 1994; Flyvbjerg 2001). 
Moral or practical reason
11
 discerns the logoi or rational principles of existence, but only 
through extended experience with, and reflection upon action.   But there is a problem:  the 
beginner is without experience!  This is why it is said that wisdom or phronesis starts with 
keeping the commandments, because the commandments are the beginning commitment 
and steps of a life consciously orientated towards the two irreducible goods of human 
existence, love of God and love of neighbour.  Thus unlike most modern practical 
                                                          
10
There is a deep connection between Staniloae’s understanding of practical or moral reason, and the Trinity.  
He writes:  
Wisdom in this sense can have no other bases than the perfection of the Trinitarian communion.  Through 
wisdom God wants to lead all things towards the perfection that radiates from that communion ... [and] it 
is only life together that implies or demands the efforts made to achieve wisdom (Staniloae 1994, p. 214). 
11Staniloae’s terminology varies considerably which is why both “moral” and “practical” reason are 
mentioned.  Typically, a contrast is made between praxis and theoria, but these are some expressions 
illustrating the same basic contrast: a) practical discernment versus contemplative knowledge; b) diakrisis 
(discernment) versus gnosis; c) the discerning of good versus evil in a particular circumstance versus 
understanding the universal logoi; d) work of a “practical nature” versus contemplative; e) the work of 
virtuous activity versus the insights of faith;  and f) being a praktikos (worker, doer) versus theoretikos (seer 
or contemplative) (Staniloae 2003).   This distinction was fundamental in classical philosophy and was 
picked up by the Fathers.   Gregory Nazianzen writes: “Understand by theoria an examining of the 
intelligibles (skepsis noeton) and by praxis the sphere of action” (Spidlik 1986, p. 179).    
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reasoning approaches, Orthodoxy starts with an explicitly ethical orientation to safeguard 
the accumulation of a certain quality of experience. 
Orthodoxy affirms that only the person aiming to act in accordance with the logoi, and 
extended reflection on this process, can approach being fully rational.  There are (at least) 
three distinct dimensions to this “virtue epistemology”, two positive and one negative.  The 
first (and already mentioned) is that the very “logos” of the human person consists in the 
active use of various faculties, not in their mere possession. Discernment of the logoi or 
proper tendencies is only possible through practical activity inasmuch as many of them are 
emergent properties.  Second, these various laws and functions (logoi) exist in complex 
intra and inter-subjective relations and even more complex historical situations; thus there 
is no formulaic way to know what the right course of action is in any specific context.  
Third, Christian phronesis involves a type of ascetical self-restraint so that the moral 
claims for the development of the vulnerable “other” can be heard over the din of one’s 
own cravings.   
This ascetical dimension helps ensure a positive outcome for reasoning and action.  
Asceticism can aid rationality by keeping the mind from tricking itself as to its own true 
good as a shared good, and thus its good as interconnected with others and the moral 
responsibilities involved therewith.  Without asceticism, one tendency or faculty in human 
nature, such as appetite, can gain hegemony over reason and reason then becomes 
rationalization; reason does the bidding of the appetite provincially conceived, versus the 
appetite serving the greater whole of human nature.   Addiction is such a case and it can 
lead to “the destructive research of lust”, a brilliant phrase coined by Maximus the 
Confessor (Thunberg 1985, p. 156).    The life of virtue (or phronesis) is thus connected 
with the disposition and clarity of mind for the moral agent “to be enlightened in regard to 
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his purposes and duties” (Staniloae 2003, p. 113).     This is why the whole person must be 
strengthened as “the will is a function of our entire nature” (Staniloae 2003, p. 104). 
Building on the experience learned from obedience to the basic commands,
12
 phronesis is 
the name for the increased capacity for action and reflection on the consequences of 
action—and thus how to “best size up the circumstances of every situation” (Staniloae 
2003, p. 196).  Phronesis is how best to realize the command to love in every varied 
circumstance and only “striving by deeds accustoms me with these judgments” (Staniloae 
2003, p. 214).   Staniloae echoes Aristotle’s language when he writes:  “We must exercise 
ourselves in sensitive acts to gain sensitivity”, exercise ourselves in faithful acts to become 
faithful, but above all, exercise ourselves in charitable acts to become charitable (Staniloae 
2003, p. 163).  It is worth noting how Staniloae’s presentation of practical reason parallels 
phronetic social science discourse concerning the requirements of context, experience, 
intuition, bodily sensation, trial and error, all of these including but going beyond analysis 
and discursive rationality towards expert judgement (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 23).   Ethics can 
never be reduced to following rules, as understanding the rules of a game is not the same as 
playing the game (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 43).   Staniloae notes that “We realize that 
discernment (diakrisis) is based on evidence larger than what we can include in our 
judgement or conception” (Staniloae 2003, p. 215).  Experienced persons of mature 
judgement know more than they can explain.  Notice Staniloae’s version where these 
themes are explicit: 
By exercise the power of observation is sharpened more and more, as well as the 
comprehension of the logoi of things, the intentions of God by them, and the consequences 
of our deeds for our neighbours and ourselves (Staniloae 2003, p. 216). 
                                                          
12
 Also, the commands are underspecified such that they cannot be exercised without considerable use of 
practical reason or discernment. 
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It is significant that “prudence”, a no longer viable translation of phronesis, is connected 
with “foresight”, of seeing “what is coming up in the road”.   Phronesis is seeing the likely 
consequences resulting from a certain course of activity.   Phronesis is a growth in this 
virtue of foresight, a growth in the capacity of predicting the outcomes, good, bad, and 
mixed, for actions and dispositions.   Furthermore, acquiring phronesis is no simple matter 
because principles or actions which may at one stage of life be seen as ultimate, at a later 
are seen as interlocked and subordinate to other and higher principles.   This growth in 
moral judgement involves a lifetime of “learning by doing”, and this largely as problem-
solving, sharing one another’s burdens.  Staniloae wisely suggested that "Orthodoxy must 
go beyond its theoretical anthropology to become like a Saint, involved in the specific 
human  relationships found in the complicated circumstances of our daily lives” (Staniloae 
1980, p. 19).    
“Wisdom is justified by her children,” which is to say that judgement about wisdom’s true 
nature must be taken by evaluating its effects “over a lifetime”, or, to take the maxim 
literally—several lifetimes.  As mentioned, much modern moral philosophy tends to take a 
“snapshot” view of ethical decision-making “in isolated moments of choice”, ignoring 
patterns of motivation, history, the narrative structure of the self, and is thus defective 
(Nussbaum 1999, p. 172).  Practical reason (of the non-Kantian variety) on the other hand, 
demands a narrative structure.   But as has been emphasized, certain ways of focusing on 
narrative can create distance from common human experience as was seen with Stanley 
Hauerwas and the early MacIntyre.   The Christian philosopher Paul Ricoeur has offered 
helpful insights in connecting narrative with practical reason.   He notes that “narrative 
intelligibility shows more kinship with practical reason or moral judgement than with 
theoretical reason” (Ricoeur 1995, p. 239).  He notes that through the “art of emplotment” 
(giving something a narrative structure), the actions, dispositions, contexts, situations, 
reversals of fortune, and triumphs or failures of a specific moral agent can be woven 
 272 
together into a meaningful whole.  It is through narrative that not timeless laws, but 
nonetheless rational patterns linking actions and consequences, virtue and well-being, 
emerge.   Narratives in turn shape the identities of persons in communities who share 
certain stories.   But lest one think that Ricoeur champions Hauerwas’ strongly 
communitarian position that isolates Christian experience from that of humanity, Ricoeur 
notes that the application of “narratology” to Biblical narratives “testifies to this continuity 
between religious and nonreligious narratives” (Ricoeur 1995, p. 241).   Some stories have 
universal relevance.  Ricoeur’s point is helpful here because he connects narrative and 
practical reason/phronesis in a way that does not a priori segregate Christian experience 
from the concerns of wider humanity.
13
  However, Ricoeur also notes that biblical 
narratives “intensify” some “traits that have been overlooked” in general narratives, a point 
which will be examined more thoroughly in the next chapter.    
Thus phronesis is not only about the capacity for action, not only about right judgement in 
regards to action and its moral ends, but also involves weaving all of these dimensions 
(action, rational reflection, moral ends) into a coherent pattern through time.  However, the 
plurality of human goods and their interaction with variable history and traditions means 
that what counts for wisdom, or what Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluation” (Taylor 
1993), can indeed vary significantly between traditions.  One would not hear Aristotle 
arguing a strong case for this taken directly from the Orthodox Lenten ascetical readings:  
“Open your mouth for the dumb, for the rights of all who are left desolate.  Open your 
mouth, judge righteously; maintain the rights of the poor and needy” (Monastery 2012).14  
                                                          
13
 In other words Ricoeur can further conceptualize how special revelation (Biblical narrative) and general 
human experience (philosophy) can be kept in a close relationship.  
14
 This passage is from Proverbs 31. 
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Thus there is a Christian phronesis that must not only try and take into account the multi-
dimensional nature of human goods, but also “maintain the rights of the poor and needy”, 
which is to say, strive to remedy their situation.
 15
  And this points to an important 
weakness in Aristotle’s account of phronesis.   Aristotle’s account ignores the reality of 
conflict, of power relations, and how the pursuit of the good life can be systematically 
denied to some. 
Bent Flyvbjerg is among the recent voices arguing that a renaissance of the social sciences 
is possible by a return to phronesis (Flyvbjerg 2001).   But his contribution is more 
specific:  he exposes and corrects accounts of practical reason that fail to address 
asymmetrical relations of power.   Practical reason in its “naive”, pre-critical form 
addresses three “value-rational” questions: 
a)  Where are we going? 
b)  Is this desirable? 
c)  What should be done? 
However, as such, these three questions fail to scrutinize the “we” that is allowed, or not, 
to participate in the value-rational determinations.   Flyvbjerg, drawing largely from 
Foucault, includes this fourth question into the account of phronesis: 
d)  Who gains and who loses; by which mechanisms of power (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 
145)? 
                                                          
15
 If phronesis aims at eudaimonia, then it is clear that Biblical wisdom aims at eudaimonia for all, and 
especially the vulnerable.  “Blessed is he who considers the poor!  The Lord delivers him...”  (Psalm 41:1).    
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Critical “phronetic” analysis will lead one to investigate in society what Machiavelli calls 
the verita effettuale, the “effective truth” of empirical processes that have little to do with 
the idealized theoretical formulations employed in the social sciences (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 
145).   Both Aristotle and modern day social sciences exhibit these blinds spots.  The 
following comparison is helpful in seeing the real challenges of human development: 
Think of the difference between the decisions of a lumberjack and those of a general.  When the 
lumberjack decides how to chop wood, he does not expect the wood to fight back; his 
environment is neutral.  But when the general tries to cut down the enemy’s army, he must 
anticipate and overcome resistance to his plans (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, p. 1).   
The social sciences and development studies often “think” like the lumberjack.  There are 
many problems with this, but one in particular means that corruption is insufficiently 
addressed.   “Prudence [phronesis] is learned through the difficult task of actually trying to 
accomplish the good in messy circumstances” (Yuengert 2010, p. 50).   These “messy 
circumstances” are intelligent and well-placed agents with privileged information and 
resources doing everything in their power (including large amounts of social capital among 
elites!) to maintain their privileges.   It is surprising that the social sciences (especially 
economics), which should be working with an understanding of these messy 
circumstances, has operated so long with such naive assumptions (Sumner 2006).   
The practice of corruption and effectively challenging it are both learned skills and thus 
domains of practical reason.  Strategy for evil must be met with and countered by strategy 
for good.   EO Churches could greatly benefit their societies, many of which are plagued 
by corruption, by playing a more visible role in its denouncement and encouraging active 
citizenship and public vigilance against this cancer.  The Church can hold up models that 
resisted power such as St. John Chrysostom or Grigory Petrov, the Russian Reformer 
(Benz 1963, p. 154-55).   However, even if most EO countries have a hard history behind 
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them, they also possess an understanding of theosis as phronesis or practical activity that 
can be tapped into.   
Practical activity or phronesis is thus the first stage of the spiritual ascent in EO.  
Clarifying the nature of EO practical reason is important because practical reason also 
plays a central role in DS as will be seen later in this chapter.  This first practical stage of 
the spiritual ascent however, gives rise to the second stage, characterized more by 
contemplation.   
8.4.2 Natural Contemplation (Second stage of spiritual ascent) 
Virtuous activity accustoms one to certain rational judgements that are not morally neutral, 
but partisan to human development.  By loving one’s Samaritan neighbour, one begins to 
see, to contemplate the shared aspects—those “others” which are in the human family.  
One begins to “see” something that was there all the time:  every human shares the same 
nature and vulnerabilities and are part of the same human family or community of moral 
responsibility.    So when Foucault writes, “Nothing in man—not even his body—is 
sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men” 
(in Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 100), it is the role of practical reason and asceticism in Orthodoxy to 
develop this very stability that Foucault dismisses.   
Thus if exercise in practical judgements is the first phase, this opens toward contemplation 
of the logoi within nature, the second phase.  The perception or intuition of the logoi of 
contemplation in turn reinforce and confirm the practical decisions if they are in line with 
God’s intentions—which are well-being for all.   There is thus an action-learning cycle 
between the domains of practical reason and contemplative.   Strictly speaking however, 
recognizing humanity’s shared or species nature is an aspect of contemplative reason 
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because contemplative reason by definition concerns universal truths, i.e. species level 
properties.  But, as emphasized above, action or praxis comes first:  “We arrive at this state 
of contemplation of various objective truths, of the certain logoi of things, only after a long 
preparation of a pronounced moral character” (Staniloae 2003, p. 209).  But with training 
and experience: “In time faith grows to a very brilliant evidence.   But it grows in the 
measure we obey the commands and gain the virtues” (Staniloae 2003, p. 128).  There is 
“truth or an objective sense in regard to everything.  This is what is meant by the term 
logos used by St. Maximus and by other church Fathers” (Staniloae 2003, p. 209).   
Staniloae goes on to explain that truth is not subjective, varying from one to another, but 
virtuous action is required to achieve the gradual realization of this truth and the 
“rationalizing” of persons.   
It is important to note the eco-logical basis for truth as contemplation.  Distorted reason 
sees things in isolation:  “it puts the general in service of the particular, hindering the 
normal development of the whole” (Staniloae 2003, p. 211), and both the particular and the 
whole (as well as relations of communion) have real ontological status.   But “everything 
has in an objective way its own sense, as well as purpose—a cause, a finality, and a special 
relationship with everything else” (Staniloae 2003, p. 209).   For humans, their “special 
relationship” is in the nature they already share, but this must realized in greater measure 
through communion.  This ecological perception of truth concerns the relationship to non-
human nature as well.  Staniloae’s volume two of his Dogmatics starts with a major 
section:  “Human Solidarity with Nature” (Staniloae 2000).  Nature, as a gift from a 
gracious God who is Tri-Unity, is already endowed with “dispositions for the good” of 
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communion and love and this is why “altruism” and lesser forms of practical reasoning can 
even be viewed in non-human nature (MacIntyre 1999; Burns 2006).
16
 
Sin, or irrational reason, neglects to see the interconnected and interdependent aspects of 
existence and is thus a form of corruption, of viewing human nature in isolation from 
others and natural context.   A principal role of the purified intellect and experience in 
judgement is the ability to see or contemplate things in their intended interrelatedness and 
wholeness, a wholeness that may not yet be actualized due to sin, neglect, apathy or simply 
underdevelopment.  Contemplative reason is thus related to faith in God as a good and 
wise Creator.  This means that faith optimistically intuits great possibilities lying dormant 
within nature—and as will be seen in the next chapter, faith of this sort is the first virtue.  
Contemplative reason can provide a vision of that wholeness that may not actually yet be, 
and provide motivation for virtuous action to bring about or restore this wholeness.  Yet if 
this is not to degenerate into dangerous illusions, it must be examined by the person 
experienced in action and reflection, the phronomos.  
Natural contemplation (this second stage—the first being practical reason) is mediated by 
creation and has to do with perceiving the logoi, the structures of creation or “the bundle of 
common attributes” that allow one to call something an essence or species (Staniloae 2003, 
p. 200).   It also can be understood as reflection on the general principles, factors, or 
conditions of healthy human development in general.   Returning to and further developing 
Staniloae’s example of linguistic development can be helpful here (Staniloae 2000, p. 35).   
                                                          
16
 Balthasar quotes Maximus the Confessor in a section entitled “The Contemplation of Nature”: 
God, the author of all visible nature, did not will it to move simply according to the laws of sense, but he 
scattered among all the species that comprise nature both intellectual meanings and the basic rules of 
moral behaviour; his purpose was that he might not only be praised loudly as Creator by dumb creatures, 
when the intelligible structure of the world points to him and announces his presence, but also that man 
might easily find the way of instruction that leads to him, being led upward by the laws and moral 
instructions that are hidden in visible things (in Balthasar 2003, p. 303). 
It is beyond the scope of this research, but there is considerable effort to show what Maximus affirmed, that 
all species have “both intellectual meanings and the basic rules of moral behaviour” (Midgley 1984; 1995).  
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Linguistic capacity is within the domain of contemplative reason (logoi) inasmuch as it is a 
universal feature of the human essence.  Literacy, however, stands with one foot, so to 
speak, in contemplative reason, and the other in practical reason.  This is because literacy 
is both a universal capacity of human existence (an “instinct to learn, speak, and 
understand language” (Pinker 1994, p. 17)), but also requires effort for its development.  
Grammatical structures are hardwired (“language organs and grammar genes”) into all 
human brains; however, specific languages, language acquisition and mastery are not, and 
even less the composition of a particular poem.  This recognition of the universal 
importance of literacy existing as a domain of natural contemplation, in turn, becomes a 
moral objective for practical reason—literacy’s increase.    Language acquisition combines 
Being (or natural contemplation) with Well-being (or practical reason),
17
  and in the EO 
framework is a dimension of theosis or salvation per se.  In all of this, it should be kept in 
mind that the domains of practical reason and natural contemplation can be entirely 
separated only in thought, not in concrete experience.   
Discerning the logoi in nature (i.e. natural contemplation) includes in principle all 
developmental norms, even basic biological functions and norms, and the “external goods” 
necessary for their fulfilment, such as proper nutrition.  Acceptable birth weights of babies 
can be considered “logoi” or natural norms within nature, as also can adequate quality and 
amounts of food to enable development.   Nature gives signals and alarms (and part of 
science is greater sophistication in detecting these) where human functioning becomes 
threatened or injured, that is, has fallen below a level at which proper functioning is 
imperilled.   This realm of natural contemplation includes these dimensions or thresholds 
and this in turn gives tasks for practical reason—including the importance of gathering 
good baseline information on health and other variables (Stewart 1989).  
                                                          
17
 Comparing the analysis here with the Being, Well-being, and Eternal-being categories, contemplative 
reason corresponds largely to Being, while practical reason corresponds largely to Well-being.    
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Staniloae insists time and again that theosis, this “ascent to God”, cannot be achieved 
without the simultaneous development of intellectual, emotional, and other human powers.   
This second stage of natural contemplation involves the continued activation of human 
powers and virtues/phronesis, but in a more profound dialogue with, and a deeper 
understanding of, the principles or logoi of existence, taking into view more factors.   
Natural contemplation is thus a further necessary step of theosis:  “there can be no 
bypassing the forms and laws of the cosmos on our way to God (Staniloae 2003, p. 205).   
And indeed, “to apprehend the logoi,18 is, in some form, to apprehend God” (Bradshaw 
2004, p. 203).   The objective logoi, not the subjective ones, serve the general development 
of humanity, “they are those which things in their healthy development move toward” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 211).   “God’s will, in other words ... follows the true line of the 
development of creation, in totality or of every fact in part” (Staniloae 2003, p. 209).   EO 
theology can be understood in this light as the contemplation of the possibilities of nature, 
or of Being, but these as continuously unfolding under the influence of the dual 
commandment of love. 
Practical wisdom (the first stage) and the contemplation of the logoi (the second stage) are, 
according to Staniloae, “two convergent peaks, which meet in love”.   This “love” can be 
seen in that natural contemplation is also aesthetic and relational.  Contemplation of nature 
is sensitive to the beauty within and between things and how these point beyond 
themselves:  “the spirit of natural contemplation … receives the proof of the creative 
Logos of all things from the beautiful order of visible things” (Staniloae 2003, p. 204).  
The “visible majesty of things” points to their origin in a loving Creator.   The logoi point 
to the Logos just as unity and diversity in the human community points to the Trinity.    
                                                          
18
 Staniloae believes that Thomistic Scholasticism follows a discursive reasoning (deductive method) as a 
way to “extract” the logoi from nature; Orthodoxy affirms a more intuitive method and one based on the 
previous stage of the purification of the irrational passions (Staniloae 2003, p. 206-7).   There is debate 
however about the degree to which Aristotle and Thomas followed the deductive method or more of an 
inductive one (Hibbs 1988; 1991).   
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Science can be a form of worship inasmuch as the discovery of the logoi is viewed 
spiritually,  that is, they are viewed as “a sign of His love in order to stimulate our love, in 
order to realize a dialogue of mutual commitment in love between us, God, and neighbour” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 217).    
This practical and natural knowledge however “give[s] birth to a higher, mystical 
knowledge of God, distinct from wisdom, or from the knowledge of him in the things of 
the world” (Staniloae 2003, p. 198).   The account now turns to the third and final step, 
theological contemplation. 
8.4.3 Theological Contemplation (Third phase of spiritual ascent): 
Practical wisdom is the realm of human actions and quintessentially the virtues or 
phronesis.   Natural contemplation, the second stage, comprehends the logoi, the structures 
and deeper intentions of creation, and creation as a pointer to God.  This third stage, 
theological contemplation, is neither of these and is the “union of the soul with God, or of 
the vision of the divine light” (Staniloae 2003, p. 199).   This third step is no longer 
concerned with the reasons of things (logoi) primarily within creation, nor with action, but 
communion with God directly.    This aspect cannot be dealt with at length except to say 
that if theological contemplation is not a direct intuition of God’s essence, what is it? 
In the “third heaven” or vision of God, the soul discovers not the intellectual essence of 
God, but experiences that which God conceived in his first intention—humans in perfect 
communion with God, their neighbours, and nature.   The vision of God is an experience of 
ecstatic love.  Staniloae quotes St. Isaac the Assyrian:  “The love of God is warm by 
nature, and when it falls on someone without measure, it makes that soul ecstatic”; it is a 
“beverage for the soul” (Staniloae 2003, p. 308).   It is the overwhelming sense, or better, 
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suprasensation of God’s “personal” love.  Love is a force which nourishes the spirit and 
body; it is not irrational as it comprehends all the logoi, but transcends them.  
Characteristic for his approach, Staniloae finds a human analogy to illustrate what he calls 
a “more interesting” take on this, quoting John Climacus of the Ladder:  “If the [human] 
face of the one we love clearly and completely changes us and makes us radiant and 
content and happy, what will the Lord’s face invisibly do when He comes…” (Staniloae 
2003, p. 309).    Apophaticism, or that which is beyond discursive reason, is a “plus” of 
knowledge beyond normal experience or concepts; it is not irrational or the negation of 
reason; it is suprarational in the same way that love is suprarational.  Even the love of a 
human person is beyond concepts, beyond reason; all the more and to an infinite degree, 
God’s love (Rogobete 1997, p. 94ff).  
As mentioned, this “theological contemplation” comes only after a long journey of 
practical charity and contemplating the effects of this love for revealing the possibilities of 
the logoi in creation.  Theological contemplation is not the starting point from which, once 
experienced, humans descend down into the world for service as was seen in Maritain.    
But at the same time, this ascent to the heights of theological contemplation does not do 
away with reason, science and practical activity; it involves them to their fullest extent, but 
extends further beyond their reach.   
These three steps, practical reason, natural contemplation, and theological are another 
interpretive key for the doctrine of theosis in Orthodoxy.   Of special importance for this 
thesis is the starting and decisive role of practical reason, or virtuous activity, or what 
Staniloae simply calls “doing” (Staniloae 2003, p. 70).   Contemplation of nature emerges 
in tandem with this, which involves a movement from ignorance to knowledge of nature’s 
laws and in turn the right use of the natural and social sciences, which is towards human 
development.   But there is a price involved in this process:  “only reason which is 
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modelled after the virtuous life, in other words after a life which has sacrificed, after 
prolonged exercise, egotism and the self-importance of personal opinion, can come to the 
truth” (Staniloae 2003, p. 212). 
8.5 Practical Reasoning in the Capability Approach 
It can be fruitful here given the overall nature of this project, to compare now Orthodoxy’s 
approach to rationality with Amartya Sen’s and the CA.  While this might seem odd, there 
are indeed some similarities, and especially of moral ends, for Sen is pre-eminently 
concerned about human development and a form of practical rationality appropriate to that.  
In a major work entitled, significantly for his approach, Freedom and Rationality, Sen 
defines rationality as “the discipline of subjecting one’s choices—of actions as well as 
objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny” (Sen 2002, p. 4).   He points out 
that “the demands of reasoned scrutiny are exacting, even when one does the scrutiny 
oneself”.  Scrutiny is not to be confused with uncritical rumination to confirm one’s 
instincts and ‘gut reactions’” and thus rationality involves “disciplined freedom” (p. 49).   
Freedom requires rationality and rationality requires discipline.   Sen notes however that 
there is no sure-fire test for rationality, and, similar to phronesis, one must rely on “our 
reasoned understanding of close connections between conduct and consequences in a ‘vast 
variety of circumstances’” (p.50).  Rationality is for Sen “a complex discipline, rather than 
seeing it as a mechanical application of a set of simple formulas” (p.49).   Succinctly put, 
Sen singles out two values, freedom and reason, shows their interdependence and relates 
these to human development objectives.      
Aspects of this are similar to Orthodoxy.  Orthodoxy views theology (not in the technical 
third sense above, but in the broader sense) as a form of practical reasoning that has 
neighbour love, or human development, as its aim.  While Orthodoxy values freedom, and 
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rationality, and would agree that rationality is a necessary discipline and for similar moral 
ends (human development), and with similar qualifications, however, there is a “missing 
link” between freedom and reason that makes Sen’s account appear unsatisfying.  The 
contrast with Orthodoxy can be seen most clearly where Sen argues for “Dependence on 
the person’s own reasoning”, which means, the “non-imposition of externally dictated 
tests” on the “discipline of self-assessment and reasoning” (Sen 2002, p. 49).19  Sen’s 
approach (with his own interlocutors primarily in economics) is allocating a broader scope 
to “other regarding” behaviour in that the “externally dictated tests” are artificial criteria of 
utility maximization.  However, Sen’s approach, while giving the possibility of a broader 
range of individual motivations and reasons for acting than rational-choice theory, is still 
highly individualistic in that anything “external” seems to be an infringement upon 
freedom and rationality as Sen defines it.  Sen appears to be rearticulating modernity’s 
commitment to an “egocentric starting point” (Macmurray 1961).  Thus, Sen’s answer to 
the Biblical question of “whether or not everybody is his brother’s keeper” (Wilson 1990, 
p. 188) can never be a definitive yes or no, but only that each person has to answer this 
question for herself.
 20
 
This approach to rationality can be contrasted with Staniloae’s which embeds the self and 
her aspirations (and thus freedom and rationality) in a larger context to give fuller meaning 
and strength to both of these values: 
The order of meanings is not the product of the human psyche nor does it end with the products 
of the psyche.  For this order imposes itself on us without our willing it, and through the 
aspiration it instils in us, surpasses our own psychic possibilities.  But the order of meanings 
imposes itself as a personal horizon, infinite and superior to man, and it requires man’s freedom 
                                                          
19
 Sen does seem to allow one external test, even on the formation of individual values, and that is democracy 
as public reason (Sen 2009, p. 336).    
20
 Paul Ricoeur argues, on the other hand, that “the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate 
degree that one cannot be thought of without the other” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 3).  Ricoeur offers many important 
arguments, but a critical one is the “constitution of a shared nature, that is, of an intersubjectively founded 
nature” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 322). 
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if he is to have a share in that order.  Even during man’s earthly existence, the order of 
meanings does call upon him to participate in itself in freedom (Staniloae 1994, p. 8). 
For Staniloae, the order of meanings or reason precedes, but draws forth human freedom 
and human freedom contributes to and enhances nature’s order.  But nature’s preceding 
order is not merely impersonal or timeless laws, but is Creativity and Personhood-in-
Communion.  Only conceived in this way can the preceding Divine Order enhance, and not 
discourage, human freedom, creativity, and communion.   
For Sen, rationality is, to put it bluntly, too much inside the head of one person, too 
insularly separated from others and nature.
 21
  As is evident in this quote, Staniloae values 
freedom and rationality, but there is a larger communal and personal context for these 
valued human functions that elicits and draws forth freedom, creativity, and human 
development.  This is the question of providing a context for rationality appropriate for 
human development, which includes, but goes far beyond “dependence on the person’s 
own reasoning”.   This provides a more normative (ontological) context for rationality as a 
set of factors both (internal and external to the person) linking agency to human 
development concerns.   It can also mean more epistemological humility.  Even Aristotle 
recognized “The bounty of nature is clearly beyond our control” (Aristotle 2004, p. 278), 
which includes persons’ powers of reason.  Humans are participants or guests in a larger 
rationality, a larger order of meanings that require the exercise of freedom and the 
discipline of rational scrutiny, but in more ways, within more contexts, and for more 
reasons than Sen’s theory would probably allow.    
                                                          
21
 John Dewey, himself a liberal but of the non-Kantian type, saw this problem of the growing importance of 
the isolation and abstraction of the individual from community and context.   He notes that “the effect was to 
isolate the individual from his connections with his fellows and with nature, and thus to create an artificial 
human nature … It shut out from view the forces which really move human nature” (Dewey 1957, p. 294). 
 285 
In this light, it can be argued that EO expresses a view of the human person and a cosmic 
context for the exercise of freedom and rationality (Sen’s Enlightenment values) that 
makes human development outcomes potentially more plausible, more reliably derived.   It 
offers a fuller set of reasons for a form of rationality relevant for human development to be 
truly imperative and not merely the “projections of subjects” (Taylor 1993, p. 212).   And 
it offers a methodology, the virtues, for persons to become agents of development.    
But there is another side to Sen’s practical reasoning that deserves highlighting, and is 
analytically distinct from his Enlightenment individualism.  As has been mentioned, Sen 
develops a theory of justice that focuses on removing or reducing remediable injustices, 
and that action for justice need not wait until all can come to a consensus on what perfect 
justice looks like.   This is the aspect of Sen’s theory that merits salvaging even if it must 
be noted that while this part of Sen’s theory can orientate justice concerns, it cannot create 
them (Deneulin 2011).    And as will be seen in the next chapter, Sen’s approach to justice 
as remedying burdens has an ancestral theological analogue.   
However, beyond Sen, there are further conversations within the CA concerning practical 
reason.  As seen earlier, practical reason has an architectonic role in Nussbaum’s list (along 
with sociability) meaning that these distinctively human capabilities should suffuse the 
more primitive capabilities such as food and shelter.  And for Nussbaum, these 
distinctively human capabilities contain their own imperatives for fulfilment (Nussbaum 
2002, p. 131).    However, as mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, an alternative 
approach to natural law, developed by John Finnis and colleagues, emerged in Catholicism 
to address the deficiencies of neo-scholasticism.
22
   This approach has been linked with the 
capability approach by Sabina Alkire (Alkire and Black 1997; Alkire 2002; 2002) and will 
now be briefly examined. 
                                                          
22
 According to Finnis, "a study of the nature of a being is ... a study of the potentialities or capacities of that 
being" (Finnis 1980, p. 90). 
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Alkire contends that instead of starting from an already given and therefore perhaps 
paternalistic list of human functions—Nussbaum is accused of this in terms of her “list” 
(Jaggar 2006)—the core dimensions of human development can be derived through an 
exercise in practical reason alone.  The basic dimensions of human development can be 
determined by iterations of the question “Why do I do what I do?” which is to say, 
sustained reflection on the various ends of the actions humans initiate.   Sufficient 
reflection on this question will show that all persons take actions and make plans to fulfil a 
finite set of basic human dimensions or functions.   Thus intentional reflection on why 
humans do and plan what they do “yields substantive, objective descriptions of dimensions 
of human flourishing while preserving a space for historical, cultural, and personal 
specification” (Alkire 2002, p. 44).  The result of this process is a list similar to others and 
includes life, work, play, friendship, knowledge and appreciation of beauty, and includes 
spirituality or transcendence defined as “harmony with some more than human source of 
meaning or value”. 
As a method for teasing out the most basic reasons for acting, there are, however, several 
problems.  First, the process is highly intellectual and abstracted.  Persons do not act out of 
a regard for abstract notions of friendship, but they act in response and in relationship with 
concrete persons, actual friends.   Second, other less “rational” but powerful motivators of 
action are not on the list such as “honour”, of which there are both universal and culturally 
specific features (Bowman 2006, p. 6).   Third, the asking of questions is not value free 
especially if one has a list already in mind.  A development expert assessing the success or 
failure of a project to achieve certain dimensions could ask questions until the right answer 
was given.  And this would not be a challenging task given the dimensions’ highly abstract 
nature.   Lastly, people just don’t live this way of repeatedly asking “why” any more than 
persons make decisions behind Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”.   Despite assertions to the 
contrary (Alkire 2002, p. 46), this practical reasoning approach is highly theoretical. 
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Still, similar to Nussbaum’s list, there is some value for abstracting and clarifying the 
“what” of development—what everyone works for if they are rationally consistent and not 
self-destructive (which are major assumptions of the approach).   But this “what” question 
neglects the more explicitly ethical question:  practical reason exercised on behalf of whom 
(cf. the fourth question of Flyvbjerg above)?  Is practical reason to fulfil basic dimensions 
of well-being exercised only on behalf of oneself?  This is a clear possibility seen in the 
fact that these valuable dimensions are asserted not to be virtues; they are pre-moral 
(Alkire and Black 1997, p. 268).   Thus it seems that they are simply descriptive of what 
persons actually do when they exercise agency, or practical reason, and not what they 
should or should not do.  However, if these “pre-moral” dimensions are to be used as a 
guide for development theory, then, for their wider fulfilment (i.e. for more persons having 
these valuable dimensions fulfilled), this “pre-moral”, non-virtue side of practical 
reasoning dimensions must be completed with the “pro-moral”, virtue side of practical 
reasoning, and particularly the virtue of justice.  Otherwise one is left with a nice list of 
valuable human dimensions, but no obligation for their wider fulfilment.  This is also to 
say that an agreed upon set of desirable dimensions of shared human nature does not 
automatically or even readily translate into a “common good”, a basis for ethical 
responsibility for the other.   Unlike Alkire however, Nussbaum treats these core 
dimensions as already moral; they demand universal fulfilment.  But where this “demand” 
comes from and why it is or is not experienced and acted upon, is among the most vital 
questions for human development.  It seems that one strength of Alkire’s approach then is 
that it separates these two questions (the existence of valuable dimensions, and the sources 
of moral duty or inspiration for their fulfilment), whereas Nussbaum’s approach fuses and 
perhaps occludes this valuable distinction.  
A theory of valuable dimensions that grounds itself in will or agency alone as does the 
practical reasoning approach—and not in controversial notions of shared human nature or 
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communitarian values—will have difficulty transmuting individual agency into human 
solidarity.   A practical reasoning approach needs the moral and spiritual virtues and it 
seems that the Finnis/Alkire approach itself recognizes this.     It can be religion’s special 
role to develop and guide agency towards these other regarding virtues, that is, to traverse 
the bridge between practical reason for self and practical reason exercised on behalf of the 
vulnerable other.   
Here it is important to mention that it is not desirable for theology to be obsessively 
seeking to uncover or provide different facts about human nature than secular accounts (the 
closeness of grace and nature can obviate this for Orthodoxy).  Theology can however, 
place these facts in a larger narrative and spiritual context that shapes persons, strengthens 
them and provides meaning and thus an increased sense of responsibility.   This is a return 
to the “Why” question of human development, and it is fundamental.  Staniloae notes that 
“The acuteness of this responsibility demonstrates that it is based on a responsibility 
toward a supreme Personal reality who is the creator of nature and of human beings” 
(Staniloae 2000, p. 2).    Secular theories cannot easily generate this “acuteness of 
responsibility”, and where they do, they have often ended up tragically idolizing a portion 
of humanity and sacrificing the rest. 
Orthodoxy is different though in many regards to a social science approach, including the 
practical reasoning approach—a difference that is a complementary strength.   Social 
science approaches reflect on what everyone, everywhere putatively needs to be fully 
human, whether these are basic needs, or activating certain capacities of the human person, 
or removing remediable injustices.  Social science aims to present a picture of human well-
being and the varied dimensions thereof and find a non controversial starting point that 
everyone can agree on.  There is value in this approach for theology and it can be part of 
discovering the logoi within creation, and developing bases for development action and 
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cooperation across traditions.   Furthermore, the agency guiding aspects of religion need to 
be informed by constant critical dialogue with the sciences and reflection on “nature’s 
norms” even if it is also (paradoxically perhaps) recognized that nature’s norms cannot 
always be properly perceived or developed by looking at nature “as is”. 
This reflection can provide a backdrop for Orthodox virtues in relation to human 
development:  they are less trying to map out the discrete dimensions of human nature and 
more aimed at a methodology for getting humanity back on track towards philanthropia, 
love of humankind.   Orthodoxy can be seen as a conversion and strengthening of practical 
reason to work for human development.   
Theosis in Orthodoxy is “therapeutic” (Greek for healing), which means it is a method for 
a return to health, not just for the individual, but the entire human family.   It recognizes 
that humans have, in a sense, lost their way—a fact which development studies 
presuppose.  Aristotle calls medicine an exemplary of practical reason.  It is the exercise of 
human action and deliberation for an agreed upon end:  a return to physical health 
(Aristotle 2004, p. 57).   Similarly, for the realm of the human composite (body and spirit), 
Orthodox virtues are about the activation and rehabilitation of the principles of good or 
healthy existence not merely for oneself, but for all.  Staniloae calls following the 
virtues/logoi, the “steps of this healing” (Staniloae 2003, p. 213) and this—in that Christ 
embodied all the virtues as the steps toward healing and human reunification—shows why 
the Incarnation is viewed as central to the unity of humankind.    
To conclude, this chapter has delineated several “meta-ethical” features of Orthodoxy’s 
way of approaching the virtues in preparation for the next chapter where individual virtues, 
their sequencing and priorities, will be detailed.  This chapter has shown primarily two 
things: a) the non-separation of the natural and supernatural virtues and b) the priority of 
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practical reason to contemplative reason, of praxis to theoria.  These two features are 
another way of analyzing two themes running through this thesis.  The first is that grace 
and nature, theology and human development, stand in a very close relation.  Salvation or 
theosis is an elevation of natural capacities and this places salvation in a direct overlap 
with the categories of human or “capability development”.  The second has been to show 
how the Orthodox approach to practical reason can enrich, but also be enriched by, 
development studies.  Both approaches have value, DS primarily by reflecting on the 
universal dimensions of human development and the removal of injustices, EO as a 
therapeutic method aiming at the well-being of all.   
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9. ORTHODOX VIRTUES, SYNERGY, & SALVATION HISTORY 
This final chapter has two aims.  The first is to outline the specific Orthodox virtues, show 
their already existing relevance for human development, and explore new connections.  
Then the virtue of love will receive extended treatment, especially in terms of the 
communitarian/cosmopolitan debate, balancing the competing claims between special 
relations such as family/Church, and duties to the distant.   The second aim of this chapter 
is to counterbalance the admittedly one-sided emphasis on human agency so far, and 
underscore the role of Divine agency or God’s work in theosis and how it is coordinated 
with human’s work in a way that respects agency and promotes human development.   EO 
names this Divine-human cooperation “synergy”, or shared action and imitating the virtues 
of Christ is central to this.
1
  The EO doctrine of synergy illustrates how human 
development is incorporated into the story of salvation itself, but priority is still given to 
the Divine initiative, for “God’s love wakes up ours”.   
9.1 Select Orthodox virtues 
The standard list of Orthodox virtues, gathered largely from Maximus, but modified 
somewhat in Staniloae’s delineation are:  “faith, fear of God, repentance, self control or 
restraint, patience and longsuffering, hope, dispassion and love” (Staniloae 2003, p. 123).   
The account here will examine only faith, repentance, and fear of God to give a few 
signposts on the journey, and then jump ahead to love, the summit of the virtues.   It is 
always to be remembered that even though Orthodoxy emphasises ethical effort in theosis, 
                                                          
1
 Staniloae rarely uses the term “imitation of Christ” because of its Western connotations.  He notes “It is not 
only an imitation of Christ as in the West” (Staniloae 2003, p. 26).  This has to do with the fact that 
participating in Christ is participating also in the “Divine energies”, which will be further discussed below.   
Staniloae’s preferred language is “cleansing of the passions and winning of the virtues” (Staniloae 2003, p. 
21ff).     
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“as the human being’s model, the Son of God himself, by becoming man, takes upon 
himself the task of the spiritualizing of the human being” (Staniloae 2000, p. 122-123).   
However, in this advance in virtue “our personal reality remains free in relation to this 
higher being.  Such a relationship is analogous to the relationship of one person to another 
in which the liberty of both is preserved” (Staniloae 1994, p. 10). 
However, before delineating the Orthodox virtues, it should be noted that in general, 
Orthodoxy often expresses very positive views about the presence of virtues outside of the 
Church.  Staniloae does not dwell on this theme, but does say “in practice, many people 
live in a way that accords with this meaning [i.e. offered by supernatural revelation], and 
when they do not, they feel guilty for not taking it into account”; but Staniloae notes that 
rarely does anyone grasp with full clarity or certainty the truth (Staniloae 1994, p. 18).   
Other Orthodox theologians, however, are even more sanguine about virtues outside the 
specific Christian or Orthodox community.   Here is an extended passage by Father 
Thomas Hopko from a textbook for theological education.  The value of this passage is that 
it illustrates in an unparalleled way the idea that virtues are universal human powers, and 
that they are not owned by Orthodoxy alone: 
[The] fruits of the Spirit often called virtues ... which literally means those powers and 
possessions of the mind and the heart which all men should have if they are truly human, 
fulfilling themselves as created in the image and likeness of God ... It has been said, and it 
is true, that the Christian virtues are not all particularly "Christian" in the sense that only 
Christians know about them and are committed to attain them.  Most, if not all, of the 
Christian virtues have been honoured, respected and recommended by all great teachers of 
the spiritual life.  This in no way detracts from their Christian value and truth, for Christ 
and His apostles and saints have not taught and practiced something other than that which 
all men should teach and practice.   As the fulfilment of all positive human aspirations and 
desires, it is quite understandable that Jesus Christ, the perfect "man from heaven" and 
"final Adam" (1 Cor.  15:45-47; Romans 5:14) should fulfil and realize in himself that 
which all men of wisdom and good-will have sought for and desired in their minds and 
hearts, enlightened by God (Hopko 1976, p. 53). 
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This passage illustrates perfectly the closeness of grace and nature which means an 
overlapping consensus is possible between Orthodoxy and other traditions.   This feature of 
Orthodoxy being noted, the Orthodox sequence of virtues can be given. 
In EO theosis or salvation is seen less as event and more as journey.  But as with any great 
journey one has not yet embarked upon, one must believe that there is a safe passage and a 
worthwhile destination in order to take those first steps.    Just as believing that God is love 
requires faith, so working for the value of human life on earth is not something that can be 
logically proven—it must be first believed, or better, committed to.2   Thus faith is the first 
virtue.   That life has meaning beyond human projections, even Kant with his insistence on 
autonomy maintained; he was not arguing for a cosmically orphaned universe (Schneewind 
1998, p. 378).   This faith is the ground of development ideals; it is the belief that there is a 
better “something” than current empirical actualities.  But faith is not just belief, it is 
faithfulness, it is action and commitment; it is taking those first steps.   Secular reason can 
almost never provide the basis for difficult action upon ideals and this is an important 
difference vis-à-vis Sen and Nussbaum.
3
  Indeed, faith is a way to stabilize reason in a firm 
position (Staniloae 2003, p. 122).  Faith is a natural virtue.   Tocqueville puts this point 
beautifully and his thought is worth mentioning in a dialogue between East and West as he 
is one of the few Western social scientists who affirm the naturalness of faith for the 
human condition: 
Religion is thus one particular form of hope so natural to the human heart as hope itself.  
Men cannot detach themselves from religious beliefs except by some wrong-headed 
thinking and by a sort of moral violence inflicted upon their true nature; they are drawn 
                                                          
2
 The sense of worth of human life is an innate “moral sense” that, like any other native virtues requires 
development and shaping (Wilson 1993). 
3
 Nussbaum in an article on the virtues ends with philosophy as “placing our hope in reason” (Nussbaum 
1999).   Orthodoxy (and much of Christianity) values reason and even places hope in reason, but views these 
within the framework of the goodness of God and the proper exercise of His gifts, one of which is reason.  
Nussbaum does believe that emotions are suffused with a moral rationality which seems to imply a very 
positive view of creation. 
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back by an irresistible inclination. Unbelief is an accident; faith is the only permanent state 
of mankind (Tocqueville 2003, p. 347). 
Faith, however, is not the start of a journey of blind commitments that receives no 
verification from within human experience itself.  This is because faith’s aim is not mere 
belief in an external revelation, but is acting on the good intentions/logoi that God has 
placed within existence.   But one must take that first step sometimes based not on 
knowledge and evidence coming from one’s own experience, but from faith, from 
testimony, and from others’ experience.  Faith is the mother of the virtues; it is a purposive 
disposition to act in accordance with the good, in the belief that God and creation are good.  
And the practice of the virtues, launched by faith, is, in turn the midwife of true 
knowledge. 
Faith launches a commitment, a set of actions, namely the keeping of the commandments 
or loving God through one’s neighbour.  Staniloae expands his explanation of this and 
offers a five step process:   1) faith, which has of yet little evidence for its convictions; 2) a 
commitment to virtues and the gaining of experience; 3) confirmation and refinement of 
experience and subtlety in judgments gained; 4) increased development of judgement, 
entering the higher realms of phronesis, and; 5) more holistic and rapid judgement, on the 
basis of an integrated vision of the truth in everything.   This is akin to the aforementioned 
“experiential learning” or “action learning” process which is rooted in the Aristotelian 
tradition.   The modern champion of this approach is John Dewey (Dewey 1897; 1934; 
1957; 1961; 1963; Rockefeller 1991).
4
    
                                                          
4
 Both of these statements by Dewey could be vintage Staniloae: 
I would suggest that the future of religion is connected with the possibility of developing a faith in 
the possibilities of human experience and human relationships that will create a vital sense of the 
solidarity of human interests and inspire action to make that sense a reality ... [and] True religion, 
they taught, is experimental religion; one comes to a genuine understanding of saving truth by 
embodying it and testing it in action (Rockefeller 1991, pp. 449, 549).   
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“Faith is the virtue for starting our journey.  It is the stream which is joined by those of the 
other virtues … In love all the virtues are gathered” (Staniloae 2003, p. 128).   Faith is the 
beginning of the virtues, but other virtues such as self-control in turn strengthen faith 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 124).   Faith is important and necessary because reason has “slipped” 
from its natural position in an intellectual-voluntary act, and must be restored similarly.   
Thus faith involves the belief in intellectual concepts such as the goodness of God and thus 
the goodness of creation, but it also involves the voluntary dimensions, the willingness and 
determination to orientate one’s life toward the good.   This intellectual-voluntary act is the 
beginning of the purification of the “mud” that dims reality and diminishes reason’s 
effectiveness.  In time “faith grows to a very [sic] brilliant evidence”.5  Faith can bring an 
added “plus” of conviction to certain truths, or even new truths which reason could in 
principle have known, but had not grasped.  Faith is a complex phenomenon and depends 
on the will, internal and external evidence, but also support from God’s power.   But most 
important is that faith involves a commitment to trust in and act upon the goodness of God 
and the related belief that God only desires good for humankind.   
The next virtue after faith is fear of God.   “The fear of God is the beginning of 
knowledge”, the book of Proverbs begins.   Faith which has not reached fear or is not 
“accompanied from the beginning by fear hasn’t gained a high enough degree of efficiency 
to lead to action” (Staniloae 2003, p. 130).   Faith, to be led to action must be an effective 
faith, a faith that is strongly enough motivated to act.    This notion of the fear of God as an 
aid to action might not be agreeable to some, but there is a wisdom here that shows that 
Orthodoxy, while more optimistic than much Western theology (Kelly 1978, p. 349), is not 
utopian.  Fear of God “makes us active agents, instead of passive puppets” (Staniloae 
2003, p. 130); that is, the stakes are perceived to be high for indifference.   But Staniloae’s 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note that for Orthodoxy, faith is born, or the seed for faith is “won or strengthened at 
Baptism” (Staniloae 2003, p. 124).   But Baptism itself has the role of strengthening human nature in line 
with God’s good intentions, the logoi within existence. 
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analysis of fear is more sophisticated still, relating it to the fear of falling into the 
“automatism” of sin, of failing to live up to the development of one’s possibilities and 
spiritual character.  This fear of God is tied closely to a sense of moral responsibility both 
for one’s own development, but also others:  “We can’t just do anything…” or nothing 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 132).  Important here is that the fear of God is initially a goad for 
motivation and improvement, of not sinking into a mere animal like existence; not being a 
passive cog in the machinery of nature.
6
  Fear of God is not a fear of arbitrary acts of 
judgment, but failure to develop oneself and shared human nature properly. 
Faith intuits an objective “something better”;7 repentance, the next virtue, does as well.   
But the virtue of repentance is connected to regret for what one has done wrong, or left 
undone.   Without this, a true development orientation is impossible.  St. Isaac (Staniloae 
notes) calls repentance the highest of the virtues because it is the means of continual 
perfection.   “Repentance is the critical act of the conscience; it is the self criticism which 
man makes” (Staniloae 2003, p. 137).    It is plausible that one of the weaknesses of 
development studies can be a neglect of self-criticism and focusing excessively on 
structural/systemic issues, and neglecting the “politics of personal transformation 
(Tessman 2005).    However, a characteristic failure on the side of theology involves a lack 
of social criticism and addressing structural injustices.  Staniloae writes: “repentance 
expresses the thought, ‘It can be better’" (Staniloae 2003, p. 138).   Notice he did not 
merely say, “I” can be better.   The “it”, is the total situation.  This implies both internal 
conditions, the state of one’s soul, but also external conditions, socio-economic structures.    
This aspect Marx got right, that what is not needed is simply more exacting critical 
rationality (Kant), but the necessity for structural transformation (Gibellini 1987, p. 26).    
                                                          
6
 This indeed was the aim of Communist habituation, to form “Cogs in the Wheel” (Heller 1988).    
7
 Martin Seligman, pioneer of the aforementioned Positive Psychology movement, notes that “the notion of 
potential, without the notion of optimism, has very little meaning” (Seligman 2006, p. 154).  
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Structural sin, the most obvious example of which is Apartheid in South Africa, is a clear 
situation that demands structural-level repentance (Gruchy 1995).  In Staniloae’s Romania, 
the Church’s “collaboration” with the Communists is one arena where structural 
repentance has been called for, though in a more morally complicated context.  This is why 
“the average Romanian was willing to overlook the Church’s past political conformism” 
(Stan and Turcescu 2000, p. 1471).   Despite these ambiguities, there is however the 
unambiguous moral damage left by Communism.  As anthropologist David Kideckel 
writes: 
the socialist system, though ostensibly designed to create new persons motivated by the 
needs of groups and of society as a whole, in fact created people were of necessity self-
centred, distrustful, and apathetic to the very core of their beings (Kideckel 1993, p. xiii).     
The Church (as all other institutions) is not unaffected by this legacy and, like much of 
Romanian society, was left unprepared to deal with it.  There is an inadequacy of 
structures, educational and otherwise to develop the virtues, and there is a lack of virtues to 
challenge or develop the structures.   The interdependent nature of these challenges for 
reform should not be lost, a challenge which itself is not lost on the virtue framework.   
But repentance should not be thought of as merely correction of mistakes or sins.   
Repentance is also the gadfly for progress: “On the one hand it is an unceasing 
dissatisfaction with whatever state we are in, on the other, it is a steady and unwavering 
trust in giant possibilities”;  it “urges man toward the better”, and it is the motor of the 
other virtues.  It is a fire burning, “which maintains the tension for the better” (Staniloae 
2003, p 139-40).  Notice how Staniloae links repentance to human solidarity: 
Repentance does not mean an isolated life, but one which involves to the highest degree the 
common destiny of the community.  It can contribute in great measure to the realization of 
a more brotherly world; it gradually overcomes egotism and increases the assets of love.  It 
can contribute in an important way to the bringing about of a real, inner and lasting 
solidarity between the members of the human community (Staniloae 2003, p. 144).  
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Repentance has a rational role as well.  It permits one to “hear an objective, external 
judgement on our deeds”, neither too merciful nor too condemning.   Tears can “wash the 
window of the soul,” cleansing the dirt and softening a hardness of heart and “opening to it 
the perspective of God and neighbour” (Staniloae 2003, p. 146).    
Staniloae continues in a similar manner with the rest of the virtues:  self-control, the 
guarding of the mind, longsuffering, hope, meekness, and dispassion.   It is easy to see, 
given the way Staniloae develops each virtue, that they are not to be domesticated into 
mere personal piety.   For Staniloae, the virtues are about social transformation, not merely 
“the narrow path of personal virtue and personal salvation” (Benz 1963, p. 155).   Much 
more can be done to develop these tendencies, but the theological foundation for advancing 
these concerns is already in place.   
9.2 Agape:  communitarian (ecclesial) and cosmopolitan 
Instead of continuing to detail each virtue, the account will now vault ahead to love, which 
is the telos of the virtues.   The account will focus primarily on finding a balance between 
the competing claims of duties to “special relations” such as family and Church, and duties 
to “distant others”.  In other words, aspects of the liberal-communitarian debate will be 
revisited.  But first, a few extended quotes will be offered to convey Staniloae’s lyrical 
sensibilities concerning the summit of all virtues:    
Love is the exit from the magic and illusory circle of egotism, a circle which I extend to the 
infinite, as in a delusive dream.  It is a breaking out into true relationship, in communion 
with others.   It is an exit from the shadowy prison of the ego and the entrance into the life 
of the community, of solidarity, into the kingdom of love, which includes everyone 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 142).  
Notice that love is universal—it includes everyone.   As will be seen later, this is, perhaps 
surprisingly, not always the case in Christian theology and even by preeminent 
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theologians.    One more extended passage is offered that combines a number of the virtues 
and culminates in love:   
It is clear that no one can approach or enter this kingdom, this paradise, unless he leaves 
behind the ocean of numberless sirens of egotism which try to attract him as so many 
violent waves ... At every step, we must struggle with all our might, to go on safe and 
sound and to arrive as another Odysseus in our true land.   Rowing powerfully, our muscles 
are made stronger and our course continually easier ... By repentance God doesn't let us be 
satisfied with what we already are, but always calls us to go on; yes even more, it doesn't 
leave us in the darkness of egotism, but it calls us to the expanses of solidarity in love 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 142). 
Staniloae writes that the “great mystery of love” is that it is the deepest and most profound 
union possible between two subjects, but “without their dissolution as free subjects” 
(Staniloae 2003, p. 310).   Staniloae, perhaps more than any other modern Orthodox 
thinker—and this undoubtedly because of his experience under communism—stresses the 
fact that the person as a moral end must be kept intact.  “The person does not exist for the 
sake of anything else, but all things exist for him” (Staniloae 1994, p. 130).8  
Love is both natural and supernatural simultaneously, illustrated in the fact that Orthodoxy 
does not stress the distinction between eros and agape (Moss 2010).   But of course there 
has to be some difference, something that grace adds to human experience or there is no 
point in theology.   This is indeed so, but first of all, it is important to stress that human 
love exists in a state of continuity, not utter discontinuity, with God’s love.   Natural love 
indeed is often fickle, unstable, often overcome by the irrational and unnatural passions, 
overcome by partiality; but love as a virtue means actual human love and sympathies are 
stabilized, rendered more firm both in their intensity, and extensity; love becomes a 
                                                          
8
 Especially relevant here in this section, Silviu Rogobete analyzed Staniloae’s theology under the helpful 
title of an “Ontology of Love”, and God as the Supreme Personal Reality, including the Trinity as the 
structure of supreme love (Rogobete 1997).  Many of Rogobete’s emphases are similar to those here, 
including the closeness of natural and supernatural revelation.   However, this present study has tried to bring 
out more fully the role of shared nature in Staniloae’s Trinitarian theological anthropology (that Rogobete 
analyzes under the broader category of ontology) and thus the cosmopolitan base of moral obligation 
required for human development. 
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“blessed passion” and the passions are to be “educated, not eradicated” (Ware 1998, p. 
116).   Love as a natural theological virtue is aided by grace, but it is aided; love grows by 
self efforts and through these efforts love grows firm, stable, and expands with Christ 
serving as the moral exemplum.  “True love for any neighbour, the love which never fails, 
can’t be born without prayer and without asceticism to purify the passions” (Staniloae 
2003, p. 319).  
Love “is a capacity to affect a unity, an alliance” (Staniloae 1994, p. 239).    Previously it 
was seen that a union can be designated loving only when the union does not dissolve the 
one into the other.   Love is “the movement full of longing on two sides”.  On the human 
level (modelled on the Trinity), “There is a unity of human nature that needs to be made 
manifest in the unity (or better harmony) of human wills” (Staniloae 1994, p. 253).   In the 
divine-human relationship there is also reciprocity; the human side is not merely a passive 
object of God’s longing and love.  God’s love for humanity expressed in the gifts of 
creation, providence, and his outgoing love in Christ is such that he “makes himself worthy 
of their love and thus actions that produce the love of creatures for him” (Staniloae 1994, 
p. 242).    
But eventually the question of questions must be squarely faced:  which others; which 
neighbours are within the circle of Christian love?  In the Gospels, a fundamental question 
in the background of the giving of the two great commandments is “Who is my 
neighbour?”   Should special relations such as family be seen as less virtuous in favour of a 
more universal, impartial love?  Or, should there be a special kind of love inside the 
Christian Church that is not shared with those outside?  If virtues need community, then 
what is the “location” of the virtues?   Staniloae does not give clear answers to all of these 
questions.  In certain writings, Staniloae advocated a communitarian type of love in the 
form of a spiritual nationalism (Staniloae 2004).   In his later major works, such as the 
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Dogmatics, he backs off almost entirely from this, emphasizing the universal nature of love 
as seen above.  The overall tendency in major Orthodox thinkers is the same, a 
cosmopolitan or universal love probably out of fears of the immanent heresy of 
“phyletism” (Benz 1963, p. 212).9   With this in mind, the following section will clarify the 
communitarian-cosmopolitan position that is not clearly developed by Staniloae, but is 
important for linking EO with human development. 
Earlier it was intimated that a love that takes no regard for special relations whatsoever can 
be irresponsible, and even destructive (Midgley 1983).   But on the other hand, a love that 
does not strain towards the universal would appear to be sub-Christian.   It is instructive 
that many of the themes encountered previously under the guise of the liberal vs. 
communitarian debate are paralleled in theological debates about the nature of love.   
These opposing positions will be briefly developed.  
First, there is the position that Christian love is strictly cosmopolitan in nature.   This 
position tends to separate “mere” human eros that is characterized by partiality, special 
relations, mutuality, or other sullying features, from its divine opposite, agape.  This 
position has the merits of extensity and equality, and it seeks to model the Biblical (and 
Kantian) emphasis on universality and to overcome impartialities and biases.  The 
following is a touchstone: "Regard is for every person qua human existent, to be 
distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular 
personalities from each other" (Outka 1977, p. 9).   There are these tendencies in Staniloae 
and the focus on the human shared essence fits this type of ethical reasoning which is 
clearly in the New Testament.   The danger with this tendency however, if taken by itself, 
                                                          
9
 “Phyletism” is an exaggerated spiritual nationalism that goes beyond simple patriotism.  It is a permanent 
danger of Orthodoxy “which permitted each nation its own language, constitution and ecclesiastical 
autonomy.   Thus the development of the Church was intimately connected with the development of the 
state…” (Benz 1963, p. 212). 
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can be to neglect the role of special relations in the family, community, and Church.   This 
is similar to Western liberal style cosmopolitanism and is influenced by a Kantian 
sensibility “where the familial is more or less ignored” (Post 1990, p. 34) and abstraction 
reigns supreme.   
However, on the “communitarian” side, there is the argument that love requires a special 
company and love seeks and requires reciprocity/mutuality within a finite set of bounds 
(Post 1990).  Love’s seeds cannot be sown and flower in any soil; virtue must be practiced 
in a fertile context, with shared values in a bounded community to achieve its distinctive 
properties.  Love has “familiar” properties and it cannot be extended infinitely or it will 
lose its special features and be diluted.   Karl Barth serves (for illustrative purposes) as a 
Weberian “ideal-type” for the communitarian position:10 
There can be no question of an extension in principle of the concept of Christian love for 
the neighbour into a universal love of humanity, unless we are to radically weaken and 
confuse it (Barth 1958, p. 807).  
Barth is here talking about agape as the special love shown by God to, and between, those 
who are on the inside, who live under the “sign of baptism”, who are part of the history of 
salvation (Heilsgeschichte).   Thus, the neighbour to be loved “is always the fellow-man 
who encounters and is united with me in the context of the history of salvation” (Barth 
1958, p. 808). 
This circle of the covenant community is not “hermetically sealed”, people are invited to 
join, but notice the following: 
                                                          
10
 Weberian “ideal-types” are theoretical constructs, not necessarily existing in reality, to illustrate certain 
tendencies in their thoroughgoing, “pure”, form.  Using these passages of Barth here is relevant inasmuch as 
he exhibits with clarity a “communitarian” tendency that can exist in any religious expression, including the 
aforementioned “phyletism” of Orthodoxy, a position that Staniloae seemed to embrace early on (Neamtu 
2006).   See next footnote for a qualification of this description of Barth. 
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It may sound harsh at first, but we have to note that neither the Old Testament nor the New 
speaks of a love for man as such and therefore for all men; of a universal love of humanity 
(Barth 1958, p. 802). 
Barth, in these passages,
11
  represents the clearest expression of this communitarian 
approach—of a view of Christian love that is limited by salvation history; agape is for 
those who exist within the covenant community and partake in its realities.    
However, the position advanced here, and one that appears to be both more Biblical and 
required for human development, is a combination of the communitarian and cosmopolitan 
positions.   It is an emphasis on salvation history which constitutes a new covenant 
community, but which also instructs its members to extend the range of love outward, as in 
the Samaritan parable.  This extension of love outward beyond the borders of the 
community is a, if not the, principle quality of the covenant itself.   Here it is necessary to 
demonstrate the much neglected scriptural basis for the “communitarian-cosmopolitan” 
argument in the New Testament, and then show how this framework can address overly 
simplistic interpretations of ethical obligation. 
The communitarian view of Christian love (articulated with absolute clarity by Barth, but 
seen in Hauerwas previously) requires “a small, intimate group grounded in special 
historical transactions” (Post 1990, p. 102).  “Solidarity in Christ is what ‘we’ share, and 
this distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’” (Horrell 2005, p. 18).  Significantly however, one 
Biblical text that is used as a key passage for a communitarian approach actually confirms 
the inverse, a communitarian-cosmopolitan position.  The Apostle Paul writes in 1Timothy 
5:8, “But if anyone does not make provision for his relations, and especially for the 
members of his own household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever”. 
                                                          
11
 Barth’s theology is obviously more complicated than this.   Gene Outka notes that Barth tried to maintain 
“the centrality of equal regard as the normative content of agape”, but also that he “correlates agape with 
faith ... occurring only to certain men.  Sometimes he proceeds to say as well that the objects of agape are 
confined to co-believers (a move I [Outka] at least find to be confused)” (Outka 1977, p. 255).   
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This verse, it is argued, “in an unequivocal manner”, undermines the “equal pull”, 
cosmopolitan, image of the moral field in theories of Christian love (Post 1990, p. 102).   
But is this right?  Is this the natural reading of this verse?   More reflection reveals that 
Paul is actually saying that it is a characteristic feature of the “pagans/unbelievers” to at 
least have the moral sense to care for their families and relations, and if one does not at 
least do this, they are “worse than” an unbeliever.  This clearly implies that the hallmark of 
Christians (and the very nature of the Gospel itself) is to do what the pagans do (care for 
their own), but do more than that, to care and make provision for more than merely their 
“familiars”.12  That is the unequivocal meaning of this verse, and many others.13  Thus this 
communitarian reading is incorrect in asserting that Paul is not aiming for some type of 
“equal pull”; but it is correct in affirming the importance of concrete communities (and 
their constituting narratives or covenants) for the maintenance of this particular quality of 
love.
14
   Paul’s position can be stated as a communitarian cosmopolitan maxim:  it is the 
decisive mark of Christians to move beyond special relations but not in a way that neglects 
these special relations.   
This very logic appears when Staniloae quotes Maximus the Confessor: 
                                                          
12
 Furthermore, it was a definite feature of the pagan world to cultivate political solidarity.   Both religious 
piety and all sorts of social experimentation aimed to bring about greater loyalty, almost never to humanity 
but to the polis for the Greeks and the Empire for the later Romans.  Christianity, or the Gospel, is the 
extension of solidarity beyond the polis and imperium based on God’s universal love expressed both in 
creation and in Christ.   This cosmopolitan feature as the very essence of the Christian Gospel is 
underappreciated. 
13
 The communitarian cosmopolitan formula “to one another and to all” is throughout the NT, including 1 
Thessalonians 3:12, 5:15, Romans 12:14-21 (Horrell 2005, p. 262).   Sometimes the relative emphasis is on 
the “to all”, sometimes on the ecclesial “to one another”, but there is almost always a cosmopolitan and not 
merely a political or ecclesial moral horizon in view.   This is important because Horrell chooses the liberal-
communitarian debate from political philosophy “in order to establish a contemporary context in which to 
read Paul’s ethics” (Horrell 2005, p. 47).   However, Horrell’s “contemporary context” is too narrow either 
for Paul’s theology, or for the needs of the contemporary world, which is why (this thesis argues) the debates 
in human development are a more appropriate “contemporary context” for interpreting Biblical ethics. 
14
 Galatians 6:10 is worth quoting in full:  “Therefore, as opportunity offers, let us work for the good of all, 
especially members of the household of faith”.   This verse is given to “balance out” Paul’s 
communitarianism of 1 Timothy 5:8 (Post 1990, p. 102).  But this verse is saying exactly the same but even 
more clearly—a communitarian cosmopolitanism.   
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God, by nature good and without passion, loves each person equally, as His creature, but 
glorifies the virtuous … likewise, the … positive man loves everybody the same, the 
virtuous for his nature and for his good will; and the evil one for his nature and out of 
sympathy (Staniloae 2003, p. 307).  
 
This clearly implies an equality of love, based on a shared human nature.  But notice that 
God loves each one equally, but “glorifies” the virtuous.  “Glory” is a communal, a shared 
concept that arises out of concrete communities valorising certain types of actions and 
commitments.
15
  Earlier it was seen how the saints and martyrs illustrated a new 
understanding of glory in contradistinction to the martial glory of Greece and Rome.   The 
“wreath of glory” is given, according to Maximus, to those who embody the virtues 
aspiring towards universal love. 
Love is multidimensional—depending upon, but extending beyond, the sympathies within 
familiar bonds to a service beyond the familiar,
16
  all the while looking “upward” as it 
were, to a loving God, backward to the example of Christ in history, and forward to the 
coming Kingdom when “fullness of life” is achieved.   Love as the summit of the virtues 
includes all the other virtues, all dimensions of existence, and seeks to include all others.  
Love is a dimension of life as a whole, permeating all other dimensions.   Thunberg sums 
up Maximus’s vision of the multidimensionality of love superbly: 
Charity secures not only a unified movement toward God as the true goal of man, but also 
the good use of man’s different natural faculties and a just relationship between all men 
who share the same nature  (Thunberg 1985, p. 108). 
This quotation captures the essence of an Orthodox theology of development.  Charity, or 
love, is the supreme “factor of integration”.   This is to say, the human’s single nature 
                                                          
15
 These cosmopolitan virtues are “comprehensive goods” to use the earlier terminology.    They are not 
liberally neutral between competing conceptions of the good.  These carry in their train a whole series of 
positive obligations.    
16
 This need not be only the biological family.  The monastery was conceived as a supreme location of 
virtues.   
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(logos) has two irreducible dimensions or functions for loving union:  union with God and 
union with others (which correspond to the two Great Commandments).    These 
dimensions are never entirely the same, nor are they ever entirely separate, and neither are 
they separate from the development of human powers or the “different natural faculties” 
and justice between persons.   The understanding of charity outlined here is much more 
comprehensive than some in that while universal love is enjoined, its platform remains 
within the concrete community and it aims at “capability development” or the good use of 
all the natural faculties, and by all who share the same nature.      
However, even if one is perfect in virtue, perfect in regards to placing persons over things, 
one still must face the question about priorities.  Humans necessarily live with finite 
abilities to give and share.  Two things are equally unhelpful and ultimately irresponsible.  
One is to say that love should have equal regard for all without any regard for distinctions 
and the other is to say that Christian love should focus primarily on those within. Better 
criteria are needed.   Some priority indeed must be given for special relations and to fail to 
do so would eventuate in universal chaos.  But persons are often unreflective and lazy in 
this and the conventional wisdom fails to capture the extent of responsibilities owed to the 
wider human community.  Framed as loyalty to special relations, or loyalty to persons in 
general misses how extreme vulnerabilities can helpfully structure priorities. (This may 
appear obvious to common sense, but common sense is often terribly uncommon in the 
theoretical realm, both in theology and the social sciences.)   Thus an even remotely 
adequate ethic of love should contain at least these three criteria.  It:  a) includes priorities 
for special relations, b) aspires toward equal concern, and c) discriminates within this equal 
concern through the additional criteria of addressing extreme vulnerabilities. 
If this is granted, the issue then becomes critical reflection on what one’s special relations 
actually require for well-being in terms of needs versus desires.  This becomes the 
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foundational issue because “it is within a person’s power to change his preferences, in a 
way that it is not within his power to change his needs” (Goodin 1985, p. 199).   One can 
see where asceticism would play a necessary role in not being dominated by selfish 
preferences, and similarly the role of self-discipline in reasoning clearly, compassionately, 
and resolutely not only about one’s own situation, but others in their plight (e.g. actually 
becoming Smith or Sen’s ‘Impartial Spectator’).   Wisdom or phronesis will of course be 
required and there are never easy answers.  This judgement can receive guidance by an 
understanding of basic needs and dimensions of flourishing which is the analytic ambit of 
the social sciences.  
But there is more; the trade-offs, or tensions, between meeting the needs of special 
relations and addressing the needs of the vulnerable are inflated.   The social sciences have 
shown that humans do not need as much “stuff” to be happy as is often thought.   Multiple 
studies have shown that while some economic development is important for well-being, it 
quickly becomes marginal, subject to diminishing and even negative returns past a certain 
modest, low middle class, per capita income (Gasper 2006).  Studies also show that 
happiness is largely found in relationships, in self-giving and even character development, 
not in unlimited consumer acquisition (Myers 1992; Lane 1994; Layard 2005; Bok 2010; 
Proyer, Ruch et al. 2012).  And there is emerging evidence that materialism breeds 
unhappiness and various forms of ill-being (Kasser 2003).    There are thus eudaimonistic 
(happiness/well-being) aspects of the social sciences that confirm the Biblical axiom, “It is 
more blessed to give than to receive” (Acts 20).  This is to say that it may not be as 
difficult as the conventional wisdom holds (with ever adequate support from the marketing 
industry) in preventing “laudable loyalties” (Goodin 1985, p. 23) from “running riot” over 
one’s general duties for protecting the vulnerable.  This vulnerability approach accords 
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well with the moral intuitions of the Samaritan parable which informs not only Christians, 
but the secular world as well—and occasionally the latter more than the former.17  
But even this clarification of principle, while helpful, will not by itself resolve many 
concrete ethical disputes in their myriad complexities.  Staniloae would argue that acting 
on agape in a situation is not one that can easily be defined beforehand, and is best 
determined by the experienced person of wisdom, the phronimos (or saint) whose reason 
and disposition are trained through many years of experience.  Phronesis, or expert 
judgement, is not merely acting on a set of general, even if correct basic principles.  But 
phronesis will be all the more difficult if the basic underlying principles are defective.   
Love is the highest virtue and the synthesis of all other virtues.  In contrast to the Western 
intellectual tradition that posits “Cogito Ergo Sum”, Staniloae argues that Christianity’s 
starting point is “Amo Ergo Sum”, reason situated within an “Ontology of Love”.   
Staniloae does not reject the Cartesian approach, but places “it within the right 
metaphysical framework” (Rogobete 1997, p. 283), which is to say, the Trinity.   However, 
in terms of understanding Orthodoxy’s structure or ontology of love and how this relates to 
human development, there is one more major doctrine to investigate, and that is synergy.   
This is vitally important because “synergy is the general formula for the working of God in 
the world” (Staniloae 2000, p. 60).    
                                                          
17
 This is one sphere of Christian spirituality that has traction in “secular” development debates (Kleinig 
1976; Mack 1980; McFarland 2001).   Even Sen references this Samaritan ethic (Sen 2009).  From an 
Orthodox perspective, the focus on Pauline ethics and not interpreting them in light of the Gospels and the 
teaching of Jesus is undoubtedly a result of those forces described earlier that separates grace from nature, 
social ethics from salvation, and faith from works. 
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9.3 Synergy: the general formula for the working of God in the world 
Freedom’s strong currency within the economy of Orthodoxy is especially evident in the 
doctrine of synergy or “action with”.  Staniloae quotes approvingly a famous passage by 
Vladimir Lossky:  “God becomes powerless before human freedom; He cannot violate it 
since it flows from His own omnipotence”.  But the passage taken from Lossky goes on to 
say, “A single will for creation, but two for deification” (Staniloae 2000, p. 108).   
Deification is synergy and synergy is God’s will cooperating with humanity’s; humanity’s 
with His.   Synergy is a dogmatic technical expression for the summum bonum of EO and 
is that “communion in freedom is the source of good” (Staniloae 2000, p. 180).   Synergy 
represents reciprocity, a unity that does not undermine but actually enhances and 
strengthens the particular identities and powers of each.   Synergy is cooperation, which is 
to say it is “non-monoenergetic” (Thunberg 1985, p. 52)—more on this term below.    
The Eastern dogma of synergy stands in conscious tension with a position associated with 
Augustine, and especially late in his career, that only one “energy” or action in the 
universe is effective for salvation, and that is God’s.  This position was formalized in the 
Canons of the Council of Orange in 529 that would be influential on the Reformed doctrine 
of total depravity.  This was a position that is called, in its correct technical formulation, 
“monergism”.18   However, there is a regulative principle within EO that emphasizes not 
“monergism”, but “synergism”, such that humans freely cooperate with Divine agency, and 
                                                          
18
 Under St. Vincent of Lerins in the Orthodox calendar, it reads:   
Without identifying by name Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Saint Vincent condemns his doctrine of Grace 
and predestination, calling it heresy to teach of ‘a certain great and special and altogether personal grace 
of God [which is given] without any labour, without any effort, without any industry, even though they 
neither ask, nor seek, nor knock’(Monastary 2009). 
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not merely in a passive way, but exercising true agency, a source of real human (but God 
given) power and grace.
19
    
9.3.1 Horizontal Synergy 
Synergy, the “general formula for the working of God in the world” applies in many 
directions such as between God and humanity (“vertically”), but also between persons 
(“horizontally”).   Staniloae notes that the Holy Spirit has a special role in synergy:  “The 
Holy Spirit is what unites the Father and the Son, not as essence but precisely as Person, 
leaving Father and Son at the same time as free Persons.  Hence the Spirit is also the one 
who unites men among themselves, but as a Person himself he leaves other persons free” 
(Staniloae 1980, p. 102).   The Spirit is the power of communion both with God, and 
between humans.  Yet it is more complicated still, for these two dimensions interact in 
important ways.   This section will briefly analyze synergy on a horizontal, inter-human 
level, bringing out new dimensions, and the next will analyze synergy more directly 
between humans and God. 
It has been sufficiently demonstrated already that inter-human sympathy is intrinsic to 
well-being, and salvation for Orthodoxy is about the activation of all dimensions, 
communion having an architectonic role.   But beyond communion itself as a desirable 
dimension, Staniloae shows, as did Maximus above, that love unlocks human potentials 
                                                          
19
 John Cassian (360-435) articulated “synergism” in conscious contrast to the Augustine influenced model of 
monergism. This synergistic model of divine-human interaction was later vindicated in the Eastern tradition 
by Maximus the Confessor on the basis of Chalcedonian Christology— “union without confusion”—a 
synergy of the two operative wills of Christ, human and divine.  In the Church calendar, it is noted that John 
Cassian (350 – 433) fought equally against “Pelagianism”, and Augustinianism: 
Pelagianism, which taught that Christ was a mere man who without the help of God had avoided sin, and 
that it was possible for man to overcome sin by his own efforts ... The error opposed to Pelagianism but 
equally ruinous was Augustine's teaching that after the fall, man was so corrupt that he could do nothing 
for his own salvation, and that God simply predestined some men to salvation and others to damnation.  
Saint John Cassian refuted this blasphemy ... at length and with many citations from the Holy Scriptures, 
[showing] the Orthodox teaching of the balance between the grace of God on one hand, and man's efforts 
on the other, necessary for our salvation (Monastary 2009). 
 311 
(logoi), revealing the “synergy” between interpersonal communion and intrapersonal 
“capability” development:  “Everyone’s subject hides indefinite potentials, which can be 
turned to good account by love” (Staniloae 2003, p. 316).20  The empirical verification of 
this was seen in the requirements of parental affection for the proper development of 
infant’s neurological systems. 
Solidarity is thus not created by humans, but is built into the very structure of existence, 
but humans contribute significantly to it.  Nature finds its fulfilment in the human person, 
who brings about and enhances nature’s own potentialities for solidarity.   When nature is 
used “in conformity with itself”, it is in turn the medium through which one “brings his 
good intentions” to others in the form of the gifts of nature.   But this respect for nature 
does not mean nature is not to be transformed through work.  Nature is a malleable, 
contingent rationality and is openly structured for the interventions of the creative human 
imagination.  Thus “humans must work and think in solidarity with regard to the 
transformation of the gifts of nature” (Staniloae 2000, p. 4).  And “even with its limited 
effects, the work man performs on nature in order to make of it in his turn a gift to others 
recalls the creative act of God whose complete gift is nature” (Staniloae 2000, p. 5).  
Solidarity with nature has as its telos solidarity among humans.
21
 
Inter-human synergy concerns primarily the second Great commandment, but focusing 
exclusively on this can distort a proper understanding of the human condition.  Rather, the 
function of the two commandments in Orthodoxy corresponds to the right operation of the 
two fundamental relational functions of the single human logos, and that is the God 
                                                          
20
 One implication of the doctrine of synergy should perhaps be made clear:  synergy dissolves the “win-
lose” relationship between God’s powers, and humans that monergism structures.  This has been a 
fundamental problem in Western Christianity in relating faith and development.     Feuerbach’s:  "To enrich 
God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing" (in Casanova 1994, p. 34) makes 
no sense within Eastern Orthodoxy.  
21
 This does not mean that there is no intrinsic value in non-human nature, just that human nature stands at a 
higher plane.   
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orientation, and the human orientation. To isolate either of them or to try and reduce one to 
the other is to warp and disfigure the human condition.   In light of this it would make 
sense that if one dimension is defective or suffering, it would affect other dimensions in a 
similar fashion as when one is malnourished one cannot think well.  But the inverse is true 
as well, that the well functioning of one dimension enhances the other.
22
     For Staniloae, 
one cannot have a relationship with God without being in good relation with neighbours, 
so much so that “we experience or test our love for God by human love” (Staniloae 2000, 
p. 199).   Staniloae writes:  “Love for God, or more strictly, thought taken for God, 
represents a continuous contribution toward keeping the world in movement towards more 
and more authentically human relations among humans” (Staniloae 2000, p. 196). 
For Staniloae, the way to God lies through one’s neighbour.  The deprioritization of the 
neighbour relation in favour of the God relation, that is, reducing the plural goods of the 
two Great commands to one, has resulted in the downgrading of praxis and viewing it as 
inferior to theology proper.  This has meant, ironically, the marginalizing of theology 
itself.  This disfigurement of the richness of the human condition, captured by the 
irreducible importance and interpenetration of both commandments, has created revulsion 
to Christianity and is also why Christianity and human development have often seemed 
irrelevant one to the other.   If one reads the actual writings of Enlightenment figures and 
not interpretations of them (e.g. (Gay 1966)) one gathers the sensation that many of these 
thinkers were not so much anti-religious, but wanted Christianity to live up to the Christian 
humanism embedded in Christ’s teaching.   A leading Enlightenment historian, J.B. 
Schneewind writes: 
                                                          
22 The notion that there is a synergy between the two Great commandments in that each enhances the other, 
receives social science confirmation, even if in a rudimentary stage.   Recall that in the Positive Psychology 
virtue list of Seligman, the virtue of Transcendence was not just a virtue or dimension alongside the others.  
It indeed was a distinct virtue, or its own dimension, but it was found to give strength and enhance the other 
virtues such as humanity, justice, temperance, wisdom and knowledge. 
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[T]he inherited conceptions of morality [from European Christianity] did not allow for a 
proper appreciation of human dignity, and therefore did not properly even allow even for 
the moral teachings of the Christianity that many of them still accepted (Schneewind 1998, 
p. 5).
23
 
But the inverse is true as well; not only does the way to God lie through one’s neighbour, 
but the way to one’s neighbour lies through God.  When the multi-dimensionality of 
Christianity is reduced either to a) one’s relationship with God, or b) the neighbour relation 
alone having absolute priority, both of these create deformities in the human condition.  
This is to say prayer and asceticism and a relationship with the Divine is a dimension of 
well-being in its own right, but it also contributes to health and human relations 
(Johnstone, Yoon et al. 2012).  Even if one does not accept the thesis of original depravity, 
nonetheless, “no human being can overcome the tendency to reuse the other, after the 
warmth of their first encounter has cooled” (Staniloae 2000, p. 198).  Others are 
instrumentalized, objectified.  God as supreme Subject “deepens in our eyes the value and 
mystery of the other person and thereby strengthens our own love for that person and vice 
versa” (Staniloae 2000, p. 198).     
The interaction between the vertical and the horizontal, or to say the synergy between the 
two great commandments, can be clarified by reverting again to Orthodoxy’s theological 
anthropology that is both Christological and Trinitarian, and briefly showing how these 
two dogmas relate.   Staniloae writes: 
The Holy Trinity determined upon the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension 
as man of one of the persons of the Trinity so that this person might recapitulate all men in 
himself and thus bring all into eternal communion with God in Trinity.  We have to do here 
with a circular movement that sets out from the Trinity towards men in order to lead them 
into the Trinity (Staniloae 1994, p. 76).    
                                                          
23
 One author notes, speaking in a Western theological context:  “It is true that few people until relatively 
recent times thought the Sermon on the Mount as the essence of Christian teaching” (Bowman 2006, p. 48); 
the same largely holds true for the Great Commandments.    
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This “circular movement” (the exitus-reditus/exit-return model transformed from neo-
Platonism) is the overall structure of Orthodox theology and how the Trinity and 
Incarnation relate.  Christ is sent (and sends himself) in mission and by uniting humans 
with himself, elevates and incorporates persons into the communion of the Trinity.   
But this passage could imply a passive relationship of humanity vis-à-vis God’s activity ad 
extra in the economy of salvation and would thus be inconsistent with the regulative 
principle of synergy.   In this longer and quite remarkable quote, Staniloae shows this same 
structure, but in a very precise way illustrating the cooperative notion of synergy: 
By deciding, therefore, to act outside himself in conformity with his being, which is to say, 
as the good that is eternal interpersonal communion, God makes use of his power to create 
persons who are to move towards the perfection of communion with him and among 
themselves [the two dimensions of the Great commands].  This movement is to come from 
themselves on the one hand, while on the other hand created persons are to be placed 
within this movement by God himself through his coming to meet them.  For this purpose 
he both implants in them a natural power of movement towards himself and also 
strengthens this natural created power of theirs with the uncreated power of his 
benevolence which comes to meet them (Staniloae 1994, p. 187). 
Persons are created for communion with God and among themselves, and contribute by 
their God-given powers to this, that are simultaneously met by God’s powers.   Humans in 
a sense are all “brothers” or family in the image of the Trinity, but this has been ruptured 
through sin.  By uniting with Christ, by adopting the virtues of Christ, humans become 
brothers with the eternal Son of God.  In becoming brother with the eternal son of God, the 
God-man, in this quality begins a process of maturation between humans “to reflect the 
relationship between the Son and the Father and the Holy-Spirit” (Rogobete 1997, p. 
284).
24
 
                                                          
24
 Staniloae writes in this regard:  
As a work of raising up believers to intimate communion with God, salvation and deification are nothing 
other than the extension to conscious creatures of the relations that obtain between the divine persons.  
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The account must now turn directly to the Divine-human relation or synergy.  Mentioned 
again is the earlier principle that charity is intended to work in an integrated fashion on 
three dimensions:  a) securing a unified movement towards God, b) the good use of the 
persons’ different faculties or powers c) and a just relationship with all who share the same 
nature.  Each of these dimensions enhances the other, and are in turn enhanced by God’s 
active power pro nobis. 
9.3.2 Vertical Synergy 
Up until now the role of human agency and interpersonal communion in theosis has been 
emphasized in order to trigger dialogue with the social sciences.  There has also been 
attention given to the various “ontological” structures within which human agency operates 
as well as voluntary communion as the highest expression of the human good.  However, a 
more complete picture of theosis must be given which emphasizes God’s initiative.  
Orthodoxy is no Promethean ethical humanism where humans have to rely only on their 
own resources; “A purely human training to awaken some unknown ‘sleeping power’ isn’t 
enough” (Staniloae 2003, p. 28).   
The nature of the relation between God and humans is, arguably, a major difference in 
Eastern theology vis-à-vis the West: 
If one were to summarize the differences between the eastern and western traditions in a 
single word, that word would be 'synergy'.  For the East the highest form of communion 
with the divine is not primarily an intellectual act, but a sharing of life and activity 
(Bradshaw 2004, p. 264-5). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
That is why the Trinity reveals itself essentially in the work of salvation and that is why the Trinity is the 
basis on which salvation stands (Staniloae 1994, p. 248).  
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The assertion that western traditions uniformly understand communion with God as an 
intellectual act is an overstatement, especially in light of the changes since Vatican II in 
Catholic theology.   However, the assertion that salvation involves for EO “sharing of life 
and activity” with God is correct.   The aim of this last section is to show how this “sharing 
of life and activity”, or synergy, contributes to a theology of human development. 
To begin, it is important to recall that for Orthodoxy one cannot “access” or participate in 
the essence (or ousia) of God through the human intellect, or in any way.   However, while 
God’s “essence” is completely beyond knowing or participation, his activities (energeia), 
are not.   This essence-energies distinction is a corollary to the doctrine of synergy and one 
cannot be understood without the other.   This essence-energies distinction was definitively 
formulated by Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) in the context of the “Hesychastic” monastic 
controversy, however, this dogma was anticipated earlier by Maximus and the Church 
Fathers.  St. Basil for example affirms that “We know the essence through the energy” 
(Ware 1998, p. 22).    Staniloae, according to Kallistos Ware, was a “decisive pioneer” in 
the revival of this Palamistic doctrine (Staniloae 1994, p. xii).   In its simplicity, it asserts 
simultaneously two paradoxical facts:  the complete otherness/Transcendence of God (as 
Essence) and the complete nearness/Immanence of God (as Energies).
25
   Though 
paradoxical, these energies in some way express the very essence of God.    This 
distinction, furthermore, is behind the priority of practical reason to theoretical that has 
been developed in this study.  
                                                          
25
 Considerable debate surrounds the nature of this distinction that can become extremely technical and need 
not be detailed.   For an entry into the debate by a Catholic Trinitarian theologian critical of this distinction, 
but who is otherwise sympathetic to Eastern Orthodoxy, see (LaCugna 1991).   For a comprehensive 
overview from a sympathetic Protestant perspective, see (Bartos 1999, pp. 57-79).  See (Williams 1977) for a 
biting accusation of Palamism as Neoplatonic pantheism and (Bradshaw 2004, p. 270-3) for a rebuttal.    
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Previously the terminology has been largely in reference to logoi, and now the vocabulary 
is shifting to that of “energies”.    These terms are not consistently employed.26  However, 
a brief interpretation of their differences will be offered here for it can help further explain 
the relevance of synergy for human development.  The logoi, as explained before are the 
laws, principles, tendencies, dimensions and virtues of this natural life.   They have their 
absolute foundation in the one Logos, Christ.   But the one Logos is not isolated but is in 
relation with the Father and the Spirit.  The logoi thus partake of a tendency for both unity 
and diversity, and can be thought of as the principles of this existence that give it both 
stability and vitality or dynamism.  The logoi are grace, aspects of grace, but they are 
dimensions of this natural life.  These logoi are internal to this life and include freedom, as 
well as structures, natural and moral laws, potentials, and human sympathies (eros)—
among other aspects.   Staniloae writes that the logoi are God’s ideas (Staniloae 2003, p. 
221), but one should not gather from this that the logoi correspond primarily to intellectual 
ideas and not to the biological or social realm.  They are created gifts and they are not 
directly God’s actions per se in the sense that humans exercise real freedom. 
The Divine energies on the other hand are described as uncreated.  They are God’s 
Personal presence as Tri-Unity to the creature.   These energies, “paralleling” the logoi, are 
also a Unity in Diversity; one in will or purpose (love), but different in actions and 
manifestations.  They are God’s agency or activity ad extra and they constitute a desire for 
communion with, and the well-being of, the creature.   These energies “lead” the creature 
towards human development, which is to say communion with others, God, and the 
fulfilment of all dimensions of existence.    The energies of God are always “one step 
                                                          
26
 Staniloae writes, using the terms synonymously “…putting into concepts some of the logoi or energies of 
His” (Staniloae 2003, p. 220).  Bradshaw notes that Palamas does on one occasion identify the divine logoi 
with God’s creative energeia, “but this is an exceptional instance” (Bradshaw 2004, p. 271).  Again, the 
terminology is not consistent. 
 318 
ahead”27 of where persons are presently at in terms of human development.   The energies 
lead (by the Holy Spirit) humanity and creation forward on the never-ending journey of 
epektasis, or continual growth.  These energies are not, however, impersonal, but are God’s 
personal engagement with the world.   “The East has no concept of God.  It views God not 
as an essence to be grasped intellectually, but as a personal reality known through His acts” 
(Bradshaw 2004).   These energies sustain the world in Being, guiding it towards Well-
being and Eternal being.    One author, writing about God’s eros for the world, but also 
eros from within the world as creational gift, captures the essence of synergy remarkably 
well: 
Thus “eros” has a dual connotation: on the one hand, an uncreated Energy of God Himself, 
and on the other, a created energy [or logoi] made in the image of the uncreated Energy 
that exists at every level of creation. It is a kind of universal life-force which is 
communicated to different creatures on different levels in different ways depending on the 
degree they can participate in it by nature. At each level above the animal it may be rightly 
directed or wrongly directed; but it remains in essence good (Moss 2010, p. 241). 
The use here of “created energy” instead of logoi, while not according to the conventional 
terminology, has merits due to the connotation of dynamism.
28
  But whether they are called 
logoi or created energies, these parallel the uncreated energies of God which is why grace 
and nature stand in such close relation.  The essence of synergy is the cooperation or 
mutual enrichment of God’s activity or energies with natural, created, processes, including 
human freedom.   Even prior to the Incarnation, God’s energies encouraged the right use of 
human agency “at each level above”.  Staniloae talks about Providence’s role:  
                                                          
27
 This expression, “one step ahead”, recalls Alfred North Whitehead’s “Process Theology”.   And indeed 
there are fruitful connections.  It is beyond the scope of this research, but that both Orthodoxy and Process 
Theology are called “panentheism” signals similarities; but differences remain.  Protopresbyter Thomas 
Hopko has engaged in the most serious research on this connection (Hopko 1986). 
28
 The terminology “created energies” brings out a needed angle that the term logoi can miss.   Logoi leads 
one to think of structures, patterns, tendencies and laws; created “energy” makes one think of the gift of free 
agency, creativity, and dynamism from within creation.  Both of these, the structural aspect and the creative 
agency aspect, characterize the human condition and are created energies, or logoi.  These terms complement 
each other.  
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At times, the working of God strengthens our own work and crowns it with success; at 
other times it blocks our path or brings failures and sufferings in its wake, inasmuch as 
what we have done does not correspond to the direction of our genuine development … for 
no contradiction exists between created nature and the powers of God [energies] who is 
perfecting his creation (Staniloae 2000, p. 60-1). 
Synergy thus has to do with God guiding humanity and nature towards its genuine 
development.  God’s energies, or activities, involve a “personal” revelation in creation and 
thus Staniloae writes that “nature can be the medium through which the believer receives 
divine grace or the beneficent uncreated energies” (Staniloae 2000, p. 3).29  These divine 
operations sustain and guide the creation which was made in the image of God’s 
Trinitarian nature, the supreme structure of love.  This entails a “wisdom [which] can have 
no other bases than the perfection of the Trinitarian communion” (Staniloae 1994, p. 
214).
30
  All of reality participates in a longing or yearning for Trinitarian wholeness, one 
dimension of which is the energy of justice.  Staniloae writes:  
Those who participate in the energies of God (among which is numbered the energy of 
justice) first through their being and then through grace—by which their being is re-
established and strengthened—are themselves also animated by the impulse to bring about 
justice.  And they also urge others to do justice (Staniloae 1994, p. 220).   
Staniloae then notes that justice must be internal (in a person’s heart) and external (social 
structures) and that God’s justice will fill the earth precisely because it will be “shown 
from the side of God and from our side” (Staniloae 1994, p. 220ff).  This “from both sides” 
is the essence of synergy.   
                                                          
29
 Thus it is not correct to think that logoi = nature, and energies = grace because grace is also within 
creation.  But this grace in creation is “met” and supported by the Divine Energies that are always leading 
nature to its proper destination.   
30
 And here, Staniloae complements the communitarian point with the cosmopolitan:    
Interpersonal communion is an image of the Trinitarian communion and a participation in it.  Hence, 
the divine image in the human person is an image of the Trinity and reveals itself in human 
communion.  St. Gregory of Nyssa observed that "the image is not in a part of our nature, nor is the 
grace in any one of the things found in nature, but this power extends equally to all the race" 
(Staniloae 2000, p. 94).  
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This is also why one can see and experience God in creation (natural theology) and in 
scientific discovery,
31
 as well as the unity and diversity within the human species and the 
eros for greater communion and justice—human development.   But, and this is critical, 
this ability to perceive God and his intentions in creation has been damaged.   
Understanding God’s purposes as loving-kindness to all has become difficult to discern 
with any certainty for humanity on their own.  
9.3.3 Salvation History and Human Development 
This is where “salvation history” becomes decisive.  God, in order to reveal himself as 
loving-kindness to all, and unequivocally beyond the energies in creation and providence, 
inaugurated a surer plan.  This of course is the Incarnation: the humble birth in a stable, the 
temptation in the wilderness, the sermon on the mountain, the transfiguration, the entire 
life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ of Nazareth.   Through this, God’s 
loving purposes for humanity cease to be dim but become radiant; revelation is no longer 
just generally perceived in nature.  In the theanthropos (God-man) “God has truly come to 
men in the closest intimacy and dialogue” (Staniloae 1980, p. 168).   Here Protestants 
strongly agree and the decisive role of salvation history—the “Great acts of God” are 
affirmed.   
But how salvation history is interpreted beyond this basic similarity reveals a very large 
divergence and one vitally important for a theology of development.   Two questions must 
be answered here.    First, how does one participate in or appropriate these past historical 
actions that all recognize are somehow central for salvation; and second, what is the 
                                                          
31
 That is, one can perceive the energies, the presence of God, by contemplating the logoi of creation 
(Bradshaw 2004, p. 206). 
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relationship of these special acts of God in ancient history to present day human 
development? 
For Orthodoxy, the answer to the first question of how one participates in, or has “faith in” 
salvation history is: “not simply through belief”.  Rather it is through mimetic action, 
through the imitation of Christ,
 
or participation in Christ’s virtues, or what Staniloae calls 
“following his example” (Staniloae 1980, p. 169).   Enough has been said about the fact of 
the virtues in Orthodoxy and their relation to theosis; what needs more clarification is how 
the virtues allow Orthodoxy to affirm the equipriority of salvation history and human 
development as if they are two sides to the same coin. 
Synergy is based on a reciprocal exchange of qualities between God and man.   Staniloae, 
as was seen, did not frequently employ the term imitation of Christ.
32
   The term however, 
if qualified, is helpful and since Maximus and others employed it—will be used here.33   
For Maximus, this reciprocal exchange or union with Christ is “brought about by divine 
love for man and the human charity that imitates it.  To participate in the divine energeia is 
here straightforwardly a matter of doing as God does” (in Bradshaw 2004, p. 199).34  With 
this “doing as God does” as a foundation of theosis, and thus participating in the divine 
energies/actions, one can further see the theological rationale for placing praxis before 
theoria, phronesis prior to episteme, love prior to theological contemplation.   The priority 
of praxis to theoria is related to the question of how loving actions are participation in the 
                                                          
32
 He does use the expression “imitation of Christ” occasionally (Staniloae 2012, p. 100). 
33
 Even though Staniloae largely avoided imitation, it is used however by many Orthodox authors, including 
Nicholas Cabasilas, John Climacus  (Spidlik 1986, p. 40) and as seen here, Maximus the Confessor.  
Staniloae emphasized that Christ “exists as a model connected ontologically with every man and exercising 
real power over all men” (Staniloae 1980), but also that humans participate in Christ by the virtues—and the 
virtues require action.  The point here is that any notion of imitation (and human ethical effort, however it is 
described) must be situated in this larger ontological and mystical context, and an awareness of the Divine 
Energies that aid humans, as well as the ecclesial and liturgical context that nourish these.  
34
 Bradshaw points out that “Truth” in scripture is understood often as activities to be performed, John 3:21, 1 
John 1:6, Isaiah 64:5, Jeremiah 9:24, Psalm 103:6, Acts 10:35, James 1:20, I John 2:29, 3:7, 10 (Bradshaw 
2004, p. 274).  
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divine energies and thus both revealing and developing the objective “norms of 
existence”—the logoi of human development.  Imitating the Logos reveals and unlocks the 
logoi, God’s intentions for human flourishing.  These are the principles of Being and Well-
being and on to Eternal-being.  Phronesis, or wisdom, theology itself is a life of rational 
reflection, following the example of Christ, the Phronimos.   
Persons are thus “saved” not through mere belief, nor a one-sided extrinsic action of God, 
but through mimesis,
35
 which is imitating or re-incarnating Christ’s love for humanity and 
especially the vulnerable.    For the Cappadocians as well as Maximus, Christianity was 
“essentially the imitation of the incarnate life of Christ” (Russell 2004, p. 13).   Hippolytus 
put it most succinctly:  by obeying Christ’s precepts, one “become[s] a good imitator of 
him who is good” (Russell 2004, p. 111).36  Maximus writes, reflecting directly the 
energies language:  
Nothing is so conducive for justification or so fitted for divinization … and nearness to 
God as mercy offered with pleasure and joy to those who stand in need.  For if the Word 
has shown that the one who is in need of having good done to him is God—“inasmuch as 
ye have done it,” he says “unto one of the least of these, ye have done it to me”  [Matt. 
25:40], and He who speaks is God—then He will much more show that the one who can do 
good and does it is truly God by grace and participation, because he has taken on in proper 
imitation the activity (energeian) and characteristic of His own beneficence (Maximus  
Confessor 1985, p. 211-12).
37
 
One becomes “near to God” thus by re-enacting, re-incarnating Christ’s beneficence for 
those who stand in need.
38
   On this understanding, the role of salvation history was to 
reveal God’s loving concern for all of humanity, that all participate equally in the Logos 
                                                          
35
 Better put from Staniloae’s perspective, instead of imitating could be “participating in Christ” a principle 
aspect of which is winning the virtues of Christ, which is a “love for all” (Staniloae 2012, p. 72). 
36
 Clement of Alexandria, in a work entitled “The Word our Paedagogus”, describes “being assimilated to 
God by a participation in virtue” and the “moral loveliness” that comes from “the training of Christ” has as 
its primary fruit the development of a “generous disposition” (Stevenson 1987, p. 182). 
37
 This translation has also followed that of (Bradshaw 2004, p. 199). 
38
 Beneficence is doing active kindness by removing a harm or improving a situation.  It is to be 
distinguished strongly from nonmaleficence, or simply “not doing harm”. 
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(the imago dei: John 1:9; James 3:9), and special concern is to be shown for the poor and 
vulnerable.   Maximus writes: 
And if the poor man is God, it is because of God’s condescension in becoming poor for us 
and in taking upon Himself by his own sufferings of each one … All the more reason then, 
will one be God who by loving men in imitation of God heals by himself in divine fashion 
the hurts of those who suffer (Maximus Confessor 1985, p. 212).   
Maximus’s logic is clear:  the poor man is “God” because of God’s identification with him 
as a sort of “patient” apart from the exercise of his own agency.  If this is the case, a 
fortiori will one be like (or participate in) God if one exercises one’s agency in imitation of 
the Divine agency, by healing the hurts of those who suffer.   And far from being merely a 
spiritualist enterprise, this imitative action is understood precisely as an unleashing of the 
universal potentials (logoi) of human development, or undoing the “shredding of human 
nature”.    Lars Thunberg writes that “the condescending philanthropy invites man to the 
very end to an imitation that liberates him from his anti-human egoism” and that this theme 
is what Maximus prefers to underline (Thunberg 1985, p. 67).    
Orthodoxy insists that God took the initiative in salvation:  God’s “energy” in the 
Incarnation wakes up humanities—but it is human love, or eros that voluntarily 
participates and is won over, and it is human action that is synergized, empowered by God.   
Human agency remains engaged; humans are not puppets:  
As inexhaustible source of energy, God shares his energy with the world and with man without 
upsetting the orderly rule of the world or reducing man’s freedom or depriving the world of its 
own causality.  Analogously, as humans energize one another, the same is true with God but to 
a greater degree ... human energy takes its beginning and has its growth from the divine energy 
(Staniloae 1980, 113-4).     
Aristotle apparently invented the word “energy” and it is derived from “ergon” meaning 
“deed”, or “thing done” (Bradshaw 2004, p. 1).   Synergy, or deed done together, is the 
reproducing of the divine philanthropia.  The Transcendent God, beyond form or shape, 
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takes form and shape in humanity through the virtues.  One more remarkable passage of 
Maximus illustrates this: 
God is thus manifest in those who possess [this grace], taking shape [morphoumenous] 
through love for mankind according to the specific character of the virtue of each, and 
condescending to be named accordingly.  For it is the most perfect work of love, and the 
goal of its activity, to contrive through the mutual exchange of what is related that the 
names and properties of those who have been united through love should be fitting to one 
another.  So the human being is made God, and God is called and appears as human, 
because of the single undeviating wish (in accordance with the will) and movement of both 
(Louth 1996, p. 86). 
Synergy thus involves the “wishes” of both God and man.  God, who is without form, 
takes form in the world through those who, by actions, share in His love for humankind, a 
love that was revealed in its full radiance in Christ.   
So if the first question was: “How can one be ‘saved’”, then the answer is: not by mere 
belief but by participating in and reproducing “God’s universal love for humanity but 
especially the poor”.  This is clear and ancient in Orthodoxy.  Now the second question 
needs to be addressed and is linked to the first:  “Can a rational, compelling relationship be 
forged between salvation history and human development?”   The answer, and developed 
through the entirety of this study, is a thoroughgoing “Yes”!    But before investigating this 
further, the implications for consigning salvation to the past must be examined. 
If redemption was already completely accomplished in salvation history, and is 
appropriated through belief, this leaves Christianity vulnerable to criticism.  One Jewish 
commentator, Gershom Sholem, has this to say about the moral relevance of what he called 
the Christian view of redemption: 
In all its forms and manifestations, Judaism has always held firmly to a concept of 
redemption which understood it as a process which takes place under the public gaze, on 
the stage of history and in the medium of society, that is, which definitely takes place in the 
visible world … By contrast, the view of Christianity is one in which redemption is a 
process in the intellectual sphere and in the invisible, which takes place in the world of 
 325 
every individual, and brings about a hidden transformation, to which nothing external in 
the world need correspond (in Moltmann 1974 , p. 100).  
Sholem does not have it quite right, for scholars address this by arguing that it is precisely 
the historical nature of the divine acts of salvation that preserves the public nature of the 
Gospel (Lee 1987).   But the spirit of his criticism is correct if redemption is something 
God exclusively does on behalf of humans, and all the more so if it was only revealed in a 
few key actions within history.   This swings the pendulum back and raises the Jewish 
question to Christianity in a new way:  can the historical actions of God (that all Christians 
that are “orthodox” accept) be connected to a transformation that is effected on a public 
stage?
39
  In other words, can theology that believes in the primacy of salvation history be 
really integrated with human development?    
The contention here is that the virtue approach of Maximus, Staniloae, and the entire 
Orthodox tradition, culminating in the doctrine of synergy as imitation of the Divine 
philanthropia, meets this challenge and in a way that demonstrates that human 
development concerns have long been at the very heart of theology.  Staniloae understands 
the real issues related to the Jewish criticism about Christian truth not being public: 
Obviously we do not approach this new thing [the basis for Christianity] through 
miraculous acts produced by God either in nature or in history, but by an upward growth in 
spiritualization which is most certainly visible in an exterior way in the perfection of social 
relations and the mastery of nature by the spirit of an evolved mankind (Staniloae 1980, p. 
128).   
Staniloae completely rejects adapting Christianity to the modern world in a way that denies 
both the priority and reality of these redemptive historical actions.   But on the other hand 
Staniloae shows that the very purpose of these actions is for human development, that is, 
                                                          
39
 This question of the relation of “God’s righteousness” or redemption vis-à-vis social transformation is, 
fortunately, contested in evangelicalism.  Ron Sider is a prominent evangelical advocate for justice concerns.  
Yet he separates God’s redemption proper from justice concerns (Sider 1993).   For an evangelical critique of 
this position, see (Samuel and Sugden 1999). 
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for enhancing the general experience of humankind, for “capability development”.40    And 
a theme that Staniloae emphasizes is that Orthodox spirituality is inconceivable without the 
perfection or improvement of social relations.  
This view of salvation clearly overlaps with Sen’s capability approach, while there are 
some departures.   Even though elements of Sen’s approach are distorted by Western 
individualism, his approach nonetheless addresses in analytically astute ways the problems 
facing especially the most vulnerable.  His concern, as was seen, is to conceptualize 
freedom and reason so they “can relate more generally to the miseries that lie within our 
power to help remedy” (Sen 1999, p. 283).  Sen goes on to note that “that responsibility is 
not, of course, the only consideration that can claim our attention...”   However, this “of 
course” is the crux of the issue:  how indeed can “that responsibility” that Sen has laboured 
to bring to humanity’s attention, actually claim sufficient attention to “keep us awake at 
night” (Sen 2009, p. xii) and change people’s behaviour?  Under what circumstances will 
the “relevance of our shared humanity” (Sen’s phrase) begin to make a difference in the 
actual pattern of choices made?    
One suggestion, anticipated in chapter seven but demanding further explication here, 
involves the role of narrative.  If development implies the exercise of practical reason 
through time, this is most appropriately grasped through a narrative structure.   Narratives 
not only comprehend what is the case in terms of a series of actions and interrelated 
consequences, but it also has the power to fire the imagination and generate powerful 
emotions.   Narratives allow persons to envision alternative storylines for their lives, or 
find new meaning for old ones.   Paul Ricoeur’s analysis in the previous chapter argued 
that theological narratives provide not necessarily new experiences, but the intensification 
                                                          
40
 Staniloae occasionally uses the capability language: “We purchase the Kingdom of heaven from our fellow 
men ... and also with the capabilities which our faith in Christ has conferred upon us” (Staniloae 1980, p. 
207). 
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of aspects of experience that might have been underperceived or connections unnoticed.   
Narratives do this in large part by constituting a community whose very identity is one of 
telling and retelling the story through actions as much as words (Ricoeur 1995, p. 241).  
It has already been argued that while shared human nature can be a powerful basis of 
ethical concern, it does not do so automatically and requires a narrative or interpretive 
framework for this “shared fact” to gain necessary salience.   A key dimension to the 
Christian story for Orthodoxy (and perhaps other traditions) is that humans share a nature 
that morally unites them.  But shared nature only “plays this role” within a certain kind of 
interpretive framework.  Both Sen and Nussbaum’s theories lack this feature, and because 
of their insistence on the individual person as the single moral principle, they cannot 
consistently develop this as a point of human solidarity. 
Christianity however, is not only about shared nature, nor is it about persons, nor 
communion—nor even the combination of these three.  Christianity is not just a Trinitarian 
model, but is the demonstration in history of a complete life, given as a pattern for 
humanity, entirely to “development action” (Tsetsis 1983, p. 95) and within a challenged 
context.  This of course is the Incarnation and this means sacrifice.  This is a missing 
ingredient in many discussions about human development and is a central node in the 
Christian narrative.   An examination of the role of sacrifice in general, and the cross in 
particular, can forge this final connection between salvation history and human 
development, and with this, this study will come to a close. 
In Orthodoxy, the cross is not the singular point of the story of salvation,
41
 but is central to 
that overall pattern that is revealed as kenosis in creation but pre-eminently in the 
                                                          
41
 This is important because if the cross itself is the singular point of redemption, and not the overall self-
giving pattern of Christ, this is a problem as “the words for ‘cross’ and ‘crucify’… are absent from Romans, 
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Incarnation (Philippians 2:7).
42
  This kenosis or “emptying” is the overall pattern of 
sacrificial giving on behalf of all.
43
  As mentioned, this love is already present in creation, 
in God’s ongoing providence, but was decisively revealed in the Incarnation, life, death 
and resurrection of Christ.   
For Orthodoxy there is a cross-shaped pattern inscribed on all of existence since Christ is 
the Logos and all things were made through him (Colossians 1: 15ff).   The cross is what 
each person must bear, the cross of asceticism and self-restraint.  The “flesh” must be 
crucified and this is the precondition for personal and social liberation.  “Flesh” of course 
is not corporeal nature but is greed, envy, strife, hypocrisy, malice, selfish ambition, lust 
for pleasure and the like.  These are the primary causes of misery, fights, quarrels, and 
wars (James 3).   Staniloae has a section called “The Cross on the Gift of the World” 
(Staniloae 2000, pp. 21-27).   For those who want to “profit selfishly” from the gifts of 
God in creation, and do not mortify selfishness, a cross of suffering will be imposed upon 
them against their will.  But those who reject this cross often impose crosses of suffering 
and injustice on others.   Paul Ricoeur points out how “narrative joins together agents and 
patients in the entangling of multiple life histories” (Ricoeur 1992, p. 320), and the “glory” 
of one person’s action can mean deep suffering for others.   
Some narratives are shaped by historical conflict, span many generations, and include, but 
transcend, individual actors.   Wounds are remembered and nursed from generation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 and 2 Thessalonians, the Pastoral Epistles, Petrine Epistles, and Johannine Epistles” (Horrell 2005, p. 37).   
Staniloae is very insistent that only when the cross is interpreted in the larger light of the Incarnation and 
Trinity can its true significance be revealed (Staniloae 1980, p. 126-127). 
42
 Western scholars have recently engaged the doctrine of kenosis and God’s self-limitation in creation as an 
act of love (Polkinghorne and Welker 2001).  Staniloae writes:  “The plan of God regarding the world itself 
represents a kenosis for him.  It is a descent of God to the dimensions, possibilities, and necessities of this 
world” (Staniloae 1994, p. 212).    
43
 This point of ethical universalism should not be taken for granted.   The statement, “The universal 
character of God’s redemption corresponds to the universality of Christian ethical and social responsibility” 
(Betz 1979, p. 311) needs emphasizing precisely because it is not universally accepted among Biblical 
scholars. 
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generation.  This negative cycle can sometimes only be broken through forgiveness, and 
this is a central point of the Christian narrative.  Christ did not merely offer a teaching, he 
embodied the most radical forgiveness imaginable.  The just “Lord”, through whom all 
was made, forgave the greatest injustice imaginable.
44
  In this he did not merely teach 
forgiveness, but inspired in his followers the practice.  Forgiveness of this sort is a 
distinctively Christian virtue, but one that can be cultivated in both interpersonal and 
international relations (Bole, Christiansen-SJ et al. 2004).
45
  It is the concrete example 
provided as revelation that reveals new dimensions for moral thought and experience 
available for everyone.   
Beyond forgiveness, the cross provides at least two additional dimensions relevant for 
human development.  The first is the power to act in the midst of suffering and poverty, 
and the second is the ability to suffer and experience poverty on behalf of others.   In terms 
of the first, Christ’s kenosis was a complete identification not just with humanity, but 
especially with the poor.  One Orthodox statement on development notes:  “The awareness 
that they [the poor] possess the dignity of the children of God should become for them a 
source of inspiration in creativity for their own development” (Tsetsis 1983, p. 91).  By 
Christ identifying with the poor,
46
 there is an elevating aspect for those on the underside of 
history.   
But the cross also serves as a source of solidarity on behalf of the poor.  Apart from being 
merely a piece of good advice for the poor to “keep their chin up”, this solidarity was 
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 It is often forgotten that it was not the “cross” per se that is the ground of forgiveness, but that Christ 
himself in a free choice, in the midst of horrific pain and dishonour, made this prayer:  “Father forgive 
them...”  
45
 Here is a clear example of where revelation provides a new basis for natural law; forgiveness as a virtue 
can demonstrate this relationship with clarity.   Recall that Hannah Arendt wisely observed that it was Jesus 
that introduced the role of forgiveness in human affairs (Arendt 1998).  
46
 Paul also identified with the poor, by taking on and insisting on the importance of manual labour in his 
tent-making.  This enactment of the kenosis (self-lowering) was an essential part of his proclamation of the 
Gospel (Horrell 2005, p. 220).    
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institutionalized, even if imperfectly, as the Church.   There can be little doubt that the 
triumph of Christianity was due largely to this factor, to the development of the 
institutional and liturgical context for the continuity of support and celebration of the 
virtues of a Christ-shaped love, which aspires to include all and inspired all sorts of social 
innovations and heroic acts to this end (Harakas 1989; Stark 1997).   This, as has been 
seen, was a fact recognized even by the pagans, who sought to emulate it such as Julian the 
Apostate.    
Christ-shaped love is active “renunciation of privileges for the sake of others”.   In current 
Biblical studies, this is argued to be the “metanorm” that trumps all other laws (Horrell 
2005, p. 222).   The radical “other-regard” expressed in the engaged humility of Christ is a 
pattern that is highly relevant to human development.
47
  It can engender forgiveness 
among antagonists, it can empower the poor in their own agency, but it can also build 
bridges of solidarity on behalf of the needy.    Every person is to “be an imitator of Christ, 
who came to serve and not to be served” (Tsetsis 1983, p. 93).  Staniloae writes: “if we act 
in the likeness of the God who is loving towards all, we act like men come to the highest 
point of their own realization, for our hearts are full of the most fervent love of all, God’s 
love” (Staniloae 1994, p. 227).   
There is thus a healing structure or pattern, relevant for all of humanity, revealed in 
salvation history.  The entire life of Christ is the unveiling of God’s radical desire to heal 
humanity, but not at the expense of, but rather through human agency.  Followers of Jesus 
are called upon to re-incarnate a similar love, not primarily back to God, but to others.  It 
was mentioned in the previous chapter that Orthodoxy is concerned less with debating lists 
of the universal dimensions of human well-being as in the social sciences, but more in the 
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 At the risk of stating the obvious, the bridge between the narrative of salvation history and human 
development in EO is practical reason.   
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method of repair, or healing.   Perhaps nowhere is this better expressed than when the 
Apostle Paul writes:  “Bear one another’s burdens and so fulfil the law of Christ” 
(Galatians 6:2).
48
   The law of Christ is the law of the repair of the brokenness of the world, 
and it exists both as universal principle (episteme) but also as practical reason (phronesis).  
Christian love works and suffers to overcome the actual contradictions, both personal and 
systemic, in concrete situations.  “Bearing one another’s burdens” has many dimensions, 
but inevitably involves a form of problem-solving on behalf of the challenges facing 
especially the vulnerable.   It is this feature which fulfils the law of Christ, which unleashes 
and discovers God’s intentions for humanity (logoi), and if taken seriously, involves 
tremendous exercises of practical reasoning.  “Bearing one another’s burdens” is as multi-
dimensional as human nature itself; it is as specific as the challenges of each situation, and 
as universal as the entire human family.   
But kenosis is not only a burden.  Ultimately, in the bounty of God’s goodness, self-giving 
is joyful (Acts 20:35).  According to the light provided by the Christian faith, when a 
person gives, “the human person is accomplishing something by which he thinks he is 
enhancing his own being” (Staniloae 2000, p. 23).   And in the Christian story, after the 
cross is the resurrection, faith in which can also give hope, inspiration, and enduring power 
in loving action.   
“God gives and seeks great deeds” (Staniloae 1980, p. 117).  Synergy is human action 
operating under the inspiration of, and seeking to re-incarnate, Christ’s philanthropia in the 
world today.  Similar to the Trinity, but in concrete, historical fashion, the Incarnation 
reveals the intended solidarity of all humans, and the lengths to which Christians are called 
to bring about this solidarity, led by the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Unity.  Synergy is the 
                                                          
48
 John Hays notes this passage as key to interpreting both the fuller meaning of the cross, and as imitatio 
Christi (Hays 1996, p. 197).   This text also plays a key role in one of the only Orthodox documents 
dedicated specifically to development (Tsetsis 1983). 
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doctrine that keeps in harmonious balance the priority of God’s action, but coordinates this 
with and empowers the free actions of humans towards the good of human development.  
Within this framework, Christian faith and human development, Jerusalem and Athens, are 
fully integrated. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
This study, now concluded, is the first to offer a detailed analysis of Eastern Orthodoxy in 
relation to development studies.  The fundamental contention of this thesis is that EO 
theology overlaps remarkably with DS, but also offers unique theological insights that can 
strengthen the ethical foundations for human development even on social scientific terms.  
Within EO, to say “The Glory of God is humanity fully alive” means much of what it 
means in DS: every person experiencing well-being in every dimension, even if faith 
brings in extra dimensions.  For EO, this overlap and mutual enrichment between the 
domains of religious faith and human development is possible because grace and nature 
stand in a closer relationship than typically has been the case in the West, and this brings 
exciting new possibilities for dialogue. 
This study employed two distinct, but intersecting strategies to substantiate these claims.  
The first was to bring into conversation the 20
th
 centuries’ best representatives of the 
Enlightenment tradition and Eastern Orthodoxy:  Amartya Sen and Dumitru Staniloae.    
The second part of the strategy, and interacting at every stage with the first, was to show 
how EO’s two fundamental dogmas, the Trinity and the Incarnation, can contribute to a 
more profound understanding of “change for the better”, the core idea of development 
studies.   This conclusion will now briefly review the argument and highlight the 
contributions to the academic literatures. 
Chapters one through three examined the Trinity in relation to human development.  In 
EO, the Trinity is the foundation for natural theology and is primarily linked to moral 
experience and especially the longing for greater communion and justice within the human 
community.   Supporting this, the Trinity implies a theological anthropology with three 
distinct dimensions.  Dumitru Staniloae’s, and the patristic formula, is:  “persons, in 
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communion, within the medium of a shared nature”.   Almost all current Trinitarian 
discussions focus on communion (koinonia or perichoresis), and possibly also person 
(hypostasis), but omit discussing the ethical implications of the category of shared nature 
(ousia) in the imago dei.  This is important because it means a conspicuous lack of 
theorizing about a) the shared structures of human existence and b) the unity of the human 
race—both vital categories for human development.   Bringing the category of nature back 
into the Trinity can revolutionize Trinitarian studies and help remedy the larger tendency 
that is detrimental to a theology of human development—the separation of grace from 
nature.  
In order to further advance these points, an original configuration was set up to bring the 
Trinitarian anthropological framework into direct dialogue with the social sciences (and 
thus DS).  The Trinitarian picture (person-communion-nature) was postulated as mirroring, 
but harmonizing three inchoate concepts widely employed in the social sciences: agency, 
solidarity, and structures.    The configuration advanced was: 
   Agency  =  Person 
         Solidarity  =  Communion 
           Structures  =  Shared Nature 
The hypothesis raised at this juncture was whether human development actually demands 
and operates with this Trinitarian picture of the human condition where each of these three 
dimensions are treated as intrinsically valuable.   
These pieces in place, the strategy was then to examine multiple theories, including 
theological ones, in light of this Trinitarian picture of the human condition.  One important 
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result was that the liberal-communitarian debate,
1
 fundamental both to political philosophy 
and development studies, can be reshaped by including shared nature.  Humans are neither 
best characterized as primarily individual, nor communitarian beings, but both of these 
dimensions operating within the unifying medium of a shared human nature.   This 
framework was then used to interpret the failures of Marxist inspired Communism.  
Communism’s failure can be illuminated precisely by analyzing it in terms of these three 
dimensions:  it ran roughshod over agency/persons; it destroyed interpersonal 
solidarity/communion; and did so because of defective views of both the structure of 
history and human nature.   Nobel Economist Amartya Sen’s influential “capability 
approach” was then examined in view of its ability to address these interrelated post-
communist challenges.   Sen’s own works reveal that he gives an overwhelming value to 
individual agency in “development as freedom”, but too weakly considers other values 
necessary for human development—these being communion, and shared human nature as a 
basis for ethical obligation.   From these and other cases, it was established that human 
development tacitly operates with all three of these values simultaneously which are 
integrated and made explicit through the Trinitarian conceptualization of personhood.   
Within this overall Trinitarian approach, especially important however was clarifying the 
conditions for retrieving the historically abused nature category (i.e. slavery is part of the 
“natural” order).  EO provides three insights into the “nature of nature” as a sacred order 
that can allow it to inform and inspire human development for the modern context.  These 
are:  a) human nature understood as a set of diverse natural human functions or capabilities 
(logoi) requiring fulfilment—for example literacy or nutrition, b) human nature as a basis 
for cosmopolitan ethical obligation—the Samaritan ethic, and c) nature as a dynamic 
framework (epektasis) where the order of creation and understanding of personhood is not 
                                                          
1
 This debate concerns whether humans are best characterized as individual or communal beings. 
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viewed as static/“Platonic”, but is responsive to and even enhanced through human effort 
and creativity.   These three understandings of the “nature of nature”—as well as the larger 
categories of agency/person and solidarity/communion—are, in fact, the moral 
assumptions, or perhaps better, dimensions of personhood, implied by the theory and 
practice of human development.   To summarize this, human development, illuminated by 
the Trinity, operates on the following levels: 
a) Person (Agency); 
b) Communion (Solidarity); 
c) Nature (Structures), with the following subcategories: 
a. Diverse human functions requiring fulfilment; 
b. Shared human nature as a basis for cosmopolitan ethical duties; 
c. The “order” of nature being not closed, but dynamic, responsive to human 
intervention and creativity. 
The implications of this Trinitarian picture of human development are foundational.  For 
theology, this claim can only be grasped by noting that the Trinity is rarely employed as a 
basis for social criticism or human development concerns.  And even where there are the 
beginnings of this Trinitarian critique as with the liberation theologian Leonardo Boff, or 
the Protestants Jurgen Moltmann or Miroslav Volf, shared human nature as a theological 
category and its various creational structures demanding fulfilment is not in view.  This EO 
Trinitarian picture of the human condition can also inform development studies as it makes 
explicit the real values operative in human development and foregoes partial solutions (i.e. 
expanse of only freedoms).  Thus this analysis is far-reaching for the literatures in both 
theology and the social sciences, but especially their nexus.   
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Beginning in chapter five, the argument shifted from the Trinity to the Incarnation.  The 
Incarnation is the basis for theosis or deification (“God became man so that man might 
become god”), which in Orthodoxy means “change for the better”, revealing a direct 
overlap with the core definition of DS.  This “change for the better” was then examined 
through Maximus’s categories of theosis as the movement from Being, to Well-being, to 
Eternal-being.  In this framework, Being is creation’s dynamic (ontological) structures and 
capacities as a gift from God; Well-being is the exercise of human agency for the 
activation of these capacities not merely for oneself, but all who share the same nature; and 
Eternal-being is the value of the human personality extended beyond the parameters of this 
life.  This chapter demonstrated that in EO, salvation is not otherworldy nor does it deny 
human action:  salvation/theosis involves the development of nature’s true tendencies and 
includes human action for their proper activation.     
In this context, a foundational difference was discovered between EO and Sen’s CA, and 
concerns the suggestive term “well-being”.  Sen ascribes “well-being” to an individual 
whose needs are met, and whose powers (beings and doings—i.e. capabilities) are being 
expressed.   However, “well-being” is considered strictly a property of individuals and is 
separate from morality or other-regarding concerns.  (Sen adds a distinct individual 
“agency” category to cover this.)  While EO would agree that well-being involves the 
activation of individual powers, and EO places a high premium on individual agency in 
this, a foundational difference is that EO could never attribute the term “well-being” to a 
person who was not exercising the specifically moral or other-regarding expression of 
human agency.   This is to say that a person, even if having their every need met and 
exercising their creative powers, cannot be experiencing “well-being” (however 
subjectively content they may feel) if they ignore the plight of the less fortunate.  In this 
way, EO explicitly includes within “well-being” the well-being of others and thus human 
development concerns.  
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Moving on, chapter six began examining whether virtue ethics can serve as a bridge 
between religion and development studies as the literature suggests.  This is immediately 
attractive for EO as theosis finds its most complete expression in terms of the virtues.  But 
to systematically address whether the virtues can indeed serve as this bridge between faith 
and development, the virtues were examined first on their “secular” side, then theological, 
revealing a complicated landscape and the need for critical scrutiny and multiple 
perspectives. 
On the social science side, Aristotle provided foundational categories for the virtues that 
remain useful to this day.  But he also subscribed to an aristocratic version of the virtues, 
as well as privileging contemplative reason over practical, both of which have a dark 
legacy and must be corrected for.   Advancing ahead to modern day development, an 
analysis of the virtues in both Nussbaum and the CSV (Character Strengths and Virtues) 
showed how using multiple approaches can correct “communitarian” and other 
deficiencies of singular perspectives.  Furthermore, it was shown that Amartya Sen’s 
individual freedoms can be tethered more reliably to human solidarity by adopting the 
virtues which he dropped from his mentor, Adam Smith.   
The virtues in Western theology were then analyzed to provide a basis for comparison with 
EO, but also to seek clues into tensions that have existed between religious faith and 
humanistic development concerns.  Protestantism—often wrongly equated with 
Christianity itself—historically rejected the virtues and bears a tendency to regard the 
cultivation of any human excellences as hubris, thus creating conceptual tensions with 
human development.   Catholics, on the other hand, have long embraced the virtues.  They 
separate them, unlike Orthodoxy, into natural and supernatural categories, and have tended 
to elevate contemplative reason over practical as in neo-scholasticism.  This is important 
because religious truth was viewed as eternal, unchanging, and thus development or 
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modernization was often viewed as heresy—another factor in the tension between faith and 
development.   However, Neo-Scholasticism tumbled with Vatican II revealing altogether 
new possibilities for human development many of which are evinced in the social 
encyclicals.  
This background was necessary to reveal the significance of two distinctive features of 
EO’s treatment of the virtues:  a) the non-separation of virtues into natural and supernatural 
categories—thus showing the overlap of grace and nature, and b) the strong role of 
practical reason (phronesis) for Orthodoxy.   As Maximus states, “The Logos of God is 
revealed in practical things and embodied in the commandments” (in Harakas 1983, p. 
236), and this means theology/theoria only emerges through loving praxis.  Significant 
here, phronesis was also seen to be at the heart of development studies.  EO and CA were 
compared at this point revealing that unlike in the capability approach that tends either to 
a) identify specific injustices to address (Sen), or b) provide a list of universal human 
functions requiring fulfilment (Nussbaum), Orthodoxy (agrees with these but) is, at its 
heart, a therapeutic method for getting humanity back on track for caring for, thinking 
rationally about, and securing committed action for human development.   The goal is 
praxis lelogismene—rational, intelligent thought through act (Harakas 1983, p. 239)—and 
the virtues are central to this therapy.     
The final chapter examined the virtues presented by Staniloae, showing just how close 
Orthodox human excellences are to the concerns of human development.   The case was 
made that the apex of the virtues, “love” or agape, must be both deeply communitarian and 
cosmopolitan simultaneously, a balance not often kept in human development or 
discussions about the Church as politeia, or way of life.  The doctrine of synergy was then 
introduced whereby salvation is understood as a sapiential process of re-incarnating 
Christ’s philanthropia in the present historical situation.   Synergy gives priority to God’s 
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initiative in history, but in a way that the Incarnation becomes the basis for present day 
practical reason in the form of problem-solving, of “bearing one another’s burdens and so 
fulfil the law of Christ” (Gal 6:2).    This parallels, but provides a theological foundation 
for Sen’s and development studies emphasis on remedying human deprivations.   The 
study closed, noting Staniloae’s understanding of the cross such that “God gives and seeks 
great deeds” in the aim of healing the human nature that is “shredded by sin”.   Overall, the 
findings in these chapters on the Incarnation are also foundational and hope to contribute to 
a better understanding of the bridge between theology and development studies via 
practical reason and the virtues. 
Stepping back from the details of the argument, one of the most obvious results of this 
research is that it will offset deep ignorance about EO.  Many believe that EO is 
unconcerned with action when rather, as Maximus insists, “theology without actions is the 
theology of demons” (in Ware 1997, p. 207).   Admittedly these themes need retrieval in 
modern Orthodox life (and especially post socialist countries), but this thesis has shown 
that EO theology at its core, and salvation itself, is a sapiential process that emerges in the 
constant dialectic between “doing the good” and “knowing the good”.  This is the true 
nature of Orthodoxy’s mysticism, and relative to the certainties of scholasticism, it is 
mysterious.  But this is due to the experiential and practical nature of phronesis itself.  
The more significant implications of this study, however, can only be seen by viewing the 
wider sweep of intellectual history.  The relationship between the disciplines of theology 
and the human sciences, and thus their respective territorial domains, was constructed 
primarily in the West and often in reaction to strongly Augustinian conceptions.  This 
relationship was built without input from EO.   EO’s understanding of the human condition 
and its predicament—namely that it rejects the doctrine of original sin and the primarily 
forensic view of salvation based on it—is different enough that many answers, and often 
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the very questions being asked, must now be rethought.   EO has the potential to breathe 
new life into the relation between faith and human development in no small part because 
grace and nature, faith and reason, human aspiration and theological inspiration, stand in 
such close proximity. 
Unlike some theological approaches which exhibit a thoroughgoing suspicion of 
Enlightenment concerns, this study has interpreted the moral impetus behind them as a 
form of natural theology.   But it has also raised the question of whether human 
development can be fully conceptualized—much less actually implemented—without 
reference to larger sources of meaning.   Charles Taylor’s aphorism, “High standards need 
strong sources” is appropriate here (Taylor 1989).  Development studies was chosen as a 
dialogue partner precisely because it expresses the high standards that are pressing 
themselves on the conscience of humanity today.   
In light of this, it would be disingenuous not to mention an apologetic intent implicit in this 
thesis.  Clement of Alexandria wrote long ago that "we try to find an argument which, by 
starting from things already believed, is able to create faith in things as yet not believed (in 
Nesteruk 1993, p. 19).   Human development is a noble aspiration implanted in creation 
and the human conscience by God; it is not limited to Christians.   Nonetheless, a careful 
analysis of the values involved in human development suggests not just the need for a 
sacred grounding for these values; it reveals the specifically Trinitarian picture of the 
human condition.  Human development cannot be conceptualized simply as the expanse of 
individual freedoms, or enriching communitarian relationships, or fulfilling nature’s 
functions.  It is all of these dimensions simultaneously, but also in relationship with God 
who is the “Lover of Humankind” and desires fullness of life for all.  But not only does 
human development point to the Trinity; it points also to the Incarnation.   Committed, 
reliable, effective, and ultimately sacrificial action, which is to say the real requirements 
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for advancing human development in challenged contexts, points to the virtues of self-
giving of which Christ is the Exemplar.  
At this final juncture it can be fruitful to ask:  what kind of practice does the argument in 
this thesis ultimately recommend?    It will be recalled from the introduction that this study 
emerged from almost fifteen years experience with grassroots youth activism in Romania.   
This closing section argues that real advances in human development such as those implied 
both by the theology of EO and the CA will, in fact, require much more attention to this 
neglected area.   
Amartya Sen’s theory rightly calls for people to be engaged in the removal of injustices.  
However, the next logical, but more challenging question must be asked: “where are these 
people that should be thus engaged”?   Sen seems to assume that if people are somehow 
made politically free, they will begin assuming these roles.   But this is untenable because 
it assumes that persons in contexts with painful socio-historical legacies such as 
Communism (and most development contexts) will magically become empowered agents 
and work for the common good once external restraints are removed.   This assumption, as 
the post-socialist experience has demonstrated, is naive.  
This study has argued that human development requires the cultivation of the virtues and 
especially of solidarity, and these virtues or strengths are won through experience, practice, 
and habituation.  What has not been stressed in this thesis is that this must begin in 
childhood.  As Aristotle long ago rightly argued: “So it is a matter of no little importance 
what sort of habits we form from the earliest age—it makes a vast difference, or rather all 
the difference in the world” (Aristotle 2004, p. 32).   
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Development has focused too much on formulating better “ideas of justice”, and not 
enough on forming enough actors who will “practice justice”.   Poverty is not a theoretical 
concept to be conquered once and for all in the academic arena, but is a multitude of 
painful burdens, concrete difficulties, and injustices requiring resolution in almost every 
context.   Human development, if it is to become more than academic jargon, must address 
itself to the cultivation of enough persons to remove enough of these burdens to tip the 
scales of societies towards justice.   This can be expressed as a universal maxim of 
practical reason: humanity will never solve the problem of development without the 
development of more problem-solvers.   
Thus, real strides forward in human development necessitate the cultivation of armies of 
change agents.  This raises the troubling question of whose values, and how this cultivation 
process is not to thwart agency.    The best approaches in youth development successfully 
address this by creating a “space” where youth themselves are empowered to identify and 
solve real community needs—and through this process enhance their sense of agency and 
learn all sorts of valuable life skills (Sherrod, Torney-Purta et al. 2012).   Far from being 
paternalistic, within this “learn by doing” process, virtues of compassion and leadership 
skills emerge in the process of addressing specific burdens and needs in local communities.    
For example, youth in a beautiful but extremely poor coal mining region in Romania (the 
only future of this area being in tourism) realized that the construction of outhouses could 
help attract tourists to campsites at a national park that were soiled with human waste and 
toilet trash.  Youth identified the need, learned the skills of project management, raised 
local funds, recruited volunteer carpenters and other in-kind contributions, and built three 
outhouses—and the area radically improved.2  If such youth-led projects seem like a drop 
                                                          
2
 See http://www.impact-clubs.org/ and (Thorup 2005; Hoksbergen 2010) for more about the youth 
activism model built in Romania.  Here is another project example:    
Constanta, a busy seaside port in Romania long known for its lasciviousness, was dotted with "spice 
shops".  These set up near schools and sold drugs that weren't yet technically illegal, but were 
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in the ocean of human development challenges, the words of Augusto Boal are appropriate 
here: “the direction of the journey is more important than the size of the steps” (Boal 2006, 
p. 108).  Launching more change agents, more youth onto the pathway of problem-solving  
on behalf of the common good, is the next logical step in human development and it must 
begin with youth.   
This “learn by doing”, “service learning” pedagogy was designed to bring practical 
Christian love into the heart of the educational process.
3
   Besides being the outworking of 
the logic of the CA, for Orthodoxy, this is a form of “eupraxis”, an example of the positive 
asceticism that Staniloae called upon all to participate in (Staniloae 2000, p. 6).    Not only 
is this theologically appropriate given the focus on practical reasoning in Orthodoxy, but  
increasing youth social activism is especially relevant for overcoming the learned 
helplessness and lack of social solidarity that afflict post-communist societies.   An EO 
version of “Sunday School” along these lines can bring a problem-solving version of 
Christian love into the heart of Orthodox societies. 
Long-term, sustainable development, to be more than a slogan, must overcome 
dependencies and this means developing more change agents, more problem-solvers 
working for the common good in every challenged situation and every sphere and station 
of society, and based on local values.  The scale necessary for this to be effective can only 
happen if various public institutions, the Church, the school system, NGO’s, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
nevertheless dangerous and thousands of youth were addicted and lives and families were being 
destroyed. The Constanta IMPACT Club decided that these "spice shops" must be shut down. They 
wrote a project, and first approached the Mayor. He ignored their request. They were undaunted and 
then canvassed the city and collected over 1000 signatures. They then organized a city-wide march 
that attracted thousands of marchers, rallying around the theme: "Don't throw your life away for 10 
lei” ($3). The Mayor was there. At the end of the march, a young teenage woman in an IMPACT club 
came to the microphone to speak to the crowd. She spoke of the awful things about these "spice 
shops", and then divulged that she too was addicted, and she begged and pleaded for help. The mayor 
relented, and city-wide these drug dens were closed. 
3
 This was reported in extensive conversations with the pioneer of “service learning” Dr. Jim Kielsmeier; see 
also http://jimkielsmeier.wordpress.com/collected-writings/.    
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international donors collaborate on youth development of this type.   This is an 
“overlapping consensus”, rooted in practical reason, and is the logical extension of both the 
capability approach and Eastern Orthodoxy.   
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11. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Apophaticism:  the idea that God is beyond words or concepts; in Orthodoxy, it is also the 
idea that the human person is beyond concepts as well.   This takes apophaticism beyond 
mere negation. 
Arête:  the Greek word for virtues.  Virtues are specific excellences within specific spheres 
of action, or disposition.   
CA:  the Capabilities Approach, otherwise known as Human Development, led by Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum.  It has been the background theory for the United Nations 
Human Development reports since 1990. 
Cataphaticism:  via positive, way of ascertaining theological truths by affirmation.   
Contemplative reason or episteme:  this, according to Aristotle, is the realm of the 
invariable, or what is true by necessity.  It is the domain of science proper.  This is 
distinguished from both techne (rational knowledge involved in producing an object or art) 
and phronesis. 
CSV:  Character Strengths and Virtues, associated with the Positive Psychology movement 
of Martin Seligman. 
Epektasis:  Gregory of Nyssa’s idea of “perpetual progress”.     Staniloae writes: 
This means that nature is structured in such a way that it leaves room for human 
interventions that do not take into consideration the totality of nature's exact laws and 
that these laws are not predetermined to yield the most useful results all by themselves, 
but instead find their wholeness through the intervention of human freedom (Staniloae 
2000, p. 47). 
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Eudaimonia:   Aristotle’s term for happiness, well-being, or flourishing; 
Logoi:  One of the most important terms in this thesis.   Lossky calls these “norms of 
existence”; Maximus calls them the divine intentions.  Key here is that these norms of 
nature include the biological and sensible realm and not merely the intelligible; they are the 
shared principles of existence.  Logoi is a polyvalent term which also includes virtues and 
commands.   The two Great commands (called logoi) correspond to the fundamental 
functions of human nature, and that is communion with both God and man.   The virtues 
are also logoi in that they structure human agency to live a truly natural life, which is to 
say according to God’s intentions.  The highest logos or intention is voluntary communion, 
the “principle of unification without violence to individualized multiplicity” (Thunberg 
1995, p. 135).   The Latin translation of logoi was rationes.   Logoi are (in principle) the 
realm of science, of universal principles, laws or tendencies.  Logos/logoi often means the 
“what-ness” of existence, which is contrasted with the term tropos, the “who-ness” of 
existence in its personalization. 
Phronesis:  The rational knowledge of appropriate human actions and attitudes.  Aristotle’s 
definition is very precise:  “a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to the 
things that are bad or good for man”.   Thus it involves reason, action, and moral 
deliberation on the ends of human activity. 
Polis:  the Greek word for city-state, but often means a specific community that senses 
itself as such. 
Politeia:  this is the Greek term translated for what is now known as Plato’s The Republic.   
It includes ideas of the founding constitution, the rights of citizens, and the form of 
government (Liddell and Scott 1985).   Ethicist Stanley Harakas uses this term extensively 
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for the Church (Harakas 1983) often as the “way of life”.   It is used in the NT to denote, 
inter alia, the freedom that comes from citizenship (Acts 22:28).    
Theosis:  deification or salvation in Orthodoxy.  
Well-being and well-being:  capitalized Well-being is the technical middle term for theosis 
in Maximus’s triad, Being, Well-being, and Eternal-being.  When referring to this triad, 
whether it is Being or Eternal-being, the capitalized form is used.   This is especially 
important for distinguishing between Well-being and well-being, the latter being the term 
as used in the social sciences.  
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